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AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMANE UNDERSTANDING.

BY

JOHN LOCKE, Gent.

VOLUME II.

LONDON:
Printed in the Year MDCCX.

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11. Enthusiasm fails of Evidence, that the Proposition is from GOD.
12. Firmness of Perswasion, no Proof that any Proposition is from GOD.
13. Light in the Mind, what.
14. Revelation must be judg'd by Reason.
15. Belief no Proof of Revelation.

CHAP. XX.

Of wrong Assent, or Error.

SECT.

1. Causes of Error.
2. First, Want of Proofs.
3. Obj. What shall become of those who want them, answered.
4. People hindered from Enquiry.
5. Secondly, Want of Skill to use them.
6. Thirdly, Want of Will to use them.
7. Fourthly, Wrong Measures of Probability, whereof.
8, 10. First, Doubtful Propositions taken for Principles.
11. Secondly, Received Hypothesis.
12. Thirdly, Predominant Passions.
13. The Means of evading Probabilities, 1st. Supposed Fallacy.
14. 2dly. Supposed Argument for the contrary.
15. What Probabilities determine the Assent.
16. Where it is in our Power to suspend it.
17. Fourthly, Authority.
18. Men not in so many Errors as is imagined.

CHAP. XXI.

Division of the Sciences.

SECT.

1. Three sorts.
2. First, Physica,
3. Secondly, Practica.
Thirdly, Σημιωτικὴ.
5. This is the first Division of the Objects of Knowledge.

OF
Humane Understanding.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of Words or Language in general.

1. GOD having designed Man for a sociable Creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind; but furnished him also with Language, which was to be the great Instrument, and common tie of Society. *Man* therefore had by Nature his Organs so fashioned, as to be *fit to frame articulate Sounds*, which we call Words. But this was not enough to produce Language; for Parrots, and several other Birds, will be taught to make articulate Sounds distinct enough, which yet, by no means, are capable of Language. *Man fitted to form articulate Sounds.*

2. Besides articulate Sounds therefore, it was further necessary, that he should be *able to use these Sounds, as Signs of internal Conceptions*; and to make them stand as marks for the *Ideas* within his own Mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the Thoughts of Men's Minds be conveyed from one to another. *To make them signs of* Ideas.

3. But neither was this sufficient to make Words so useful as they ought to be. It is not enough for the perfection of Language, that Sounds can be made Signs of *Ideas*, unless those *Signs* can be so made use of as *to comprehend several particular Things*: For the Multiplica- *To make general Signs.*

tion of Words would have perplexed their Use, had every particular thing need of a distinct Name to be signified by. To remedy this Inconvenience, Language had yet a farther Improvement in the use of general Terms, whereby one Word was made to mark a multitude of particular Existences: Which advantageous use of Sounds was obtain'd only by the Difference of the *Ideas* they were made Signs of. Those Names becoming general, which are made to stand for general *Ideas*, and those remaining particular, where the *Ideas* they are used for are particular.

To make general Signs.

§. 4. Besides these Names which stand for *Ideas*, there be other Words which Men make use of, not to signify any *Idea*, but the want or absence of some *Ideas* simple or complex, or all *Ideas* together; such as are *Nihil* in Latin, and in English, *Ignorance* and *Barrenness*. All which negative or privative Words, cannot be said properly to belong to, or signify no *Ideas*: for then they would be perfectly insignificant Sounds; but they relate to positive *Ideas*, and signify their Absence.

Words ultimately derived from such as signify sensible Ideas.

§. 5. It may also lead us a little towards the Original of all our Notions and Knowledge, if we remark, how great a Dependance our *Words* have on common sensible *Ideas*; and how those, which are made use of to stand for Actions and Notions quite removed from Sense, *have their rise from thence, and from obvious sensible* Ideas *are transferred to more abstruse Significations*, and made to stand for *Ideas* that come not under the cognizance of our Senses; *v. g.* to *Imagine*, *Apprehend*, *Comprehend*, *Adhere*, *Conceive*, *Instill*, *Disgust*, *Disturbance*, *Tranquillity*, &c. are all Words taken from the Operations of sensible Things, and applied to certain Modes of Thinking. *Spirit*, in its primary Signification, is Breath; *Angel*, a Messenger: And I doubt not, but if we could trace them to their Sources, we should find, in all Languages, the Names, which stand for Things that fall not under our Senses, to have had their first rise from sensible *Ideas*. By which we may give some kind of guess, what kind of Notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their Minds, who were the first Beginners of Languages; and how Nature, even in the naming of Things, unawares suggested to Men the Originals and Principles of all their Knowledge: Whilst, to give Names, that might make known to others any Operations they felt in themselves, or any other *Ideas*, that came not under their Senses, they were fain to borrow

Words

Words from ordinary known *Ideas* of Senſation, by that means to make others the more eaſily to conceive thoſe Operations they experimented in themſelves, which made no outward ſenſible Appearances; and then when they had got known and agreed Names, to ſignify thoſe internal Operations of their own Minds, they were ſufficiently furniſhed to make known by Word, all their other *Ideas*; ſince they could conſiſt of nothing, but either of outward ſenſible Perceptions, or of the inward Operations of their Minds about them; we having, as has been proved, no *Ideas* at all, but what originally come either from ſenſible Objects without, or what we feel within our ſelves, from the inward Workings of our own Spirits, which we are conſcious to our ſelves of within.

§. 6. But to underſtand better the uſe and force of Language, as ſubſervient to Inſtruction and Knowledge, it will be convenient to conſider, *Diſtribution.*

Firſt, *To what it is that Names, in the uſe of Language, are immediately applied.*

Secondly, Since all (except proper) Names are general, and ſo ſtand not particularly for this or that ſingle Thing; but for ſorts and ranks of Things, it will be neceſſary to conſider, in the next place, what the Sorts and Kinds, or, if you rather like the Latin Names, *what the Species and Genera of Things* are; wherein they conſiſt; and how they come to be made. Theſe being (as they ought) well looked into, we ſhall the better come to find the right uſe of Words; the natural Advantages and Defects of Language; and the Remedies that ought to be uſed, to avoid the inconveniencies of obſcurity or uncertainty in the ſignification of Words, without which, it is impoſſible to diſcourſe with any clearneſs, or order, concerning Knowledge: Which being converſant about Propoſitions, and thoſe moſt commonly univerſal ones, has greater connexion with Words, than perhaps is ſuſpected.

Theſe Conſiderations therefore, ſhall be the matter of the following Chapters.

CHAP. II.

Of the Signification of Words.

Words are sensible Signs necessary for Communication.

§. 1. MAN, though he have great variety of Thoughts, and such, from which others, as well as himself, might receive Profit and Delight; yet they are all within his own Breast, invisible, and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made appear. The Comfort, and Advantage of Society, not being to behad without Communication of Thoughts, it was necessary, that Man should find out some external sensible Signs, whereby those invisible *Ideas*, which his Thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. For this purpose, nothing was so fit, either for Plenty or Quickness, as those articulate Sounds, which with so much Ease and Variety, he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how *Words*, which were by Nature so well adapted to that purpose, come to be made use of by Men, as *the Signs of* their *Ideas*; not by any natural connexion, that there is between particular articulate Sounds and certain *Ideas*, for then there would be but one Language amongst all Men; but by a voluntary Imposition, whereby such a Word is made arbitrarily the Mark of such an *Idea*. The use then of Words, is to be sensible Marks of *Ideas*; and the *Ideas* they stand for, are their proper and immediate Signification.

Words are the sensible Signs of his Ideas *who uses them.*

§. 2. The use Men have of these Marks, being either to record their own Thoughts for the Assistance of their own Memory; or, as it were, to bring out their *Ideas*, and lay them before the view of others: *Words in their primary or immediate Signification, stand for nothing, but the* Ideas *in the Mind of him that uses them*, how imperfectly soever, or carelesly those *Ideas* are collected from the Things, which they are supposed to represent. When a Man speaks to another, it is, that he may be understood; and the end of Speech is, that those Sounds, as Marks, may make known his *Ideas* to the Hearer. That then which Words are the Marks of, are the *Ideas* of the Speaker: Nor can any one apply them, as Marks, immediately to

any thing elſe, but the *Ideas*, that he himſelf hath. For this ould be to make them Signs of his own Conceptions, and yet pply them to other *Ideas*; which would be to make them igns, and not Signs of his *Ideas* at the ſame time; and ſo in fect, to have no Signification at all. Words being voluntary gns, they cannot be voluntary Signs impoſed by him on Things e knows not. That would be to make them Signs of nothing, ounds without Signification. A Man connot make his Words ie Signs either of Qualities in Things, or of Conceptions in the lind of another, whereof he has none in his own. 'Till he is ſome *Ideas* of his own, he cannot ſuppoſe them to correond with the Conceptions of another Man; nor can uſe any gns for them: For thus they would be the Signs of he knows ot what, which is in Truth to be the Signs of nothing. But hen he repreſents to himſelf other Mens *Ideas*, by ſome of his vn, if he conſent to give them the ſame Names, that other len do, 'tis ſtill to his own *Ideas*; to *Ideas* that he has, and ot to *Ideas* that he has not.

§. 3. This is ſo neceſſary in the uſe of Lanage, that in this reſpect, the Knowing, and the norant; the Learned, and Unlearned, uſe the *Words* they ſpeak (with any meaning) all alike. hey, *in every Man's Mouth, ſtand for the* Ideas *he* s, and which he would expreſs by them. A Child having ken notice of nothing in the Metal he hears called Gold, but e bright ſhining yellow Colour, he applies the Word Gold ly to his own *Idea* of that Colour, and nothing elſe; and erefore calls the ſame Colour in a Peacock's Tail, Gold. Aother that hath better obſerved, adds to ſhining yellow, great eight: And then the Sound Gold, when he uſes it, ſtands a complex *Idea* of a ſhining Yellow and very weighty Subnce. Another adds to thoſe Qualities, Fuſibility: and then e Word Gold to him ſignifies a Body, bright, yellow, fuſi, and very heavy. Another adds Malleability. Each of ſe uſes equally the Word Gold, when they have Occaſion to preſs the *Idea*, which they have apply'd it to: But it is evint, that each can apply it only to his own *Idea*; nor can he ke it ſtand, as a Sign of ſuch a complex *Idea*, as he has not.

Words are the ſenſible Signs of his Ideas *who uſe them.*

§. 4. But though Words, as they are uſed by en, can properly and immediately ſignify nong but the *Ideas*, that are in the Mind of the aker; yet they in their Thoughts give them cret reference to two other things.

Words often ſecretly referred, Firſt, to the Ideas *in other Mens Minds.*

Firſt,

First, they ſuppoſe their Words to be Marks of the Ideas *in the Minds alſo of other Men, with whom they communicate*: For elſe they ſhould talk in vain, and could not be underſtood, if the Sounds they applied to one *Idea*, were ſuch, as by the Hearer were applied to another, which is to ſpeak two Languages. But in this Men ſtand not uſually to examine, whether the *Ideas* they, and thoſe they diſcourſe with have in their Minds, be the ſame: But think it enough, that they uſe the Word, as they image, in the common Acceptation of that Language; in which they ſuppoſe, that the *Idea*, they make it a Sign of, is preciſely the ſame, to which the Underſtanding Men of that Country apply that Name.

Secondly, To the reality of Things.

§. 5. *Secondly*, Becauſe *Men* would not be thought to talk *barely* of their own Imaginations, but of Things as really they are; therefore they *often ſuppoſe their Words to ſtand alſo for the reality of Things*. But this relating more particularly to Subſtances and their Names, as perhaps the former does to ſimple *Ideas* and Modes, we ſhall ſpeak of theſe two different ways applying Words more at large, when we come to treat of the Names of mixed Modes, and Subſtances, in particular: Though give me leave here to ſay, that it is a perverting the uſe of Words, and brings unavoidable Obſcurity and Confuſion into their Signification, whenever we make them ſtand for any thing, but the *Ideas* we have in our own Minds.

Words by uſe readily excite Ideas.

§. 6. Concerning Words alſo it is farther to be conſidered: *Firſt*, That they being immediately the Signs of Mens *Ideas*; and, by that means, the Inſtruments whereby Men communicate their Conceptions, and expreſs to one another thoſe Thoughts and Imaginations, they have within their own Breaſts, *the comes by conſtant uſe*, to be ſuch *a Connexion between certain Sounds and the* Ideas *they ſtand for*, that the Names heard, almoſt as readily excite certain *Ideas*, as if the Objects themſelves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the Senſes. Which is manifeſtly ſo in all obvious ſenſible Qualities; and in all Subſtances, that frequently, and familiarly occur to us.

Words often uſed without ſignification.

§. 7. *Secondly*, That though the proper and immediate Signification of Words, are *Ideas* in the Mind of the Speaker; yet becauſe by familiar uſe from our Cradles, we come to learn certain articulate Sounds very perfectly, and have them ready on our Tongues, and always at hand in our Memories; but

re not always careful to examine, or settle their Significations erfectly, it *often* happens that *Men*, even when they would ap-ly themselves to an attentive Consideration, do *set their Thoughts more on Words than Things.* Nay, because Words are many of hem learn'd, before the *Ideas* are known for which they stand: Therefore some, not only Children, but Men, speak several Words, no otherwise than Parrots do, only because they have earn'd them, and have been accustomed to those Sounds. But o far as Words are of Use and Signification, so far is there a onstant connexion between the Sound and the *Idea*; and a De-ignation, that the one stand for the other: without which Ap-lication of them, they are nothing but so much insignificant Noise.

Their Signification perfectly arbitrary.

§. 8. *Words* by long and familiar use, as has been aid, come to excite in Men certain *Ideas*, so con-tantly and readily, that they are apt to suppose a natural connexion between them. But that they *ignify* only Mens peculiar *Ideas*, and that *by a perfectly arbitrary Imposition*, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the same Language) the same *deas*, we take them to be the Signs of: And every Man has so nviolable a Liberty, to make Words stand for what *Ideas* he pleases, that no one hath the Power to make others have the ame *Ideas* in their Minds, that he has, when they use the same Words, that he does. And therefore the great *Augustus* himself, n the Possession of that Power which ruled the World, acknow-edged, he could not make a new Latin Word: which was as much as to say, that he could not arbitrarily appoint, what *Idea* ny Sound should be a Sign of, in the Mouths and common Language of his Subjects. 'Tis true, common use, by a tacit Consent, appropriates certain Sounds to certain *Ideas* in all Lan-guages, which so far limits the Signification of that Sound, hat unless a Man applies it to the same *Idea*, he does not speak properly: And let me add, that unless a Man's Words excite he same *Ideas* in the Hearer, which he makes them stand for in peaking, he does not speak intelligibly. But whatever be the consequence of any Man's using of Words differently, either rom their general Meaning, or the particular Sense of the Per-on to whom he addresses them, this is certain, their Significa-ion, in his use of them, is limited to his *Ideas*, and they can be Signs of nothing else.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of General Terms.

The greateſt part of Words general.

§. 1. ALL Things, that exiſt, being Particulars, it may perhaps be thought reaſonable that Words, which ought to be conformed to Things, ſhould be ſo too, I mean in their Signification: but yet we find the quite contrary. The far *greateſt part of Words*, that make all Languages, *are general Terms*: which has not been the Effect of Neglect, or Chance, but of Reaſon, and Neceſſity.

For every particular thing to have a name is impoſſible.

§. 2. Firſt, *It is impoſſible, that every particular Thing ſhould have a diſtinct peculiar Name.* For the ſignification and uſe of Words, depending on that connexion, which the Mind makes between its *Ideas*, and the Sounds it uſes as Signs of them, it is neceſſary, in the Application of Names to Things, that the Mind ſhould have diſtinct *Ideas* of the Things, and retain alſo the particular Name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropiation to that *Idea*. But it is beyond the Power of Humane Capacity to frame and retain diſtinct *Ideas* of all the particular Things we meet with: every Bird, and Beaſt Men ſaw; every Tree, and Plant, that affected the Senſes, could not find a Place in the moſt capacious Underſtanding. If it be looked on, as an Inſtance of a prodigious Memory, That ſome Generals have been able to call every Soldier in their Army, by his proper Name: We may eaſily find a Reaſon, why Men have never attempted to give Names to each Sheep in their Flock, or Crow that flies over their Heads; much leſs to call every Leaf of Plants, or Grain of Sand that came in their way, by a peculiar Name.

And uſeleſs.

§. 3. *Secondly*, If it were poſſible, *it would yet be uſeleſs*; becauſe it would not ſerve to the chief end of Language. Men would in vain heap up Names of particular Things, that would not ſerve them to communicate their Thoughts. Men learn Names, and uſe them in Talk with others, only that they may be underſtood: which is then only done, when by Uſe or Conſent, the Sound I make

by

y the Organs of Speech, excites in another Man's Mind, who ears it, the *Idea* I apply it to in mine, when I ſpeak it. This annot be done by Names, applied to particular Things, where- f I alone having the *Ideas* in my Mind, the Names of them ould not be ſignificant, or intelligible to another, who was not cquainted with all thoſe very particular Things, which had allen under my Notice.

§. 4. *Thirdly*, But yet granting this alſo feaſible; (which I hink is not,) yet *a diſtinct Name for every particular Thing, would ot be of any great uſe for the improvement of Knowledge*: which hough founded in particular Things, enlarges it ſelf by ge- eral Views; to which, Things reduced into Sorts under ge- eral Names, are properly ſubſervient. Theſe, with the Names belonging to them, come within ſome compaſs, and do not mul- iply every Moment, beyond what, either the Mind can con- ain, or Uſe requires. And therefore in theſe Men, have for he moſt part ſtopp'd: but yet not ſo, as to hinder themſelves rom diſtinguiſhing particular Things, by appropriated Names, where Convenience demands it. And therefore in their own pecies, which they have moſt to do with, and wherein they ave often occaſion to mention particular Perſons; they make ſe of proper Names, and their diſtinct Individuals have di- tinct Denominations.

§. 5. Beſides Perſons, Countries alſo, Cities, Rivers, Mountains, and other the like Diſtinctions of Place, have uſually found peculiar Names, and that for the ſame Reaſon; they being ſuch as Men have often an Occaſion to mark particularly, and, as it were, ſet before others in their Diſcourſes with them. And I doubt not, but if we had reaſon to mention particular Horſes, as often as we have to mention particular Men, we ſhould have *proper Names* for the one, as familiar as for the other; and *Bucephalus* would be a Word as much in Uſe, as *Alexander*. And therefore we ſee that amongſt Jockeys, Horſes have their proper Names to be known and diſtinguiſhed by, as commonly as their Servants: Becauſe amongſt them, there is often occaſion to men- on this or that particular Horſe, when he is out of Sight. *What things have proper Names.*

§. 6. The next thing to be conſidered is, *how eneral Words come to be made.* For ſince all things hat exiſt are only particulars, how come we by eneral Terms, or where find we thoſe general Na- ures they are ſuppoſed to ſtand for? Words be- ome general, by being made the ſigns of general *Ideas*: and *How general Words are made.*

Ideas

Ideas become general, by ſeparating from them the circumſtances of Time, and Place, and any other *Ideas*, that may determine them to this or that particular Exiſtence. By this way of abſtraction they are made capable of repreſenting more Individuals than one; each of which, having in it a conformity to that abſtract *Idea*, is (as well call it) of that Sort.

§. 7. But to deduce this a little more diſtinctly, it will not perhaps be amiſs, to trace our Notions, and Names, from their beginning, and obſerve by what degrees we proceed, and by what ſteps we enlarge our *Ideas* from our firſt Infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the *Ideas* of the Perſons Children converſe with, (to inſtance in them alone) are like the Perſons themſelves, only particular. The *Ideas* of the Nurſe, and the Mother, are well framed in their Minds; and, like Pictures of them there, repreſent only thoſe Individuals. The Names they firſt gave to them, are confined to theſe Individuals; and the Names of *Nurſe* and *Mamma*, the Child uſes, determine themſelves to thoſe Perſons. Afterwards, when Time and a large Acquaintance has made them obſerve, that there are a great many other Things in the World, that in ſome common agreements of Shape, and ſeveral other Qualities, reſemble their Father and Mother, and thoſe Perſons they have been uſed to, they frame an *Idea*, which they find thoſe many Particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with others, the name *Man* for Example. And *thus they come to have a general Name*, and a general *Idea*. Wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex *Idea* they had of *Peter* and *James*, *Mary* and *Jane*, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.

§. 8. By the ſame way, that they come by the general Name and *Idea* of *Man*, they eaſily *advance to more general Names* and Notions. For obſerving, that ſeveral Things that differ from their *Idea* of *Man*, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that Name, have yet certain Qualities, wherein they agree with *Man*, by retaining only thoſe Qualities, and uniting them into one *Idea*, they have again another and a more general *Idea*; to which having given a Name, they make a term of a more comprehenſive extenſion: Which new *Idea* is made, not by any new addition, but only, as before, by leaving out the ſhape, and ſome other Properties ſignified by the name *Man*, and retaining only a Body, with Life, Senſe, and Spontaneous Motion, comprehended under the Name *Animal*.

§. 9.

§. 9. That this is the *way, whereby Men first med general* Ideas, *and general Names to them*, I nk, is so evident, that there needs no other oof of it, but the considering of a Man's self, others, and the ordinary proceedings of their inds in Knowledge: And he that thinks geral Natures or Notions, are any thing else but such abstract d partial *Ideas* of more complex ones, taken at first from parular Existences, will, I fear, be at a loss where to find them. r let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his *Idea Man* differ from that of *Peter* and *Paul*; or his *Idea* of *Horse* m that of *Bucephalus*, but in the leaving out something, that eculiar to each Individual; and retaining so much of those rticular complex *Ideas*, of several particular Existences, as they found to agree in? Of the complex *Ideas*, signified by the mes *Man*, and *Horse*, leaving out but those particulars where they differ, and retaining only those wherein they agree, and those, making a new distinct complex *Idea*, and giving the me *Animal* to it, one hath a more general term, that comprends, with Man, several other Creatures. Leave out of the *a* of *Animal*, Sense and spontaneous Motion, and the remain complex *Idea*, made up of the remaining simple ones of Body, e, and Nourishment, becomes a more general one, under more comprehensive term, *Vivens*. And not to dwell lon upon this particular, so evident in it self, by the same way Mind proceeds to *Body*, *Substance*, and at last to *Being*, *Thing*, d such universal terms, which stand for any of our *Ideas* whatver. To conclude, this whole *mystery* of *Genera* and *Species*, hich make such a noise in the Schools, and are, with Justice, little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract *Ideas*, re or less comprehensive, with names annexed to them. In which, this is constant and unvariable, That every one neral term, stands for such an *Idea*, as is but a part of any of se contained under it.

General Natures are nothing but abstract Ideas.

§. 10. This may shew us the reason, *why, in the ning of Words*, which is nothing but declaring ir signification, *we make use of the Genus*, or next neral Word that comprehends it. Which is not of necessity, but only to save the labour of enerating the several simple *Ideas*, which the t general Word or *Genus*, stands for; or, perhaps, some es the shame of not being able to do it. But though defining *Genus* and *Differentia*, (I crave leave to use these terms of Art, though

Why the Genus *is ordinarily made use of in Definitions.*

though originally Latin, since they most properly suit those Notions they are applied to ;) I say, though defining by the *Genus* be the shortest way ; yet, I think, it may be doubted, whether it be the best. This I am sure, it is not the only, and so not absolutely necessary. For Definition being nothing but making another understand by Words, what *Idea*, the term defined stands for, a definition is best made by enumerating those simple *Ideas* that are combined in the signification of the term defined : and if instead of such an enumeration, Men have accustomed themselves to use the next general term, it has not been out of necessity, or for greater clearness ; but for quickness and dispatch sake. For, I think, that to one who desired to know what *Idea* the word *Man* stood for ; if it should be said, that *Man* was a solid extended Substance, having Life, Sense, spontaneous Motion, and the Faculty of Reasoning, I doubt not but the meaning of the term *Man*, would be as well understood, and the *Idea* it stands for, be at least as clearly made known, as when it is defined to be a *rational Animal* ; which by the several definitions of *Animal*, *Vivens*, and *Corpus*, resolves it self into those enumerated *Ideas*. I have in explaining the term *Man*, followed here the ordinary Definition of the Schools : which tho', perhaps, not the most exact, yet serves well enough to my present purpose. And one may, in this instance, see what gave occasion to the Rule, that a Definition must consist of *Genus* and *Differentia* : and it suffices to shew us the little necessity there is of such a Rule, or advantage in the strict observing of it. For Definitions, as has been said, being only the explaining of one Word, by several others, so that the meaning, or *Idea* it stands for, may be certainly known, Languages are not always so made, according to the Rules of Logick, that every term can have its signification, exactly and clearly expressed by two others. Experience sufficiently satisfies us to the contrary ; or else those who have made this Rule, have done ill, that they have given us so few Definitions conformable to it. But of Definitions, more in the next Chapter.

General and Universal are Creatures of the Understanding.

§. 11. To return to general Words, it is plain, by what has been said, That *General and Universal*, belong not to the real existence of Things ; but *are the Inventions* and *Creatures of the Understanding*, made by it for its own use, *and concern only Signs*, whether Words, or *Ideas*. Words are general, as has been said, when used, for Signs of general *Ideas* ; and so are applicable indifferently to many particular Things ;

'hings; And *Ideas*, are general, when they are ſet up as the epreſentatives of many particular Things: but Univerſality elongs not to things themſelves, which are all of them partiular in their Exiſtence, even thoſe Words, and *Ideas*, which in eir ſignification, are general. When therefore we quit Parculars, the Generals that reſt, are only Creatures of our own aking, their general Nature being nothing but the Capacity ey are put into by the Underſtanding, of ſignifying or repreting many particulars. For the ſignification they have, is othing but a relation, that by the Mind of Man is added to em. (a)

§. 12.

(a) Againſt this the Biſhop of *Worceſter* objects, and our uthor * anſwers as followeth: *However*, ſaith the Biſhop, *e abſtracted Ideas are the Work of the Mind, as appears an Inſtance produced of* the Eſſence of the Sun being in e ſingle Individual: *In which Caſe it is granted*, That e Idea may be ſo abſtracted, that more Suns might agree in it, and it is much a Sort, as if there were as many Suns as there are Stars. So that re we have a real Eſſence ſubſiſting in one Individual, but capable of being ul iplied into more, and the ſame Eſſence remaining. But in this one Sun ere is a real Eſſence, and not a meer nominal or abſtracted Eſſence: But ppoſe there were more Suns; would not each of them have the real Eſſence the Sun? For what is it makes the Second Sun, but having the ſame real ſence with the Firſt? If it were but a Nominal Eſſence, then the Second uld have nothing but the Name.

* *In his firſt Letter, p.* 189, &c.

This, as I underſtand it, replies Mr. *Locke*, is to prove, that the abſtract neral Eſſence of any Sort of Things, or things of the ſame Denominati-, *v. g.* of *Man* or *Marigoles*, hath a *real Being* out of the Underſtanding; ich, I confeſs, I am not able to conceive. Your Lordſhip's Proof here ought out of my Eſſay, coucerning the Sun, I humbly conceive will not ch it; becauſe what is ſaid there, does not at all concern the *real* but *noinal* Eſſence, as is evident from hence, that the *Idea* I ſpeak of there, is *complex* Idea; but we have no *complex Idea* of the internal Conſtitution real Eſſence of the Sun. Beſides, I ſay expreſly, That our diſtinguiſhg Subſtances into Species, by Names, is not at all founded on their real ſences. So that the Sun being one of theſe Subſtances, I cannot, in the ace quoted by your Lordſhip, be ſuppoſed to mean by *Eſſence of the Sun*, e real Eſſence of the Sun, unleſs I had ſo expreſſed. But all this Argunt will be at an end, when your Lordſhip ſhall have explained what u mean by theſe Words, *true Sun*. In my Senſe of them, any thing will a true *Sun* to which the name *Sun* may be truly and properly apply'd, d ro that Subſtance or Thing, the name *Sun* may be truly and properly ply'd, which has united in it that Combination of ſenſible Qualities, by ich any thing elſe that is called *Sun* is diſtinguiſhed from other Sub-

Abstract Ideas *are the Essences of the* Genera *and* Species.

§. 12. The next thing therefore to be considered, is, *What kind of signification it is, that General Words have.* For as it is evident, that they do not signify barely one particular thing; for then they would not be general Terms, but proper Names; so on the other side, 'tis as evident, they do not signify a plurality; for Man and Men would then signify the same; and the distinction of number (as Grammarians call them) would be superfluous and useless. That then which general Words signify, is a sort of Things, and each of them does that, by being a sign of an abstract *Idea*

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stances, *i. e.* by the *Nominal Essence*: And thus our *Sun* is denominated and distinguished from a fixed Star, not by a *real Essence* that we do not know (for if we did, 'tis possible we should find the *real Essence* or *Constitution* of one of the fixed Stars to be the same with that of our *Sun*) but by a complex Idea of sensible Qualities co-existing, which, wherever they are found *make a true Sun*. And thus I crave leave to answer your Lordship's Question: *For what is it makes the Second Sun to be a true Sun, but having the same real Essence with the First? If it were but a Nominal Essence, then the Second would have nothing but the Name.*

I humbly conceive, if it had the *nominal Essence*, it would have something besides *the Name*, viz. That nominal Essence which is sufficient to denominate it truly a *Sun*, or to make it be a *true Sun*, though we know nothing of that real Essence whereon that nominal one depends; your Lordship will then argue, That that *real Essence* is in the *Second Sun*, and *makes the Second Sun*. I grant it, when the *Second Sun* comes to exist, so as to be perceived by us to have all the Ideas contained in our complex Idea, *i. e.* in our *Nominal Essence* of a *Sun*. For should it be true (as is now believed by Astronomers) that the real Essence of the Sun were in any of the fixed Stars, yet such a Star could not for that, be by us called a *Sun*, whilst it answer'd not our complex Idea, or nominal Essence of a *Sun*. But how far that will prove, *That the Essences of Things, as they are knowable by us, have a reality in them* distinct from that of *abstract Ideas* in the Mind, which are *meerly Creatures of the Mind*, I do not see; and we shall farther enquire, in considering your Lordship's following Words. *Therefore*, say you, *there must be a real Essence in every Individual of the same Kind*, Yes, and I beg leave of your Lordship to say, of a different *Kind* too. *For that alone is that which makes it to be what it is.*

That every Individual Substance has a real, internal, individual Constitution, *i. e.* a real Essence, that makes it to be what it is, I grant. Upon this your Lordship says, *Peter, James* and *John* are all true and real Men. *Answ.* Without doubt, supposing them to be Men, they are true and real Men, *i. e.* supposing the Names of that Species belongs to them. And so Three *Bobaques* are all true and real *Bobaques*, supposing the Name of that Species of Animals belongs to them. For

ea in the mind, to which *Idea*, as Things existing are found to ree, so they come to be ranked under that name; or, which all one, be of that sort. Whereby it is evident, that the *ſences of* the *ſorts*, *or* (if the Latin Word pleaſes better) *Species* Things, are nothing elſe but theſe abſtract *Ideas*. For the ving the Eſſence of any Species, being that which makes any ing to be of that Species, and the conformity to the *Idea*, to hich the name is annexed, being that which gives a right to at name, the having the Eſſence, and the having that Conrmity, muſt needs be the ſame thing: Since to be of any ecies, and to have a right to the name of that Species, is all one.

For I beſeech your Lordſhip to conſider, Whether in your way of arguing, naming them *Peter*, *James* and *John*, Names familiar to us, as appropria- l to Individuals of the Species *Man*, your Lordſhip does not firſt ſuppoſe em Men, and then very ſafely ask, Whether they be not *all true and real n?* But if I ſhould ask your Lordſhip, Whether *Wewcena*, *Cuckery* and *nſpeda* were true and real Men or no? Your Lordſhip would not be able tell me, till I have pointed out to your Lordſhip the Individuals called by oſe Names, your Lordſhip by examining whether they had in them thoſe ſible Qualities, which your Lordſhip has combined into that complex a, to which you give the Specifick Name *Man*, determin'd them all, or ne of them to be of the Species which you call *Man*, and ſo to be *true and l Man*; which when your Lordſhip has determin'd, 'tis plain you did it that which is only the nominal Eſſence, as not knowing the *real* one. t your Lordſhip farther asks, *What is it makes* Peter, James *and* John *l Men? Is it the attributing the general Name to them? No certainly; t that the true and real Eſſence of Man is in every one of them.*

If when your Lordſhip asks, *What makes them Men?* Your Lordſhip d the Word *making* in the proper Senſe for the efficient Cauſe, and in that nſe it were true, that the Eſſence of a Man, *i. e.* the Specifick Eſſence that Species made a Man; it would undoubtedly follow, that this Spe- ick Eſſence had a reality beyond that of being only a general, abſtract a in the Mind. But when it is ſaid, That it is *the true and real Eſſence a Man in every one of them that makes* Peter, James *and* John *true and l Men*, the true and real meaning of thoſe Words is no more but that the ence of that Species, *i. e.* The Properties anſwering the complex, abſtract a, to which the Specifick Name is given, being found in them that makes em be properly and truly called Men, or is the reaſon why they are called n. Your Lordſhip adds, *And we muſt be as certain of this, as we are t we are Men.*

How, I beſeech your Lordſhip, are we certain, that they are *Men*, but ly by our Senſes, finding thoſe Properties in them which anſwer the ab- act, complex Idea, which is in our Minds of the Specifick idea, to which have annexed the Specifick Name *Man*? This I take to be the true mean-

one. As for Example, to be a *Man*, or of the Species *Man*, and to have right to the name *Man*, is the same thing. Again, to be a *Man*, or of the same Species *Man*, and have the Essence of a *Man*, is the same thing. Now since nothing can be a *Man*, or have a right to the name *Man*, but what has a conformity to the abstract *Idea* the name *Man* stands for; nor any thing be a Man, or have a right to the Species *Man*, but what has the Essence of that Species; it follows, that the abstract *Idea* for which the name stands, and the Essence of the Species, is one and the same. From whence it is easy to observe, that the Essences of the sorts of things, and consequently the sorting of This, is the Work-

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ing of what your Lordship says in the next Words, *viz. They take their Denomination of being Men, from that common Nature or Essence which is in them*; and I am apt to think, these Words will not hold true in any other Sense.

Your Lordship's fourth Inference begins thus: *That the general Idea is not made from the simple Ideas, by the meer Act of the Mind abstracting from Circumstances, but from Reason and Consideration of the Nature of Things.*

I thought, my Lord, That *Reason* and *Consideration* had been *Acts of the Mind, meer Acts of the Mind*, when any thing was done by them. Your Lordship gives a Reason for it, *viz. For when we see several Individuals that have the same Powers and Properties, we thence infer, That there must be something common to all, which makes them of one Kind.*

I grant the Inference to be true; but must beg leave to deny that this proves, That the general Idea the Name is annexed to, is not made by the Mind. I have said, and it agrees with what your Lordship here says, * That 'the Mind in making it complex Ideas
* *B.* 3. *C.* 6. §. 28, 29. 'of Substances, only follows Nature, and puts no Ideas to-'gether, which are not supposed to have an Union in Na-'ture; no body joins the Voice of a Sheep, with the Shape of an Horse 'nor the Colour of Lead, with the Weight and Fixedness of Gold, to be 'the complex Ideas of any real Substances; unless he has a Mind to fill his 'Head with Chimera's, and his Discourses with unintelligible Words. Men 'observing certain Qualities always joined and existing together, there-'copied Nature, and of Ideas so united, made their complex ones of Sub-'stances, *&c.* Which is very little different from what your Lordship here says, That 'tis from our Observation of Individuals, that we come to infer *That there is something common to them all.* But I do not see how it will thence follow, that the general or specifick Idea is not made by the meer Act of the Mind. No, says your Lordship, *There is something common to them all, which makes them of one Kind; and if the difference of Kinds be real, that which makes them all of one Kind must not be* a nominal, *but* real Essence.

This

rkmanſhip of the Underſtanding that abſtracts and makes ſe general *Ideas*.

. 13. I would not here be thought to forget, ch leſs to deny, that Nature in the Production Things, makes ſeveral of them alike: there is hing more obvious, eſpecially in the Races of mals, and all things propagated by Seed. But I think, we may ſay, the *ſorting* of them un- Names, *is the Workmanſhip of the Underſtanding*, *ng occaſion from the ſimilitude* it obſerves amongſt m, to make abſtract general *Ideas*, and ſet them in the mind, with Names annexed to them, as Patterns or ms, (for in that ſence the word *Form* has a very proper ſig- cation,) to which, as particular Things exiſting are found to

They are the Workmanſhip of the Underſtanding, but have their foundation in the ſimilitude of things.

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his may be ſome Objection to the Name of *nominal Eſſence*; but is, as mbly conceive, none to the Thing deſigned by it. There is an internal ſtitution of Things, on which their Properties depend. This your Lord- and I are agreed of, and this we call the *real Eſſence*. There are alſo ain complex Ideas, or Combinations of theſe Properties in Mens Minds, hich they commonly annex Specifick Names, or Names of Sorts or *ds* of Things. This, I believe, your Lordſhip does not deny. Theſe plex Ideas, for want of a better Name, I have called *nominal Eſſence*; properly, I will not diſpute. But if any one will help me to a better ne for them, I am ready to receive it: till then, I muſt, to expreſs my ſelf, this. Now, my Lord, *Body*, *Life*, and the Power of *Reaſoning*, being the real Eſſence of a Man, as I believe your Lordſhip will agree, will r Lordſhip ſay, that they are not enough to make the thing wherein are found, of the Kind called *Man*, and not of the Kind called Baboon, *uſe the difference of theſe Kinds is real?* If this be not real enough to e *the Thing of one Kind*, and *not of another*, I do not ſee how *Animal onale* can be enough *really* to diſtinguiſh a *Man* from an *Horſe*; for that it the nominal, not real Eſſence of that Kind, deſigned by the Name *Man*. yet, I ſuppoſe, every one thing is *real* enough, to make a *real diffe-* e between that and other *Kinds*. And if nothing will ſerve the turn, AKE things *of one Kind*, *and not of another* (which as I have ſhew'd, fies no more but ranking of them under different Specifick Names) but real, unknown Conſtitutions, which are the *real Eſſences* we are ſpeak- of, I fear it would be a long while before we ſhould have really different ls of Subſtances, or diſtinct Names for them, unleſs we could diſtinguiſh n by theſe Differences, of which we have no diſtinct Conceptions. For nk it would not be readily anſwer'd me, if I ſhould demand, wherein he *real difference* in the internal Conſtitution of a *Stag* from that of a ; which are each of them very well known to be *of one Kind*, and not

to agree, so they come to be of that Species, have that Denomination, or are put into that *Classis*. For when we say, this is a *Man*, that a *Horse*; this *Justice*, that *Cruelty*; this a *Watch*, that a *Jack*; what do we else but rank Things under different specifick Names, as agreeing to those abstract *Ideas*, of which we have made those Names the signs? And what are the Essences of those Species, set out and marked by Names, but those abstract Ideas in the mind; which are, as it were, the bonds between particular Things that exist, and the Names they are to be ranked under? And when general Names have any connexion with particular Beings, these abstract *Ideas* are the *Medium* that unites them: so that the Essences of Species, as distinguished and denominated by us, neither are, nor can be any thing but those precise abstract *Ideas* we have in our minds. And therefore

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of the other; and no body questions but that the *Kind* whereof each of them is, are *really different*.

Your Lordship farther says, *And this difference doth not depend upon the complex Ideas of Substances, whereby Men arbitrarily join Modes together, in their Minds.* I confess, my Lord, I know not what to say to this, because I do not know what these complex Ideas of Substances are, *whereby* Men arbitrarily join Modes together in their Minds. But I am apt to think there is a Mistake in the matter, by the Words that follow, which are these: *For let them mistake in their Complication of Ideas, either in leaving out or putting in what doth not belong to them; and let their Ideas be what they will, the real Essence of a Man, and an Horse, and a Tree, are just what they were.*

The Mistake I spoke of, I humbly suppose is this, That Things are here taken to be distinguished by their real Essence; when by the very way of speaking of them, it is clear, That they are already distinguished by their nominal Essences, and are so taken to be. For what I beseech your Lordship, does your Lordship mean, when you say, *The real Essence of a Man, and an Horse, and a Tree*, but that there are such kinds already set out by the Signification of these Names, *Man, Horse, Tree*? And what, I beseech your Lordship, is the Signification of each of the Specifick Names, but the complex Idea it stands for? And that complex Idea is the nominal Essence, and nothing else. So that, taking *Man*, as your Lordship does here, to stand for a kind or sort of Individuals, all which agree in that common, complex Idea, which that Specifick Name stands for, it is certain that the real Essence of all the Individuals, comprehended under the Specifick Name *Man*, in your use of it, would be just the same; let others leave out or put into their complex Idea of *Man* what they please; because the real Essence on which that unalter'd complex Idea, *i. e.* those Properties depend, must necessarily be concluded to be the same.

For

re the ſuppoſed real Eſſences of Subſtances, if different from r abſtract *Ideas*, cannot be the Eſſences of the Species we rank hings into. For two Species may be one, as rationally, as vo different Eſſences be the Eſſences of one Species: And I deand, what are the alterations may, or may not be in a *Horſe* *Lead*, without making either of them to be of another Spees? In determining the Species of Things by our abſtract *Ideas*, is is eaſy to reſolve: but if any one will regulate himſelf here-, by ſuppoſed real Eſſences, he will, I ſuppoſe, be at a loſs: id he will never be able to know when any thing preciſely ceaſes be of the Species of a *Horſe*, or *Lead*.

§. 14. Nor will any one wonder, that I y theſe *Eſſences*, or abſtract *Ideas*, (which e the meaſures of Name, and the boundaries of

Each diſtinct abſtract Idea *is a diſtinct Eſſence.*

For I take it for granted, That in uſing the Name *Man*, in this place, ur Lordſhip uſes it for that complex Idea which is in your Lordſhip's Mind that Species. So that your Lordſhip by putting it for or ſubſtituting it the place of that complex Idea where you ſay the real Eſſence of it is *juſt it was*, or the very ſame it was, does ſuppoſe the Idea it ſtands for, to Ideally the ſame. For if I change the Signification of the Word *Man*, hereby it may not comprehend juſt the ſame Individuals which in your ordſhip's Senſe it does, but ſhut out ſome of thoſe that to your Lordſhip e *Men* in your Signification of the Word *Man*, or take in others to which ur Lordſhip does not allow the Name *Man*. I do not think you will ſay, at the real Eſſence of *Man*, in both theſe Senſes, is the ſame; and yet ur Lordſhip ſeems to ſay ſo, when you ſay, *Let Men miſtake in the Comication of their Ideas, either in leaving out or putting in what doth not long to them; and let their Ideas be what they pleaſe, the real Eſſence* of e Individuals comprehended under the Names annexed to theſe Ideas, will the ſame: For ſo, I humbly conceive, it muſt be put, to make out what ur Lordſhip aims at. For as your Lordſhip puts it by the Name of *Man*, any other Specifick Name, your Lordſhip ſeems to me to ſuppoſe, that at Name ſtands for, and not for the ſame Idea, at the ſame time.

For Example, my Lord, let your Lordſhip's Idea, to which you annex e Sign *Man*, be a rational Animal: Let another Man's Idea be a rational imal of ſuch a Shape; let a third Man's Idea be of an Animal of ſuch a ze and Shape, leaving out Rationality; let a fourth be an Animal with a dy of ſuch a Shape, and an immaterial Subſtance, with a Power of Reaning; let a fifth leave out of his Idea, and immaterial Subſtance. 'Tis ain every one of theſe will call his a *Man*, as well as your Lordſhip, and t 'tis as plain that *Man* as ſtanding for all theſe diſtinct, complex Ideas nnot be ſuppoſed to have the ſame internal Conſtitution, *i. e.* the ſame *al Eſſence*. The Truth is, every diſtinct, abſtract Idea, with a Name to it;

of Species) are *the Workmanship of the Understanding*, who consi-ders, that at least the complex ones are often, in several Men, different Collections of simple *Ideas*: and therefore that is *Covetousness* to one Man, which is not so to another. Nay, even in Substances, where their abstract *Ideas* seem to be taken from the Things themselves, they are not constantly the same; no not in that Species, which is most familiar to us, and with which we have the most intimate acquaintance: It having been more than once doubted, whether the *Fœtus* born of a Woman were a *Man*, even so far, as that it hath been debated, whether it were, or were not to be nourished and baptized: which could

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it, makes a real, distinct kind, whatever the real Essence (which we know not of any of them) be.

And therefore I grant it true what your Lordship says in the next Words, *And let the nominal Essence differ never so much, the real, common Essence or Nature of the several Kinds, are not at all alter'd by them, i. e.* That our Thoughts or Ideas cannot alter the real Constitutions that are in Things that exist, there is nothing more certain. But yet 'tis true, that the Changes of Ideas to which we annex them, can and does alter the Signification of their Names, and thereby alter the Kinds, which by these Names we rank and sort them into. Your Lordship farther adds, *And these real Essences are unchangeable, i. e.* the internal Constitutions *are unchangeable.* Of what, I beseech your Lordship, are the *internal Constitutions unchangeable?* Not of any Thing that exists, but of God alone; for they may be changed all as easily by that Hand that made them, as the internal Frame of a Watch. What then is it that is unchangeable? The internal Constitution or real Essence of a Species: which, in plain English, is no more but this, whilst the same Specifick Name, *v. g.* of *Man*, *Horse*, or *Tree*, is annexed to or made the Sign of the same abstract, complex Idea, under which I rank several Individuals; it is impossible but the real Constitution on which that unalter'd, complex Idea or nominal Essence depends, must be the same, *i. e.* in other Words, where we find all the same Properties, we have Reason to conclude there is the same real, internal Constitution, from which those Properties flow.

But your Lordship proves the real Essences to be unchangeable, because God makes them, in those following Words: *For however there may happen some variety in Individuals by particular Accidents, yet the Essences of Men, and Horses, and Trees remain always the same; because they do not depend on the Ideas of Men, but on the Will of the Creator, who hath made several Sorts of Beings.*

'Tis true, the real Constitutions or Essences of particular Things existing, do not depend on the Ideas of Men, but on the Will of the Creator; but their being ranked into Sorts, under such and such Names, does depend and wholly depend on the Ideas of Men.

not

ot be, if the abſtract *Idea* or Eſſence, to which the Name *Man* elonged, were of Nature's making; and were not the uncer-in and various Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, which the Under-anding puts together, and then abſtracting it, affixed a name o it. So that in truth *every diſtinct abſtract* Idea, *is a diſtinct Eſſence*: and the names that ſtand for ſuch diſtinct *Ideas*, are the ames of Things eſſentially different. Thus a Circle is as eſſen-ally different from an Oval, as a Sheep from a Goat: and Rain as eſſentially different from Snow, as Water from Earth, that bſtract *Idea* which is the Eſſence of one, being impoſſible to be ommunicated to the other. And thus any two abſtract *Ideas*, hat in any part vary one from another, with two diſtinct names nnexed to them, conſtitute two diſtinct ſorts, or if you pleaſe, *pecies*, as eſſentially different, as any two the moſt remote, or ppoſite in the World.

Real and nominal Eſſence.

§. 15. But ſince the *Eſſences* of Things are hought, by ſome, (and not without reaſon,) to e wholly unknown; it may not be amiſs to con-der the *ſeveral ſignifications of the Word* Eſſence.

Firſt, *Eſſence* may be taken for the being of any thing, where-y it is, what it is. And thus the real internal, but generally n Subſtances, unknown Conſtitution of Things, whereon their iſcoverable Qualities depend, may be called their *Eſſence*. This the proper original ſignification of the Word, as is evident rom the formation of it; *Eſſentia*, in its primary notation ſig-ifying properly *Being*. And in this ſenſe it is ſtill uſed, when ve ſpeak of the *Eſſence* of particular things, without giving them ny Name.

Secondly, The Learning and Diſputes of the Schools, having een much buſied about *Genus* and *Species*, the Word *Eſſence* as almoſt loſt its primary Signification; and inſtead of the real Conſtitution of things, has been almoſt wholly applied to the rtificial Conſtitution of *Genus* and *Species*. 'Tis true, there is rdinarily ſuppoſed a real Conſtitution of the ſorts of Things; nd 'tis paſt doubt, there muſt be ſome real Conſtitution, on vhich any Collection of ſimple *Ideas* co exiſting, muſt depend. ut it being evident, that Things are ranked under Names in-o Sorts or *Species*, only as they agree to certain abſtract *Ideas*, o which we have annexed thoſe Names, the *Eſſence* of each *enus*, or Sort, comes to be nothing but that abſtract *Idea*, vhich the General, or *Sortal* (if I may have leave ſo to call it om *Sort*, as I do *General* from *Genus*,) Name ſtands for. And his we ſhall find to be that, which the Word *Eſſence* imports,

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in its most familiar use. These two sorts of *Essences*, I suppose, may not unfitly be termed, the one the *Real*, the other the *Nominal Essence*.

Constant Connection between the Name and Nominal Essence.

§. 16. *Between the Nominal Essence, and the Name*, there is so *near* a *Connection*, that the Name of any sort of Things cannot be attributed to any particular Being, but what has this *Essence*, whereby it answers that abstract *Idea*, whereof that Name is the Sign.

Supposition that Species are distinguished by their real Essences, useless.

§. 17. Concerning the real Essences of corporeal Substances, (to mention those only,) there are, if I mistake not, two Opinions. The one is of those, who using the Word *Essence*, for they know not what, suppose a certain number of those Essences, according to which, all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and so become of this or that *Species*. The other, and more rational Opinion, is of those, who look on all natural Things to have a real, but unknown Constitution of their insensible Parts, from which flow those sensible Qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one from another, according as we have Occasion to rank them into sorts, under common Denominations. The former of these Opinions, which supposes these *Essences*, as a certain number of Forms or Molds, wherein all natural Things, that exist, are cast, and do equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplexed the Knowledge of natural Things. The frequent Productions of Monsters, in all the Species of Animals, and of Changelings, and other strange Issues of humane Birth, carry with them difficulties, not possible to consist with this *Hypothesis*: Since it is as impossible, that two Things, partaking exactly of the same real *Essence*, should have different Properties, as that two Figures partaking in the same real *Essence* of a Circle, should have different Properties. But were there no other reason against it, yet the *supposition of Essences, that cannot be known*; and the making them nevertheless to be that, which distinguishes the Species of Things, *is* so *wholly useless*, and unserviceable to any part of our Knowledge, that that alone were sufficient, to make us lay it by; and content our selves with such *Essences* of the Sorts or Species of Things, as come within the reach of our Knowledge: which, when seriously considered, will be found, as I have said, to be nothing else, but those abstract complex *Ideas*, to which we have annexed distinct general Names.

§. 18. *Essences* being thus distinguished into *Nominal and Real*, we may farther observe, that in the Species of *simple* Ideas *and Modes* they *are always the same*: But *in Substances, always quite different.* Thus a Figure including a Space between three Lines, is the real, as well as nominal *Essence* of a Triangle; it being not only the abstract *Idea* to which the general Name is annexed, but the very *Essentia*, or Being, of the thing it self, that Foundation from which all its Properties flow, and to which they are inseparably annexed. But it is far otherwise concerning that Parcel of Matter, which makes the Ring on my Finger, where these two *Essences* are apparently different. For it is the real Constitution of its insensible Parts, on which depend all those Properties of Colour, Weight, Fusibility, Fixedness, &c. which makes it to be *Gold*, or gives it a right to that Name, which is therefore its nominal *Essence*. Since nothing can be call'd *Gold*, but what has a Conformity of Qualities to that abstract complex *Idea*, to which that Name is annexed. But this Distinction of *Essences*, belonging particularly to Substances, we shall, when we come to consider their Names, have an occasion to treat of more fully.

Real and nominal Essence the same in simple Ideas *and Modes, different in Substances.*

§. 19. That such *abstract* Ideas, *with Names to them*, as we have been speaking of, *are Essences*, may farther appear by what we are told concerning *Essences*, *viz.* that they are all ingenerable, and incorruptible. Which cannot be true of the real Constitutions of Things, which begin and perish with them. All things, that exist, besides their Author, are all liable to Change; especially those Things we are acquainted with, and have ranked into Sorts, under distinct Names or Ensigns. Thus that, which was Grass to Day, is to Morrow the Flesh of a Sheep; and within a few days after, becomes part of a Man; In all which, and the like Changes, 'tis evident, their real *Essence*, *i. e.* that Constitution, whereon the Properties of these several things depend, is destroy'd, and perishes with them. But *Essences* being taken for *Ideas*, established in the Mind, with Names annexed to them, they are supposed to remain steadily the same, whatever mutations the particular Substances are liable to. For whatever becomes of *Alexander* and *Bucephalus*, the *Ideas* to which *Man* and *Horse* are annexed, are supposed nevertheless to remain in the same; and so the *Essences* of those Species are preserved whole and undestroy'd, whatever Changes happen to any, or all of the

Essences ingenerable and incorruptible.

the Individuals of those *Species*. By this means the *Essence* of a *Species* rests safe and entire, without the existence of so much as one Individual of that kind. For were there now no Circle existing any where in the World, (as, perhaps, that Figure exists not any where exactly marked out,) yet the *Idea* annexed to that Name would not cease to be what it is; nor cease to be as a pattern, to determine which of the particular Figures we meet with have, or have not a Right to the Name *Circle*, and so to shew, which of them, by having that Essence, was of that *Species*. And though there neither were, nor had been in Nature such a Beast as an *Unicorn*, nor such a Fish as a *Mermaid*; yet supposing those Names to stand for complex abstract *Ideas*, that contained no inconsistency in them; the *Essence* of a *Mermaid* is as intelligible, as that of a *Man*; and the *Idea* of an *Unicorn*, as certain, steady, and permanent, as that of a Horse. From what has been said, it is evident, that the Doctrine of the Immutability of *Essences*, proves them to be only abstract *Ideas*; and is founded on the Relation, established between them, and certain Sounds as Signs of them; and will always be true, as long as the same Name can have the same signification.

Recapitulation.

§. 20. To conclude, this is that, which in short I would say, (*viz.*) that all the great Business of *Genera* and *Species*, and their *Essences*, amounts to no more but this, That Men making abstract *Ideas*, and settling them in their Minds, with Names annexed to them, do thereby enable themselves to consider Things, and discourse of them, as it were in bundles, for the easier and readier improvement, and communication of their Knowledge, which would advance but slowly, were their Words and Thoughts confined only to Particulars.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Names of simple Ideas.

Names of simple Ideas, *Modes, and Substances, have each something peculiar.*

§. 1. THough all Words, as I have shewn, signify nothing immediately, but the *Ideas* in the Mind of the Speaker, yet upon a nearer survey, we shall find that the *Names of simple* Ideas, *mixed Modes*, (under which I comprise Relations too,) *and natural Substances*,

have

ve each of them something peculiar, and different from the other. or Example:

§. 2. *First*, The *Names of simple* Ideas *and Subnces*, with the abstract *Ideas* in the Mind, which ey immediately signify, *intimate* also *some real cistence*, from which was derived their original ttern. But the *Names of mixed Modes, terminate the* Idea that is in the Mind, and lead not the houghts any farther, as we shall see more at large in the following Chapter.

First, names of simple Ideas *and Substances, intimate real Existence.*

§. 3. *Secondly*, The *Names of simple* Ideas *and lodes, signify always the real, as well as nominal ssence of their Species.* But *the Names of natul Substances, signify* rarely, if ever, any thing it *barely the nominal Essences* of those Species, we shall shew in the Chapter, that treats of ie Names of Substances in particular.

Secondly, Names of simple Ideas *and Modes signify always both real and nominal Essence.*

§. 4. *Thirdly*, The *Names of simple* Ideas *are not pable of any definitions*; the Names of all complex *leas* are. It has not, that I know, hitherto been ken notice of by any Body, what Words are, and what are not capable of being defined: the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not seldom the occasion of reat wrangling, and obscurity in Mens Discourses, whilst some emand definitions of Terms, that cannot be defined; and others ink, they ought to rest satisfied, in an Explication made by a nore general Word, and its Restriction, (or to speak in Terms f Art by a Genus and Difference,) when even after such Definition made, according to rule those who hear it, have often o more a clear Conception of the meaning of the Word, than ey had before. This at least, I think, that the shewing what Words are, and what are not capable of Definitions, and wherein consists a good Definition, is not wholly besides our present urpose; and perhaps, will afford so much Light to the Nature f these Signs, and our *Ideas*, as to deserve a more particular Consideration.

Thirdly, Names of simple Ideas *undefinable.*

§. 5. I will not here trouble my self, to prove hat all Terms are not definable from that Proress, *in infinitum*, which it will visibly lead us into, if we should allow, that all Names could be efined. For if the Terms of one Definition, were till to be defined by another, Where at last should ve stop? But I shall from the Nature of our *Ideas*, and the

If all were definable, 'twould be a process in infinitum.

Signifi-

Signification of our Words shew, *why some Names can, and others cannot be defined*, and which they are.

What a Definition is.

§. 6. I think, it is agreed, that *a Definition is* nothing else, but *the shewing the meaning of one Word by several other not synonymous Terms.* The meaning of Words being only the *Ideas* they are made to stand for by him that uses them; the meaning of any Term is then shewed, or the Word is defined when by other Words, the *Idea* it is made the Sign of, and annexed to in the Mind of the Speaker, is as it were represented, or set before the view of another; and thus its Signification ascertained: This is the only use and end of Definitions; and therefore the only measure of what is, or is not a good Definition.

Simple Ideas *why undefinable.*

§. 7. This being premised, I say, that *the Names of Simple* Ideas, and those only, *are incapable of being defined.* The reason whereof is this, That the several Terms of a Definition, signifying several *Ideas*, they can altogether by no means represent an *Idea*, which has no Composition at all: And therefore a Definition which is properly nothing but the shewing the meaning of one Word by several others not signifying each the same thing, can in the Names of simple *Ideas* have no Place.

Instances Motion.

§. 8. The not observing this difference in our *Ideas*, and their Names, has produced that eminent trifling in the Schools, which is so easy to be observed, in the definitions they give us of some few of these simple *Ideas*. For as to the greatest part of them, even those Masters of Definitions, were fain to leave them untouch'd, meerly by the impossibility they found in it. What more exquisite *Jargon* could the Wit of Man invent, than this Definition, *The Act of a being in Power, as far forth as in Power*, which would puzzle any rational Man, to whom it was not already known by its famous absurdity, to guess what Word it could ever be supposed to be the Explication of. If *Tully* asking a *Dutchman* what *Beweeginge* was, should have received this Explication in his own Language, that it was *Actus entis in potentia quatenus in potentia*; I ask whether any one can imagine he could thereby have understood what the Word *Beweeginge* signified, or have guessed what *Idea* a *Dutchman* ordinarily had in his Mind, and would signify to another when he used that sound.

§. 9. Nor have the Modern Philosophers, who have endeavoured to throw off the *Jargon* of the Schools, and speak intelligibly, much better succeeded in defining simple *Ideas*, whether by

explaining their Causes, or any otherwise. The *Atomists*, o define Motion to be a *passage from one place to another*, What they more than put one synonimous Word for another? For at is *Passage* other than *Motion*? And if they were asked at Passage was, How would they better define it than by *Mo-*? For is it not at least as proper and significant, to say, *Jage is a Motion from one place to another*, as to say, *Motion is a Jage*, &c. This is to translate, and not to define, when we nge two Words of the same Signification one for another; ich when one is better understood than the other, may serve discover what *Idea* the unknown stands for; but is very far m a *Definition*, unless we will say, every English Word in Dictionaray, is the definition of the Latin Word it ans, and that Motion is a definition of *Motus*. *Nor will the essive Application of the parts of the* Superficies *of one Body, to e of another*, which the *Cartesians* give us, prove a much bet- definition of Motion, when well examined.

§. 10. *The Act of Perspicuous, as far forth as perspi-* *Light.* *us*, is another Peripathetick definition of a simple ; which though not more absurd than the former of *Motion*, betrays its Uselessness and Insignificancy more plainly, be- se Experience will easily convince any one, that it cannot ke the meaning of the Word *Light* (which it pretends to de-) at all understood by a blind Man: but the definition of *tion* appears not at first sight so useless, because it scapes this y of Trial. For this simple *Idea*, entring by the Touch as l as Sight; 'tis impossible to shew an Example of any one, o has no other way to get the *Idea* of *Motion*, but barely by definition of that Name. Those who tell us, that *Light* is reat number of little Globules, striking briskly on the bottom he Eye, speak more intelligibly than the Schools: but yet se Words never so well understood, would make the *Idea*, Word *Light* stands for, no more known to a Man that un- stands it not before, than if one should tell him, that *Light* nothing but a Company of little Tennis-balls, which Fairies day long struck with Rackets against some Mens Fore-heads, lst they passed by others. For granting this explication of thing to be true; yet the *Idea* of the cause of *Light*, if we it never so exact, would no more give us the *Idea* of *Light* lf, as it is such a particular perception in us, than the *Idea* of Figure and Motion of a sharp piece of Steel, would give us *Idea* of that Pain, which it is able to cause in us. For the e of any Sensation, and the Sensation it self, in all the sim-

ple

ple *Ideas* of one Sense, are two *Ideas*; and two *Ideas* so different, and distant one from another, that no two can be more so. And therefore should *Des Cartes*'s Globules strike never so long on the *retina* of a Man, who was blind by a *Gutta Serena*, he would thereby never have any *Idea* of *Light*, or any thing approaching to it, though he understood what little Globules were, and what striking on another Body was, never so well. And therefore the *Cartesians* very well distinguish between that Light which is the Cause of that Sensation in us, and the *Idea* which is produced in us by it, and is that which is properly Light.

Simple Ideas *why undefinable, farther explained.*

§. 11. *Simple Ideas*, as has been shewn, *are only* to be *got by* those *impressions*, Objects themselves make on our Minds, by the proper Inlets appointed to each sort. If they are not received this way, all the *Words* in the World, *made use of to explain or define any of their Names, will never be able to produce in us the* Idea *it stands for*. For Words being Sounds, can produce in us no other simple *Ideas*, than of those very Sounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connexion, which is known to be between them, and those simple *Ideas*, which common Use has made them Signs of. He that thinks otherwise, let him try if any Words can give him the taste of a Pine Apple, and make him have the true *Idea* of the Relish of that celebrated delicious Fruit. So far as he is told it has a resemblance with any Tastes, whereof he has the *Ideas* already in his Memory, imprinted there by sensible Objects not Strangers to his Palate, so far may he approach that resemblance in his Mind. But this is not giving us that *Idea* by a *Definition*, but exciting in us other simple *Ideas*, by their known Names; which will be still very different from the true taste of that Fruit it self. In Light and Colours, and all other simple *Ideas*, it is the same thing: for the signification of Sounds, is not natural, but only imposed and arbitrary. And no definition of *Light*, or *Redness* is more fitted, or able to produce either of those *Ideas* in us, than the sound *Light*, or *Red*, by it self. For to hope to produce an *Idea* of Light, or Colour, by a Sound, however formed, is to expect that Sounds should be visible, or Colours audible; and to make the Ears do the Office of all the other Senses. Which is all one as to say, that we might Taste, Smell, and See by the Ears: a sort of Philosophy worthy only of *Sancho Pancha*, who had the Faculty to see *Dulcinea* by Hearsay. And therefore he that has not before received into his Mind, by the proper Inlet, the simple *Idea* which any Word stands for, can never come to know

the

e signification of that Word, by any other Words, or Sounds, hatsoever put together, according to any Rules of Definition. he only way is, by applying to his Senses the proper Object; d so producing that *Idea* in him, for which he has learn'd the me already. A studious blind Man, who had mightily beat s Head about visible Objects, and made use of the explication his Books and Friends, to understand those names of Light, d Colours, which often came in his way; bragg'd one day, hat he now understood what *Scarlet* signified. Upon which s Friend demanding, what *Scarlet* was? the blind Man anered, It was like the Sound of a Trumpet. Just such an Unrstanding of the Name of any other simple *Idea* will he have, no hopes to get it only from a Definition, or other Words ade use of to explain it.

The contrary shewed in complex Ideas *by instances of a Statue and Rainbow.*

§. 12. The case is quite otherwise *in complex eas*; which consisting of several simple ones, it is the power of Words, standing for the several *eas*, that make that Composition, to imprint complex *Ideas* in the Mind, which were never there before, and so make their Names be understood. In ch Collections of *Ideas*, passing under one name, *finition*, or the teaching the signification of one word, by seral others, has place, and *may make us understand the Names* of hings, which never came within the reach of our Senses; and me *Ideas* suitable to those in other Mens Minds, when they e those Names: provided that none of the terms of the Definition stand for any such simple *Ideas*, which he to whom the Exication is made, has never yet had in his Thought. Thus the ord *Statue* may be explained to a blind Man by other words, hen *Picture* cannot, his Senses having given him the *Idea* of gure, but not of Colours, which therefore Words cannot exe in him. This gain'd the Prize to the Painter, against the atuary; each of which contending for the Excellency of his t, and the Statuary bragging, that his was to be preferred, cause it reached farther, and even those who had lost their es, could yet perceive the excellency of it. The Painter aeed to refer himself to the judgment of a blind Man; who ing brought where there was a Statue made by the one, and Picture drawn by the other; he was first led to the Statue, in hich he traced with his Hands, all the Lineaments of the Face d Body; and with great admiration, applauded the Skill of e Work-man. But being led to the Picture, and having his ands laid upon it, was told, That now he touched the Head,

and then the Forehead, Eyes, Nose, &c. as his Hand moved over the Parts of the Picture on the Cloth, without finding any the least distinction: Whereupon, he cried out, that certainly that must needs be a very admirable and divine piece of Workmanship, which could represent to them all those Parts, where he could neither feel nor perceive any thing.

§ 13. He that should use the word *Rainbow*, to one who knew all those Colours, but yet had never seen that *Phænomenon*, would, by enumerating the Figure, Largeness, Position, and Order of the Colours, so well define that word, that it might be perfectly understood. But yet that *Definition*, how exact and perfect soever, would never make a blind Man understand it; because several of the simple *Ideas* that make that complex one, being such as he never received by Sensation and Experience, no words are able to excite them in his Mind.

The Names of complex Ideas *when to be made intelligible by Words.*

§. 14. Simple *Ideas*, as has been shewed, can only be got by Experience, from those Objects, which are proper to produce in us those Perceptions. *When* by this means we have our Minds stored with them, and know the Names for them, then *we are in a condition to define*, and by *Definition* to understand the Names of complex *Ideas*, that are made up of them. But when any term stands for a simple *Idea*, that a Man has never yet had in his Mind, it is impossible, by any Words, to make known its meaning to him. When any term stands for an *Idea* a Man is acquainted with, but is ignorant, that that term is the sign of it, there another name, of the same *Idea* which he has been accustomed to, may make him understand its meaning. But in no case whatsoever, is any name, of any simple *Idea*, capable of a *Definition*.

Fourthly, Names of simple Ideas *least doubtful.*

§. 15. *Fourthly*, But though the Names of *simple Ideas*, have not the help of *Definition* to determine their signification; yet that hinders not but that they *are generally less doubtful and uncertain, than those of mixed Modes and Substances.* Because they standing only for one simple Perception, Men, for the most part, easily and perfectly agree in their signification: And there is little room for mistake and wrangling about their meaning. He that knows once, that Whiteness is the Name of that Colour he has observed in Snow, or Milk, will not be apt to misapply that Word, as long as he retains that *Idea*; which when he has quite lost, he is not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but perceives he understands it not. There is neither

multiplicity of simple *Ideas* to be put together, which makes e doubtfulness in the Names of mixed Modes: nor a supposed, it an unknown real Essence, with properties depending there-1, the precise number whereof are also unknown, which akes the difficulty in the Names of Substances. But on the ntrary, in simple *Ideas* the whole signification of the Name known at once, and consists not of parts, whereof more or s being put in, the *Idea* may be varied, and so the significa-n of its Name, be obscure, or uncertain.

§. 16. *Fifthly*, This farther may be observed, ncerning *simple* Ideas, and their Names, that they *ve but few Ascents in linea prædicamentali*, (as they ll it,) *from the lowest Species, to the summum Genus.* he reason whereof is, that the lowest Species be-g but one simple *Idea*, nothing can be left out of , that so the difference being taken away, it may agree with me other thing in one *Idea* common to them both; which ha-ng one Name, is the *Genus* of the other two: *v. g.* There is thing can be left out of the *Idea* of White and Red, to make em agree in one common appearance, and so have one general me; as *Rationality* being left out of the complex *Idea* of *Man*, akes it agree with Brute, in the more general *Idea* and name *Animal.* And therefore when to avoid unpleasant enumera-ns, Men would comprehend both *White* and *Red*, and several her such simple *Ideas*, under one general name; they have been n to do it by a Word, which denotes only the way they get to the Mind. For when *White*, *Red*, and *Yellow*, are all com-ehended under the *Genus* or name *Colour*, it signifies no more, t such *Ideas*, as are produced in the Mind only by the Sight, d have entrance only through the Eyes. And when they uld frame yet a more general term, to comprehend both *Co-rs* and *Sounds*, and the like simple *Ideas*, they do it by a Word, at signifies all such as come into the Mind only by one Sense: nd so the general term *Quality*, in its ordinary acception, com-ehends Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Smells, and tangible Quali-s, with distinction from Extension, Number, Motion, Plea-e, and Pain, which make Impressions on the Mind, and in-duce their *Ideas* by more Senses than one.

Fifthly, Simple Ideas *have few Ascents in linea prædicamentali.*

§. 17. *Sixthly*, The Names of simple *Ideas*, bstances, and mixed Modes, have also this ference; That those *of mixed Modes* stand *Ideas* perfectly *arbitrary*: Those *of Sub-nces*, are not perfectly so; but *refer to a pat-*

Sixthly, Names of simple Ideas *stand for* Ideas *not at all arbitrary.*

tern, though with some latitude: and those of simple Ideas *are* perfectly taken from the Existence of Things, and are *not arbitrary at all.* Which what difference it makes in the Significations of their Names, we shall see in the following Chapters.

The Names of simple Modes, differ little from those of simple *Ideas.*

CHAP. V.

Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations.

They stand for abstract Ideas, as other general Names.

§. 1. THE Names of mixed Modes being general, they stand, as has been shewn, for Sorts or Species of Things, each of which has its peculiar Essence. The Essences of these Species also, as has been shewed, are nothing but the abstract *Ideas* in the Mind, to which the Names is annexed. Thus far the Names and Essences of mixed Modes, have nothing but what is common to them, with other *Ideas*: But if we take a little nearer survey of them, we shall find, that they have something peculiar, which, perhaps, may deserve our attention.

First, The Ideas *they stand for, are made by the Understanding.*

§. 2. The first Particularity I shall observe in them is, that the abstract *Ideas*, or, if you please, the Essences of the several Species *of mixed Modes are made by the Understanding*, wherein they differ from those of simple *Ideas*: in which sort, the Mind has no Power to make any one, but only receives such as are presented to it, by the real Existence of Things operating upon it.

§. 3. In the next place, these *Essences of the Species of mixed Modes, are* not only *made* by the Mind, but made *very arbitrarily*, made without Patterns, or reference to any real Existence. Wherein they differ from those of Substances, which carry with them the Supposition of some real Being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable. But

Secondly, made arbitrarily, and without Patterns.

in its complex *Ideas* of mixed Modes, the Mind takes a liberty not to follow the Existence of Things exactly. It unites and retains certain Collections, as so many distinct specifick *Ideas*, whilst others, that as often occur in Nature, and are as plainly

ainly ſuggeſted by outward Things, paſs neglected without rticular Names or Specifications. Nor does the Mind, in theſe mixed Modes, as in the complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, examine em by the real Exiſtence of Things; or verify them by Patrns, containing ſuch peculiar Compoſitions in Nature. To ow whether his *Idea* of *Adultery*, or *Inceſt*, be right, will a lan ſeek it any where amongſt Things exiſting? Or is it true, cauſe any one has been Witneſs to ſuch an Action? No: but ſuffices here, that Men have put together ſuch a Collection to one complex *Idea*, that makes the *Archetype*, and ſpecifick *ea*, whether ever any ſuch Action were committed *in rerum tura*, or no.

How this is done.

§. 4. To underſtand this aright, we muſt conler *wherein this making of theſe complex* Ideas *conſ*: and that is not in the making any new *Idea*, putting together thoſe which the Mind had before. Where the Mind does theſe three things: Firſt, It chuſes a certain umber. Secondly, It gives them connexion, and makes them o one *Idea*. Thirdly, It ties them together by a Name. If e examine how the Mind proceeds in theſe, and what Liberit takes in them, we ſhall eaſily obſerve, how theſe Eſſences the Species of mixed Modes, are the Workmanſhip of the ind; and conſequently, that the Species themſelves are of ens making.

Evidently arbitrary, that the Idea *is often before the Exiſtence.*

§. 5. No body can doubt, but that theſe *Ideas* of xed Modes, are made by a voluntary Collection *Ideas* put together in the Mind, independent m any original Patterns in Nature, who will t reflect, that this ſort of complex *Ideas* may be ade, abſtracted, and have names given them, and a Species be conſtituted, before any one individual of that Spes ever exiſted. Who can doubt, but the *Ideas* of *Sacrilege*, or *ultery*, might be framed in the Mind of Men, and have names ven them; and ſo theſe Species of mixed Modes be conſtituted, fore either of them was ever committed; and might be as well courſed of, and reaſoned about, and as certain Truths diſcored of them, whilſt yet they had no being but in the Underſtanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently eal Exiſtence? Whereby it is plain, how much *the ſorts of mixed des are the Creatures of the Underſtanding*, where they have a ng as ſubſervient to all the ends of real Truth and Knowledge, when they really exiſt: And we cannot doubt, but Lawkers have often made Laws about Species of Actions, which

were only the Creatures of their own Understandings; Beings that had no other existence, but in their own Minds. And, I think, no body can deny, but that the *Resurrection* was a Species of mixed Modes in the Mind, before it really existed.

Instances, Murder, Incest, Stabbing.

§. 6. To see *how arbitrarily these Essences of mixed Modes are made* by the Mind, we need but take a view of almost any of them. A little looking into them, will satisfie us, that 'tis the Mind, that combines several scattered independent *Ideas*, into one complex one; and by the common name it gives them, makes them the Essence of a certain Species, without regulating it self by any connexion they have in Nature. For what greater connexion in Nature, has the *Idea* of a Man, than the *Idea* of a Sheep, with Killing, that this is made a particular Species of Action, signified by the Word *Murder*; and the other not? Or what union there is in Nature, between the *Idea* of the Relation of a Father, with Killing, than that of a Son, or Neighbour; that those are combined into one complex *Idea*, and thereby made the Essence of the distinct Species *Parricide*, whilst the other make no distinct Species at all? But though they have made killing a Man's Father, or Mother, a distinct Species from killing his Son, or Daughter; yet in some other cases, Son and Daughter are taken in too, as well as Father and Mother; and they are all equally comprehended in the same Species, as in that of *Incest*. Thus the Mind in mixed Modes arbitrarily unites into complex *Ideas*, such as it finds convenient; whilst others that have altogether as much union in Nature, are left loose, and never combined into one *Idea*, because they have no need of one name. 'Tis evident then, that the Mind, by its free choice, gives a connexion to a certain number of *Ideas*; which in Nature have no more union with one another, than others that it leaves out: Why else is the part of the Weapon, the beginning of the Wound is made with, taken notice of, to make the distinct Species called *Stabbing*, and the Figure and Matter of the Weapon left out? I do not say, this is done without Reason, as we shall see more by and by; but this I say, that it is done, by the free choice of the Mind, pursuing its own ends; and that therefore these Species of mixed Modes, are the Workmanship of the Understanding: And there is nothing more evident, than that for the most part, in the framing these *Ideas*, the Mind searches not its Patterns in Nature, nor refers the *Ideas* it makes to the real Existence of Things; but puts such together, as may best serve its own Purposes, without tying

it

ſelf to a preciſe imitation of any thing that really exiſts.

§. 7. But though theſe complex *Ideas*, or *Eſſences of mixed Modes*, depend on the Mind, and are made it with great liberty; yet they *are not made at dom*, and jumbled together without any reaſon all. Though theſe complex *Ideas* be not always pied from Nature, yet they are always ſuited to e end for which abſtract *Ideas* are made: And though they Combinations made of *Ideas*, that are looſe enough, and have little union in themſelves, as ſeveral other, to which the ind never gives a connexion that combines them into one *Idea*; they are always made for the convenience of Communica-n, which is the chief end of Language. The uſe of Language by ſhort Sounds to ſignify with eaſe and diſpatch general nceptions; wherein not only abundance of particulars may contained, but alſo a great variety of independant *Ideas* col-ted into one complex one. In the making therefore of the ecies of mixed Modes, Men have had regard only to ſuch mbinations, as they had occaſion to mention one to another: noſe they have combined into diſtinct complex *Ideas*, and gi-n Names to; whilſt others that in Nature have as near a union, left looſe and unregarded. For to go no farther than hu-ne Actions themſelves, if they would make diſtinct abſtract *as*, of all the Varieties might be obſerved in them, the Num-t muſt be infinite, and the Memory confounded with the nty, as well as overcharged to little Purpoſe. It ſuffices, t Men make and name ſo many complex *Ideas* of theſe mixed odes, as they find they have occaſion to have names for, in ordinary occurrence of their Affairs. If they join to the *Idea* Killing, the *Idea* of Father, or Mother, and ſo make a di-nct Species from killing a Man's Son, or Neighbour, it is be-uſe of the different Heinouſneſs of the Crime, and the diſtinct niſhment is due to the murdering a Man's Father and Mother, ferent from what ought to be inflicted on the Murder of a n or Neighbour; and therefore they find it neceſſary to men-n it by a diſtinct Name, which is the end of making that di-nct Combination. But tho' the *Ideas* of Mother and Daugh-, are ſo differently treated, in reference to the *Idea* of Killing, t the one is joined with it to make a diſtinct abſtract *Idea* th a name, and ſo a diſtinct Species, and the other not; yet reſpect of carnal Knowledge, they are both taken in under eſt; and that ſtill for the ſame convenience of expreſſing un-r one Name, and reckoning of one Species, ſuch unclean Mix-

But ſtill ſubſervient to the end of Language.

tures, as have a peculiar turpitude beyond others; and this to avoid Circumlocutions, and tedious Descriptions.

Whereof the intranslatable Words of divers Languages are a proof.

§. 8. A moderate Skill *in different Languages*, will easily satisfy one of the truth of this, it being so obvious to observe great store of *Words in one* Language, *which have not any that answer them in another.* Which plainly shews, that those of one Country, by their customs and manner of Life, have found occasion to make several complex *Ideas*, and give Names to them, which others never collected into specifick *Ideas.* This could not have happened, if these Species were the steady Workmanship of Nature; and not Collections made and abstracted by the Mind, in order to naming, and for the convenience of Communication. The Terms of our Law, which are not empty Sounds, will hardly find Words that answer them in the Spanish or Italian, no scanty Languages; much less, I think, could any one translate them into the *Caribee*, or *Westoe* Tongues: And the *Versura* of the *Romans*, or *Corban* of the *Jews*, have no Words in other Languages to answer them: The reason whereof is plain, from what has been said. Nay, if we will look a little more nearly into this matter, and exactly compare different Languages, we shall find, that though they have Words, which in Translations and Dictionaries, are supposed to answer one another; yet there is scarce one of ten, amongst the Names of complex *Ideas*, especially of mixed Modes, that stands for the same precise *Idea*, which the Word does that in Dictionaries it is rendred by. There are no *Ideas* more common, and less compounded, than the Measures of Time, Extension, and Weight, and the Latin Names *Hora*, *Pes*, *Libra* are, without difficulty, rendred by the *English* Names, *Hour*, *Foot*, and *Pound*: But yet there is nothing more evident, than that the *Ideas* a *Roman* annexed to these Latin Names, were very far different from those which an *Englishman* expresses by those English ones. And if either of these should make use of the measures that those of the other Language design'd by their Names, he would be quite out in his account. These are too sensible proofs to be doubted; and we shall find this much more so, in the Names of more abstract and compounded *Ideas*; such as are the greatest part of those which make up Moral Discourses: Whose Names, when Men come curiously to compare, with those they are translated into, in other Languages, they will find very few of them exactly to correspond in the whole extent of their Significations.

§. 9.

§. 9. The reaſon why I take ſo particular No- e of this, is, that we may not be miſtaken about *era*, and *Species*, and their *Eſſences*, as if they re Things regularly and conſtantly made by ture, and had a real Exiſtence in things; when y appear, upon a more wary ſurvey, to be no- ng elſe but an Artifice of the Underſtanding, for eaſier ſignifying ſuch collections of *Ideas*, as it ſhould often ve occaſion to communicate by one general term; under ich divers particulars, as far forth as they agreed to that ab- act *Idea*, might be comprehended. And if the doubtful ſig- ication of the word *Species*, may make it ſound harſh to ſome, t I ſay, that the Species of mixed Modes are made by the derſtanding; yet, I think, it can by no body be denied, that the Mind makes thoſe abſtract complex *Ideas*, to which ſpe- ck Names are given. And if it be true, as it is, that the nd makes the Patterns, for ſorting and naming of Things, I ve it to be conſidered, who makes the Boundaries of the Sort, *Species*; ſince with me, *Species* and *Sort* have no other diffe- ce, than that of a Latin and Engliſh *Idiom*.

This ſhews Species to be made for Communication.

§. 10. *The near Relation* that there is *between cies, Eſſences, and* their *general Name*, at leaſt in *xed Modes*, will farther appear, when we con- r, that it is the Name that ſeems to preſerve ſe *Eſſences*, and give them their laſting duration. r the connexion between the looſe parts of thoſe nplex *Ideas*, being made by the Mind, this union, ich has no particular foundation in Nature, ud ceaſe again, were there not ſomething that , as it were, hold it together, and keep the parts from ſcat- ing. Though therefore it be the Mind that makes the Colle- on, 'tis the Name which is, as it were, the Knot, that ties m faſt together. What a vaſt variety of different *Ideas*, does Word *Triumphus* hold together, and deliver to us as one *Spe-* ! Had this Name been never made, or quite loſt, we might, doubt, have had deſcriptions of what paſſed in that Solem- y: But yet, I think, that which holds thoſe different parts ether, in the unity of one complex *Idea*, is that very Word nexed to it: without which, the ſeveral parts of that, would more be thought to make one thing, than any other ſhew, ich having never been made but once, had never been united o one complex *Idea*, under one denomination. How much refore, in mixed Modes, the unity neceſſary to any Eſſence,

In mixed Modes 'tis the Name that ties the Combination together, and makes it a Species.

depends

depends on the Mind; and how much the continuation and fixing of that Unity, depends on the Name in common use annexed to it, I leave to be considered by those, who look upon *Essences* and *Species*, as real established Things in Nature.

§. 11. Suitable to this, we find, that *Men speaking of mixed Modes, seldom* imagine or *take any other for Species of them, but such as are set out by name*: Because they being of Man's making only in order to naming, no such *Species* are taken notice of, or supposed to be, unless a *Name* be joined to it, as the Sign of Man having combined into one *Idea* several loose ones; and by that *Name*, giving a lasting Union to the Parts, which would otherwise cease to have any, as soon as the Mind laid by that abstract *Idea*, and ceased actually to think on it. But when a Name is once annexed to it, wherein the parts of that complex *Idea* have a settled and permanent Union; then is the *Essence*, as it were established, and the *Species* look'd on as compleat. For to what purpose should the Memory charge it self with such Compositions, unless it were by Abstraction to make them general? And to what purpose make them general, unless it were, that they might have general *Names*, for the convenience of Discourse and Communication? Thus we see, that killing a Man with a Sword, or a Hatchet, are looked on as no distinct Species of Action: But if the Point of the Sword first enter the Body, it passes for a distinct *Species*, where it has a distinct *Name*, as in *England*, in whose Language it is call'd *Stabbing*: But in another Country, where it has not happened to be specified under a peculiar *Name*, it passes not for a distinct *Species*. But in the *Species* of corporeal Substances, though it be the Mind that makes the nominal Essence: yet since those *Ideas*, which are combined in it, are supposed to have an Union in Nature, whether the Mind joins them or no, therefore those are looked on as distinct *Species*, without any operation of the Mind, either abstracting, or giving a *Name* to that complex *Idea*.

For the Originals of mixed Modes, we look no farther than the Mind, which also shews them to be the Workmanship of Understanding.

§. 12. Conformable also to what has been said concerning the *Essences* of the *Species* of *mixed Modes*, that they are the Creatures of the Understanding, rather than the Works of Nature: Conformable, I say, to this, we find, that *their Names lead our Thoughts to the Mind, and no farther.* When we speak of *Justice*, or *Gratitude*, we frame to our selves no Imagination of any thing existing, which we would conceive; but our Thoughts terminate in the abstract *Ideas* of those Vertues, and look

not

farther; as they do, when we ſpeak of a *Horſe*, or *Iron*, whoſe cifick *Ideas* we conſider not, as barely in the Mind, but as in ings themſelves, which afford the original Patterns of thoſe s. But in mixed Modes, at leaſt the moſt conſiderable parts hem, which are moral Beings, we conſider the original Pat- s, as being in the Mind; and to thoſe we refer for the di- guiſhing of particular Beings under Names. And hence I k it is, That theſe *Eſſences* of the *Species* of mixed Modes, by a more particular Name called *Notions*; as by a peculiar ht, appertaining to the Underſtanding.

Their being made by the Underſtanding without Patterns, ſhews the reaſon why they are ſo compounded.

§. 13. Hence likewiſe we may learn, *Why the plex* Ideas *of mixed Modes, are commonly more pounded and decompounded, than thoſe of natural ſtances.* Becauſe they being the Workmanſhip he Underſtanding, purſuing only its own ends, the conveniency of expreſſing in ſhort thoſe s it would make known to another, does with at liberty unite often into one abſtract *Idea* ings that in their Nature have no coherence; ſo under one Term, bundle together a great variety of npounded, and decompounded *Ideas*. Thus the Name of *ceſſion*, what a great mixture of independent *Ideas* of Perſons, bits, Tapers, Orders, Motions, Sounds, does it contain in t complex one, which the Mind of Man has arbitrarily put ether, to expreſs by that one Name? Whereas the complex s of the ſorts of Subſtances, are uſually made up of only a ll number of ſimple ones; and in the *Species* of Animals, ſe two, *viz.* Shape and Voice, commonly make the whole ninal Eſſence.

Names of mixed Modes, ſtand always for their real Eſſences.

§. 14. Another thing we may obſerve from at has been ſaid, is, That *the Names of mixed des always ſignify* (when they have any deter- ned Signification) *the real Eſſences of their Species.* theſe abſtract *Ideas*, being the Workmanſhip he Mind, and not referred to the real Exiſtence Things, there is no ſuppoſition of any thing more ſignified that Name, but barely that complex *Idea*, the Mind it ſelf formed, which is all it would have expreſs'd by it; and is t, on which all the properties of the *Species* depend and from ich alone they all flow: and ſo in theſe the *real* and *nominal* ence is the ſame; which of what Concernment it is to the tain Knowledge of general Truth, we ſhall ſee hereafter.

§. 15.

Why their Names are usually got before their Ideas.

§. 15. This also may shew us the Reason, *Why for the most part the Names of mixed Modes are got before the* Ideas *they stand for are perfectly known.* Because there being no *Species*, of these ordinarily taken notice of, but what have Names; and those *Species*, or rather their Essences, being abstract complex *Ides* made arbitrarily by the Mind, it is convenient, i not necessary, to know the Names, before one endeavour t frame these complex *Ideas*: unless a Man will fill his Head wit a Company of abstract complex *Ideas*, which others having n Names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by, and forge again. I confess, that in the beginning of Languages, it wa necessary to have the *Idea*, before one gave it the Name: An so it is still, where making a new complex *Idea*, one also, b giving it a new Name, makes a new Word. But this concern not Languages made, which have generally pretty well provide for *Ideas*, which Men have frequent Occasion to have, and com municate: And in such, I ask, whether it be not the ordinar Method, that Children learn the Names of mixed Modes, befor they have their *Ideas*? What one of a thousand ever frames th abstract *Idea* of *Glory* and *Ambition* before he has heard th Names of them. In simple *Ideas* and Substances, I grant it otherwise; which being such *Ideas*, as have a real Existen and Union in Nature, the *Ideas*, or Names, are got one befo the other, as it happens.

Reason of my being so large on this Subject.

§. 16. What has been said here of mixed Mode is with very little difference applicable also to R lations; which since every Man himself may o serve, I may spare my self the Pains to enlarge o Especially, since what I have here said concernin Words in this Third Book, will possibly be thoug by some to be much more than what so slight a Subject require I allow, it might be brought into a narrower Compass: But was willing to stay my Reader on an Argument, that appears me new, and a little out of the way, (I am sure 'tis one, thought not of, when I began to write,) That by searching to the bottom, and turning it on every side, some part or oth might meet with every one's Thoughts, and give occasion to t most averse, or negligent, to reflect on a general Miscarriag which, though of great consequence, is little taken notice When it is considered, what a pudder is made about *Essences*, a how much all sorts of Knowledge, Discourse, and Conver tion, are pester'd and disorder'd by the careless, and confus

and Application of Words, it will, perhaps, be thought th while throughly to lay it open. And I shall be pardon'd, have dwelt long on an Argument, which I think therefore ds to be inculcated; because the Faults, Men are usually ty of in this kind, are not only the greatest hinderances of Knowledge; but are so well thought of, as to pass for it. n would often see what a small pittance of Reason and Truth, ossibly none at all, is mixed with those huffing Opinions they swell'd with; if they would but look beyond fashionable nds, and observe what *Ideas* are, or are not comprehended er those Words, with which they are so armed at all points, with which they so confidently lay about them. I shall gine I have done some Service to Truth, Peace, and Learn- if, by any enlargement on this Subject, I can make Men ct on their own Use of Language; and give them Reason spect, that since it is frequent for others, it may also be pos- for them, to have sometimes very good and approved rds in their Mouths, and Writings, with very uncertain, , or no signification. And therefore it is not unreasonable hem to be wary herein themselves, and not to be unwilling ve them examined by others. With this design therefore, ll go on with what I have farther to say, concerning this er.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Names of Substances.

The common Names of Substances stand for Sorts.

THE *common Names of Substances*, as well as other general Terms, *stand for Sorts*: which is nothing else but the made signs of such complex *Ideas*, wherein se- particular Substances do, or might agree, by e of which, they are capable or being com- nded in one common Conception, and be signified by one e. I say, do or might agree: for though there be but one xisting in the World, yet the *Idea* of it being abstracted, t more Substances (if there were several) might each a- in it; it is as much a Sort, as if there were as many Suns re are Stars. They want not their Reasons, who think there

there are, and that each fixed Star, would answer the *Idea* t Name *Sun* stands for, to one who were placed in a due distanc which, by the way, may shew us how much the Sorts, or, you please, *Genera* and *Species* of Things (for those Latin Ter signify to me, no more than the English word *Sort*) depend such Collections of *Ideas*, as Men have made; and not on t real Nature of Things: since 'tis not impossible, but that propriety of Speech, that might be a Sun to one, which is Star to another.

The Essence of each sort is the abstract Idea.

§. 2. The measure and boundary of each So or *Species*, whereby it is constituted that particul Sort, and distinguished from others, is that we c its *Essence*, which *is* nothing but that *abstract* Id *to which the Name is annexed*: So that every thi contained in that *Idea*, is essential to that So This, though it be all the *Essence* of natural Substances, that know, or by which we distinguish them into Sorts; yet I c it by a peculiar Name, the *nominal Essence*, to distinguish it fr that real Constitution of Substances, upon which depends t *nominal Essence*, and all the Properties of that Sort; which the fore, as has been said, may be called the *real Essence*: *v. g.* t *nominal Essence* of *Gold*, is that complex *Idea* the word *Gold* stan for, let it be, for instance, a Body yellow, of a certain weigh malleable, fusible, and fixed. But the *real Essence* is the Cons tution of the insensible parts of that Body, on which those Q lities, and all the other Properties of *Gold* depend. How t these two are different, though they are both called *Essence*, obvious, at first sight, to discover.

The nominal and real Essence different.

§. 3. For though, perhaps, voluntary Motio with Sense and Reason, join'd to a Body of a c tain Shape, be the complex *Idea*, to which I, a others, annex the Name *Man*; and so be the *minal Essence* of the *Species* so called: yet no bo will say, that that complex *Idea* is the *real Esse* and Source of all those Operations, which are to be found in Individual of that Sort. The foundation of all those Qualiti which are the Ingredients of our complex *Idea*, is something qu different: And had we such a Knowledge of that Constituti of *Man*, from which his Faculties of Moving, Sensation, and Re soning, and other Powers flow; and on which his so regul shape depends, as 'tis possible Angels have, and 'tis certain h Maker has, we should have a quite other *Idea* of his *Essen* than what now is contained in our Definition of that *Specie*

t what it will: And our *Idea* of any individual *Man* would s far different from what it now is, as is his, who knows the Springs and Wheels, and other contrivances within, of famous Clock at *Strasburg*, from that which a gazing Coun-man has of it, who barely sees the motion of the Hand, and 's the Clock strike, and observes only some of the outward earances.

Nothing essential to Individuals.

4. That *Essence*, in the ordinary use of the d, relates to *Sorts*, and that it is considered in icular Beings, no farther than as they are rank-nto *Sorts*, appears from hence: That take but y the abstract *Ideas*, by which we sort Individuals, and rank n under common Names, and then the thought of any thing *tial* to any of them, instantly vanishes: we have no notion ne one, without the other: which plainly shews their rela-. 'Tis necessary for me to be as I am; GOD and Nature made me so: But there is nothing I have, is essential to me. Accident, or Disease, may very much alter my Colour, or pe; a Fever, or Fall, may take away my Reason or Me-y, or both; and an Apoplexy leave neither Sense, nor Un-tanding, no, nor Life. Other Creatures of my shape, may nade with more, and better, or fewer, and worse Faculties I have: and others may have Reason and Sense in a shape body very different from mine. None of these are essential ne one, or the other, or to any Individual whatsoever, till Mind refers it to some Sort or *Species* of things; and then ently, according to the abstract *Idea* of that sort, something und *essential*. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and vill find, that as soon as he supposes or speaks of *Essential*, consideration of some *Species*, or the complex *Idea*, signified ome general Name, comes into his Mind: And 'tis in refe-e to that, that this or that Quality is said to be *essential*. So if it be asked, whether it be *essential* to me, or any other icular corporeal Being to have Reason? I say no; no more it is *essential* to this white thing I write on, to have Words . But if that particular Being be to be counted of the Sort , and to have the Name *Man* given it, then Reason is *essen-*to it, supposing Reason to be a part of the complex *Idea* the he *Man* stands for: as it is *essential* to this thing I write on ontain Words, if I will give it the Name *Treatise*, and rank nder that *Species*. So that *essential, and not essential, relate only r abstract Ideas, and the Names annexed to them*; which a-nts to no more but this, That what ever particular Thing,

has

has not in it those Qualities, which are contained in the abstract *Idea*, which any general Term stands for, cannot be ranked under that *Species*, nor be called by that Name, since that abstract *Idea* is the very *Essence* of that *Species*.

§. 5. Thus if the *Idea* of *Body*, with some People, be bare Extention or Space, then Solidity is not *essential* to Body: If others make the *Idea*, to which they give the Name *Body*, to be Solidity and Extension, then Solidity is essential to *Body*. That therefore, and *that alone is* considered as *essential*, *which makes a part of the complex* Idea *the Name of a Sort stands for*, without which, no particular Thing can be reckoned of that Sort, nor be intituled to that Name. Should there be found a parcel of Matter, that had all the other Qualities that are in *Iron*, but wanted Obedience to the Load-stone; and would neither be drawn by it, nor receive Direction from it, Would any one question, whether it wanted any thing *essential*? It would be absurd to ask, Whether a thing really existing, wanted any thing *essential* to it. Or could it be demanded, Whether this made an *essential* or *specifick* difference, or no; since we have no other measure of *essential* or *specifick*, but our abstract *Ideas*? And to talk of specifick Difference in Nature, without reference to general *Ideas* and Names, is to talk unintelligibly. For I would ask any one, What is sufficient to make an *essential* difference in Nature, between any two particular Beings, without any regard had to some abstract *Idea* which is looked upon as the Essence and Standard of a *Species*. All such Patterns and Standards, being quite laid aside, particular Beings, considered barely in themselves, will be found to have all their Qualities equally *essential*; and every thing, in each Individual, will be *essential* to it, or, which is more, nothing at all. For though it may be reasonable to ask, Whether obeying the Magnet, be *essential* to *Iron*? yet, I think, it is very improper and insignificant to ask, Whether it be *essential* to the particular parcel of Matter, I cut my Pen with, without considering it under the Name *Iron*, or as being of a certain *Species*? And if, as has been said, our abstract *Ideas*, which have Names annexed to them, are the Boundaries of *Species*, nothing can be *essential* but what is contained in those *Ideas*.

§. 6. 'Tis true, I have often mentioned a *real Essence*, distinct in Substances, from those abstract *Ideas* of them, which I call the *nominal Essence*. By this *real Essence*, I mean, that real constitution of any Thing, which is the foundation of all those Properties, that are combined in, and are constantly found to co exist with the *nominal Essence*; that particular constitution, which ever

Thin

ng has within it self, without any relation to any thing hout it. But *Essence*, even in this sense, *relates to a Sort*, and poses a *Species*: For being that real Constitution, on which Properties depend, it necessarily supposes a sort of Things, perties belonging only to *Species*, and not to Individuals; *v. g.* posing the nominal Essence of *Gold*, to be Body of such a liar Colour and Weight, with Malleability and Fusibility, real Essence is that Constitution of the parts of Matter, on ch these Qualities, and their Union, depend; and is also the ndation of its Solubility in *Aq. Regia*, and other Properties ac- panying that complex *Idea*. Here are *Essences* and *Proper-* but all upon supposition of a Sort, or general abstract *Idea*, ch is considered as immutable: but there is no individual par- of Matter, to which any of these Qualities are so annexed, as e *essential* to it, or inseparable from it. That which is *es- ial*, belongs to it as a Condition, whereby it is of this or that : But take away the consideration of its being ranked under Name of some abstract *Idea*, and then there is nothing neces- to it, nothing inseparable from it. Indeed, as to the *real Es- s* of Substances, we only suppose their Being, without pre- ly knowing what they are: But that which annexes them still he *Species*, is the nominal Essence, of which they are the sup- ed foundation and cause.

The nominal essence bounds the Species.

. 7. The next thing to be considered is, by which nose Essences it is, that *Substances are determined* Sorts, or *Species*; and that 'tis evident, is *by the inal Essence*. For 'tis that alone, that the Name, ich is the mark of the Sort, signifies. 'Tis impossible there- , that any thing should determine the Sorts of Things, which rank under general Names, but that *Idea*, which that Name lesign'd as a mark for; which is that, as has been shewn, ich we call the *Nominal Essence*. Why do we say, This is a se, and that a *Mule*; this is an *Animal*, that an *Herb*? How nes any particuliar Thing to be of this or that *Sort*, but because as that nominal Essence, or, which is all one, agrees to that tract *Idea*, that Name is annexed to? And I desire any one to reflect on his own Thoughts, when he hears or speaks any those, or other Names of Substances, to know what sort of *nces* they stand for.

. 8. And that the *Species of Things to us, are nothing but the king them under distinct Names, according to the complex* Ideas *in us*; not according to precise, distinct, real *Essences* in them, is

plain from hence, That we find many of the Individuals that are rank'd into one Sort, call'd by one common Name, and so receiv'd as being of one *Species*, have yet Qualities depending on their real Constitutions, as far different one from another, as from others, from which they are accounted to differ *specifically*. This, as it is easy to be observed by all, who have to do with natural Bodies; so Chymists especially are often, by sad Experience, convinced of it, when they, sometimes in vain, seek for the same Qualities in one parcel of Sulphur, Antimony, or Vitriol, which they have found in others. For though they are Bodies of the same *Species*, having the same nominal *Essence*, under the same Name; yet do they often, upon severe ways of Examination, betray Qualities so different one from another, as to frustrate the Expectation and Labour of very wary Chymists. But if Things were distinguished into *Species*, according to their real Essences, it would be as impossible to find different Properties in any two individual Substances of the same *Species*, as it is to find different Properties in two Circles, or two equilateral Triangles. That is properly the *Essence* to us, which determines every particular to this or that *Classis*; or, which is the same Thing, to this or that general Name: And what can that be else, but that abstract *Idea*, to which that Name is annexed? and so has, in truth, a reference, not so much to the Being of particular Things, as to their general Denominations.

Not the real Essence which we know not.

§. 9. Nor indeed *can we* rank, and *sort Things*, and consequently (which is the end of Sorting) denominate them *by their real Essences*, because we know them not. Our Faculties carry us no farther towards the knowledge and distinction of Substances, than a Collection of those sensible *Ideas*, which we observe in them; which however made with the greatest diligence and exactness, we are capable of, yet is more remote from the true internal Constitution, from which those Qualities flow, than, as I said, a Countryman's *Idea* is from the inward contrivance of that famous Clock at *Strasburg*, whereof he only sees the outward Figure and Motion. There is not so contemptible a Plant or Animal, that does not confound the most inlarged Understanding. Though the familiar use of Things about us, take off our Wonder; yet it cures not our Ignorance. When we come to examine the Stones, we tread on; or the Iron, we daily handle, we presently find, we know not their Make; and can give no Reason, of the different Qualities we find in them. 'Tis evident the internal Constitution, whereon their Properties depend, is unknown to us.

For to go no farther than the grossest and most obvious we imagine amongst them, What is that Texture of Parts, that *Essence*, that makes Lead and Antimony fusible; Wood and es not? What makes Lead, and Iron malleable; Antimony Stones not? And yet how infinitely these come short, of the Contrivances, and unconceivable *real Essences* of Plants or nals, every one knows. The Workmanship of the All-wise, Powerful God, in the great Fabrick of the Universe, and y part thereof, farther exceeds the Capacity and Compre-ion of the most inquisitive and intelligent Man, than the contrivance of the most ingenious Man, doth the Concepti-f the most ignorant of rational Creatures. Therefore we in pretend to range Things into Sorts, and dispose them into ain Classes, under Names, by their *real Essences*, that are so rom our discovery or comprehension. A blind Man may as sort Things by their Colours, and he that has lost his Smell, ell distinguish a Lily and a Rose by their Odors, as by those nal Constitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he distinguish Sheep and Goats by their real Essences, that are nown to him, may be pleased to try his Skill in those *Species*, d *Cassiowary*, and *Querechinchio*; and by their internal real nces, determine the Boundaries of those *Species*, without wing the complex *Idea* of sensible Qualities, that each of e Names stand for, in the Countries where those Animals o be found.

Not substantial forms which we know less.

10. Those therefore who have been taught, the several *Species* of Substances had their di-t internal *substantial Forms*; and that it was e *Forms*, which made the distinction of Sub-ces into their true *Species* and *Genera*, were led farther out of the way, by having their Minds set upon less Enquiries after *substantial Forms*, wholly unintelligible, whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure, or con-d Conception in general.

That the nominal Essence is that whereby we distinguish Species farther evident from Spirits.

11. That our *ranking*, and distinguishing natu-*Substances into Species, consists in the Nominal Essences* Mind makes, and not in the real Essences to be d in the Things themselves, is farther evident n our *Ideas* of *Spirits*. For the Mind getting, by reflecting on its own Operations, those sim-*Ideas* which it attributes to *Spirits*, it hath, or have no other Notion of *Spirit*, but by attribu-all those Operations, it finds in it self, to a sort

of Beings, without consideration of Matter. And even the most advanced Notion we have of God, is but attributing the same simple *Ideas* which we have got from Reflection on what we find in our selves, and which we conceive to have more Perfection in them, than would be in their absence, attributing, I say, those simple *Ideas* to him in an unlimited degree. Thus having got from reflecting on our selves, the *Idea* of Existence, Knowledge, Power, and Pleasure, each of which we find it better to have than to want; and the more we have of each, the better; joyning all these together, with infinity to each of them, we have the complex *Idea* of an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, infinitely wise, and happy Being. And though we are told, that there are different *Species of Angels*; yet we know not how to frame distinct specifick *Ideas* of them; not out of any Conceit, that the Existence of more *Species* than one of *Spirits*, is impossible; But because having no more simple *Ideas* (nor being able to frame more) applicable to such Beings, but only those few, taken from our selves, and from the Actions of our own Minds in thinking, and being delighted, and moving several parts of our Bodies; we can no otherwise distinguish in our Conceptions the several *Species of Spirits*, one from another, but by attributing those Operations and Powers we find in our selves, to them in a higher or lower degree; and so have no very distinct specifick *Ideas* of *Spirits*, except only of GOD, to whom we attribute both Duration, and all those other *Ideas* with Infinity; to the other *Spirits*, with limitation: Nor as I humbly conceive do we, between GOD and them in our *Ideas*, put any difference by any number of simple *Ideas*, which we have of one, and not of the other, but only that of Infinity. All the particular *Ideas* of Existence, Knowledge, Will, Power, and Motion, &c. being *Ideas* derived from the Operations of our Minds, we attribute all of them to all sorts of *Spirits*, with the difference only of degrees, to the utmost we can imagine, even Infinity, when we would frame, as well as we can, an *Idea* of the first Being; who yet, 'tis certain, is infinitely more remote in the real Excellency of his Nature, from the highest and perfectest of all created Beings, than the greatest Man, nay, purest Seraphim, is from the most contemptible part of Matter; and consequently must infinitely exceed what our narrow Understandings can conceive of him.

Whereof there are probably numberless Species.

§. 12. It is not impossible to conceive, nor repugnant to reason, that there may be many *Species of Spirits*, as much separated and diversifie-

ified one from another, by distinct Properties, whereof we e no *Ideas*, as the *Species* of sensible Things are distinguish- one from another, by Qualities, which we know, and ob- e in them. That there should be more *Species* of intelli- t Creatures above us, than there are of sensible and mate- below us, is probable to me from hence; That in all the ole corporeal World, we see no Chasms, or no Gaps. All e down from us, the descent is by easy steps, and a conti- d series of Things, that in each remove, differ very little from the other. There are Fishes that have Wings, and not Strangers to the airy Region: and there are some Birds, are Inhabitants of the Water; whose Blood is cold as Fishes, their Flesh so like in taste, that the scrupulous are allowed n on Fish-days. There are Animals so near of kin both to ls and Beasts, that they are in the middle between both: Am- bious Animals link the Terrestrial and Aquatique together; s live at Land and at Sea, and Porpoises have the warm Blood Entrails of a Hog, not to mention what is confidently repor- of Mermaids, or Sea-men. There are some Brutes, that n to have as much Knowledge and Reason, as some that are ed Men: and the Animal and Vegetable Kingdoms are so tly join'd, that if you will take the lowest of one, and the iest of the other, there will scarce be perceived any great erence between them; and so on till we come to the lowest the most inorganical parts of Matter, we shall find every- re, that the several *Species* are linked together, and differ in almost insensible degrees. And when we consider the in- e Power and Wisdom of the Maker, we have reason to k, that it is suitable to the magnificent Harmony of the verse, and the great Design and infinite Goodness of the hitect, that the *Species* of Creatures should also, by gentle rees, ascend upward from us toward his infinite Perfection, e see they gradually descend from us downwards: Which if probable, we have reason then to be perswaded, that there ar more *Species* of Creatures above us, than there are beneath; being in degrees of perfection, much more remote from the nite Being of GOD, than we are from the lowest state of ng, and that which approaches nearest to nothing. And yet l those distinct *Species*, for the reasons above-said, we have lear distinct *Ideas*.

The nominal Essence that of the Species, proved from Water and Ice.

§. 13. But to return to the *Species* of poreal Substances. If I should ask any whether *Ice* and *Water* were two distinct

Species of Things, I doubt not but I should be answered in the affirmative: And it cannot be denied, but he that says they are two distinct *Species*, is in the right. But if an *English-man*, bred in *Jamaica*, who, perhaps, had never seen nor heard of Ice, coming into *England* in the Winter, find, the Water he put in his Bason at night, in a great part frozen in the Morning; and not knowing any peculiar Name it had, should call it harden'd Water; I ask, Whether this would be a new *Species* to him, different from Water? And, I think, it would be answered here, It would not be to him a new *Species*, no more than congealed Gelly, when it is cold, is a distinct *Species*, from the same Gelly fluid and warm; or that liquid Gold, in the Furnace, is a distinct *Species* from hard Gold in the Hands of a Workman. And if this be so, 'tis plain, that our *distinct Species*, *are nothing but distinct complex* Ideas, *with distinct Names annexed to them*. 'Tis true, every Substance that exists, has its peculiar Constitution, whereon depend those sensible Qualities, and Powers, we observe in it: But the ranking of Things into *Species*, which is nothing but sorting them under several Titles, is done by us according to the *Ideas* that we have of them: Which tho' sufficient to distinguish them by Names; so that we may be able to discourse of them, when we have them not present before us; yet if we suppose it to be done by their real internal Constitution, and that Things existing are distinguished by Nature into Species by real Essences, according as we distinguish them into *Species* by Names, we shall be liable to great Mistakes.

Difficulties against a certain number of real Essences

§. 14. To distinguish substantial Beings into *Species*, according to the usual supposition, that there are certain precise *Essences* or *Forms* of Things, whereby all the Individuals existing, are, by Nature distinguished into *Species*, these Things are necessary:

§. 15. *First*, To be assured, that Nature, in the production of Things, always designs them to partake of certain regulated established *Essences*, which are to be the Models of all Things to be produced. This, in that crude Sense, it is usually proposed, would need some better Explication, before it can be assented to.

§. 16. *Secondly*, It would be necessary to know, whether Nature always attains that *Essence*, it designs in the production of Things. The irregular and monstrous Births, that in divers sorts of Animals have been observed, will always give us reason to doubt of one, or both of these.

Thirdly,

§. 17. *Thirdly*, It ought to be determined, whether those
call *Monsters*, be really a distinct *Species*, according to the
plastick notion of the word *Species*; since it is certain, that
ry thing that exists, has its particular Constitution: And yet
find, that some of these monstrous Productions, have few or
ne of those Qualities, which are supposed to result from, and
ompany the *Essence* of that *Species*, from whence they seem
belong.

§. 18. *Fourthly*, The *real Essences* of those Things, which we distinguish into *Species*, and as so distinguished we name, ought to be known; *i. e.* we ght to have *Ideas* of them. But since we are ignorant in these four points, *the supposed real Essences Things, stand us not instead for the distinguishing stances into Species.* *Our nominal Essences of Substances, not perfect Collections of Properties.*

§. 19. *Fifthly*, The only imaginable help in this case would that having framed perfect complex *Ideas* of the *Properties* things, flowing from their different real Essences, we should reby distinguish them into *Species*. But neither can this be ne: for being ignorant of the real Essence it self, it is impossi- to know all those Properties that flow from it, and are so nexed to it, that any one of them being away, we may cer- nly conclude, that that Essence is not there, and so the Thing ot of that *Species*. We can never know what are the pre- number of Properties depending on the real Essence of *Gold*, one of which failing, the real Essence of Gold, and con- uently Gold, would not be there, unless we knew the real ence of Gold it self, and by that determined that *Species*. the Word *Gold* here, I must be understood to design a parti- ar piece of Matter; *v. g.* the last Guinea that was coin'd. r if it should stand here in its ordinary Signification for that nplex *Idea* which I or any one else calls Gold; *i. e.* for the minal Essence of Gold, it would be *Jargon*: so hard is it, to w the various meaning and imperfection of Words, when we ve nothing else but Words to do it by.

§. 20. By all which it is clear, That our *distinguishing Subnces into Species* by Names, *is not* at all *founded on their real ences*; nor can we pretend to range, and determine them actly into Species, according to internal essential differences.

§. 21. But since, as has been remarked, we ve need of general Words, tho' we know not e real Essences of Things; all we can do, is to llect such a number of simple *Ideas*, as by *But such a Collection as our Names stands for.*

Examination, we find to be united together in Things existing, and thereof to make one complex *Idea*. Which though it be not the real Essence of any Substance that exists, is yet *the specifick Essence*, to which our Name belongs, and is convertible with it; by which we may at least try the Truth of these nominal Essences. For Example, there be that say, that the Essence of *Body* is Extension: If it be so, we can never mistake in putting the Essence of any thing for the Thing it self. Let us then in Discourse, put *Extension* for *Body*; and when we would say, that Extension moves, and see how it will look. He that should say, that one Extension, by impulse moves another extension, would, by the bare Expression, sufficiently shew the absurdity of such a Notion. The *Essence* of any thing, in respect of us, is the whole complex *Idea*, comprehended and marked by that Name; and in Substances, besides the several distinct simple *Ideas* that make them up, the confused one of Substance, or of an unknown Support and Cause of their Union, is always a part: And therefore the Essence of Body is not bare Extension, but an extended solid thing; and so to say, an extended solid thing moves, or impels another, is all one, and as intelligible, as to say, *Body* moves or impels. Likewise, to say, that a rational Animal is capable of Conversation, is all one, as to say, a *Man*. But no one will say That Rationality is capable of Conversation, because it makes not the whole Essence, to which we give the Name Man.

Our abstract Ideas are to us the measures of Species, instance in that of Man.

§. 22. There are Creatures in the World, that have shapes like ours, but hairy, and want Language, and Reason. There are Naturals amongst us, that have perfectly our shape, but want Reason and some of them Language too. There are Creatures, as 'tis said, (*sit fides penes Authorem*, but there appears no contradiction, that there should be such) that with Language, and Reason, and a shape in other Things agreeing with ours, have hairy Tails; others where the Males have no Beards, and others where the Females have. If it be asked, whether these be all *Men*, or no, all of humane *Species*; 'tis plain, the Question refers only to the nominal Essence: For those of them to whom the definition of the Word *Man*, or the complex *Idea* signified by Name, agrees, are *Men*, and the other not. But if the Enquiry be made concerning the supposed real Essence; and whether the internal Constitution and Frame of these several Creatures be specifically different, it is wholly impossible for us to answer, no part of that going into our specifick *Idea*: only we have Reason to think, that where the

Faculties

ulties, or outward Frame so much differs, the internal Con-
ution is not exactly the same: But, what difference in the
rnal real Constitution makes a specifick difference, it is in
n to enquire; whilst *our measures of Species* be, as they *are*, *only*
bstract Ideas, which we know; and not that internal Consti-
on, which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of
ir only on the Skin, be a mark of a different internal specifick
nstitution between a Changeling and a Drill, when they a-
e in Shape, and want of Reason and Speech? And shall not
want of Reason and Speech, be a sign to us of different real
nstitutions and *Species* between a Changeling, and a reason-
e Man? And so of the rest, if we pretend, that the distin-
n of *Species* or Sorts is fixedly established by the real Frame,
secret Constitutions of things.

Species not distinguished by Generation.

. 23. Nor let any one say, that the power of
pagation in Animals by the mixture of Male
Female, and in Plants by Seeds, keeps the
posed real *Species* distinct and entire. For grant-
this to be true, it would help us in the distin-
n of the *Species* of things no farther than the Tribes of A-
nals and Vegetables. What must we do for the rest? But in
se too it is not sufficient: for if History lie not, Women
e conceived by Drills; and what real *Species*, by that measure,
n a Production will be in Nature, will be a new Question;
we have Reason to think this not impossible, since Mules
Jumarts, the one from the mixture of an Ass and a Mare,
other from the mixture of a Bull and a Mare, are so fre-
nt in the World. I once saw a Creature that was the Issue
Cat and a Rat, and had the plain Marks of both about it;
erein Nature appear'd to have followed the Pattern of nei-
sort alone, but to have jumbled them both together. To
ch, he that shall add the monstrous Productions, that are so
uently to be met with in Nature, will find it hard, even in the
e of Animals, to determine by the Pedigree of what *Species*
ry Animal's Issue is; and be at a loss about the real Essence,
ch he thinks certainly conveyed by Generation, and has alone
ght to the specifick Name. But farther, if the *Species* of Ani-
s and Plants are to be distinguished only by Propagation, must
to the *Indies* to see the Sire and Dam of the one, and the
nt from which the Seed was gather'd, that produced the other,
know whether this be a Tyger or that Tea?

Not by substantial forms.

. 24. Upon the whole matter, 'tis evident,
't 'tis their own Collections of sensible Qua-

lities,

lities, that Men make the Essences of their several sorts of Substances; and that their real internal Structures, are not considered by the greatest part of Men, in the sorting them. Much less were any *substantial Forms* ever thought on by any, but those who have in this one part of the World, learned the Language of the Schools: and yet those ignorant Men, who pretend not any insight into the real Essences, nor trouble themselves about substantial Forms, but are content with knowing Things one from another, by their sensible Qualities, are often better acquainted with their Differences; can more nicely distinguish them from their uses; and better know what they may expect from each, than those learned quick-sighted Men, who look so deep into them, and talk so confidently of something more hidden and essential.

The specifick Essences are made by the Mind.

§. 25. But supposing that the *real Essences* of Substances were discoverable, by those, that would severely apply themselves to that Enquiry; yet we could not reasonably think, that the *ranking of things under general Names, was regulated by* those internal real Constitutions, or any thing else but *their obvious appearances.* Since Languages, in all Countries, have been established long before Sciences. So that they have not been Philosophers, or Logicians, or such who have troubled themselves about *Forms* and *Essences*, that have made the general Names, that are in use amongst the several Nations of Men: But those, more or less comprehensive terms, have for the most part in all Languages, received their Birth and Signification, from ignorant and illiterate People, who sorted and denominated Things, by those sensible Qualities they found in them, thereby to signify them, when absent, to others, whether they had an Occasion to mention a Sort, or a particular Thing.

Therefore very various and uncertain.

§. 26. Since then it is evident, that we sort and name Substances by their *nominal*, and not by their real *Essences*; the next thing to be considered is, how, and by whom these *Essences* come to be made. As to the latter, 'tis evident they *are made by the Mind*, and not by Nature: For were they Nature's Workmanship, they could not be so various and different in several Men, as experience tells us, they are. For if we will examine it, we shall not find the nominal Essence of any one *Species* of Substances, in all Men the same; no not of that, which of all others we are the most intimately acquainted with. It could not possibly be, that the abstract *Idea*, to which the Name

May

an is given, should be different in several Men, if it were of ature's making; and that to one it should be *Animal rationale*, d to another, *Animal implume bipes latis unguibus.* He that anxes the Name *Man*, to a complex *Idea*, made up of Sense and ontaneous Motion, join'd to a Body of such a Shape, has there- one Essence of the *Species Man*: And he that, upon farther amination, adds Rationality, as another Essence of the *Species* calls *Man*: By which means, the same individual will be a ie *Man* to the one, which is not so to the other. I think, ere is scarce any one will allow this upright Figure, so well own, to be the essential difference of the *Species Man*; and t how far Men determine of the sorts of Animals, rather by eir Shape, than Descent, is very visible; since it has been more an once debated, whether several humane *Fœtus* should be eserved, or received to Baptism, or no, only because of the ference of their outward Configuration, from the ordinary ake of Children, without knowing whether they were not capable of Reason, as Infants cast in another Mould: Some hereof, though of an approved shape, are never capable of as ich appearance of Reason, all their Lives, as is to be found an Ape, or an Elephant; and never give any signs of being ted by a rational Soul. Whereby it is evident, that the outard Figure, which only was found wanting, and not the Faty of Reason, which no body could know would be wanting its due Season, was made essential to the humane *Species*. The arned Divine and Lawyer, must, on such occasions, renounce s sacred Definition of *Animal Rationale*, and substitute some oer Essence of the humane *Species*. Monsieur *Menage* furnishes with an Example worth the taking notice of on this occasion. *hen the Abbot of St. Martin*, says he, *was born, he had so little of e Figure of a Man, that it bespake him rather a Monster. 'Twas for ne time under Deliberation, whether he should be baptized or no. owever, he was baptized and declared a Man provisionally* [till me should shew what he would prove.] *Nature had moulded m so untowardly, that he was called all his Life the Abbot Malotru*, e. Ill-shaped. *He was of* Caen. Menagiana $\frac{2}{4}\frac{7}{5}\frac{8}{0}$. This Child e see was very near being excluded out of the *Species* of *Man*, rely by his Shape. He escaped very narrowly as he was, and s certain a Figure a little more odly turn'd had cast him, and had been executed as a thing not to be allowed to pass for a an. And yet there can be no Reason given, why if the Liaments of his Face had been a little alter'd, a rational Soul uld not have been lodg'd in him; why a Visage somewhat longer

longer, or a Nose flatter, or a wider Mouth could not have consisted, as well as the rest of his ill Figure, with such a Soul, such Parts, as made him, disfigured as he was, capable to be a Dignitary in the Church.

§. 27. Wherein then, would I gladly know, consists the precise and *unmoveable Boundaries of* that *Species?* 'Tis plain, if we examine, there is *no* such thing *made by Nature*, and established by Her amongst Men. The real Essence of that, or any other sort of Substances, 'tis evident we know not; and therefore are so undetermined in our nominal Essences, which we make ourselves, that if several Men were to be asked, concerning some odly-shaped *Fœtus*, as soon as born, whether it were a *Man*, or no, 'tis past doubt, one should meet with different Answers. Which could not happen, if the nominal Essences, whereby we limit and distinguish the *Species* of Substances, were not made by Man, with some liberty; but were exactly copied from precise Boundaries set by Nature, whereby it distinguish'd all Substances into certain *Species*. Who would undertake to resolve what *Species* that Monster was of, which is mentioned by *Licetus lib.* 1. *c.* 3. with a Man's Head and Hog's Body? Or those other, which to the Bodies of Men, had the Heads of Beasts, as Dogs, Horses, *&c.* If any of these Creatures had lived, and could have spoke, it would have increased the difficulty. Had the upper part, to the middle, been of humane Shape, and all below Swine; Had it been Murder to destroy it? Or must the Bishop have been consulted, whether it were Man enough to be admitted to the Font, or no? As I have been told, it happen'd in *France* some Years since, in somewhat a like case. So uncertain are the Boundaries of *Species* of Animals to us, who have no other Measures, than the complex *Ideas* of our own collecting. And so far are we from certainly knowing what a *Man* is, though, perhaps, it will be judged great Ignorance to make any doubt about it. And yet, I think, I may say, that the certain Boundaries of that *Species*, are so far from being determined, and the precise number of simple *Ideas*, which make the nominal Essence, so far from being setled, and perfectly known, that very material Doubts may still arise about it: And I imagine none of the Definitions of the word *Man*, which we yet have, nor Descriptions of that sort of Animal, are so perfect and exact as to satisfie a considerate inquisitive Person; much less to obtain a general Consent, and to be that which Men would everywhere stick by, in the Decision of Cases, and determining of Life and Death, Baptism or no Baptism, in Productions that might happen.

§. 2

. 28. But though these *nominal Essences of Sub-*
ces are made by the Mind, they are *not* yet *made*
rbitrarily, as those of mixed Modes. To the ma-
g of any nominal Essence, it is necessary, *First*,
at the *Ideas* whereof it consists, have such an Union as to
ke but one *Idea*, how compounded soever. *Secondly*, That
particular *Ideas* so united, be exactly the same, neither more
less. For if two abstract complex *Ideas*, differ either in
mber or Sorts, of their component parts, they make two
erent, and not one and the same Essence. In the first of
e, the Mind, in making its complex *Ideas* of Substances,
y follows Nature; and puts none together, which are not
posed to have an union in Nature. No body joins the Voice
Sheep, with the Shape of a Horse; nor the Colour of Lead,
h the Weight and Fixedness of Gold, to be the complex
s of any real Substances; unless he has a mind to fill his
d with *Chimæra's*, and his Discourse with unintelligible
rds. Men, observing certain Qualities always join'd and
ting together, therein copied Nature; and of *Ideas* so united,
le their complex ones of Substances. For tho' Men may
ke what complex *Ideas* they please, and give what Names to
m they will; yet if they will be understood, when they
k of Things really existing, they must, in some degree,
form their *Ideas* to the Things they would speak of: Or else
ns Language will be like that of *Babel*; and every Man's
rds, being intelligible only to himself, would no longer serve
Conversation, and the ordinary Affairs of Life, if the *Ideas*
r stand for, be not some way answering the common ap-
rances and agreement of Substances, as they really exist.

But not so arbitrary as mixed Modes.

. 29. *Secondly*, Though the Mind of Men, *in*
ing its *complex Ideas of Substances*, never put any
ether that do not really, or are not supposed to
xist; and so it truly borrows that Union from
ure: Yet *the number* it combines, *depends upon the various Care,*
stry, or Fancy of him that makes it. Men generally content
nselves with some few sensible obvious Qualities; and often,
ot always, leave out others as material, and as firmly uni-
as those that they take. Of sensible Substances there are
sorts; one of organiz'd Bodies, which are propagated by
l; and in these, the Shape is that, which to us is the lead-
Quality, and most characteristical Part, that determines the
ies: And therefore in Vegetables and Animals, an extended
l Substance of such a certain Figure usually serves the turn.

Tho' very imperfect.

For

For however some Men seem to prize their Definition of *Animal Rationale*, yet should there a Creature be found, that had Language and Reason, but partaked not of the usual shape of a Man, I believe it would hardly pass for a *Man*, how much soever it were *Animal Rationale*. And if *Balaam*'s Ass had, all his Life, discoursed as rationally as he did once with his Master, I doubt yet, whether any one would have thought him worthy the Name *Man*, or allowed him to be of the same *Species* with himself. As in Vegetables and Animals 'tis the Shape, so in most other Bodies, not propagated by Seed, 'tis the Colour we most fix on, and are most led by. Thus where we find the Colour of Gold, we are apt to imagine all the other Qualities, comprehended in our complex *Idea*, to be there also: and we commonly take these two obvious Qualities, *viz.* Shape and Colour, for so presumptive *Ideas* of several *Species*, that in a good Picture, we readily say, this is a Lion, and that a Rose; this is a Gold, and that a Silver Goblet, only by the different Figures and Colours, represented to the Eye by the Pencil.

Which yet serve for common Converse.

§. 20. But though this serves well enough for gross and confused Conceptions, and unaccurate ways of Talking and Thinking; yet *Men are far enough from having agreed on the precise number of simple* Ideas, *or* Qualities, *belonging to any sort of Things, signified by its name.* Nor is it a wonder, since it requires much time, pains, and skill, strict enquiry, and long examination, to find out what, and how many those simple *Ideas* are, which are constantly and inseparably united in Nature, and are always to be found together in the same Subject. Most Men, wanting either Time, Inclination, or Industry enough for this, even to some tolerable degree, content themselves with some few obvious, and outward appearances of Things, thereby readily to distinguish and sort them for the common Affairs of Life: And so, without farther examination, give them Names, or take up the Names already in use. Which, though in common Conversation they pass well enough for the signs of some few obvious Qualities co-existing, are yet far enough from comprehending, in a setled signification, a precise number of simple *Ideas*; much less all those, which are united in Nature. He that shall consider, after so much stir, about *Genus* and *Species*, and such a deal of Talk of specifick Differences, how few Words we have yet setled Definitions of, may, with Reason, imagine, that those *Forms*, which there hath been so much noise made about, are only *Chimæra's*; which give us no light into the specifick Natures

s of Things. And he that shall consider, how far the nes of Substances are from having Significations, wherein all uſe them do agree, will have reaſon to conclude, that igh the nominal Eſſences of Subſtances, are all ſuppoſed to copied from Nature; yet they are all, or moſt of them, very erfect. Since the Compoſition of thoſe complex *Ideas*, are, veral Men, very different: and therefore, that theſe Boun-s of *Species*, are as Men, and not as Nature makes them, leaſt there are in Nature any ſuch prefixed Bounds. 'Tis , that many particular Subſtances are ſo made by Nature, they have agreement and likeneſs one with another, and ſo d a Foundation of being ranked into ſorts. But the ſorting hings by us, or the making of determinate *Species*, being in r to naming and comprehending them under general terms, not ſee how it can be properly ſaid, that Nature ſets the ndaries of the *Species* of Things: Or if it be ſo, our Boun-s of *Species*, are not exactly conformable to thoſe in Na-

For we, having need of general Names for preſent uſe, not for a perfect diſcovery of all thoſe Qualities, which d beſt ſhew us their moſt material differences and agree-s; but we our ſelves divide them, by certain obvious ap-nces, into *Species*, that we may the eaſier, under general es, communicate our Thoughts about them. For having no Knowledge of any Subſtance, but of the ſimple *Ideas*, that nited in it; and obſerving ſeveral particular Things to a-with others, in ſeveral of thoſe ſimple *Ideas*, we make that tion our ſpecifick *Idea*, and give it a general Name; that cording our own Thoughts, and in our Diſcourſe with o-, we may in one ſhort word, deſign all the Individuals that in that complex *Idea*, without enumerating the ſimple that make it up; and ſo not waſte our Time and Breath dious Deſcriptions: which we ſee they are fain to do, who d diſcourſe of any new ſort of Things, they have not yet me for.

Eſſences of Species under the ſame name very different.

31. But however, theſe *Species* of Subſtances well enough in ordinary Converſation, it is , that this complex *Idea*, wherein they ob- ſeveral Individuals to agree, is, by different , made very differently; by ſome more, and s leſs accurately. In ſome, this complex *Idea* ins a greater, and in others a ſmaller number of Qualities; ſo is apparently ſuch as the Mind makes it. The yellow ng Colour, makes *Gold* to Children; others add Weight, Malleable-

Malleableness, and Fusibility; and others yet other Qualities, which they find joined with that yellow Colour, as constantly as its Weight and Fusibility: For in all these, and the like Qualities, one has as good a right to be put into the complex *Idea* of that Substance, wherein they are all join'd, as another. And therefore *different Men* leaving out, or putting in several simple *Ideas*, which others do not, according to their various Examination, Skill, or observation of that subject, *have different Essences of Gold*; which must therefore be of their own, and not of Nature's making.

The more general our Ideas are, the more incomplete and partial they are.

§. 32. If the *number of simple* Ideas, *that make the nominal Essence* of the lowest *Species*, or first sorting of Individuals, *depends on the Mind* of Man, variously collecting them, it is much more evident, that they do so, in the more comprehensive *Classes*, which, by the Masters of Logick are called *Genera*. These are complex *Ideas* designedly imperfect: And 'tis visible at first sight, that several of those Qualities, that are to be found in the Things themselves, are purposely left out of *generical Ideas*. For as to the Mind, to make general *Ideas*, comprehending several particulars, leave out those of Time, and Place, and such other, that make them incommunicable to more than one Individual; so to make other yet more general *Ideas*, that may comprehend different sorts, it leaves out those Qualities that distinguish them, and puts into its new Collection, only such *Ideas*, as are common to several sorts. The same Convenience that made Men express several parcels of yellow Matter coming from *Guiny* and *Peru*, under one Name, sets them also upon making of one Name, that may comprehend both Gold, and Silver, and some other Bodies of different sorts. This is done by leaving out those Qualities, which are peculiar to each sort; and retaining a complex *Idea* made up of those, that are common to them all. To which the Name *Metal* being annexed, there is a *Genus* constituted; the Essence whereof being that abstract *Idea*, containing only Malleableness and Fusibility, with certain degrees of Weight and Fixedness, wherein some Bodies of several Kinds agree, leaves out the Colour, and other Qualities peculiar to Gold, and Silver, and the other sorts comprehended under the Name *Metal*. Whereby it is plain, that Men follow not exactly the Patterns set them by Nature, when they make their general *Ideas* of Substances; since there is no Body to be found, which has barely Malleableness and Fusibility in it, without other Qualities as inseparable as those. But Men, in

making

king their general *Ideas*, seeking more the convenience of nguage and quick dispatch, by short and comprehensive signs, n the true and precise Nature of Things, as they exist, have, he framing their abstract *Ideas*, chiefly pursued that end, ich was, to be furnished with store of general, and variously nprehensive Names. So that in this whole business of *Genera Species*, the *Genus*, or more comprehensive, is but a partial nception of what is in the *Species*, and the *Species*, but a par- *Idea* of what is to be found in each individual. If therefore one will think, that a *Man*, and a *Horse*, and an Animal, and ant, &c. are distinguished by real Essences made by Nature, must Nature to be very liberal of these real Essences, making for Body, another for an Animal, and another for a Horse, and these Essences liberally bestowed upon *Bucephalus*. But if we uld rightly consider what is done, in all these *Genera* and *Spe-*, or Sorts, we should find, that there is no new Thing made, only more or less comprehensive signs whereby we may be bled to express, in a few syllables, great numbers of parti- r Things, as they agree in more or less general Conceptions, ich we have framed to that purpose. In all which, we may erve, that the more general term, is always the Name of a less nplex *Idea*; and that each *Genus* is but a partial Conception of *Species* comprehended under it. So that if these abstract ge- l *Ideas* be thought to be complete, it can only be in respect a certain established relation, between them and certain nes, which are made use of to signifie them; and not in respect ny thing existing, as made by Nature.

This all accommodated to the end of Speech.

. 33. *This* is *adjusted to the true end of Speech*, ich is to be the easiest and shortest way of com- nicating our Notions. For thus he, that would ke and discourse of Things, as they agreed in complex *Idea* of Extension and Solidity, needed use the Word *Body*, to denote all such. He ; to these, would join others, signified by the Words Life, se, and spontaneous Motion, needed but use the Word *Animal*, ignify all which partaked of those *Ideas*: and he that had le a complex *Idea* of a Body, with Life, Sense, and Motion, h the Faculty of Reasoning, and a certain Shape joined to it, ded but use the short monosyllable *Man*, to express all parti- rs that correspond to that complex *Idea*. This is the proper ness of *Genus* and *Species*: and this Men do, without any sideration of *real Essences* or *substantial Forms*, which come not hin the reach of our Knowledge, when we think of those

things; nor within the signification of our Words; when we discourse with others.

Instance in Contraries.

§. 34. Were I to talk with any one, of a Sort of Birds, I lately saw in St. *James*'s Park, about three or four Foot high, with a Covering of something between Feathers and Hair, of a dark brown Colour, without Wings, but in the Place thereof, two or three little Branches, coming down like sprigs of Spanish Broom; long great Legs, with Feet only of three Claws, and without a Tail; I must make this Description of it, and so may make others understand me: But when I am told, that the Name of it is *Cassuaris*, I may then use that Word to stand in discourse for all my complex *Idea* mentioned in that description; though by that word, which is now become a specifick Name, I know no more of the real Essence, or Constitution of that sort of Animals, than I did before; and knew probably as much of the Nature of that *Species* of Birds, before I learn'd the Name, as many *English*-men do of Swans, or Herons, which are specifick Names very well known of sorts of Birds common in *England*.

Men determine the sorts.

§. 35. From what has been said, 'tis evident that *Men make sorts of Things.* For it being different Essences alone, that make different *Species*, 'tis plain, that they who make those abstract *Ideas* which are the nominal Essences, do thereby make the *Species*, or Sort. Should there be a Body found, having all the other Qualities of Gold, except Malleableness, 'twould, no doubt, be made a question whether it were Gold or no; *i. e.* whether it were of that *Species*. This could be determined only by that abstract *Idea*, to which every one annexed the Name *Gold*: so that it would be true Gold to him, and belong to that *Species* who included not Malleableness in his nominal Essence, signified by the Sound *Gold*; and on the other side, it would not be true Gold or of that *Species* to him, who included Malleableness in his specifick *Idea*. And who, I pray, is it, that makes these divers *Species*, even under one and the same name, but Men that make two different abstract *Ideas*, consisting not exactly of the same collection of Qualities? Nor is it a mere Supposition to imagine that a Body may exist, wherein the other obvious Qualities of Gold may be without Malleableness; since it is certain, that Gold it self will be sometimes so eager, (as Artists call it) that it will as little endure the Hammer, as Glass it self. What we have said, of the putting in, or leaving out of Malleableness out of the complex *Idea*, the Name *Gold* is, by any one, annexed to, may

be

id of its peculiar Weight, Fixedness, and several other the Qualities: For whatsoever is left out, or put in, 'tis still the plex *Idea*, to which that Name is annexed, that makes the *es*: and as any particular parcel of Matter answers that *Idea*, e Name of the sort belongs truly to it; and it is of that *Spe-* And thus any thing is true *Gold*, perfect *Metal*. All which mination of the *Species*, 'tis plain, depends on the Under- ling of Man, making this or that complex *Idea*.

36. This then, in short, is the Case: *Nature* *many particular Things, which do agree* one another, in many sensible Qualities, and pro- too, in their internal Frame and Constitution: *Nature makes the Similitude.*

is not this real Essence that distinguishes them into *Species*; *en*, who, taking occasion from the Qualities they find uni- them, and wherein, they observe often several individuals ree, *range them into Sorts, in order to their naming*, for the nience of comprehensive signs; under which individuals, ding to their conformity to this or that abstract *Idea*, come ranked as under Ensigns; so that this is of the Blue, that ed Regiment; this is a Man, that a Drill: And in this, k, consists the whole business of *Genus* and *Species*.

37. I do not deny, but Nature, in the constant production rticular Beings, makes them not always new and various, ery much alike and of kin one to another: But I think it theless true, that *the boundaries of the Species, whereby Men em, are made by Men*; since the Essences of the *Species*, di- ished by different Names, are, as has been proved, of making, and seldom adequate to the internal Nature of hings they are taken from. So that we may truly say, manner of sorting of Things, is the Workmanship of

8. One thing, I doubt not, but will seem range in this Doctrine; which is, that from has been said, it will follow, that *each ab-* dea, *with a name to it, makes a distinct Species*. *Each abstract* Idea *is an Essence.*

ho can help it, if Truth will have it so? For so it must n, till some body can shew us the *Species* of Things, limited stinguished by something else; and let us see, that general signify not our abstract *Ideas*, but something different from I would fain know, why a Shock and a Hound, are distinct *Species*, as a Spaniel and an Elephant. We have ner *Idea* of the different Essence of an Elephant and a l, than we have of the different Essence of a Shock and a

Hound; all the essential difference, whereby we know and distinguish them one from another, consisting only in the different Collection of simple *Ideas*, to which we have given those different Names.

Genera and Species are in order to naming.

§. 39. How much *the making of* Species *and* Genera *is in order to general Names*, and how much general Names are necessary, if not to the Being, yet at least to the completing of a *Species*, and making it pass for such, will appear, besides what has been said above concerning Ice and Water, in a very familiar Example. A silent and a striking *Watch*, are but one *Species*, to those who have but one Name for them: but he that has the Name *Watch* for one, and *Clock* for the other, and distinct complex *Ideas*, to which those Names belong, to him they are different *Species*. It will be said, perhaps, that the inward contrivance and constitution is different between these two, which the Watch maker has a clear *Idea* of. And yet, 'tis plain, they are but one *Species* to him, when he has but one Name for them. For what is sufficient in the inward Contrivance, to make a new *Species*? There are some *Watches*, that are made with four Wheels, others with five: Is this a specifick difference to the Workman? Some have Strings and Physies, and others none; some have the Balance loose, and others regulated by a spiral Spring, and others by Hogs Bristles: Are any, or all of these enough to make a specifick difference to the Workman, that knows each of these, and several other different contrivances, in the internal Constitutions of *Watches*? 'Tis certain, each of these hath a real difference from the rest: But whether it be an essential, a specifick difference or no, relates only to the complex *Idea*, to which the Name *Watch* is given: as long as they all agree in the *Idea* which that Name stands for, and that Name does not as a generical Name comprehend different *Species* under it, they are not essentially nor specifically different. But if any one will make minuter Divisions from Differences, that he knows in the internal frame of Watches; and to such precise complex *Ideas*, give Names that shall prevail, they will then be new *Species* to them, who have those *Ideas* with Names to them; and can by those differences, distinguish Watches into these several sorts, and then *Watch* will be a generical Name. But yet they would be no distinct *Species* to Men, ignorant of Clock-work, and the inward Contrivances of Watches, who had no other *Idea*, but the outward Shape and Bulk, with the marking of the Hour by the Hand. For to them, all those other Names would be but

synonymous Terms for the same *Idea*, and signifie no more, no other thing but a *Watch*. Just thus, I think, it is in nal Things. No body will doubt, that the Wheels, or Springs I may so say) within, are different in a *rational Man*, and a *ngeling*, no more than that there is a Difference in the Frame ween a *Drill* and a *Changeling*. But whether one, or both se Differences be essential, or specifical, is only to be known us, by their agreement, or disagreement with the complex that the Name *Man* stands for: For by that alone can it be ermined, whether one, or both, or neither of those be a Man, no.

Species of artificial things less confused than natural.

§. 40. From what has been before said, we y see the reason, *why, in the Species of artificial ngs, there is generally less confusion and uncertainty, in natural.* Because an *artificial* Thing being roduction of Man, which the Artificer design'd, I therefore well knows the *Idea* of, the Name of it is supposed stand for no other *Idea*, nor to import any other Essence, n what is certainly to be known, and easy enough to be ap-hended. For the *Idea*, or Essence, of the several sorts of *ar-cial* Things, consisting, for the most part, in nothing but determinate Figure of sensible Parts; and sometimes Mo-n depending thereon, which the Artificer fashions in Matter, h as he finds for his Turn, it is not beyond the reach of our culties to attain a certain *Idea* thereof; and so settle the signifi-on of the Names whereby the Species of *artificial* Things are inguished, with less Doubt, Obscurity, and Equivocation, than can in Things natural, whose Differences and Operations end upon Contrivances, beyond the reach of our Discoveries.

Artificial things of distinct Species.

§. 41. I must be excused here, if I think, *artificial ngs are of distinct Species*, as well as natural: ce I find they are as plainly and orderly ranked sorts, by different abstract *Ideas*, with gene Names annexed to them, as distinct one from another as those natural Substances. For why should we not think a Watch, Pistol, as distinct Species one from another, as a Horse, and og, they being expressed in our Minds by distinct *Ideas*, and others, by distinct Appellations?

Substances alone have proper Names.

§. 42. This is farther to be observ'd concerning *stances*, that they *alone* of all our several sorts of *s, have* particular, or *proper Names*, whereby only particular Thing is signified. Because in ple *Ideas*, Modes, and Relations, it seldom happens, that

Men have occasion to mention often this, or that particular, when it is absent. Besides, the greatest part of mixed Modes, being Actions, which perish in their Birth, are not capable of a lasting Duration, as Substances, which are the Actors; and wherein the simple *Ideas* that make up the complex *Ideas* designed by the Name, have a lasting Union.

Difficulty to treat of Words.

§. 43. I must beg pardon of my Reader, for having dwelt so long upon this Subject, and perhaps, with some Obscurity. But I desire, it may be considered, how *difficult* it is, *to lead another by Words into the Thoughts of Things, stripp'd of those specifical differences* we give them: Which Things, if I name not, I say nothing; and if I do name them, I thereby rank them into some sort, or other, and suggest to the Mind the usual abstract *Idea* of that *Species*; and so cross my purpose. For to talk of a *Man*, and to lay by, at the same time, the ordinary signification of the Name *Man*, which is our complex *Idea*, usually annexed to it; and bid the Reader consider *Man*, as he is in himself, and as he is really distinguished from others, in his internal Constitution, or real Essence, that is, by something, he knows not what, looks like trifling: and yet thus one must do, who would speak of the supposed real Essences and *Species* of Things, as thought to be made by Nature, if it be but only to make it understood, that there is no such thing signified by the general Names, which Substances are called by. But because it is difficult by known familiar Names to do this, give me leave to endeavour by an Example, to make the different Consideration, the Mind has of specifick Names and *Ideas*, a little more clear; and to shew how the complex *Ideas* of Modes are referred sometimes to Archetypes in the Minds of other intelligent Beings; or which is the same, to the signification annexed by others to their received Names; and sometimes to no Archetypes at all. Give me leave also to shew how the Mind always refers its *Ideas* of Substances, either to the Substances themselves, or to the signification of their Names, as to the *Archetypes*; and also to make plain the Nature of *Species*, or sorting of Things, as apprehended, and made use of by us; and of the Essences belonging to those *Species*, which is, perhaps, of more Moment, to discover the Extent and Certainty of our Knowledge, than we at first imagine.

Instance of mixed Modes in Kinneah *and* Nioupb.

§. 44. Let us suppose *Adam* in the State of a grown Man, with a good Understanding, but in a strange Country, with all Things new, and unknown about him; and no

other

er Faculties, to attain the Knowledge of them, but what of this Age has now. He obſerves *Lamech* more melancholy n uſual, and imagines it to be from a ſuſpicion he has of his ſe *Adah* (whom he moſt ardently loved) that ſhe had too ch kindneſs for another Man. *Adam* diſcourſes theſe his oughts to *Eve*, and deſires her to take care that *Adah* commit folly: And in theſe Diſcourſes with *Eve*, he makes uſe of ſe two new Words, *Kinneah* and *Niouph*. In time, *Adam*'s ſtake appears, for he finds *Lamech*'s Trouble proceeded from ing kill'd a Man: But yet the two Names, *Kinneah* and *uph*; the one ſtanding for Suſpicion, in a Husband, of his fe's Diſloyalty to him, and the other, for the Act of commit- g Diſloyalty, loſt not their diſtinct ſignifications. It is plain n, that here were two diſtinct complex *Ideas* of mixed des, with Names to them, two diſtinct Species of Actions ntially different; I ask wherein conſiſted the Eſſences of ſe two diſtinct Species of Actions? And 'tis plain, it conſiſt- in a preciſe combination of ſimple *Ideas*, different in one m the other. I ask, whether the complex *Idea* in *Adam*'s Mind, ich he call'd *Kinneah*, were adequate, or no? And it is plain vas; for it being a Combination of ſimple *Ideas*, which he hout any regard to any Archetype, without reſpect to any ng as a Pattern, voluntarily put together, abſtracted and gave Name *Kinneah* to, to expreſs in ſhort to others, by that ſound, all the ſimple *Ideas* contain'd and united in that com- one, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that it was an adequate *Idea*. own Choice having made that Combination, it had all in it intended it ſhould, and ſo could not but be perfect, could but be adequate, it being referr'd to no other Archetype, ich it was ſuppoſed to repreſent.

. 45. Theſe Words, *Kinneah* and *Niouph*, by degrees grew common uſe; and then the caſe was ſomewhat alter'd. *A-*'s Children had the ſame Faculties, and thereby the ſame ver that he had, to make what complex *Ideas* of mixed des they pleaſed in their own Minds; to abſtract them, and e what Sounds, they pleaſed, the ſigns of them: But the of Names being to make our *Ideas* within us known to others, cannot be done, but when the ſame Sign ſtands for the ſame in two, who would communicate their Thoughts, and courſe together. Thoſe therefore of *Adam*'s Children, that nd theſe two Words, *Kinneah* and *Niouph*, in familiar uſe, d not take them for inſignificant Sounds; but muſt needs con- le, they ſtood for ſomething, for certain *Ideas*, abſtract *Ideas*,

they being general Names, which abstract *Ideas* were the Essences of the Species distinguished by those Names, If therefore they would use these Words, as Names of Species already establish'd and agreed on, they were obliged to conform the *Ideas*, in their Minds, signified by these Names, to the *Ideas*, that they stood for in other Mens Minds, as to their Patterns and *Archetypes*; and then indeed their *Ideas* of these complex Modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt (especially those that consisted of Combinations of many simple *Ideas*) not to be exactly conformable to the *Ideas* in other Mens Minds, using the same Names; though for this, there be usually a Remedy at Hand, which is, to ask the meaning of any Word, we understand not, of him that uses it: it being as impossible, to know certainly, what the Words Jealousy and Adultery (which I think answer קנאה and נאוף) stand for in another Man's Mind, with whom I would discourse about them; as it was impossible, in the beginning of Language, to know what *Kinneah* and *Niouph* stood for in another Man's Mind, without Explication, they being voluntary Signs in every one.

Instance of Substances in Zahab.

§. 46. Let us now also consider after the same manner, the Names of Substances, in their first Application. One of *Adam*'s Children, roving in the Mountains, lights on a glittering Substance, which pleases his Eye, Home he carries it to *Adam*, who, upon consideration of it, finds it to be hard, to have a bright yellow Colour, and an exceeding great Weight. These, perhaps at first, are all the Qualities, he takes notice of in it, and abstracting this complex *Idea*, consisting of a Substance having that peculiar bright Yellowness, and a Weight very great in proportion to its Bulk, he gives it the Name *Zahab*, to dominate and mark all Substances, that have these sensible Qualities in them. 'Tis evident now that, in this Case, *Adam* acts quite differently, from what he did before in forming those *Ideas* of mixed Modes, to which he gave the Name *Kinneah* and *Niouph*. For there he put *Ideas* together, only by his own Imagination, not taken from the Existence of any thing; and to them he gave Names to denominate all Things, that should happen to agree to those his abstract *Ideas*, without considering whether any such thing did exist, or no; the Standard there was of his own making. But in the forming his *Idea* of this new Substance he takes the quite contrary Course; here he has Standard made by Nature; and therefore being to represent that to himself, by the *Idea* he has of it, even when it is absent, he puts in no simple *Idea* into his

complex

plex one, but what he has the Perception of from the thing
ſ. He takes Care that his *Idea* be conformable to his *Ar-*
pe, and intends the Name ſhould ſtand for an *Idea* ſo
ormable.

. 47. This piece of Matter, thus denominated *Zahab* by
m, being quite different from any he had ſeen before, no Bo-
I think, will deny to be a diſtinct Species, and to have its
liar Eſſence; and that the Name *Zahab* is the mark of the
ies, and a Name belonging to all Things partaking in that
nce. But here it is plain, the Eſſence, *Adam* made the
ne *Zahab* ſtand for, was nothing but a Body hard, ſhining,
ow, and very heavy. But the inquiſitive Mind of Man,
content with the Knowledge of theſe, as I may ſay, ſuper-
l Qualities, puts *Adam* upon farther Examination of this
ter. He therefore knocks, and beats it with Flints, to ſee
t was diſcoverable in the Inſide: He finds it yield to Blows,
not eaſily ſeparate into pieces: he finds it will bend without
king. Is not now Ductility to be added to his former *Idea*,
made part of the Eſſence of the Species, that Name *Zahab*
ds for? Farther Trials diſcover Fuſiblity, and Fixedneſs
not they alſo, by the ſame Reaſon, that any of the others
e, to be put into the complex *Idea*, ſignified by the Name
ab? If not, What Reaſon will there be ſhewn more for the
than the other? If theſe muſt, then all the other Properties,
ch any farther Trials ſhall diſcover in this Matter, ought by
ſame Reaſon to make a part of the Ingredients of the com-
Idea, which the Name *Zahab* ſtands for, and ſo be the
nce of the Species, marked by that Name. Which Proper-
, becauſe they are endleſs, it is plain, that the *Idea* made
r this faſhion by this *Archetype*, will be always inadequate.

. 48. But this is not all, it would alſo follow,
the *Names of Subſtances* would not only have, in truth they have) but would alſo be ſuppo-
to *have different ſignifications, as uſed by different*
, which would very much cumber the uſe of
nguage. For if every diſtinct Quality, that
e diſcovered in any Matter by any one, were ſuppoſed to
e a neceſſary part of the complex *Idea*, ſignified by the
mon Name given it, it muſt follow, that Men muſt ſup-
e the ſame Word to ſignify different Things in different
n: ſince they cannot doubt, but different Men may have
covered ſeveral Qualities in Subſtances of the ſame Deno-
nation, which others know nothing of.

Their Ideas *imperfect, and therefore various.*

To

Therefore to fix their Species, a real Essence it supposed.

§. 49. To avoid this therefore, they have *supposed a real Essence belonging to every Species*, from which these Properties all flow, and would have their Name of the Species stand for that. But they not having any *Idea* of that real Essence in Substances, and their Words signifying nothing but the *Ideas* they have, that which is done by this Attempt, is only to put the Name or Sound, in the place and stead of the thing having that real Essence, without knowing what the real Essence is; and this is that which Men do, when they speak of Species of Things, as supposing them made by Nature, and distinguished by real Essences.

Which Supposition is of no use.

§. 50. For let us consider, when we affirm, that all *Gold* is fixed, either it means that Fixedness is a part of the Definition, part of the nominal Essence the Word *Gold* stands for; and so this Affirmation, *all Gold is fixed*, contains nothing but the signification of the Term *Gold*. Or else it means, that Fixedness not being a part of the Definition of the Word *Gold*, is a Property of that Substance it self: in which case, it is plain, that the Word *Gold* stands in the place of a Substance, having the real Essence of a Species of Things, made by Nature. In which way of Substitution, it has so confused and uncertain a signification, that though this Proposition, *Gold is fixed*, be in that sense an Affirmation of something real; yet 'tis a Truth will always fail us in its particular Application, and so is of no real Use nor Certainty. For let it be never so true, that all *Gold*, *i. e.* all that has the real Essence of *Gold*, is fixed, What serves this for, whilst we know not in this sense, what is or is not *Gold?* For if we know not the real Essence, of Gold, 'tis impossible we should know what parcel of Matter has that Essence, and so whether it be true *Gold* or no.

Conclusion.

§. 51. To conclude; What liberty *Adam* had at first to make any complex *Ideas* of mixed Modes, by no other Patern, but by his own Thoughts, the same have all Men ever since had. And the same necessity of conforming his *Ideas* of Substances to Things without him, as to *Archetypes* made by Nature, that *Adam* was under, if he would not wilfully impose upon himself, the same are all Men ever since under too. The same Liberty also, that *Adam* had of affixing any new Name to any *Idea*; the same has any one still, (especially the beginners of Languages, if we can imagine any such,) but only with this difference, that in Places, where

Men

n in Society have already eſtabliſhed a Language amongſt
m, the ſignification of Words are very warily and ſparingly
e alter'd. Becauſe Men being furniſhed already with Names
their *Ideas*, and common Uſe having appropriated known
mes to certain *Ideas*, and affected Miſapplication of them
not but be very ridiculous. He that hath new Notions,
, perhaps, venture ſometimes on the coining new Terms
expreſs them; But Men think it a Boldneſs, and 'tis uncer-
, whether common Uſe will ever make them paſs for currant.
in Communication with others, it is neceſſary, that we
form the *Ideas* we make the Vulgar Words of any Lan-
ge ſtand for, to their known proper Significations, (which I
e explain'd at large already,) or elſe to make known that
Signification, we apply them to.

CHAP. VII.

Of Particles.

Particles connect Parts, or whole Sentences together.

. BEſides Words, which are Names of *Ideas* in the Mind, there are a great many others that are made uſe of, to ſignify *onnexion* that the Mind gives to *Ideas*, *or Pro-ons*, *one with another*. The Mind, in commu-ting its thought to others, does not only need ſigns of the it has then before it, but others alſo, to ſhew or intimate e particular action of its own, at that time, relating to thoſe . This it does ſeveral ways; as, *Is*, and *Is not* are the ge-l marks of the Mind affirming or denying. But beſides nation, or negation, without which, there is in Words no th or Falſhood, the Mind does, in declaring its Sentiments thers, connect, not only the parts of Propoſitions, but le Sentences one to another, with their ſeveral Relations Dependencies, to make a coherent Diſcourſe.

In them conſiſts the Art of well ſpeaking.

2. The Words, whereby it ſignifies what exion it gives to the ſeveral Affirmations and ations, that it unites in one continued Reaſon-or Narration, are gnerally call'd *Particles*: and the right uſe of theſe, that more particularly conſiſts the neſs and beauty of a good Stile. To think well, it is not enough,

enough, that a Man has *Ideas* clear and distinct in his Thoughts, nor that he observes the agreement, or disagreement, of some of them; but he must think in train, and observe the dependence of his Thoughts and Reasonings, one upon another: And to express well such methodical and rational Thoughts, he must have Words to *shew* what *Connexion*, *Restriction*, *Distinction*, *Opposition*, *Emphasis*, &c. he gives to each respective *part of his discourse*. To mistake in any of these, is to puzzle, instead of informing, his Hearer: and therefore it is, that those Words, which are not truly, by themselves, the names of any *Ideas*, are of such constant and indispensible use in Language, and do much contribute to Mens well expressing themselves.

They shew what Relation the Mind gives to its own Thoughts.

§. 3. This part of Grammar has been, perhaps, as much neglected, as some others over-diligently cultivated. 'Tis easy for Men to write, one after another, of *Cases* and *Genders*, *Moods* and *Tenses*, *Gerunds* and *Supines*: In these and the like, there has been great diligence used; and Particles themselves, in some Languages, have been, with great shew of exactness, ranked into their several Orders. But though *Prepositions* and *Conjunctions*, &c. are Names well known in Grammar, and the Particles contained under them carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions; yet he who would shew the right use of Particles, and what significancy and force they have, must take a little more pains, enter into his own Thoughts, and observe nicely the several Postures of his Mind in discoursing.

They shew what Relation the Mind gives to its own Thoughts.

§. 4. Neither is it enough, for the explaining of these Words, to render them, as is usually in Dictionaries, by Words of another Tongue which came nearest to their signification: For what is meant by them, is commonly as hard to be understood in one, as another Language. They are all *marks of some Action, or Intimation of the Mind*; and therefore to understand them rightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations, and exceptions, and several other Thoughts of the Mind, for which we have either none, or very deficient Names, are diligently to be studied. Of these, there are a great variety, much exceeding the number of Particles that most Languages have, to express them by; and therefore it is not to be wondred, that most of these Particles have divers and sometimes almost opposite significations. In the Hebrew Tongue, there is a particle consisting but of one single Letter

which there are reckoned up, as I remember, seventy, I am above fifty several significations.

§. 5. *BUT* is a Particle, none more familiar in Language: and he that says it is a discretive conjunction, and that it answers *Sed* in Latin, or *mais* in French, thinks he has sufficiently explained it. But it seems to me to intimate several relations, the Mind gives to the several Propositions or Parts of them, which it joins by this monosyllable. *Instance in* But.

First, *BUT to say no more*: Here it intimates a stop of the mind, in the course it was going, before it came to the end of it.

Secondly, *I saw BUT two Plants*: Here it shews, that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed, with a Negation of all other.

Thirdly, *You Pray; BUT it is not that GOD would bring you to the true Religion.*

Fourthly, *BUT that he would confirm you in your own*: The first of these *BUTS* intimates a supposition in the Mind, of something otherwise than it should be; the latter shews, that the Mind makes a direct opposition between that, and what is before it.

Fifthly, *All Animals have Sense; BUT a Dog is an Animal*: where it signifies little more, but that the latter Proposition is joined to the former, as the *Minor* of a Syllogism.

§. 6. To these, I doubt not, might be added a great many other significations of this Particle, if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude, and consider it in all the places it is to be found: which if one should do, I doubt, whether in all those manners it is made use of, it would deserve the Title of *Discretive*, which Grammarians give to it. But I intend not here a full explication of this sort of Signs. The instances I have given in this one, may give occasion to reflect upon their force and force in Language, and lead us into the contemplation of several Actions of our Minds in discoursing, which it has found a way to intimate to others by these Particles, some where-constantly, and others in certain constructions, have the sense of a whole Sentence contained in them.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Abstract and Concrete Terms.

Abstract Terms not predicable one of another, and why.

§. 1. THE ordinary Words of Language, and our common use of them, would have given us light into the Nature of our *Ideas*, if they had been but considered with Attention. The Mind, as has been shewn, has a Power to abstract its *Ideas*, and so they become Essences, general Essences, whereby the sorts of Things are distinguished. Now each abstract *Idea* being distinct, so that of any two the one can never be the other, the Mind will, by its intuitive Knowledge, perceive their difference; and therefore in Propositions, no two whole *Ideas* can ever be affirmed one of another. This we see in the common use of Language, which permits *not any two Abstract Words, or Names of abstract Ideas*, to be *affirmed one of another*. For how near of kin soever they may seem to be, and how certain soever it is, that Man is an Animal, or Rational, or White, yet every one, at first hearing, perceives the Falshood of these Propositions; *Humanity is Animality*, or *Rationality*, or *Whiteness*: And this is as evident, as any of the most allow'd Maxims. All our Affirmations then are only inconcrete, which is the affirming, not one abstract *Idea* to be join'd to another; which abstract *Ideas*, in Substances, may be of any sort; in all the rest, are little else but of Relations; and in Substances, the most frequent are of Powers; *v. g. a Man is White*, signifies, that the thing that has the Essence of a Man, has also in it the Essence of Whiteness, which is nothing but a power to produce the *Idea* of Whiteness in one, whose Eyes can discover ordinary Objects; or *a Man is rational*, signifies, that the same thing, that hath the Essence of a Man, hath also in it the Essence of rationality, *i. e.* a power of Reasoning.

They shew the difference of our Ideas.

§. 2. This distinction of Names, shews us also the difference of our *Ideas*: For if we observe them, we shall find, that our *simple Ideas have all abstract*, *as well as concrete Names*: The one whereof is (to speak the Language of Grammarians)

ans) a Subſtantive, the other an Adjective; as Whiteneſs, ite, Sweetneſs, Sweet. The like alſo holds in our *Ideas* of *es* and Relations; as Juſtice, Juſt; Equality, Equal; only this difference, That ſome of the concrete Names of tions, amongſt Men chiefly, are Subſtantives; as *Paterni-Pater*; whereof it were eaſy to render a Reaſon. But as our *Ideas* of *Subſtances*, we have very few or *no abſtract es* at all. For though the Schools have introduced *Animali-Humanitas*, *Corporetas*, and ſome others; yet they hold no portion with that infinite number of Names of Subſtances, which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the ing of abſtract ones: and thoſe few that the Schools for- and put into the mouths of their Scholars, could never get admittance into common uſe, or obtain the licenſe of lick approbation. Which ſeems to me at leaſt to intimate confeſſion of all Mankind, that they have no *Ideas* of the Eſſences of Subſtances, ſince they have not Names for *Ideas*: which no doubt they would have had, had not conſciouſneſs to themſelves of their ignorance of them, them from ſo idle an attempt. And therefore though had *Ideas* enough to diſtinguiſh Gold from a Stone, and al from Wood; yet they but timorouſly ventured on ſuch ns, as *Aurietas* and *Saxietas*, *Metallietas* and *Lignietas*, or the Names, which ſhould pretend to ſignify the real Eſſences oſe Subſtances, whereof they knew they had no *Ideas*. And ed, it was only the Doctrine of *ſubſtantial Forms*, and the idence of miſtaking Pretenders to a Knowledge that they not, which firſt coined, and then introduced *Animalitas*, *Humanitas*, and the like; which yet went very little far- than their own Schools, and could never get to be current ngſt underſtanding Men. Indeed, *Humanitas* was a Word liar amongſt the *Romans*; but in a far different Sence, and d not for the abſtract Eſſence of any Subſtance; but was abſtract Name of a Mode, and its concrete *Humanus*, not o.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

Words are used for recording and communicating our Thoughts.

§. 1. FROM what has been said in the fore going Chapters, it is easy to perceive what imperfection there is in Lan guage, and how the very Nature of Words, make it almost unavoidable, for many of them to b doubtful and uncertain in their significations. T examine the perfection, or imperfection of Word it is necessary first to consider their use and end: For as they ar more or less fitted to attain that, so are they more or less pe fect. We have, in the former part of this Discourse, ofte upon occasion, mentioned *a double use of Words.*

First, One for the recording of our own Thoughts.

Secondly, The other for the communicating of our Thoughts to others.

Any Words will serve for recording.

§. 2. As to the first of these, *for the recording o own Thoughts* for the help of our own Memori whereby, as it were, we talk to our selves, an Words will serve the turn. For since Sounds a voluntary and indifferent signs of any *Ideas*, a Ma may use what Words he pleases, to signify his own *Ideas* t himself: and there will be no imperfection in them, if he co stantly use the same sign for the same *Idea*, for then he cann fail of having his meaning understood, wherein consists th right use and perfection of Language.

Communication by Words Civil or Philosophical.

§. 3. *Secondly*, As to *communication of Words*, th too *has a double use.*

I. *Civil.*

II. *Philosophical.*

First, By their *civil Use*, I mean such a commu nication of Thoughts and *Ideas* by Words, as ma serve for the upholding common Conversation and Commerc about the ordinary Affairs and Conveniencies of civil Life, i the Societies of Men one amongst another.

Secondly, By the *Philosophical Use* of Words, I mean such a use of them, as may serve to convey the precise Notions o Thing

igs, and to expreſs, in general Propoſitions, certain and ubted Truths, which the Mind may reſt upon, and be ſa- l with, in its ſearch after true Knowledge. Theſe two are very diſtinct; and a great deal leſs exactneſs will in the one, than in the other, as we ſhall ſee in what ws.

The Imperfections of Words is the doubtfulneſs of their Signification.

4. The chief End of Language in Commu- ion being to be underſtood, Words ſerve not for that end, neither in Civil, nor Philoſo- l Diſcourſe, when any Word does not excite e Hearer, the ſame *Idea* which it ſtands for e Mind of the Speaker. Now ſince Sounds no natural connexion with our *Ideas*, but all their ſignification from the arbitrary impoſition of Men, *doubtfulneſs* and uncertainty *of their ſignification*, which *is mperfection* we here are ſpeaking of, has its cauſe more in *deas* they ſtand for, than in any incapacity there is in one id, more than in another, to ſignify any *Idea*: For in that rd, they are all equally perfect.

hat then which makes doubtfulneſs and uncertainty in the fication of ſome more than other Words, is the difference *leas* they ſtand for.

Cauſes of their Imperfection.

5. Words having naturally no ſignification, *Idea* which each ſtands for, muſt be learned retained by thoſe who would exchange ughts, and hold intelligible Diſcourſe with others, in any guage. But this is hardeſt to be done, where,

rſt, the *Ideas* they ſtand for, are very complex, and made f a great Number *Ideas* put together.

condly, Where the *Ideas* they ſtand for, have no certain exion in Nature; and ſo no ſettled Standard, any-where ature exiſting, to rectify and adjuſt them by.

irdly, Where the ſignification of the Word is referred to ndard, which Standard is not eaſy to be known.

urthly, Where the ſignification of the Word, and the real ce of the Thing, are not exactly the ſame.

heſe are difficulties that attend the ſignification of ſeveral ds that are intelligible. Thoſe which are not intelligible l, ſuch as Names ſtanding for any ſimple *Ideas*, which a- er has not Organs or Faculties to attain; as the Names of urs to a blind Man, or Sounds to a deaf Man, need not be mentioned.

all theſe caſes, we ſhall find an imperfection in Words;

which I shall more at large explain, in their particular appli tion to our several sorts of *Ideas*: For if we examine them, shall find, that the *Names of mixed Modes are most liable to dou fulness and imperfection, for the two first of these Reasons; and Names of Substances chiefly for the two latter.*

The Names of mixed Modes doubtful. First, Because the Ideas they stand for, are so complex.

§. 6. *First*, The Names of *mixed Modes*, many of them liable to great uncertainty and curity in their signification.

I. *Because of* that *great Composition*, these compl *Ideas* are often made up of. To make Wo serviceable to the end of Communication, it necessary, (as has been said) that they excite, the Hearer, exactly the same *Idea* they stand for the Mind of the Speaker. Without this, Men fill one anoth Heads with noise and sounds; but convey not thereby th Thoughts, and lay not before one another their *Ideas*, which the end of Discourse and Language. But when a Word sta for a very complex *Idea*, that is compounded and decompound it is not easy for Men to form and retain that *Idea* so exact as to make the Name in common use, stand for the same p cise *Idea*, without any the least variation. Hence it comes pass, that Mens Names, of very compound *Ideas*, such as the most part are moral Words, have seldom, in two differ Men, the same precise signification, since one Man's comp *Idea* seldom agrees with anothers, and often differs from own, from that which he had yesterday, or will have to mo row.

Secondly, Because they have no Standards.

§. 7. II. *Because the names of mixed Modes*, the most part, *want Standards* in Nature, where Men may rectify and adjust their significatio therefore they are very various and doubtful. Th are assemblages of *Ideas* put together at the pleas of the Mind, pursuing its own ends of Discour and suited to its own Notions, whereby it designs not to co any thing really existing, but to denominate and rank Thin as they come to agree, with those Archetypes or Forms it made. He that first brought the word *Sham*, *Wheedle*, or *B ter* in use, put together, as he thought fit, those *Ideas* he ma it stand for: And as it is with any new Names of Modes, t are now brought into any Language; so was it with the ones, when they were first made use of. Names therefore, t stand for Collections of *Ideas*, which the Mind makes at pl sure, must needs be of doubtful signification, when such Colle

re no where to be found constantly united in Nature, nor Patterns to be shewn whereby Men may adjust them. it the word *Murther*, or *Sacriledge*, &c. signifies, can never nown from Things themselves: There be many of the of those complex *Ideas*, which are not visible in the Acti- self, the intention of the Mind, or the Relation of holy ngs, which make a part of *Murder*, or *Sacriledge*, have no sary connexion with the outward and visible Action of that commits either: and the pulling the Trigger of the , with which the Murther is committed, and is all the Acti- that, perhaps, is visible, has no natural connexion with other *Ideas*, that make up the complex one, named *Mur-* They have their union and combination only from the erstanding which unites them under one Name: but uni- them without any Rule, or Pattern, it cannot be but that ignification of the Name, that stands for such voluntary ections, should be often various in the Minds of different , who have scarce any standing Rule to regulate themselves, their Notions by, in such arbitrary *Ideas*.

Propriety not a sufficient Remedy.

8. 'Tis true, *common Use*, that is the Rule of riety, may be supposed here to afford some to settle the signification of Language; and it ot be denied, but that in some measure it does.

mon use *regulates the meaning of Words* pretty well for com- Conversation; but no body having an Authority to esta- the precise signification of Words, nor determine to what any one shall annex them, common Use is not sufficient ljust them to Philosophical Discourses; there being scarce Name, of any very complex *Idea*, (to say nothing of others,) h, in common Use, has not a great latitude, and which kee- within the Bounds of Propriety, may not be made the of far different *Ideas*. Besides, the rule and measure of Pro- it self being no where established, it is often matter of ute, whether this or that way of using a Word, be pro- of Speech, or no. From all which, it is evident, that Names of such kind of very complex *Ideas*, are naturally to this imperfection, to be of doubtful and uncertain sig- tion; and even in Men, that have a Mind to understand another, do not always stand for the same *Idea* in Speaker Hearer. Though the Names *Glory* and *Gratitude* be the same tive *Idea*, which every one thinks on, or intends by that e, is apparently very different in Men using the same in e- Man's mouth, Through a whole Country, yet the complex

The way of Learning these Names contributes also to their Doubtfulness.

§. 9. *The way* also *wherein the Names of mixed Modes are ordinarily learned, does* not a little *contribute to the doubtfulness of their signification.* For if we will observe how Children learn Languages, we shall find, that to make them understand what the Names of simple *Ideas*, or Substances, stand for, People ordinarily shew them the thing, whereof they would have them have the *Idea*; and then repeat to them the Name that stands for it, as *White*, *Sweet*, *Milk*, *Sugar*, *Cat*, *Dog*. But as for mixed Modes, especially the most material of them, moral Words, the Sounds are usually learn'd first, and then to know what complex *Ideas* they stand for, they are either beholden to the explication of others, or (which happens for the most part) are left to their own Observation and Industry; which being little laid out in the search of the true and precise meaning of Names, these moral Words are, in most Mens Mouths, little more than bare Sounds; or when they have any, 'tis for the most part but a very loose and undetermined, and consequently obscure and confused signification. And even those themselves, who have with more attention settled their Notions, do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience, to have them stand for complex *Ideas*, different from those which other, even intelligent and studious Men, make them the signs of. Where shall one find any, either *controversial Debate*, or *familar Discourse*, concerning *Honour*, *Faith*, *Grace*, *Religion*, *Church*, &c. wherein it is not easy to observe the different Notions Men have of them; which is nothing but this, that they are not agreed in the signification of those Words; nor have in their Minds the same complex *Ideas* which they make them stand for: and so all the contests that follow thereupon, are only about the meaning of a Sound. And hence we see, that interpretation of Laws, whether Divine, or Humane, there is no end; Comments beget Comments, and Explications make new Matter for Explications: And of limiting, distinguishing, varying the signification of these moral Words, there is no end. These *Ideas* of Mens making, are, by Men still having the same Power, multiplied *in infinitum*. Many a Man, who was pretty well satisfied of the meaning of a Text of Scripture, or Clause in the Code, at first reading, has by consulting, Commentators, quite lost the sense of it, and by those Elucidations, given rise or increase to his Doubts, and drawn obscurity upon the place. I say not this, that I think Commentaries needless; but to shew how uncertain the Names of mixed Modes naturally

rally

are, even in the Mouths of those, who had both the Inion and the Faculty of Speaking as clearly, as Language capable to express their Thoughts.

Hence unavoidable Obscurity in ancient Authors.

§. 10. What obscurity this has unavoidably ught upon the Writings of Men, who have d in remote Ages, and different Countries, it be needless to take notice. Since the numerous umes of learned Men, employing their oughts that way, are Proofs more than enough, to shew t Attention, Study, Sagacity, and Reasoning is required, nd out the true meaning *of antient Authors*. But there being Writings we have any great concernment to be very solliciabout the meaning of, but those that contain either Truths are required to believe, or Laws we are to obey, and draw nveniences on us, when we mistake or transgress, we may es anxious about the Sense of other Authors, who Writing their own Opinions, we are under no greater necessity to w them, than they to know ours. Our good or evil depend not on their Decrees, we may safely be ignorant of their tions: And therefore in the reading of them, if they do not their Words with a due clearness and perspicuity, we may them aside, and without any injury done them, resolve thus h our selves,

Si non vis intelligi, debes negligi.

§. 11. If the signification of the Names of mixed Modes are certain, because there be no real Standards existing in Na-e, to which those *Ideas* are referred, and by which they may adjusted, the *Names of Substances are of a doubtful significati-* for a contrary reason, *viz. because* the *Ideas*, they stand for, supposed conformable to the reality of Things, and are *red to Standards* made by Nature. In our *Ideas* of Substances have not the liberty as in mixed Modes, to frame what mbinations we think fit, to be the characteristical Notes, to k and denominate Things by. In these we must follow Na-e, suit our complex *Ideas* to real Existences, and regulate the ification of their Names by the Things themselves, if we l have our Names to be the signs of them, and stand for m. Here, 'tis true, we have Patterns to follow; but Patns, that will make the signification of their Names very untain: For Names must be of a very unsteady and various aning, if the *Ideas* they stand for, be referred to Standards

without us, *that either cannot be known at all, or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly.*

Names of Substances referr'd, First, To real Essences that cannot be known.

§. 12. The *Names of Substances have*, as has been shewed, a double *reference* in their ordinary use.

First, Sometimes they are made to stand for, and so their signification is supposed to agree to, *The real Constitution of Things*, from which all their Properties flow, and in which they all centre. But this real Constitution, or (as it is apt to be called) Essence, being utterly unknown to us, any Sound that is put to stand for it, must be very uncertain in its application; and it will be impossible to know, what Things are, or ought to be called an *Horse*, or *Antimony*, when those Words are put for real Essences, that we have no *Ideas* of at all. And therefore in this Supposition, the Names of Substances being referred to Standards that cannot be known, their significations can never be adjusted and established by those Standards.

Secondly, To co-existing Qualities, which are known but imperfectly.

§. 13. *Secondly*, The *simple Ideas* that are found to *co-exist in Substances*, being that which their Names immediately signify, these, as united in the several Sorts of Things, *are* the proper *Standards* to which their Names are referred, and by which their significations may best be rectified. But neither will these *Archetypes* so well serve to this purpose, as to leave these Names, without very various and uncertain significations. Because these simple *Ideas* that co-exist, and are united in the same Subject, being very numerous, and having all an equal right to go into the complex specifick *Idea*, which the specifick Name is to stand for, Men, though they propose to themselves the very same Subject to consider, yet frame very different *Ideas* about it; and so the Name they use for it, unavoidably comes to have, in several Men, very different significations. The simple Qualities which make up the complex *Ideas*, being most of them Powers, in relation to Changes, which they are apt to make in, or receive from other Bodies, are almost infinite. He that shall but observe, what a great variety of alterations any one of the baser Metals is apt to receive, from the different application only of Fire; and how much a greater number of Changes any of them will receive in the Hands of Chymists, by the application of other Bodies, will not think it strange, that I count the Properties of Bodies not easy to be Collected, and completely known by the

ways of enquiry, which our Faculties are capable of. They
g therefore at leaſt ſo many, that no Man can know the pre-
ınd definite number, they are differently diſcovered by diffe-
Men, according to their various skill, attention, and ways
andling; who therefore cannot chuſe but have different *Ideas*
he ſame Subſtance, and therefore make the ſignification of its
mon Name very various and uncertain. For the complex *I-*
of Subſtances, being made up of ſuch ſimple ones as are ſupp-
d to co-exiſt in Nature, every one has a right to put into his
plex *Idea*, thoſe Qualities he has found to be united together.
though in the Subſtance *Gold*, one ſatisfies himſelf with Co-
and Weight, yet another thinks Solubility in *Aq. Regia*, as
ſſary to be joined with that Colour in his *Idea* of Gold, as
one does its Fuſibility; Solubility in *Aq Regia*, being a Qua-
as conſtantly join'd with its Colour and Weight, as Fuſibili-
or any other; others put in its Ductility or Fixedneſs, *&c.* as
have been taught by Tradition, or Experience. Who of
theſe, has eſtabliſh'd the right ſignification of the Word
? Or who ſhall be the Judge to determine? Each has his
dard in Nature, which he appeals to, and with Reaſon thinks
as the ſame right to put into his complex *Idea*, ſignified by
Word *Gold*, thoſe Qualities, which upon Trial he has found
ed; as another, who has not ſo well examined, has to leave
n out; or a third, who has made other Trials, has to put in
rs. For the Union in Nature of theſe Qualities, being the
Ground of their Union in one complex *Idea*, Who can ſay,
of them has more reaſon to be put in, or left out, than ano-
? From whence it will always unavoidably follow, that the
plex *Ideas* of Subſtances, in Men uſing the ſame Name for
n, will be very various; and ſo the ſignifications of thoſe
nes, very uncertain.

Secondly, To co-exiſting Qualities which are known but imperfectly.

14. Beſides, there is ſcarce any particular
g exiſting, which, in ſome of its ſimple *Ideas*,
not communicate with a greater, and in o-
s with a leſs Number of particular Beings:
o ſhall determine in this Caſe, which are thoſe
are to make up the preciſe Collection, that is to be ſignified
he ſpecifick Name; or can with any juſt Authority preſcribe,
ch obvious or common Qualities are to be left out; or which
e ſecret, or more particular, are to be put into the ſignification
he Name of any Subſtance? All *which* together, ſeldom or
r fail to *produce* that various and *doubtful Signification in the*
es of Subſtances, which cauſes ſuch Uncertainty, Diſputes, or Mi-
es, when we come to a Philoſophical Uſe of them. §. 15.

With this imperfection, they may serve for Civil, but not well for Philosophical Use.

§. 15. 'Tis true, as *to civil and common Conversation*, the general *names of Substances*, regulated in their ordinary Signification by some obvious Qualities, (as by the Shape and Figure in Things of known seminal Propagation, and in other Substances, for the most part by Colour, join'd with some other sensible Qualities,) *do well enough*, to design the Things Men would be understood to speak of: And so they usually conceive well enough the Substances meant by the Word *Gold*, or *Apple*, to distinguish the one from the other. *But in Philosophical Enquiries and Debates*, where general Truths *are* to be establish'd, and Consequences drawn from Positions laid down, there the precise signification of the Names of Substances will be found, not only *not* to be *well established*, but also very hard to be so. For Example, he that shall make Malleableness, or a certain degree of Fixedness, a part of his complex *Idea* of *Gold*, may make Propositions concerning Gold, and draw Consequences from them, that will truly and clearly follow from *Gold*, taken in such a signification: But yet such as another Man can never be forced to admit, nor be convinced of their Truth, who makes not Malleableness, or the same degree of Fixedness, part of that complex *Idea*, that the Name *Gold*, in his use of it, stands for.

Instance, Liquor.

§. 16. This is a natural, and almost unavoidable Imperfection in almost all the Names of Substances, in all Languages whatsoever, which Men will easily find, when once passing from confused or loose Notions, they come to more strict and close Enquiries. For then they will be convinced, how doubtful and obscure those Words are in their Signification, which in ordinary use appeared very clear and determined. I was once in a Meeting of very learned and ingenious Physicians, where by chance there arose a Question, whether any Liquor passed through the Filaments of the Nerves. The Debate having been manag'd a good while, by variety of Arguments on both sides, I (who had been used to suspect, that the greatest part of Disputes were more about the signification of Words, than a real difference in the Conception of Things) desired, That before they went any farther on in this Dispute, they would first examine, and establish amongst them, what the Word *Liquor* signified. They at first were a little surprized at the Proposal; and had they been Persons less ingenious, they might perhaps have taken it for a very frivolous or extravagant one: Since there was no one

there

, that thought not himself to understand very perfectly, the Word Liquor stood for; which, I think too, none of ost perplexed Names of Substances. However, they were ed to comply with my Motion, and upon Examination d, that the signification of that Word, was not so settled certain, as they had all imagined; but that each of them it a sign of a different complex *Idea*. This made them ive, that the Main of their Dispute was about the signifi- n of that Term; and that they differed very little in their ions, concerning some fluid and subtile Matter, passing gh the Conduits of the Nerves; tho' it was not so easy to whether it was to be called *Liquor*, or no, a thing which each considered, he thought it not worth the contending t.

17. How much this is the Case in the great- rt of Disputes, that Men are engaged so hotly shall, perhaps, have an Occasion in another to take notice. Let us only here consider a little more ly the fore-mentioned instance of the Word *Gold*, and we see how hard it is precisely to determine its Signification. I all agree, to make it stand for a Body of a certain yellow ng Colour; which being the *Idea* to which Children have xed that Name, the shining yellow part of a Peacock's is properly to them Gold. Others finding Fusibility join'd that yellow Colour in certain parcels of Matter, make of Combination a complex *Idea* to which they give the Name o denote a sort of Substances; And so exclude from being all such yellow shining Bodies, as by Fire will be reduc'd hes, and admit to be of that Species, or to be comprehended r that Name *Gold* only such Substances as having that shi- yellow Colour will by Fire be reduced to Fusion, and not hes. Another by the same Reason adds the Weight, which a Quality, as straitly join'd with that Colour, as its Fusibi- he thinks has the same Reason to be join'd in its *Idea*, and signified by its Name: And therefore the other made up ody, of such a Colour and Fusibility, to be imperfect; o on of all the rest: Wherein no one can shew a Reason, some of the inseparable Qualities, that are always united in re, should be put into the nominal Essence, and others left Or why the Word *Gold*, signifying that sort of Body the on his Finger is made of, should determine that sort, rather s Colour, Weight, and Fusibility; than by its Colour, ght, and Solubility in *Aq. Regia*: Since the dissolving it by that

Instance Gold.

that Liquor, is as inſeparable from it, as the Fuſion by Fire and they are both of them nothing, but the relation which tha Subſtance has to two other Bodies, which have a Power to ope rate differently upon it. For by what right is it, that Fuſibilit comes to be a part of the Eſſence, ſignified by the Word *Gold* and Solubility but a property of it? Or why is its Colour part of the Eſſence, and its Malleableneſs but a property? Tha which I mean, is this, That theſe being all but Properties, de pending on its real Conſtitution; and nothing but Powers, ei ther active or paſſive, in reference to other Bodies, no one has Authority to determine the ſignification of the Word *Gold*, (as referr'd to ſuch a Body exiſting in Nature) more to one Col lection of *Ideas* to be found in that Body, than to another: Whereby the ſignification of that Name muſt unavoidably be very uncertain. Since, as has been ſaid, ſeveral People obſerve ſeveral Properties in the ſame Subſtance; and, I think, I may ſay no body at all. And therefore we have but very imperfect deſcriptions of Things, and Words have very uncertain Signifi cations.

The Names of ſimple Ideas *the leaſt doubtful.*

§. 18. From what has been ſaid, it is eaſy to obſerve, what has been before remarked, *viz.* That the *Names of ſimple* Ideas *are*, of all others, the *leaſt liable to Miſtakes*, and that for theſe Rea ſons. *Firſt*, Becauſe the *Ideas* they ſtand for, be ing each but one ſingle perception, are much eaſier got, and more clearly retained, than the more complex ones and therefore are not liable to the uncertainty, which uſually at tends thoſe compounded ones of *Subſtances and mixed Modes*, in which the preciſe number of ſimple *Ideas*, that make them up, are not eaſily agreed, and ſo readily kept in the Mind. And *Secondly*, becauſe they are never referr'd to any other Eſ ſence, but barely that Perception they immediately ſignify. Which reference is that, which renders the ſignification of the Names of Subſtances naturally ſo perplexed, and gives occaſion to ſo many Diſputes. Men that do not perverſly uſe their Words, or on purpoſe ſet themſelves to cavil, ſeldom miſtake in any Language, which they are acquainted with, the Uſe and Signification of the Names of ſimple *Ideas*: *White*, and *Sweet*, *Yellow* and *Bitter*, carry a very obvious meaning with them, which every one preciſely comprehends, or eaſily perceives he is ignorant of, and ſeeks to be informed. But what preciſe Col lection of ſimple *Ideas*, *Modeſty*, or *Frugality* ſtand for in ano ther's uſe, is not ſo certainly known. And however we are apt

to

ink, we well enough know, what is meant by *Gold* or *Iron*; ıe precise complex *Idea*, others make them the signs of, is ſo certain: And I believe it is very ſeldom that in Speaker Hearer, they ſtand for exactly the ſame Collection. Which needs produce Miſtakes and Diſputes, when they are made f in Diſcourſes, wherein Men have to do with univerſal oſitions, and would ſettle in their Minds univerſal Truths, conſider the Conſequences, that follow from them.

And next to them ſimple Modes.

19. By the ſame Rule, the *Names of ſimple s are next to thoſe of ſimple* Ideas, *leaſt liable to and Uncertainty*, eſpecially thoſe of Figure Number, of which Men have ſo clear and di- *Ideas*. Whoever, that had a Mind to un- and them, miſtook the ordinary meaning of *Seven*, or *a gle*? And in general the leaſt compounded *Ideas* in every have the leaſt dubious Names.

The moſt doubtful are the Names of very compounded mixed Modes and Subſtances.

20. Mixed Modes therefore, that are made ut of a few and obvious ſimple *Ideas*, have ly Names of no very uncertain Signification. he Names of *mixed Modes*, which comprehend at Number of ſimple *Ideas*, are commonly of ry doubtful, and undetermined meaning, as een ſhewn. The Names of Subſtances, be- nnexed to *Ideas*, that are neither the real Eſ- s, nor exact Repreſentations of the Patterns they are re- l to, are liable yet to greater Imperfection and Uncertain- ſpecially when we come to a philoſophical uſe of them.

Why this imperfection charged upon Words.

21. The great diſorder that happens in our es of Subſtances, proceeding for the moſt part our want of Knowledge, and Inability to rate into their real Conſtitutions, it may pro- be wondered, *Why I charge this as an Imper-*, rather *upon our Words* than Underſtandings. Exception has ſo much appearance of Juſtice, that I think lf obliged to give a Reaſon, why I have followed this Me- I muſt confeſs then, that when I firſt began this Diſcourſe Underſtanding, and a good while after, I had not the leaſt ght, that any Conſideration of Words was at all neceſſary But when having paſſed over the Original and Compoſi- f our *Ideas*, I began to examine the Extent and Certainty r Knowledge, I found it had ſo near a Connexion with ls, that unleſs their force and manner of Signification were well obſerved, there could be very little ſaid clearly and

perti-

pertinently concerning Knowledge: which being converſant about Truth, had conſtantly to do with Propoſitions. And though it terminated in Things, yet it was for the moſt part ſo much by the intervention of Words, that they ſeem'd ſcarce ſeparable from our general Knowledge. At leaſt they interpoſe themſelves ſo much between our Underſtandings, and the Truth which it would contemplate and apprehend, that like the *Medium* through which viſible Objects paſs, their Obſcurity and Diſorder does not ſeldom caſt a miſt before our Eyes, and impoſe upon our Underſtandings. If we conſider, in the Fallacies Men put upon themſelves, as well as others, and the Miſtakes in Mens Diſputes and Notions, how great a part is owing to Words, and their uncertain or miſtaken Significations, we ſhall have reaſon to think this no ſmall obſtacle in the way to Knowledge, which, I conclude we are the more carefully to be warned of, becauſe it has been ſo far from being taken notice of as an inconvenience, that the Arts of improving it have been made the buſineſs of Mens ſtudy; and obtained the Reputation of Learning and Subtility, as we ſhall ſee in the following Chapter. But I am apt to imagine, that were the Imperfections of Language, as the Inſtrument of Knowledge, more throughly weighed, a great many of the Controverſies that make ſuch a Noiſe in the World, would of themſelves ceaſe; and the way to Knowledge, and, perhaps, Peace too, lie a great deal open'er than it does.

This ſhould teach us Moderation, in impoſing our own Senſe of old Authors.

§. 22. Sure I am, that the ſignification of Words, in all Languages, depending very much on the Thoughts, Notions, and *Ideas* of him that uſes them, muſt unavoidably be of great uncertainty, to Men of the ſame Language and Country. This is ſo evident in the Greek Authors, that he, that ſhall peruſe their Writings, will find, almoſt every one of them, a diſtinct Language though the ſame Words. But when to this natural difficulty in every Country, there ſhall be added different Countries, and remote Ages, wherein the Speakers and Writers had very different Notions, Tempers, Cuſtoms, Ornaments, and Figures of Speech, *&c.* every one of which, influenced the ſignification of their Words then, though to us now they are loſt and unknown; *it would become us to be charitable one to another in our Interpretation or Miſunderſtanding of* thoſe *ancient Writings*, which though of great concernment to be underſtood, are liable to the unavoidable difficulties of Speech, which, (if we except the Names of ſim-

e *Ideas*, and some very obvious Things) is not capable, out a constant defining the terms of conveying the sense and tion of the Speaker, without any manner of doubt and unnty, to the Hearer. And in Discourses of Religion, Law, Morality, as they are Matters of the highest concernment, ere will be the greatest difficulty.

23. The Volumes of Interpreters, and Commentators on Old and New Testament, are but too manifest proofs of Tho' every thing said in the Text be infallibly true, yet Reader may be, nay cannot chuse but be very fallible in the rstanding of it. Nor is it to be wondred, that the Will of D, when cloathed in Words, should be liable to that doubt uncertainty, which unavoidably attends that sort of Conce, when even his Son, whilst cloathed in Flesh, was subto all the Frailties and Inconveniences of humane Nature, xcepted. And we ought to magnify his Goodness, that ath spread before all the World, such legible Characters of Works and Providence, and given all Mankind so sufficilight of Reason, that they, to whom this written Word r came, could not (whenever they set themselves to search) r doubt of the Being of GOD, or of the Obedience due im. Since then the Precepts of natural Religion are plain, very intelligible to all Mankind, and seldom come to be roverted; and other revealed Truths, which are conveyed by Books and Languages, are liable to the common and naobscurities and difficulties incident to Words, methinks it ld become us to be more careful and diligent in observing ormer, and less magisterial, positive, and imperious, in img our own sense and interpretations of the latter.

CHAP. X.

Of the Abuse of Words.

Abuse of Words.

BEsides the Imperfection that is naturally in Language, and the obscurity and confusion that is so hard to be avoided e Use of Words, there are several *wilful Faults and Neglects*, h Men are guilty of, in this way of Communication, whereey render these signs less clear and distinct in their significathan naturally they need to be.

§. 24.

First, Words without any, or without clear Ideas.

§. 2. *First*, In this kind, the first and most pa pable abuse is, the using of Words, without cle and distinct *Ideas*; or, which is worse, signs wit out any thing signified. Of these there are tw sorts:

I. One may observe, in all Languages, certai Words, that if they be examined, will be found, in their fir Original, and their appropriated Use, not to stand for any cle and distinct *Ideas*. These, for the most part, the several Se of Philosophy and Religion have introduced. For their A thors, or Promoters, either affecting something singular, a out of the way of common Apprehensions, or to support so strange Opinions, or cover some Weakness of their Hypothes seldom fail to *coin* new Words, and such as, when they come be examined, may justly be called *insignificant Terms*. For h ving either had no determinate Collection of *Ideas* annexed them, when they were first invented; or at least such as, if w examined, will be found inconsistent, 'tis no wonder if afte wards, in the vulgar use of the same party, they remain emp Sounds, with little or no signification, amongst those who thi it enough to have them often in their Mouths, as the distinguis ing Characters of their Church, or School, without much tro bling their Heads to examine, what are the precise *Ideas* th stand for. I shall not need here to heap up Instances, eve one's Reading and Conversation will sufficiently furnish him Or if he wants to be better stored, the great Mint-Masters these kind of Terms, I mean the School-men and Metaphysi ans, (under which, I think, the disputing Natural and Mor Philosophers of these latter Ages, may be comprehended,) ha where-withal abundantly to content him.

§. 3. II. Others there be, who extend this abuse yet farthe who take so little care to lay by Words, which in their primar Notation have scarce any clear and distinct *Ideas* which they a annexed to, that by an unpardonable Negligence, they familia ly *use Words*, which the Propriety of Language has affixed very important *Ideas*, *without any distinct meaning* at all. *Wisdo Glory*, *Grace*, &c. are Words frequent enough in every Man Mouth; but if a great many of those who use them, should b asked, what they mean by them? they would be at a stand, an not know what to answer: A plain proof, that though the have learned those Sounds, and have them ready at their Tongue end, yet there are no determined *Ideas* laid up in their Mind which are to be expressed to others by them.

§.

4. *Men* having been *accustomed* from their
les *to learn Words*, which are easily got and re-
d, *before they knew*, or had framed *the complex*
, to which they were annexed, or which were
e found in the things *they* were thought to
for, they *usually continue to do so* all their Lives,
without taking the pains necessary to settle in
Minds determined *Ideas*, they use their Words for such un-
y and confused Notions as they have, contenting them-
s with the same Words other People use; as if their very
d necessarily carried with it constantly the same meaning.
, though Men make a shift with in the ordinary Occur-
es of Life, where they find it necessary to be understood,
therefore they make signs till they are so: Yet this insigni-
cy in their Words, when they come to reason concerning
r their Tenents or Interest, manifestly fills their Discourse
abundance of empty unintelligible Noise and Jargon, espe-
in Moral Matters, where the Words, for the most part,
ding for arbitrary and numerous Collections of *Ideas*, not
larly and permanently united in Nature, their bare Sounds
often only thought on, or at least very obscure and uncertain
ons annexed to them. Men take the Words they find in
mongst their Neighbours; and that they may not seem igno-
what they stand for, use them confidently, without much
bling their heads about a certain fixed meaning; whereby,
es the ease of it, they obtain this advantage, That as in
Discourses they seldom are in the right, so they are as seldom
convinced, that they are in the wrong; itbeing all one to
bout to draw those Men out of their Mistakes, who have no
d Notions, as to dispossess a Vagrantof his Habitation, who
o settled abode. This I guess tobe so; and every one may
ve in himself and others, whether it be, or no.

Occasioned by learning Names before the Ideas *they belong to.*

5. *Secondly*, Another great abuse of Words
inconstancy in the use of them. It is hard to
a Discourse written of any Subject, espe-
y of Controversie, whereon one shall not
rve, if he read with attention, the same Words
d those commonly the most material in the Discourse, and
n which the Argument turns) used sometimes for one Colle-
n of simple *Ideas*, and sometimes for another, which is a per-
Abuse of Language. Words being intended for signs of my
, to make them known to others, not by any natural signi-
ion, but by a voluntary imposition, 'tis plain cheat and
abuse,

Secondly, Unsteady Application of them.

abuse, when I make them stand sometimes for one thing, and sometimes for another; the wilful doing whereof, can be imputed to nothing but great Folly, or greater Dishonesty. And a Man, in his Accompts with another, may, with as much fairness, make the Characters of Numbers stand sometimes for one, and sometimes for another Collection of Unites: *v. g.* this Character 3 stands sometimes for three, sometimes for four, and sometimes for eight; as in his Discourse, or Reasoning, make the same Words stand for different Collections of simple *Ideas*. If Men should do so in their Reckonings, I wonder who would have to do with them? One who would speak thus in the Affairs and Business of the World, and call 8 sometimes 7, and sometimes nine, as best served his Advantage, would presently have clapp'd upon him one of the two Names Men constantly are disgusted with. And yet in Arguins, and learned Contests, the same sort of proceeding passes commonly for Wit and Learning: but to me it appears a greater dishonesty, than the misplacing of Counters, in the casting up a Debt; and the cheat the greater, by how much Truth is of greater concernment and value, than Money.

Thirdly, Affected Obscurity by wrong Application.

§. 6. *Thirdly*, Another abuse of Language is, *affected Obscurity*, by either applying old Words to new and unusual Significations; or introducing new and ambiguous Terms, without defining either; or else putting them so together, as may confound their ordinary meaning. Though the Peripatetick Philosophy has been most eminent in this way, yet other Sects have not been wholly clear of it. There is scarce any of them that are not cumbred with some Difficulties, (such is the Imperfection of Humane Knowledge) which they have been fain to cover with Obscurity of Terms, and to confound the signification of Words, which, like a Mist before Peoples Eyes, might hinder their weak parts from being discovered. That *Body* and *Extension*, in common use, stand for two distinct *Ideas*, is plain to any one that will but reflect a little. For were their Signification precisely the same, it would be proper, and as intelligible to say, the *Body of an Extension*, as the *Extension of a Body*; and yet there are those who find it necessary to confound their Signification. To this Abuse, and the Mischiefs of confounding the Signification of Words, Logick, and the liberal Sciences, as they have been handled in the Schools have given Reputation; and the admired Art of Disputing hath added much to the natural Imperfection of Languages, which it has been made use of, and fitted, to perplex the Significati-

ords, more than to discover the Knowledge and Truth of gs: And he that will look into that sort of learned Writings, ind the Words there much more obscure, uncertain, and ermined in their Meaning, than they are in ordinary Con- ion.

7. This is unavoidably to be so, where Mens and Learning, are estimated by their Skill in *ing*. And if Reputation and Reward shall l these Conquests, which depend mostly on ineness and Niceties of Words, 'tis no Won- the Wit of Man so employ'd, should perplex, involve, ubtilize the Signification of Sounds, so as never to want hing to say, in opposing or defending any Question; the ry being adjudged not to him who had Truth on his side, he last Word in the Dispute. *Logick and Dispute has much contributed to this.*

8. This, though a very useless skill, and that I think the direct opposite to the ways of vledge, hath yet passed hitherto under the ble and esteemed Names of *Subtlety* and *Acuteness*; and has he applause of the Schools, and Encouragement of one part e learned Men of the World. And no wonder, since the sophers of old, (the disputing and wrangling Philosopher's n, such as *Lucian* wittily, and with reason taxes,) and hoolmen since, aiming at Glory and Esteem, for their great niversal Knowledge, easier a great deal to be pretended to, really acquired, found this a good Expedient to cover their ance, with a curious and unexplicable Web of perplexed ls, and procure to themselves the admiration of others, by elligible Terms, the apter to produce Wonder, because could not be understood: whilst it appears in all History, hese profound Doctors were no wiser, nor more useful their Neighbours; and brought but small Advantage to he Life, or the Societies, wherein they lived: Unless the g of new Words, where they produced no new Things ly them to, or the perplexing or obscuring the signifi- of old ones, and so bringing all things into question and e, were a thing profitable to the Life of Man, or worthy mendation and Reward. *Calling it Subtlety.*

9. For, notwithstanding these learned Dis- ts, these allk-nowing Doctors, it was to the plastick Statesman, that the Governments World owed their Peace, Defence, and Li- ; and from the illiterate and contemned *This Learning very little benefits Society.*

Mechanick, (a Name of Disgrace) that they received the Improvements of useful Arts. Nevertheless, this artificial Ignorance, and *learned Gibberish*, prevailed mightily in these last Ages, by the Interest and Artifice of those, who found no easier way to that pitch of Authority and Dominion they have attained, than by amusing the Men of Business, and Ignorant, with hard Words, or employing the Ingenious and Idle in intricate Disputes, about unintelligible Terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that endless Labyrinth. Besides, there is no such way to gain admittance, or give Defence to strange and absurd Doctrines, as to guard them round about with Legions of obscure, doubtful, and undefined Words. Which yet make these Retreats, more like the Dens of Robbers, or Holes of Foxes, than the Fortresses of fair Warriours: which if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the strength that is in them, but the Briars and Thorns, and the Obscurity of the Thickets they are hid with. For Untruth being unacceptable to the Mind of Man, there is no other defence left for Absurdity, but Obscurity.

But destroys the Instruments of Knowledge and Communication.

§. 10. Thus learned Ignorance, and this Art of keeping, even inquisitive Men, from true Knowledge, hath been propagated in the World, and hath much perplexed whilst it pretended to inform the Understanding. For we see, that other well meaning and wise Men, whose Education and Parts had not acquired that *acuteness*, could intelligibly express themselves to one another; and in its plain use, make a benefit of Language. But though unlearned Men well enough understood the Words *White* and *Black*, &c. and had constant Notions of the *Ideas* signified by those Words; yet there were Philosophers found, who had learning and *subtlety* enough to prove, that *Snow was black*; *i. e.* to prove, that *White* was *Black*. Whereby they had the Advantage to destroy the Instruments and Means of Discourse, Conversation, Instruction, and Society; whilst with great Art and *Subtlety* they did no more but perplex and confound the signification of Words, and thereby render Language less useful, than the real Defects of it had made it, a Gift, which the illiterate had not attained to.

As useful as to confound the sound of the Letters.

§. 11. These learned Men did equally instruct Mens Understandings, and profit their lives, as he who should alter the signification of known Characters, and, by a subtle Device of Learning, far surpassing the Capacity of the Illiterate, Dull, and Vulgar, should, in his Writing, shew, that he could

ld put *A* for *B*, and *D* for *E*, *&c.* to the no small Admiration
Benefit of his Reader. It being as senseless to put *Black*,
ich is a Word agreed on to stand for one sensible *Idea*, to put
I say, for another, or the contrary *Idea*, *i. e.* to call *Snow*
ck, as to put this mark *A*, which is a Character agreed on to
nd for one Modification of Sound, made by a certain Moti-
of the Organs of Speech, for *B* which is agreed on to stand
another Modification of Sound, made by another certain Mo-
of the Organs of Speech.

This Art has perplexed Religion and Justice.

. 12. Nor hath this Mischief stopped in logical
eties, or curious empty Speculations; it hath in-
led the great Concernments of Humane Life and
iety; obscured and perplexed the material
ths of Law and Divinity; brought Confusion,
order and Uncertainty into the Affairs of Mankind; and if
destroyed, yet in great measure rendred useless, those two
at Rules, Religion and Justice. What have the greatest part
the Comments and Disputes, upon the Laws of GOD and
n served for, but to make the meaning more doubtful, and
plex the sense? What have been the effect of those multi-
d curious Distinctions, and acute Niceties, but Obscurity and
certainty, leaving the Words more unintelligible, and the Rea-
more at a loss? How else comes it to pass, that Princes, speak-
or writing to their Servants, in their ordinary Commands, are
y understood; speaking to their People, in their Laws, are
so? And, as I remarked before, doth it not often happen, that
an of an ordinary Capacity, very well understands a Text,
Law, that he reads, till he consults an Expositor, or goes to
ncil; who by that time he hath done explaining them, makes
Words signifie either nothing at all, or what he pleases.

And ought to pass for Learning.

. 13. Whether any by-Interests of these Pro-
ons have occasioned this, I will not here exa-
e; but I leave it to be considered, whether it
ld not be well for Mankind, whose concern-
t it is to know Things as they are, and to do what they ought;
not to spend their Lives in talking about them, or tossing
rds to and fro; Whether it would not be well, I say, that
Use of Words were made plain and direct; and that Lan-
ge, which was given us for the improvement of Knowledge,
bond of Society, should not be employ'd to darken Truth,
unsettle Peoples Rights; to raise Mists, and render unintel-
le both Morality and Religion? Or that at least, if this will
n, it should not be thought Learning or Knowledge to
o?

Fourthly, taking them for things.

§ 14. *Fourthly*, Another great *abuse of Words is, the taking them for Things.* This, though it, in some degree, concerns all Names in general; yet more particularly affects those of Substances. To this Abuse, those Men are most subject, who confine their Thoughts to any one System, and give themselves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received Hypothesis: whereby they come to be persuaded, that the Terms of that Sect, are so suited to the Nature of Things, that they perfectly correspond with their real Existence. Who is there, that has been bred up in the Peripatetick Philosophy, who does not think the Ten Names, under which are ranked the Ten Predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the Nature of Things? Who is there of that School, that is not persuaded, that *substantial Forms, vegetative Souls, abhorrence of a Vacuum, intentional Species*, &c. are something real? These Words Men have learned from their very entrance upon Knowledge, and have found their Masters and Systems lay great Stress upon them: and therefore they cannot quit the Opinion, that they are conformable to Nature, and are the Representations of something that really exists. The *Platonists* have their *Soul of the World*, and the *Epicureans* their *endeavour towards Motion* in their Atoms, when at rest. There is scarce any Sect in Philosophy has not a distinct set of Terms, that others understand not. But yet this Gibberish, which in the Weakness of Humane Understanding, serves so well to palliate Mens Ignorance, and cover their Errors, comes by familiar use amongst those of the same Tribe, to seem the most important part of Language, and of all other the Terms the most significant: And should *Aerial* and *Ætherial Vehicles* come once, by the prevalency of that Doctrine, to be generally received any where, no doubt those Terms would make impressions on Mens Minds, so as to establish them in the persuasion of the reality of such Things, as much as *peripatetick Forms* and *intentional Species* have heretofore done.

Instance in Matter.

§. 15. How much *names taken for Things*, are apt to *mislead the Understanding*, the attentive reading of philosophical Writers would abundantly discover; and that, perhaps, in Words little suspected of any such Misuse. I shall instance in one only, and that a very familiar one. How many intricate Disputes have there been about *Matter*, as if there were some such thing really in Nature, distinct from *Body*; as 'tis evident, the Word *Matter* stands for an *Idea* distinct from the *Idea* of Body? For if the *Ideas* these two

Terms

erms ſtood for, were preciſely the ſame, they might indifently in all places be put one for another. But we ſee, that ough it be proper to ſay, There is *one Matter of all Bodies*, one not ſay, There is *one Body of all Matters*: We familiarly ſay, e *Body* is bigger than another; but it ſounds harſh (and I think never uſed) to ſay, one *Matter* is bigger than another. Whence mes this then? *Viz.* from hence, that tho' *Matter* and *Body*, not really diſtinct, but where-ever there is the one, there is e other; Yet *Matter* and *Body*, ſtand for two different Conptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but a part of the ner. For *Body* ſtands for a ſolid extended figured Subſtance, nereof *Matter* is but a partial and more confuſed Conception, it ming to me to be uſed for the Subſtance and Solidity of Body, ithout taking in its Extenſion and Figure: And therefore it is at ſpeaking of *Matter*, we ſpeak of it always as one, becauſe truth, it expreſly contains nothing but the *Idea* of a ſolid Subnce, which is every-where the ſame, every-where uniform, his being our *Idea* of *Matter*, we no more conceive, or ſpeak of ferent *Matters* in the World, than we do of different Solidis; though we both conceive, and ſpeak of different Bodies, cauſe Extenſion and Figure are capable of variation. But ſince lidity cannot exiſt without Extenſion, and Figure, the taking *atter* to be the Name of ſomething really exiſting under that eciſion, has no doubt produced thoſe obſcure and unintelligie diſcourſes and Diſputes, which have filled the Heads and oks of Philoſophers concerning *Materia prima*; which Imperſtion or Abuſe, how far it may concern a great many other neral Terms, I leave to be conſidered. This, I think, I may leaſt ſay, that we ſhould have a great many fewer Diſputes the World, if Words were taken for what they are, the Signs our *Ideas* only, and not for Things themſelves. For when argue about *Matter*, or any the like Term, we truly argue ly about the *Idea* we expreſs by that Sound, whether that pre *Idea* agree to any thing really exiſting in Nature, or no. And Men would tell, what *Ideas* they make their Words ſtand for, ere could not be half that Obſcurity or Wrangling, in the rch or ſupport of Truth, that there is.

§. 16. But whatever inconvenience follows from s miſtake of Words, this I am ſure, that by nſtant and familiar uſe, they charm Men into tions far remote from the Truth of Things. 'Twould be ard Matter, to perſuade any one, that the Words which his ther or Schoolmaſter, the Parſon of the Pariſh, or ſuch a Re- *This makes Errors laſting.*

verend Doctor used, signified nothing that really existed in Nature: Which, perhaps, is *none of the least Causes, that Men are so hardly drawn to quit their Mistakes*, even in Opinions purely Philosophical, and where they have no other Interest but Truth. For the Words, they have a long time been used to, remaining firm in their Minds, 'tis no wonder, that the wrong Notions annexed to them, should not be removed.

Fifthly, setting them for what they cannot signify.

§. 17. *Fifthly*, Another *Abuse of Words, is the setting them in the place of Things, which they do or can by no means signify.* We may observe, that in the general Names of Substances, whereof the nominal Essences are only known to us, when we put them into Propositions, and affirm or deny any thing about them, we do most commonly tacitly suppose, or intend they should stand for the real Essence of a certain sort of Substances. For when a Man says *Gold is Malleable*, he means and would insinuate something more than this, that *what I call Gold is malleable*, (though truly it amounts to no more) but would have this understood, *viz.* that *Gold*; i. e. *what has the real Essence of Gold is malleable*, which amounts to thus much, that *Malleableness depends on, and is inseparable from the real Essence of Gold.* But a Man, not knowing wherein that real Essence consists, the connexion in his Mind of Malleableness, is not truly with an Essence he knows not, but only with the Sound Gold he puts for it. Thus when we say, that *Animal rationale* is, and *Animal implume bipes latis unguibus*, is not a good definition of a Man; 'tis plain, we suppose the Name *Man* in this case to stand for the real Essence of a Species, and would signify, that a *rational Animal* better described that real Essence, than *a two-legg'd Animal with broad Nails, and without Feathers.* For else, why might not *Plato* as properly make the Word ἄνθρωπος or *Man* stand for his complex *Idea*, made up of the *Ideas* of a Body, distinguished from others by a certain shape and other outward appearances, as *Aristotle*, make the complex *Idea*, to which he gave the Name ἄνθρωπος or *Man*, of Body, and the Faculty of Reasoning join'd together; unless the Name ἄνθρωπος or *Man*, were supposed to stand for something else, than what it signifies; and to be put in the place of some other thing, than the *Idea* a Man professes he would express by it?

V. g. Putting them for the real Essences of Substances.

§. 18. 'Tis true, the Names of Substances would be much more useful, and Propositions made in them much more certain, were the real Essences of Substances the *Ideas* in our Minds, which

h those words signified. And 'tis for want of those real nces, that our Words convey so little Knowledge or Cer- y in our discourses about them: And therefore the Mind, move that Imperfection as much as it can, makes them, by ret Supposition, to stand for a Thing, having that real Es- e, as if thereby it made some nearer approaches to it. For gh the Word *Man* or *Gold*, signify nothing truly but a plex *Idea* of Properties, united together in one sort of Sub- es: Yet there is scarce any Body in the use of these Words, often supposes each of those Names to stand for a thing ng the real Essence, on which those Properties depend. ich is so far from diminishing the Imperfection of our Words, by a plain Abuse, it adds to it, when we would make them d for something, which not being in our complex *Idea*, the e we use, can no ways be the sign of.

Hence we think every change of our Idea *in Substances, not to change the Species.*

19. This shews us the Reason, Why in *d Modes* any of the *Ideas* that make the Com- ion of the complex one, being left out, or nged, it is allowed to be another thing, *i.e.* e of another Species, as is plain in *Chance- y*, *Man-slaughter*, *Murther*, *Parricide*, &c. Reason whereof is, because the complex signified by that Name, is the real, as well as nominal Es- ; and there is no secret of that Name to any other Essence, hat. But in *Substances* it is not so. For though in that called one puts into his complex *Idea*, what another leaves out; *Vice Versa*: yet Men do not usually think, that therefore the ies is changed: Because they secretly in their Minds refer that ne, and suppose it annexed to a real immutable Essence of a g existing, on which those Properties depend. He that adds is complex *Idea* of *Gold*, that of Fixedness or Solubility in *egia*, which he put not in it before, is not thought to have nged the Species; but only to have a more perfect *Idea*, by ng another simple *Idea*, which is always in fact, joined with e other, of which his former complex *Idea*, consisted. But reference of the Name to a thing, whereof we have not the , is so far from helping at all, that it only serves the more to lve us in Difficulties. For by this tacit reference to the real nce of that Species of Bodies, the Word *Gold* (which by ding for a more or less perfect Collection of simple *Ideas*, es to design that sort of Body well enough in civil Discourse) es to have no signification at all, being put for somewhat, reof we have no *Idea* at all, and so can signify nothing at all,

all, when the Body it self is away. For however it may be thought all one; yet, if well considered, it will be found a quite different thing, to argue about *Gold* in Name, and about a parcel of the Body it self, *v.g.* a piece of *Leaf-Gold* laid before us; though in Discourse we are fain to substitute the Name for the thing.

The Cause of the Abuse, a Supposition of Nature's working always regularly.

§. 20. That which, I think, very much disposes Men to substitute their Names for the real Essences of *Species*, is the supposition before mentioned, that Nature works regularly in the Production of Things, and sets the Boundaries to each of those *Species*, by giving exactly the same real internal Constitution to each individual, which we rank under one general Name. Whereas any one who observes their different Qualities can hardly doubt, that many of the Individuals, called by the same Name, are, in their internal Constitution, as different one from another, as several of those which are ranked under different specifick Names. *This supposition*, however *that the same precise internal Constitution goes always with the same specifick name, makes Men forward to take* those *names for the Representatives* of those real *Essences*, though indeed they signify nothing but the complex *Ideas* they have in their Minds, when they use them. So that, if I may so say, signifying one thing, and being supposed for, or put in the place of another, they cannot but, in such a kind of use, cause a great deal of Uncertainty in Mens Discourses; especially in those, who have throughly imbibed the Doctrine of *substantial Forms*, whereby they firmly imagine the several Species of Things to be determined and distinguished.

This Abuse contains two false suppositions.

§. 21. But however preposterous and absurd it be, to make our Names stand for *Ideas* we have not, or (which is all one) Essences that we know not, it being in effect to make our Words the signs of nothing; yet 'tis evident to any one, whoever so little reflects on the use Men make of their Words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a Man asks, whether this or that thing he sees, let it be a Drill, or a monstrous *Fœtus*, be a *Man*, or no; 'tis evident, the Question is not, Whether that particular thing agree to his complex *Idea*, expressed by the Name *Man*: But whether it has in it the real Essence of a Species of Things, which he supposes his Name *Man* to stand for. In which way of using the Names of Substances, there are these false suppositions contained.

First,

irst, That there are certain precise Essences, according to
:h Nature makes all particular Things, and by which they
listinguished into *Species*. That every Thing has a real Con-
tion, whereby it is what it is, and on which its sensible
lities depend, is past Doubt: But I think it has been proved,
this makes not the distinction of *Species*, as we rank them;
the boundaries of their Names.

condly, This tacitly also insinuates, as if we had *Ideas* of
proposed Essences. For to what purpose else is it, to en-
whether this or that thing have the real Essence of the
ies *Man*, if we did not suppose that there were such a spe-
c Essence known? Which yet is utterly false: And there-
such Application of Names, as would make them stand for
which we have not, must needs cause great Disorder in Dis-
ses and Reasonings about them, and be a great Inconveni-
in our Communication by Words.

22. *Sixthly*, There remains yet another more
ral, though, perhaps, less observed *Abuse of*
ls; and that is, that Men having by a long and
liar use annexed to them certain *Ideas*, they are
o imagine so near and necessary a connexion between
Names and the Signification they use them in, that
forwardly suppose one cannot but understand
t their meaning is; and therefore one ought
cquiesce in the Words delivered, as if it were past doubt,
in the use of those common received Sounds, the Speaker
Hearer had necessarily the same precise *Ideas*. Whence
ming, that when they have in Discourse used any Term,
have thereby, as it were, set before others the very thing
talk of. And so likewise taking the Words of others, as
ally standing for just what they themselves have been ac-
med to apply them to, they never trouble themselves to
in their own, or understand clearly others meaning. From
ice commonly proceeds Noise, and Wrangling, without
ovement or Information; whilst Men take Words to be
onstant regular marks of agreed Notions, which in truth
o more but the voluntary and unsteady signs of their own

Sixthly, A Supposition that Words have a certain and evident signification.

And yet Men think it strange, if in Discourse, or (where
often absolutely necessary) in Dispute, one sometimes asks
neaning of their Terms: Though the Arguings one may
y day observe in Conversation, make it evident, that there
ew Names of complex *Ideas*, which any two Men use for
ame just precise Collection. 'Tis hard to name a Word,
which

which will not be a clear Instance of this *Life* is a Term, none more familiar. Any one almost would take it for an Affront, to be asked what he meant by it. And yet if it comes in Question, whether a Plant, that lies ready formed in the Seed, have Life; whether the Embrio in an Egg before Incubation, or a Man in a Swound without Sense or Motion, be alive, or no? It is easy to perceive, that a clear distinct settled *Idea* does not always accompany the Use of so known a Word, as that of *Life* is. Some gross and confused Conceptions Men indeed ordinarily have, to which they apply the common Words of their Language, and such a loose use of their Words serves them well enough in their ordinary Discourses or Affairs. But this is not sufficient for Philosophical Enquiries. Knowledge and Reasoning require precise determinate *Ideas*. And though Men will not be so importunately dull, as not to understand what others say, without demanding an Explication of their Terms; nor so troublesomely critical, as to correct others in the use of the Words they receive from them: yet where Truth and Knowledge are concerned in the Case, I know not what Fault it can be to desire the Explication of Words, whose Sense seems dubious; or why a Man should be ashamed to own his Ignorance, in what Sense another Man uses his Words, since he has no other way of certainly knowing it, but by being informed. This Abuse of taking Words upon Trust, has no where spread so far, nor with so ill Effects, as amongst Men of Letters. The multiplication and obstinacy of Disputes, which has so laid waste the intellectual World, is owing to nothing more, than to this ill use of Words. For though it be generally believed, that there is great diversity of Opinions in the Volumes and Variety of Controversies, the World is distracted with; yet the most I can find, that the contending learned Men of different Parties do, in their Arguings one with another, is, that they speak different Languages. For I am apt to imagine, that when any of them quitting Terms, think upon Things, and know what they think, they think all the same: Though perhaps, what they would have, be different.

§. 23. To conclude this Consideration of the Imperfection, and Abuse of Language; the *ends of Language in our Discourse with others*, being chiefly these three: *First*, *To make known* one Man's Thoughts or *Ideas* to another. *Secondly*, To do it *with* as much ease and *quickness*, as is possible; and *Thirdly*, Thereby *to convey* the *Knowledge* of Things. Language

The Ends of Language, First, To convey our Ideas.

e is either abused, or deficient, when it fails of any of these
e.

st, Words fail in the first of these Ends, and lay not open Man's *Ideas* to another's view. *First*, When Men have es in their Mouths without any determined *Ideas* in their ls, whereof they are the signs: or *Secondly*, When they the common received Names of any Language to *Ideas*, to n the common use of that Language does not apply them: *rdly*, When they apply them very unsteadily, making them now for one, and by and by for another *Idea*.

24. *Secondly*, Men fail of conveying their ghts, with all the quickness and ease that may hen they have complex *Ideas*, without ha- distinct Names for them. This is sometimes ault of the Language it self, which has not in it a Sound pply'd to such a Signification: and sometimes the Fault of lan, who has not yet learn'd the Name for that *Idea* he shew another. *Secondly, To do it with quickness:*

25. *Thirdly*, There is no Knowledge of gs, conveyed by Mens Words, when their gree not to the Reality of Things. Tho' it Defect, that has its Original in our *Ideas*, are not so conformable to the Nature of s, as Attention, Study, and Application make them: Yet it fails not to extend it self to our Words hen we use them as Signs of real Beings, which yet ne- d any Reality or Existence. *Thirdly, Therewith to convey the Knowledge of Things.*

26. *First*, He that hath Words of any Lan- without distinct *Ideas* in his Mind, to which plies them, does, so far as he uses them in rse, only make a Noise without any Sense nification; and how learned soever he may seem by the hard Words, or learned Terms, is not much more ad- thereby in Knowledge, than he would be in Learning, ad nothing in his Study but the bare Titles of Books, t possessing the Contents of them. For all such Words, er put into Discourse, according to the right Construc- of Grammatical Rules, or the Harmony of well turned s, do yet amount to nothing but bare Sounds, and no- else. *How Mens Words fail in all these.*

27. *Secondly*, He that has complex *Ideas*, without particular for them, would be in no better a Case than a Book- who had in his Ware-house Volumes, that lay there un-

bound,

bound, and without Titles; which he could therefore make known to others, only by shewing the loose Sheets, and communicate them only by Tale. This Man is hindred in his Discourse, for want of Words to communicate his complex *Ideas*, which he is therefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the simple ones that compose them; and so is fain often to use twenty Words, to express what another Man signifies in one.

§. 28. *Thirdly*, He that puts not constantly the same Sign for the same *Idea*, but uses the same Words sometimes in one, and sometimes in another Signification, ought to pass in the Schools and Conversation for as fair a Man, as he does in the Market and Exchange, who sells several things under the same Name.

§. 29. *Fourthly*, He that applies the Words of any Language to *Ideas*, different from those, to which the common use of that Country applies them, however his own Understanding may be fill'd with Truth and Light, will not by such Words be able to convey much of it to others, without defining his Terms. For however, the Sounds are such as are familiarly known, and easily enter the Ears of those who are accustomed to them; yet standing for other *Ideas* than those they usually are annexed to, and are wont to excite in the Mind of the Hearers, they cannot make known the Thoughts of him who thus uses them.

§. 30. *Fifthly*, He that hath imagined to himself Substances such as never have been, and fill'd his Head with *Ideas* which have not any correspondence with the real Nature of Things to which yet he gives settled and defined Names, may fill his Discourse, and perhaps, another Man's Head, with the fantastical Imaginations of his own Brain, but will be very far from advancing thereby one jot in real and true Knowledge.

§. 31. He that hath Names without *Ideas*, wants meaning in his Words, and speaks only empty Sounds. He that hath complex *Ideas* without Names for them, wants Liberty and Dispatch in his Expressions, and is necessitated to use Periphrases. He that uses his Words loosly and unsteadily, will either be not minded or not understood. He that applies his Names to *Ideas*, different from their common use, wants Propriety in his Language, and speaks Gibberish. And he that hath *Ideas* of Substances, disagreeing with the real Existence of Things, so far wants the Materials of true Knowledge in his Understanding, and has instead thereof, *Chimera's*.

How in Substances. §. 32. In our Notions concerning Substances we are liable to all the former Inconvenien-

He that uſes the word *Tarantula*, without having any Ima-
ion or *Idea* of what it ſtands for, pronounces a good Word;
long means nothing at all by it. 2. He that, in a new-
er'd Country, ſhall ſee ſeveral ſorts of Animals and Ve-
les, unknown to him before, may have as true *Ideas* of
, as of a Horſe, or a Stag; but can ſpeak of them only by
cription, till he ſhall either take the Names the Natives
hem by, or give them Names himſelf. 3. He that uſes the
d *Body* ſometimes for pure Extenſion, and ſometimes for
ſion and Solidity together, will talk very fallaciouſly.
e that gives the Name *Horſe*, to that *Idea* which common
call *Mule*, talks improperly, and will not be underſtood.
e that thinks the Name *Centaur* ſtands for ſome real Being,
s on himſelf, and miſtakes Words for Things.

33. In Modes and Relations generally, we able only to the four firſt of theſe Inconve-es, (*viz.*) 1. I may have in my Memory the s of Modes, as *Gratitude*, or *Charity*, and yet ave any preciſe *Ideas* annexed in my Thoughts to thoſe es. 2. I may have *Ideas*, and not know the Names that g to them; *v. g.* I may have the *Idea* of a Man's drinking, is Colour and Humour be altered, till his Tongue trips, and yes look red, and his Feet fail him, and yet not know, t is to be called *Drunkenneſs*. 3. I may have the *Ideas* of es or Vices, and Names alſo, but apply them amiſs: *v. g.* I apply the Name *Frugality* to that *Idea* which others call gnify by this ſound, *Covetouſneſs*. 4. I may uſe any of thoſe s with inconſtancy. 5. But in Modes and Relations, I t have *Ideas* diſagreeing to the Exiſtence of Things: for s being complex *Ideas*, made by the Mind at pleaſure; Relation being but my way of conſidering, or comparing Things together, and ſo alſo an *Idea* of my own making, *Ideas* can ſcarce be found to diſagree with any Thing exi- ſince they are not in the Mind, as the Copies of Things rly made by Nature, nor as Properties inſeparably flowing the internal Conſtitution or Eſſence of any Subſtance; s it were, Patterns lodg'd in my Memory, with Names ed to them, to denominate Actions and Relations by, as ome to exiſt. But the miſtake is commonly in my giving ng Name to my Conceptions; and ſo uſing Words in a nt ſenſe from other People, I am not underſtood, but am ht to have wrong *Ideas* of them, when I give wrong s to them. Only if I put in my *Ideas* of mixed Modes

How in Modes and Relations.

or

or Relations, any inconsistent *Ideas* together, I fill my Hea also with *Chimæra's*; since such *Ideas*, if well examined, cann so much as exist in the Mind, much less any real Being, be ev denominated from them.

Seventhly, Figurative Speech also an Abuse of Language.

§. 34. Since Wit and Fancy finds easier ente tainment in the World, than dry Truth and re Knowledge, *figurative Speeches*, and allusion in La guage, will hardly be admitted, as *an* imperfec on or *abuse* of it. I confess in Discourses, whe we seek rather Pleasure and Delight, than Infor mation and Improvement, such Ornaments as are borrow'd from them, can scarce pass for Faults. But yet, i we would speak of Things as they are, we must allow, that a the Art of Rhetorick, besides Order and Clearness, all the ar ficial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath i vented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong *Ideas*, mo the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment: and so ind are perfect cheat: And therefore however laudable or allo able Oratory may render them in Harangues and popular A dresses, they are certainly, in all Discourses that pretend to form or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where Truth Knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fa either of the Language or Person that makes use of th What, and how various they are, will be superfluous here take notice; the Books of Rhetorick which abound in the Wo will instruct those, who want to be informed: Only I can but observe, how little the preservation and improvement Truth and Knowledge, is the Care and Concern of Mank since the Arts of Fallacy are endow'd and preferred. 'Tis dent how much Men love to deceive, and be deceived, si Rhetorick, that powerful Instrument of Error and Deceit, its established Professors, is publickly taught, and has alw been had in great Reputation: And, I doubt not, but it be thought great boldness, if not brutality in me to have thus much against it. *Eloquence*, like the fair Sex, has too p vailing Beauties in it, to suffer it self ever to be spoken aga And 'tis in vain to find fault with those Arts of Deceiv wherein Men find pleasure to be Deceived.

CHA

CHAP. XI.

Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses.

They are worth seeking.

THE natural and improved Imperfections of Languages, we have seen above at large: and Speech being great Bond that holds Society together, and the common duit, whereby the Improvements of Knowledge are cond from one Man, and one Generation to another, it would deserve our most serious Thoughts, to consider what *Remedies* are to be found *for these Inconveniences* above-mentioned.

Are not easy.

2. I am not so vain to think, that any one pretend to attempt the perfect *Reforming* the *guages* of the World, no not so much as of his Country, without rendring himself ridiculous. require that Men should use their Words constantly in the sense, and for none but determined and uniform *Ideas*, d be to think, that all Men should have the same Notions, should talk of nothing but what they have clear and di- *Ideas* of. Which is not to be expected by any one, who not vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with Men to ery knowing or very silent. And he must be very little d in the World, who thinks that a voluble Tongue, shall mpany only a good Understanding; or that Mens talking n or little, shall hold proportion only to their Know-.

But yet necessary to Philosophy,

3. But though the Market and Exchange be left to their own ways of Talking, and ppings not be robb'd of their ancient Privi- though the Schools, and Men of Argument d perhaps take it amiss to have any thing offered, to abate ength, or lessen the number of their Disputes; yet, methinks , *who* pretend *seriously* to *search after*, or maintain *Truth*, should themselves obliged to study, how they might deliver selves without Obscurity, Doubtfulness, or Equivocation, which Mens Words are naturally liable, if care be not

Misuse of Words the cause of great Errors.

§. 4. For he that shall well consider the *Errors* and Obscurity, the Mistakes and Confusion, that is *spread in the World by an ill use of Words*, will find some reason to doubt, whether Language, as it has been employ'd, has contributed more to the improvement or hindrance of Knowledge amongst Mankind. How many are there, that when they would think on things, fix their Thoughts only on Words, especially when they would apply their Minds to Moral Matters? And who then can wonder, if the result of such Contemplations and Reasonings, about little more than Sounds, whilst the *Ideas* they annexed to them, are very confused, or very unsteady, or perhaps none at all; who can wonder, I say, that such Thoughts and Reasonings, end in nothing but Obscurity and Mistake, without any clear Judgment or Knowledge?

Obstinacy

§. 5. This Inconvenience, in an ill use of Words, Men suffer in their own private Meditations: but much more manifest are the Disorders which follow from it, in Conversation, Discourse, and Arguings with others. For Language being the great Conduit, whereby Men convey their Discoveries, Reasonings, and Knowledge, from one to another, he that makes an ill use of it, though he does not corrupt the Fountains of Knowledge, which are in Things themselves; yet he does, as much as in him lies, break or stop the Pipes, whereby it is distributed to the publick use and advantage of Mankind. He that uses Words without any clear and steady meaning, What does he but lead himself and others into Errors? And he that designedly does it, ought to be looked on as an Enemy to Truth and Knowledge. And yet who can wonder, that all the Sciences and Parts of Knowledge, have been so over-charged with obscure and equivocal Terms, and insignificant and doubtful Expressions, capable to make the most attentive or quick-sighted, very little, or not at all the more Knowing or Orthodox; since Subtilty, in those who make Profession to teach or defend Truth, hath passed so much for a Vertue: A Vertue, indeed, which consisting, for the most part, in nothing but the fallacious and illusory use of *obscure* or *deceitful Terms*, is only fit to *make Men* more *conceited* in their Ignorance, and *obstinate* in their Errors.

And Wrangling.

§. 6. Let us look into the Books of Controversy of any kind, there we shall see, that the effect of obscure, unsteady or equivocal Terms, is nothing but noise and wrangling about Sounds, without convincing

ncing or bettering a Man's Underſtanding. For if the
e not agreed on, betwixt the Speaker and Hearer, for
h the Words ſtand, the Argument is not about Things, but
es. As often as ſuch a Word, whoſe Signification is not
ained betwixt them, comes in uſe, their Underſtandings
no other Object wherein they agree, but barely the
d, the Things that they think on at that time as expreſſed
at Word, being quite different.

7. Whether a *Bat* be a *Bird*, or no, is not a *Inſtance Bat and Bird.*
on, whether a *Bat* be another Thing than
d it is, or have other Qualities than indeed it
for that would be extremely abſurd to doubt of: But the
ion is, 1. Either between thoſe that acknowledged them-
to have but imperfect *Ideas* of one or both of thoſe ſorts
hings, for which theſe Names are ſuppoſed to ſtand; and
t is a real Enquiry, concerning the Nature of a *Bird*, or a
to make their yet imperfect *Ideas* of it more complete, by
ining, whether all the ſimple *Ideas*, to which combined to-
r, they both give the Name *Bird*, be all to be found in a
But this is a queſtion only of Enquirers, (not Diſputers)
neither affirm, nor deny, but examine: Or, 2. It is a
ion between Diſputants; whereof the one affirms, and the
denies, that a *Bat* is a *Bird*. And then the queſtion is
about the ſignification of one, or both theſe Words; in
hey not having both the ſame complex *Ideas*, to which
give theſe two Names; one holds, and t'other denies, that
two Names may be affirmed one of another. Were they
d in the Signification of theſe two Names, it were impoſ-
hey ſhould diſpute about them. For they would preſently
learly ſee, (were that adjuſted between them,) whether
ie ſimple *Ideas*, of the more general Name *Bird*, were
in the complex *Idea* of a *Bat*, or no; and ſo there could
doubt, whether a *Bat* were a *Bird* or no. And here I
it may be conſidered, and carefully examined, whether
eateſt part of the Diſputes in the World, are not meerly
l, and about the Signification of Words; and whether if
Terms they are made in, were defined, and reduced in
Signification (as they muſt be where they ſignify any
) to determined Collections of the ſimple *Ideas* they do
uld ſtand for, thoſe Diſputes would not end of themſelves,
nmediately vaniſh. I leave it then to be conſidered, what
arning of Diſputation is, and how well they are employ'd for
dvantage of themſelves, or others, whoſe Buſineſs is only

the vain Oſtentation of Sounds; *i. e.* thoſe who ſpend th Lives in Diſputes and Controverſies. When I ſhall ſee any thoſe Combatants, ſtrip all his Terms of Ambiguity and Obſ rity, (which every one may do in the Words he uſe himſelf ſhall think him a Champion for Knowledge, Truth, and Pea and not the Slave of Vain-Glory, Ambition, or a Party.

First, Remedy to uſe no Word without an Idea.

§. 8. *To remedy the Defects of Speech* before-me tioned, to ſome degree, and to prevent the Inco veniences that follow from them, I imagine, t obſervation of theſe following Rules may be uſe, till ſome body better able ſhall judge it wor his while, to think more maturely on this Mat and oblige the World with his Thoughts on it.

First, A Man ſhould take care *to uſe no word without a ſig fication*, no Name without an *Idea* for which he makes it ſta This Rule will not ſeem altogether needleſs, to any one w ſhall take the pains to recollect how often he has met with Words; as *Inſtinct*, *Sympathy*, and *Antipathy*, &c. in the l courſe of others, ſo made uſe of, as he might eaſily concl that thoſe that uſed them, had no *Ideas* in their Minds to wh they applied them; but ſpoke them only as Sounds, wh uſually ſerved inſtead of Reaſons, on the like Occaſions. N but that theſe Words, and the like, have very proper Sig cations in which they may be uſed; but there being no natu connexion between any Words, and any *Ideas*, theſe, and other, may be learn'd by rote, and pronounced or writ by M who have no *Ideas* in their Minds, to which they have anne them, and for which they make them ſtand; which is no ſary they ſhould, if Men would ſpeak intelligibly even to th ſelves alone.

Secondly, to have diſtinct Ideas annexed to them in Modes.

§. 9. *Secondly*, 'Tis not enough a Man *uſe Words as ſigns of* ſome *Ideas*, thoſe *Ideas* he ann them to, if they be *ſimple*, muſt be clear and diſtinc if *complex*, muſt be *determinate*, *i. e.* the pr Collection of ſimple *Ideas* ſettled in the Mi with that Sound annexed to it, as the ſign of t preciſe determined Collection, and no other. T is very neceſſary in Names of Modes, and eſpecially mo Words; which having no ſettled Objects in Nature, from whe their *Ideas* are taken, as from their Original, are apt to be v confuſed. *Juſtice* is a Word in every Man's Mouth, but m commonly with a very undetermined looſe ſignification: Wh will always be ſo, unleſs a Man has in his Mind diſtinct comp

hen

i of the component parts, that complex *Idea* consists of; it be decompounded, must be able to resolve it still on, at last comes to the simple *Ideas*, that make it up: And this be done, a Man makes an ill use of the Word, let it *ice*, for example, or any other. I do not say, a Man tand to recollect, and make this Analysis at large every ie word *Justice* comes in his way: But this, at least, is ry, that he have so examined the signification of that and settled the *Idea* of all its Parts in his Mind, that he it when he pleases. If one, who makes his complex *Idea* of to be such a treatment of the Person or Goods of another, cording to Law, hath not a clear and distinct *Idea* what , which makes a part of his complex *Idea* of Justice, 'tis his *Idea* of Justice it self, will be confused and imperfect. xactness will, perhaps, be judged very troublesome: and re most Men will think, they may be excused from set- e complex *Ideas* of mixed Modes so precisely in their But yet I must say, till this be done, it must not be d, that they have a great deal of Obscurity and Confusion own Minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their ses with others.

And conformable in Substances.

9. In the Names of *Substances*, for a right hem, something more is required than *letermined Ideas*: In these *the Names must also mable to Things*, as they exist: But of this, ave occasion to speak more at large by and by. This s is absolutely necessary in Enquiries after philosophical dge, and in Controversies about Truth. And though be well too, if it extended it self to common Conversa- d the ordinary Affairs of Life; yet I think that is scarce pected. Vulgar Notions suit Vulgar Discourses: and ough confused enough, yet serve pretty well the Market, Wake. Merchants and Lovers, Cooks and Taylors, ords wherewithal to dispatch their ordinary Affairs; and ink, might Philosophers and Disputants too, if they lind to understand, and to be clearly understood.

Thirdly, Propriety

Thirdly, 'Tis not enough that Men have termined *Ideas*, for which they make these nd; but they *must* also take care to *apply* *rds*, as near as may be, *to such* Idea *as se has annexed them to*. For Words, especially of Lan- ready framed, being no Man's private possession, but non measure of Commerce and Communication, 'tis

not for any one, at pleaſure, to change the Stamp they a current in; nor alter the *Ideas* they are affixed to; or at le when there is a neceſſity to do ſo, he is bound to give noti of it. Men's Intentions in ſpeaking are, or at leaſt ſhould b to be underſtood; which cannot be without frequent Explan tions, Demands, and other the like incommodious Interruption where Men do not follow common Uſe. Propriety of Spee is that which gives our Thoughts entrance into other Me Minds with the greateſt eaſe and advantage: and therefo deſerves ſome part of our Care and Study, eſpecially in t Names of moral Words. The proper ſignification and uſe Terms is beſt to be learned from thoſe, who in their Writin and Diſcourſes, appear to have had the cleareſt Notions, a apply'd to them their Terms with the exacteſt choice and fitn This way of uſing a Man's Words, according to the Propri of the Language, tho it have not always the good Fortune t underſtood: Yet moſt commonly leaves the blame of it on h who is ſo unskilful in the Language he ſpeaks, as not to un ſtand it, when made uſe of, as it ought to be.

Fourthly, to make known their meaning.

§. 12. *Fourthly*, But becauſe common uſe not ſo viſibly annexed any ſignification to Wo as to make Men know always certainly what t preciſely ſtand for: And becauſe Men in the provement of their Knowledge, come to hav *deas* different from the vulgar and ordinary received ones, which they muſt either make new Words, (which Men ſel venture to do, for fear of being thought guilty of Affect or Novelty,) or elſe muſt uſe old ones, in a new Signific Therefore after the Obſervation of the foregoing Rules, ſometimes neceſſary for the aſcertaining the ſignification Words, to *declare their Meaning*; where either common Uſe left it uncertain and looſe; (as it has in moſt Names of m complex *Ideas*) or where the Term, being very material in t Diſcourſe, and that upon which it chiefly turns, is liable to a Doubtfulneſs or Miſtake.

And that three ways.

§. 13. As the *Ideas*, Mens Words ſtand for, of different ſorts: ſo the way of making know the *Ideas*, they ſtand for, when there is Occaſio is alſo different. For though defining be thoug the proper *way*, *to make known the proper ſignification of Word* yet there be ſome Words, that will not be defined, as there others, whoſe preciſe Meaning cannot be made known, but Definition: and, perhaps, a third, which partake ſomewhat both

he other, as we shall see in the Names of simple *Ideas* s, and Substances.

14. *First*, When a Man makes use of the of *any simple* Idea, which he perceives is not stood, or is in danger to be mistaken, he is d by the Laws of Ingenuity, and the end of h, to declare his meaning, and make known *Idea* he makes it stand for. This, as has been i, cannot be done by Definition: and therefore, when a synous Word fails to do it, there is but one of these ways left. Sometimes the *naming the Subject, wherein that simple* Idea *is* found, will make its Name be understood by those, who are inted with that Subject, and know it by that Name. So ke a Country-man understand what *Fueillemorte* Colour ies, it may suffice to tell him, 'tis the Colour of wither'd es falling in *Autumn*. *Secondly*, But the only sure way of ng known the signification of the Name of any simple *Idea presenting to his Senses that Subject, which may produce it in ind*, and make him actually have the *Idea*, that Word, s for.

First, In simple Ideas *by synonimous terms or shewing.*

15. *Secondly, Mixed Modes*, especially those ging to Morality, being most of them such binations of *Ideas*, as the Mind puts together own choice; and whereof there are not al- standing Paterns to be found existing, the signification of Names cannot be made known, as those of simple *Ideas*, y shewing: but in recompence thereof, may be perfectly d. For they being Combinations of several *Ideas*, that the l of Man has arbitrarily put together, without reference to Archetypes, Men may, if they please, exactly know the I- that go to each Compositions, and so both use these Words certain and undoubted Signification, and perfectly declare, there is Occasion, what they stand for. This, if well dered, would lay great blame on those, who make not Discourses about moral things very clear and distinct. ince the precise signification of the Names of mixed Modes, hich is all one, the real Essence of each Species, is to be vn, they being not of Nature's, but Man's making, it is a Negligence and Perverseness, to discourse of moral Things Uncertainty and Obscurity, which is more pardonable in ing of natural Substances, where doubtful Terms are hard- o be avoided, for a quite contrary Reason, as we shall see nd by.

Secondly, in mixed Modes by definition.

Morality capable of Demonstration.

§. 16. Upon this ground it is, that I am bold to think, that *Morality is capable of Demonstration*, as well as Mathematicks: Since the precise real Essence of the Things moral Words stand for, may be perfectly known; and so the Congruity, or Incongruity of the Things themselves, be certainly discovered, in which consists perfect Knowledge. Nor let any one object, that the Names of Substances are often to be made use of in Morality, as well as those of Modes, from which will arise Obscurity. For as to Substances, when concerned in moral Discourses, their divers Natures are not so much enquir'd into, as supposed; *v. g.* when we say that *Man is subject to Law*: We mean nothing by *Man*, but corporeal rational Creature: What the real Essence or other Qualities of that Creature are in this Case, is no way considered. And therefore, whether a Child or Changeling be a *Man* in a physical Sense, may amongst the Naturalists be as disputable as it will, it concerns not at all the *moral Man*, as I may call him, which is this immoveable unchangeable *Idea*, *a corporeal rational Being*. For were there a Monkey, or any other Creature to be found, that had the use of Reason, to such a degree, as to be able to understand general Signs, and to deduce Consequences about general *Ideas*, he would no doubt be subject to Law, and, in that sense, be a *Man*, how much soever he differ'd in Shape from others of that Name. The Names of Substances, if they be used in them as they should, can no more disturb Moral, than they do Mathematical Discourses: Where, if the Mathematicians speak of a *Cube* or *Globe* of *Gold*, or any other Body, he has his clear settled *Idea*, which varies not, though it may, by mistake, be applied to a particular Body, to which it belongs not.

Definitions can make moral Discourses clear.

§. 17. This I have here mentioned by the bye, to shew of what Consequence it is for Men, in their Names of mixed Modes, and consequently, in all their moral Discourses, to define their Words when there is Occasion: Since thereby moral Knowledge may be brought to so great Clearness and Certainty. And it must be great want of Ingenuity, (to say no worse of it) to refuse to do it: Since a *Definition is the only way, whereby the precise Meaning of moral Words can be known*; and yet a way, whereby their Meaning may be known *certainly*, and without leaving any room for any contest about it. And therefore the Negligence or Perverseness of Mankind, cannot be excused, if their Discourses in Morality be not much more clear, than those

in

ıtural Philosophy: since they are about *Ideas* in the Mind, n are none of them false or disproportionate; they having ɛternal Beings for *Archetypes* which they are referr'd to, and correspond with. It is far easier for Men to frame in Minds an *Idea*, which shall be the Standard to which they give the Name *Justice*, with which Pattern so made, all ons that agree shall pass under that denomination, than, g seen *Aristides*, to frame an *Idea*, that shall, in all Things, ɛactly like him, who is as he is, let Men make what *Idea* please of him. For the one, they need but know the Comion of *Ideas*, that are put together within in their own s; for the other, they must enquire into the whole Nature, bstruse hidden Constitution, various Qualities of a thing ng without them.

18. Another Reason that makes the *defining xed Modes* so necessary, *especially of moral Words*, iat I mentioned a little before, *viz.* That it *only way whereby the signification of the most of* them can be n with Certainty. For the *Ideas* they stand for, being for ıost part such, whose component Parts no where exist to-r, but scattered and mingled with others, it is the Mind that collects them, and gives them the Union of one *Idea*: t is only by Words, enumerating the several simple *Ideas* ı the Mind has united, that we can make known to others, their Names stand for; the Assistance of the Senses in this not helping us, by the proposal of sensible Objects, to the *Ideas*, which our Names of this kind stand for, as it often in the Names of sensible simple *Ideas*, and also to degree in those of Substances.

And is the only way.

19. *Thirdly, For the explaining* the significa- *of the Names of Substances* as they stand for the we have of their distinct Species, both the nentioned ways, *viz.* of *shewing and defining*, *uisite*, in many Cases, to be made use of. For being ordinarily in each Sort some leading Qualities, to ı we suppose the other *Ideas*, which make up our complex of that Species, annexed, we forwardly give the specifick e to that thing, wherein that characteristical Mark is l, which we take to be the most distinguishing *Idea* of Species. These leading or characteristical (as I may so hem) *Ideas*, in the sorts of Animals and Vegetables, is (as een before remarked, *Ch.* VI. §. 29. *Ch.* IX. §. 15.) most-gure, and in inanimate Bodies Colour, and in some both to-

Thirdly, In Substances, by shewing and defining.

r. Now,

Ideas of the leading Qualities of Substances, are best got by shewing.

§. 20. These *leading sensible Qualities* are those, which make *the chief Ingredients of our specifick Ideas*, and consequently the most observable and unvariable part in the Definitions of our specifick Names, as attributed to Sorts *of Substances* coming under our Knowledge. For though the Sound *Man*, in its own Nature, be as apt to signify a complex *Idea* made up of Animality and Rationality, united in the same Subject, as to signify any other Combination; yet used as a Mark to stand for a sort of Creatures we count of our own kind, perhaps the outward shape is as necessary to be taken into our complex *Idea*, signified by the Word *Man*, as any other we find in it; and therefore why *Plato*'s *Animal implume Bipes latis unguibus*, should not be as good a Definition of the Name *Man*, standing for that sort of Creatures, will not be easy to shew: for 'tis the Shape, as the leading Quality, that seems more to determine that Species, than a Faculty of Reasoning, which appears not at first, and in some never. And if this be not allow'd to be so, I do not know how they can be excused from Murther, who kill monstrous Births, (as we call them,) because of an unordinary Shape, without knowing whether they have a Rational Soul, or no; which can be no more discerned in a well-formed, than ill-shaped Infant, as soon as born. And who is it has informed us, that a Rational Soul can inhabit no Tenement, unless it has just such a sort of Frontispiece, or can join it self to, and inform no sort of Body, but one that is just of such an outward Structure?

Ideas of the leading Qualities of Substances, are best got by shewing.

§. 21. Now *these leading Qualities, are best made known by shewing*, and can hardly be made known otherwise. For the shape of an *Horse*, or *Cassuary*, will be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the Mind by Words, the sight of the Animal doth it a thousand times better: And the *Idea* of the particular Colour *Gold*, is not to be got by any description of it, but only by the frequent Exercise of the Eyes about it, as is evident, in those who are used to this Metal, who will frequently distinguish true from counterfeit, pure from adulterate, by the Sight, where others (who have as good Eyes, but yet, by use, have not got the precise nice *Idea* of that peculiar Yellow) shall not perceive any difference. The like may be said of those other simple *Ideas*, peculiar in their kind to any Substance; for which precise *Ideas*, there are no peculiar Names. The particular Ringing Sound there is in *Gold*, distinct from

he Sound of other Bodies, has no particular Name annexed to more than the particular Yellow, that belongs to that Metal.

22. But because many of the simple *Ideas* make up our specifick *Ideas* of Substances, are rs, which lie not obvious to our Senses in the gs as they ordinarily appear; therefore, *in* ignification of our *Names of Substances, some f the signification will be betttr made known, by rating those simple* Ideas, *than in shewing the Substance it self.* ie that, to the yellow shining Colour of *Gold* got by sight, from my enumerating them, have the *Ideas* of great Du- y, Fusibility, Fixedness, and Solubility in *Aq. Regia*, will a perfecter *Idea* of *Gold*, than he can have by seeing a piece old, and thereby imprinting in his Mind only its obvious ities. But if the formal Constitution of this shining, heavy, l Thing (from whence all these its Properties flow) lay to our Senses, as the formal Constitution, or Essence of a ngle does, the signification of the Word *Gold*, might as easily certained, as that of *Triangle*.

The Ideas of their Powers best by Definition.

23. Hence we may take notice, how much Foundation of all *our Knowledge or corporeal rs, lies in our Senses.* For how Spirits, separate Bodies, (whose Knowledge and *Ideas* of these ngs, is certainly much more perfect than ours) v them, we have no Notion, no *Idea* at all. The whole nt of our Knowledge, or Imagination, reaches not beyond wn *Ideas*, limited to our ways of Perception. Though yet not to be doubted, that Spirits of a higher rank than those ersed in Flesh, may have as clear *Ideas* of the radical Con- tion of Substances, as we have of a Triangle, and so per- e how all their Properties and Operations flow from thence: he manner how they come by that Knowledge, exceeds our ceptions.

A Reflection on the Knowledge of Spirits.

24. But though Definitions will serve to ex- n the Names of Substances, as they stand for *Ideas*; yet they leave them not without great erfection, as they stand for Things. For our nes of Substances being not put barely for our , but being made use of ultimately to repre- Things, and so are put in their place, their signification t agree with the Truth of Things, as well as with Mens s. And therefore in Substances, we are not always to rest ne ordinary complex *Idea*, commonly received as the signifi- cation

Ideas also of Substances must be conformable to Things.

cation of that Word, but must go a little farther, and enquire into the Nature and Properties of the Things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our *Ideas* of their distinct Species; or else learn them from such as are used to that sort of Things, and are experienced in them. For since 'tis intended their Names should stand for such Collections of simple *Ideas*, as do really exist in Things themselves, as well as for the complex *Idea* in other Mens Minds, which in their ordinary acceptation they stand for: therefore *to define their Names right, natural History is to be enquired into*; and their Properties are, with Care and Examination, to be found out. For it is not enough, for the avoiding Inconveniences in Discourses and Arguings about natural Bodies and substantial Things, to have learned, from the Propriety of the Language, the common but confused, or very imperfect *Idea*, to which each Word is applied, and to keep them to that *Idea* in our use of them: but we must, by acquainting our selves with the History of that sort of things rectify and settle our complex *Idea*, belonging to each specifick Name; and in discourse with others, (if we find them mistake us) we ought to tell, what the complex *Idea* is, that we make such a Name stand for. This is the more necessary to be done by all those who search after Knowledge, and Philosophical Verity, in that Children being taught Words whilst they have but imperfect Notions of Things, apply them at random, and without much thinking, and seldom frame determined *Ideas* to be signified by them. Which Custom, (it being easy, and serving well enough for the ordinary Affairs of Life and Conversation) they are apt to continue, when they are Men: And so begin at the wrong end, learning Words first, and perfectly, but make the Notions to which they apply those Words afterwards, very overly. By this means it comes to pass, that Men speaking the proper Language of their Country, *i. e.* according to Grammar-Rules of that Language, do yet speak very improperly of Things themselves; and by their arguing one with another, make but small Progress in the discoveries of useful Truths, and the Knowledge of Things, as they are to be found in themselves, and not in our Imaginations; and it matters not much, for the improvement of our Knowledge, how they are call'd.

Not easy to be made so.

§. 25. It were therefore to be wish'd, That Men, versed in physical Enquiries, and acquainted with the several sorts of natural Bodies, would set down those simple *Ideas*, wherein they observe the Individuals of each sort constantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that con-

uſion, which comes from ſeveral Perſons, applying the ſame
ie to a Collection of a ſmaller, or greater number of ſen-
Qualities, proportionably as they have been more or leſs
ainted with, or accurate in examining the Qualities of any
of Things, which come under one denomination. But a
tionary of this ſort, containing, as it were, a Natural Hi-
, requires too many Hands, as well as too much Time, Coſt,
s, and Sagacity, ever to be hoped for; and till that be done,
uſt content our ſelves with ſuch Definitions of the Names
bſtances, as explain the ſenſe Men uſe them in. And
uld be well, where there is Occaſion, if they would afford
much. This yet is not uſually done; but Men talk to one
her, and diſpute in Words, whoſe meaning is not agreed
'een them, out of a miſtake, that the ſignification of com-
Words, are certainly eſtabliſhed, and the preciſe *Ideas*, they
l for, perfectly known; and that it is a ſhame to be igno-
of them. Both which Suppoſitions are falſe: no Names
mplex *Ideas* having ſo ſettled determined Significations, that
are conſtantly uſed for the ſame preciſe *Ideas*. Nor is it a
e for a Man not to have a certain Knowledge of any thing,
by the neceſſary ways of attaining it; and ſo it is no diſcre-
ot to know, what preciſe *Idea* any Sound ſtands for in ano-
Man's Mind, without he declare it to me, by ſome other
than barely uſing that Sound, there being no other way,
out ſuch a Declaration, certainly to know it. Indeed, the
ſity of Communication by Language, brings Men to an
ement in the ſignification of common Words, within ſome
able latitude, that may ſerve for ordinary Converſation:
o a Man cannot be ſuppoſed wholly ignorant of the *Ideas*,
h are annexed to Words by common Uſe, in a Language
liar to him. But common Uſe being, but a very uncertain
, which reduces it ſelf at laſt to the *Ideas* of particular Men,
es often but a very variable Standard. But though ſuch a
ionary, as I have above-mentioned, will require too much
e, Coſt and Pains, to be hoped for in this Age; yet, me-
s, it is not unreaſonable to propoſe, that Words ſtanding
Things, which are known and diſtinguiſhed by their out-
ſhapes, ſhould be expreſſed by little Draughts and Prints
e of them. A Vocabulary made after this faſhion, would,
aps with more eaſe, and in leſs time, teach the true ſignifi-
n of many Terms, eſpecially in Languages of remote Coun-
or Ages, and ſettle truer *Ideas* in Mens Minds of ſeveral
ngs, whereof we read the Names in ancient Authors, than
e large and laborious Comments of learned Criticks. Natura-

liſts,

lists, that treat of Plants and Animals, have found the Benefit of this way: And he that has had occasion to consult them, will have reason to confess, that he has a clear *Idea* of *Apium*, or *Ibex* from a little Print of that Herb, or Beast, than he could have from a long Definition of the Names of either of them. And so no doubt, he would have of *Strigil* and *Sistrum*, if instead of a *Curry-comb* and *Cymbal*, which are the English Names Dictionaries render them by, he could see stamp'd in the Margin, small Pictures of these Instruments, as they were in use amongst the Ancients. *Toga*, *Tunica*, *Pallium*, are Words easily translated by *Gown*, *Coat*, and *Cloak*: but we have thereby no more true *Ideas* of the Fashion of those Habits amongst the *Romans*, than we have of the Faces of the Taylors who made them. Such things as these, which the Eye distinguishes by their shapes, would be best let into the Mind by Draughts made of them, and more determine the signification of such Words, than any other Words set for them, or made use of to define them. But this only by the bye.

Fifthly, by Constancy in their signification.

§. 26. *Fifthly*, If Men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their Words, and Definitions of their Terms are not to be had; yet this is the least can be expected, that in all Discourse, wherein one Man pretends to instruct or convince another, he should *use the same Word constantly in the same sense*: If this were done, (which no body can refuse, without great disingenuity) many of the Books extant might be spared; many of the Controversies in Dispute would be at an end, several of those great Volumes, swollen with ambiguous Words, now used in one sense, and by and by in another, would shrink into a very narrow compass; and many of the Philosophers (to mention no other,) as well as Poets Works, might be contained in a Nut-shell.

When the variation is to be explain'd.

§. 27. But after all, the provision of Words is so scanty in respect of that infinite variety of Thoughts, that Men, wanting Terms to suit their precise Notion, will, notwithstanding their utmost caution, be forced often to use the same Word, in somewhat different Senses. And though in the continuation of a Discourse, or the pursuit of an Argument, there be hardly room to digress into a particular Definition, as often as a Man varies the signification of any Term; yet the import of the Discourse will, for the most part, if there be no designed fallacy, sufficiently lead candid and intelligent Readers, into the true meaning of it: but where that is not sufficient to guide the Reader, there it concerns the Writer to explain his meaning, and shew in what sense he there uses that Term.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Of Knowledge in General.

Our Knowledge conversant about our Ideas.

1. SINCE *the Mind*, in all its Thoughts and Reasonings, hath no other immediate Object but its own *Ideas*, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is dent, that our Knowledge is only conversant ut them.

Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas.

2. *Knowledge* then seems to me to be nothing *the perception of the connexion and agreement, or greement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas.* In alone it consists. Where this Perception is, re is Knowledge, and where it is not, there, ugh we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we ays come short of Knowledge. For when we ow that *White is not Black*, what do we else but perceive, that se two *Ideas* do not agree? When we possess our selves with utmost security of the Demonstration, that *the three Angles of riangle are equal to two right ones*, What do we more but perve, that Equality to two right ones, does necessary agree to, l is inseparable from the three Angles of a Triangle? *

§. 3.

* The placing of Certainty, as Mr. *Locke* does in the Perception of the reement or Disagreement of our Ideas, the Bishop of *Worcester* suspects y be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith, which he has eavoured to defend; to which Mr. *Locke* answers, † ce your Lordship hath not, as I remember, shewn, or e about to shew, how this Proposition, *viz.* that Certy consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disaement of two Ideas, is opposite or inconsistent with *that ticle of Faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to nd*: 'tis plain, 'tis but your Lordship's Fear, that it

† *In his 2d Letter to the Bishop of* Worcester, *p.* 83, *&c.*

may

This Agreement fourfold.

§. 3. But to understand a little more distinctly, wherein this Agreement or Disagreement consists, I think we may reduce it all to these four Sorts:

1. *Identity*, or *Diversity.*
2. *Relation.*
3. *Co-existence*, or *necessary Connexion.*
4. *Real Existence.*

First, Of *Identity*, or *Diversity.*

§. 4. *First*, As to the first sort of Agreement or Disagreement, *viz. Identity*, or *Diversity*. 'Tis the first Act of the Mind, when it has any Sentiments or *Ideas* at all, to perceive its *Ideas*, and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely necessary, that without it there could be no Knowledge,

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may *be of dangerous Consequence to it*, which, as I humbly conceive, is no proof that it is any way inconsistent with that Article.

No Body, I think, can blame your Lordship, or any one else, for being concerned for any Article of the Christian Faith: but if that Concern (as it may, and as we know it has done) make any one apprehend Danger, where no Danger is; are we, therefore, to give up and condemn any Proposition, because any one, though of the first Rank and Magnitude, fears *it may be of dangerous Consequence* to any Truth of Religion, without shewing that it is so? If such Fears be the Measures whereby to judge of Truth and Falshood, the affirming that there are Antipodes would be still a Heresie; and the Doctrine of the Motion of the Earth, must be rejected, as overthrowing the Truth of the Scripture, for of *that dangerous Consequence* it has been apprehended to be, by many learned and pious Divines, out of their great Concern for Religion. And yet, notwithstanding those great Apprehensions *of what dangerous Consequence it might be*, it is now universally received by Learned Men, as an undoubted Truth; and writ for by some, whose Belief of the Scriptures is not at all questioned; and particularly, very lately, by a Divine of the Church of *England*, with great Strength of Reason, in his wonderfully ingenious *New Theory of the Earth.*

The Reason your Lordship gives of your Fears, that *it may be of such dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith, which your Lordship endeavours to defend*, though it occur in more Places than one, is only this, *viz.* That *it is made use of by ill Men to do Mischief, i. e.* to oppose that Article of Faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend. But, my Lord, if it be a Reason to lay by any Thing, as bad, because it is, or may be used to an ill Purpose, I know not what will be innocent enough to be kept. Arms, which were made for our Defence, are sometimes made use of to do *Mischief*; and yet they are not thought of *dangerous Consequence* for

all

e, no Reasoning, no Imagination, no distinct Thoughts at . By this the Mind clearly and infallibly perceives each *Idea* gree with it self, and to be what it is; and all distinct *Ideas* disagree, *i. e.* the one not to be the other: And this it does with- pains, Labour, or Deduction, but at first View, by its natural er of Perception and Distinction. And though Men of have reduced this into those general Rules, *What is, is; and impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be,* for ready Ap- tion in all Cases, wherein there may be occasion to reflect ; yet it is certain, that the first Exercise of this Faculty, out particular *Ideas.* A Man infallibly knows, as soon as he has them in his Mind that the *Ideas* he calls *White* and *d*, are the very *Ideas* they are, and that they are not other which he calls *Red* or *Square.* Nor can any Maxim or osition in the World make him know it clearer or surer he did before, and without any such general Rule. This then

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ar. No Body lays by his Sword and Pistols, or thinks them of such *rous Consequence* as to be neglected, or thrown away, because Robbers, e worst of Men, sometimes make use of them, to take away honest Lives or Goods. And the reason is, because they were designed, and erve to preserve them. And who knows but this may be the present ? If your Lordship thinks, that placing of Certainty in the Perception Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, be to be rejected as false, be- you apprehend *it may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of* ; on the other side, perhaps others, with me, may think it a Defence t Error, and so (as being of good use) to be received and adhered to. ould not, my Lord, be hereby thought to set up my own, or any ones ent against your Lordship's. But I have said this only to shew, while rgument lies for or against the Truth of any Proposition, barely in an nation, that *it may be* of Consequence to the supporting or overthrow- any remote Truth; it will be impossible, that way, to determine of ruth or Falshood of that Proposition. For Imagination will be set up t Imagination, and the stronger probably will be against your Lord- the strongest Imaginations being usually in the weakest Heads. The way, in this case, to put it past doubt, is to shew the Inconsistency of wo Propositions; and then it will be seen, that one overthrows the ; the true the false one.

ur Lordship says indeed, This is a *new Method of Certainty.* I will ay so my self, for Fear of deserving a second Reproof from your hip, for being too forward to assume to my self the *Honour of being iginal.* But this, I think, gives me occasion, and will excuse me from thought impertinent, if I ask your Lordship, whether there be any , or older *Method of Certainty?* And what it *is?* For if there be no , nor older than this, either this was always the *Method of Certainty,*

and

then is the first Agreement or Disagreement, which the Mind perceives in its *Ideas*; which it always perceives at first sight. And if there ever happen any doubt about it, 'twill always be found to be about the Names, and not the *Ideas* themselves whose Identy and Diverty will always be perceived, as soon and as clearly as the *Ideas* themselves are, nor can it possibly be otherwise.

Secondly, Relative.

§. 5. *Secondly*, The next sort of Agreement, or Disagreement, the Mind perceives in any of its *Ideas*, may, I think, be called *Relative*, and is nothing but *the Perception of the Relation between any two Ideas*, of what kind soever, whether Substances, Modes, or any other. For since all distinct *Ideas* must eternally be known not to be the same, and so be universally and constantly denied one of another, there could be no room for any positive Knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any Relation between our *Ideas*.

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and so mine is no *new* one; or else the World is ogliged to me for this new one, after having been so long in the Want of so necessary a Thing, as *Method a Certainty*. If there be an older, I am sure your Lordship cannot but know it; your condemning mine as *new*, as well as your through Insight into Antiquity, cannot but satisfy every Body that you do. And therefore to set the World right, in a thing of that great Concernment, and to overthrow mine, and thereby prevent the *dangerous Consequence* there is in my having unseasonably *started* it, will not, I humbly conceive, misbecome your Lordship's Care of *that Article you have endeavoured to defend*, or the good Will you bear to Truth in general. For I will be answerable for my self, that I shall: And I think I may be for all others, that they will give off the placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, if your Lordship will be pleased to shew, that it lies in any Thing else.

But truly, not to ascribe to my self an Invention of what has been as old as Knowledge is in the World, I must own, I am not guilty of what your Lordship is pleased to call *starting new Methods of Certainty*. Knowledge ever since there has been any in the World, has consisted in one particular Action of the Mind; and so, I conceive, will continue to do to the end of it: And to *start new Methods of Knowledge*, or *Certainty*, (for they are to me the same thing) *i. e.* to find out and propose new Methods of attaining new Knowledge, either with more Ease and Quickness, or in things yet unknown, is what I think no Body could blame: But this is not that which your Lordship here means, by *new Methods of Certainty*. Your Lordship, I think, means by it, the placing of *Certainty* in something, wherein either it does not consist, or else wherein it was not placed before now; if that were to be called a *new Method of Certainty*. As to the latter of these, I shall know whether I am guilty or no, when your Lordship will do me the Favour

and find out the Agreement or Disagreement, they have one another, in several ways the Mind takes of comparing them.

6. *Thirdly*, The third sort of Agreement, or reement to be found in our *Ideas*, which the ption of the Mind is employ'd about, is *Co-ice*, or *Non-co-existence* in the same Subject; and this be particularly to Subsstances. Thus when we pronounce rning *Gold*, that it is fixed, our Knowledge of this Truth nts to no more but this, that fixedness, or a Power to re-in the Fire unconsumed, is an *Idea*, that always accompa-nd is joined with that particular sort of Yellowness, Weight, lity, Malleableness, and Solubility in *Aq. Regia*, which our complex *Idea*, signified by the Word *Gold*. *Thirdly, of Co-existence.*

r. *Fourthly*, The fourth and last sort is, that of *real Existence* agreeing to any *Idea*. Within our sorts of Agreement or Disagreement, is, I suppose contained *Fourthly, of real Existence.*

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to tell me, wherein it was placed before: which your Lordship professed my self ignorant of, when I writ my Book, and so I am at if *starting of new Methods of Certainty*, be the placing of Certainty thing wherein it does not consist; whether I have done that or no, I peal to the Experience of Mankind.

e are several Actions of Mens Minds, that they are conscious to them-f performing, as *willing*, *believing*, *knowing*, &c. which they have cular sense of, that they can distinguish them one from another; or y could not say, when they *willed*, when they *believed*, and when they ny thing. But though these Actions were different enough from one , not to be confounded by those who spoke of them, yet no Body, ad met with, had, in their Writings, particularly set down wherein of *Knowing* precisely consisted.

is Reflection, upon the Actions of my own Mind, the Subject of my ncerning *Humane Understanding* naturally led me; wherein, if I ne any thing *new*, it has been to describe to others, more particu-an had been done before, what it is their Minds do, when they perform ion which they call *Knowing*; and if, upon Examination, they observe, given a true Account of that Action of their Minds in all the parts of ppose it will be in vain to dispute against what they find and feel in ves. And if I have not told them right, and exactly what they feel in themselves, when their Minds perform the Act of knowing, have said will be all in vain; Men will not be persuaded against their Knowledge is an internal Perception of their Minds; and if, when lect on it, they find it is not what I have said it is, my groundless will not be hearken'd to, but be exploded by every Body, and die : And no body need to be at any Pains to drive it out of the World. ssible is it to find out, or start *new Methods of Certainty*, or to

tained all the Knowledge we have, or are capable of: For all the Enquiries that we can make, concerning any of our *Ideas*, all that we know or can affirm concerning any of them, is, That it is or is not the same with some other; that it does, or does not always, co-exist with some other *Idea* in the same Subject; that it has this or that Relation to some other *Idea*; or that it has a real Existence without the Mind. Thus *Blue is not Yellow*, is of Identity. *Two Triangles upon equal Basis, between two Parallels are equal*, is of Relation. *Iron is susceptible of magnetical Impressions*, is of Co-existence, *GOD is*, is of real Existence. Though Identity and Co-existence are truly nothing but Relations, yet they are so peculiar ways of Agreement, or Disagreement of our Ideas, that they deserve well to be consider'd as distinct Heads, and not under Relation in general; since they are so different Grounds of Affirmation and Negation, as will easily appear to any one who will but reflect on what is said in several places of this Essay.

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have them received, if any one places it in any thing, but in that where it really consists: much less can any one be in danger to be misled into Error, by any such *new*, and to every one visibly senseless Project. Can be supposed, That any one could *start a new Method of Seeing*, and persuade Men thereby, that they do not see what they do see? Is it to be fear'd, That any one can cast such a Mist over their Eyes, that they shall not know when they see, and so be led out of their way by it?

Knowledge, I find in my self, and I conceive in others, consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking, which I call *Ideas*: But whether it does so in others or no, must be determin'd by their own Experience, reflecting upon the Action of their Mind in knowing; for that I cannot alter, nor I think they themselves. But whether they will call those immediate Objects of their Minds, in thinking Ideas or no, is perfectly in their own Choice. If they dislike that Name, they may call them *Notions* or *Conceptions*, or how they please; it matters not, if they use them so as to avoid Obscurity and Confusion. If they are constantly used in the same and a known sense, every one has the Liberty to please himself in his *Terms*, there lies neither Truth nor Error, nor Science, in that; though those that take them for Things and not for what they are, bare arbitrary Signs of our *Ideas*, make a great deal of Do often about them; as if some great Matter lay in the use of this or that Sound. All that I know, or can imagine of Difference, about them is, that those Words are always best, whose Significations are best known in the Sense they are used; and so are least apt to breed Confusion.

My Lord, your Lordship has been pleased to find fault with my use of the new *Term Ideas*, without telling me a better Name for the immediate Objects of the Mind in thinking. Your Lordship also has been pleased to find fault with my Definition of Knowledge, without doing me the Favour to give

uld now proceed to examine the ſeveral degrees of our wledge, but that it is neceſſary firſt to conſider the different ptations of the Word *Knowledge*.

8. There are ſeveral ways wherein the Mind ſſeſſed of Truth; each of which is called *vledge*. *Knowledge actual or habitual.*

There is *actual Knowledge*, which is the pre- View the Mind has of the Agreement, or Diſagreement of of its *Ideas*, or of the Relation they have one to another.

A Man is ſaid to know any Propoſition, which having been laid before his Thoughts, he evidently perceived the Agree-, or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* whereof it conſiſts; and ſo d it in his Memory, that whenever that Propoſition comes to be reflected on, he, without doubt or heſitation, em- es the right ſide, aſſents to, and is certain of the Truth of This, I think, one may call *habitual Knowledge*: And thus a Man

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ne a better. For it is only about my Definition of Knowledge, that s ſtir, concerning *Certainty*, is made. For with me, to know and be n, is the ſame thing; what I know, that I am certain of; and what certain of, that I know. What reaches to Knowledge, I think may be Certainty; and what comes ſhort of Certainty, I think cannot be Knowledge; as your Lordſhip could not but obſerve in the 18th n of *Ch.* 4. of my 4th *Book*, which you have quoted.

Definition of Knowledge ſtands thus: *Knowledge ſeems, to me, to thing but the Perception of the Connexion, and Agreement, or Diſa- ent, and Repugnancy of any of our Ideas.* This Definition your hip diſlikes, and apprehends *it may be of dangerous Conſequence as to Article of Chriſtian Faith, which your Lordſhip has endeavoured to de-*

For this there is a very eaſy Remedy: It is but for your Lordſhip *aſide* this Definition of Knowledge, by giving us a better, and this er is over. But your Lordſhip ſeems rather to have a Controverſy ny Book, for having it in it, and to put me upon the Defence of it; ich I muſt acknowledge my ſelf obliged to your Lordſhip for affording much of your Time, and for allowing me the Honour of converſing ch, with one ſo far above me in all Reſpects.

ur Lordſhip ſays, *It may be of dangerous Conſequence to that Article iſtian Faith, which you have endeavoured to defend.* Though the of diſputing allow bare denial as a ſufficient Anſwer to Sayings, with- y Offer of a Proof; yet, my Lord, to ſhew how willing I am to give Lordſhip all Satisfaction, in what you apprehend may be of *dangerous uence* in my Book, as to that Article, I ſhall not ſtand ſtill ſullenly, ut your Lordſhip upon the Difficulty of ſhewing wherein that Danger but ſhall, on the other ſide, endeavour to ſhew your Lordſhip that Definition of mine, whether true or falſe, right or wrong, can be *of*

Man may be ſaid to know all thoſe Truths, which are lodg'd in his Memory, by a foregoing clear and full Perception, whereof the Mind is aſſured paſt doubt, as often as it has Occaſion to reflect on them. For our finite Underſtandings being able to think, clearly and diſtinctly, but on one thing at once, if Men had no Knowledge of any more than what they actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant: And he that knew moſt, would know but one Truth, that being all he was able to think on at one time.

Habitual Knowledge two-fold.

§. 9. Of habitual Knowledge, there are alſo, vulgarly ſpeaking, two degrees:

Firſt, The one is of *ſuch Truths laid up in the Memory, as whenever they occur to the Mind, it actually perceives the Relation is between thoſe* Ideas. And this is in all thoſe Truths, whereof we have an *intuitive Knowledge*, where the *Ideas* themſelves, by an immediate View, diſcover their Agreement or Diſagreement one with another.

Secondly, The other is of *ſuch Truths, whereof the Mind having been convinced, it retains the Memory of the Conviction, without the Proofs.* Thus a Man that remembers certainly, that he once perceived

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no dangerous Conſequence to that Article of Faith. The Reaſon which I ſhall offer for it, is this; Becauſe it can be of no Conſequence to it at all.

That which your Lordſhip is afraid it may be dangerous to, is an *Article of Faith*: That which your Lordſhip labours and is concerned for, is the *Certainty of Faith*. Now, My Lord, I humbly conceive the *Certainty of Faith*, if your Lordſhip thinks fit to call it ſo, has nothing to do with the *Certainty of Knowledge*. And to talk of the *Certainty of Faith*, ſeems all one to me, as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing, a way of ſpeaking not eaſy to me to underſtand.

Place Knowledge in what you will, *ſtart what new Methods of Certainty* you pleaſe, *that are apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before*; place Certainty on ſuch Grounds, as will leave little or no Knowledge in the World. For theſe are the Arguments your Lordſhip uſes againſt my Definition of Knowledge; this ſhakes not at all, nor in the leaſt concerns the Aſſurance of Faith; this is quite diſtinct from it, neither ſtands nor falls with Knowledge.

Faith ſtands by it ſelf, and upon Grounds of its own; nor can be removed from them, and placed on thoſe of Knowledge. Their Grounds are ſo far from being the ſame, or having any common, that when it is brought to *Certainty*, *Faith* is deſtroy'd; 'tis Knowledge then, and Faith no longer.

With what Aſſurance ſoever of Believing, I aſſent to any *Article of Faith*, ſo that I ſtedfaſtly venture my All upon it, it is ſtill but *Believing*. Bring it to *Certainty*, and it ceaſes to be *Faith*. I believe that Jeſus Chriſt

ed the Demonſtration, that the three Angles of a Triangle equal to two right ones, is certain that he knows it, becauſe he not doubt of the Truth of it. In his adherence to a Truth, re the Demonſtration, by which it was at firſt known, is ot, though a Man may be thought rather to believe his Me-y, than really to know, and this way of entertaining a Truth 'd formerly to me like ſomething between Opinion and owledge, a ſort of Aſſurance which exceeds bare Belief, for relies on the Teſtimony of another; Yet upon a due exa-ation I find it comes not ſhort of perfect Certainty, and is in t true Knowledge. That which is apt to miſlead our firſt oughts into a miſtake in this Matter is, that the Agreement Diſagreement of the *Ideas* in this Caſe is not perceived, as it at firſt, by an actual View of all the intermediate *Ideas*, where-he Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe in the Propoſition at firſt perceived; but by other intermediate *Ideas*, that ſhew Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* contained in the Pro-tion whoſe Certainty we remember. For Example, in this poſition, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two t ones, one, who has ſeen and clearly perceived the Demon-ion of this Truth, knows it to be true, when that Demon-

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ſt was crucified, dead, and buried, roſe again the third Day from the l, and aſcended into Heaven: Let now *ſuch Methods* of Knowledge or *ainty, be ſtarted, as leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before*: he Grounds of Knowledge be reſolved into what any one pleaſes, it nes not my *Faith*; the Foundation of that ſtands as ſure as before, cannot be at all ſhaken by it; and one may as well ſay, That any g that weakens the Sight, or caſts a miſt before the Eyes, endangers Hearing; as that any thing which alters the Nature of Knowledge hat could be done) ſhould be of *dangerous Conſequence to an Article aith.*

hether then I am or I am not miſtaken, in the placing *Certainty* in Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*; whether this unt of Knowledge be true or falſe, enlarges or ſtraitens the Bounds of ore than it ſhould; *Faith* ſtill ſtands upon its own Baſis, which is not l alter'd by it; and every Article of that has juſt the ſame unmoved dation, and the very ſame credibility, that it had before. So that, my , whatever I have ſaid about *Certainty*, and how much ſoever I may ut in it, if I am miſtaken, your Lordſhip has no Reaſon to apprehend *Danger* to any *Article of Faith*, from thence; every one of them ls upon the ſame Bottom it did before, out of the Reach of what be-s to Knowledge and Certainty. And thus much of my *way of Certain-Ideas*, which, I hope, will ſatisfie your Lordſhip, how far it is from g *dangerous to any Article of the Chriſtian Faith* whatſoever.

ſtration is gone out of his Mind; ſo that at preſent it is not actually in View, and poſſibly cannot be recollected: But he knows it in a different way, from what he did before. The Agreement of the two *Ideas* join'd in that Propoſition is perceived, but it is by the intervention of other *Ideas* than thoſe which at firſt produced that Perception. He remembers, *i. e.* he knows (for Remembrance is but the reviving of ſome paſt Knowledge) that he was once certain of the Truth of this Propoſition, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones. The Immutability of the ſame Relations between the ſame immutable Things, is now the *Idea* that ſhews him, that if the three Angles of a Triangle were once equal to two right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones. And hence he comes to be certain, that what was once true in the caſe is always true; what *Ideas* once agreed will always agree; and conſequently what he once knew to be true he will always know to be true, as long as he can remember that he once knew it. Upon this ground it is, that particular Demonſtrations in Mathematicks afford general Knowledge. If then the Perceptions that the ſame *Ideas* will eternally have the ſame Habitudes and Relations be not a ſufficient ground of Knowledge, there could be no knowledge of general Propoſitions in Mathematicks, for no Mathematical Demonſtration would be any other than particular: And when a Man had demonſtrated any Propoſition concerning one Triangle or Circle, his Knowledge would not reach beyond that particular Diagram. If he would extend it farther, he muſt renew his Demonſtration in another inſtance, before he could know it to be true in another like Triangle, and ſo on: by which means one could never come to the Knowledge of any general Propoſitions. No Body, I think, can deny that Mr. *Newton* certainly knows any Propoſition, that he now at any time reads in his Book, to be true, though he has not in actual View that admirable Chain of intermediate *Ideas*, whereby he at firſt diſcovered it to be true. Such a Memory as that, able to certain ſuch a Train of Particulars, may be well thought beyond the Reach of Humane Faculties. When the very Diſcovery, Perception, and laying together that wonderful Connexion of *Ideas* is found to ſurpaſs moſt Readers Comprehenſion. But yet 'tis evident, the Author himſelf knows the Propoſition to be true, remembring he once ſaw the Connexion of thoſe *Ideas* as certainly as he knows ſuch a Man wounded another, remembring that he ſaw him run him through. But becauſe the Memory is not always ſo clear as actual Perception, and does in all Men more or leſs decay in

length

n of time, this amongſt other Differences is one, which , that *demonſtrative Knowledge*, is much more imperfect *intuitive*, as we ſhall ſee in the following Chapter.

CHAP. II.

Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

Intuitive.

ALL our Knowledge conſiſting, as I have ſaid, in the View the Mind has of its own *Ideas*, which is the utmoſt Light and eſt Certainty, we with our Faculties, and in our way of vledge are capable of, it may not be amiſs, to conſider a little degrees of its Evidence. The different clearneſs of our vledge ſeems to me to lie in the different way of Perception, Mind has of the Agreement, or Diſagreement of any of its For if we will reflect on our own ways of Thinking, we find, that ſometimes the Mind perceives the Agreement or reement of two *Ideas* immediately by themſelves, without ntervention of any other: And this, I think, we may call *ive Knowledge*. For in this, the Mind is at no Pains of pro- or examining, but perceives the Truth, as the Eye doth , only by being directed toward it. Thus the Mind per- , that *White* is not *Black*, That a *Circle* is not a *Triangle*, That are more than *Two*, and equal to *One* and *Two*. Such kind ruths, the Mind perceives at the firſt ſight of the *Ideas* to- r, by bare *Intuition*, without the Intervention of any other and this kind of Knowledge is the cleareſt, and moſt cer- that humane Frailty is capable of. This part of Know- is irreſiſtible, and like bright Sun-ſhine, forces it ſelf imme- y to be perceived, as ſoon as ever the Mind turns its View way; and leaves no Room for Heſitation, Doubt, or Ex- ation, but the Mind is preſently fill'd with the clear Light 'Tis on this *Intuition*, that depends all the Certainty and nce of all our Knowledge, which Certainty every one finds ſo great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require ter: For a Man cannot conceive himſelf capable of a grea- ertainty, than to know that any *Idea* in his Mind is ſuch, perceives it to be; and that two *Ideas*, wherein he per- a difference, are different, and not preciſely the ſame. He

that demands a greater Certainty than this, demands he knov not what, and ſhews only that he has a Mind to be a Sceptic, without being able to be ſo. Certainty depends ſo wholly o this Intuition, that in the next degree of *Knowledge*, which I ca *Demonſtrative*, this Intuition is neceſſary in all the Connexion of the intermediate *Ideas*, without which we cannot attai Knowledge and Certainty.

Demonſtrative.

§. 2. The next degree of Knowledge is, when the Mind perceives the Agreement or Diſagree ment of any *Ideas*, but not immediately. Though wherever the Mind perceives the Agreement o Diſagreement of any of its *Ideas*, there be certain knowledge Yet it does not always happen, that the Mind ſees that Agree nent or Diſagreement, which there is between them, even whe it is diſcoverable; and in that caſe, remains in Ignorance, a at moſt, gets no farther than a probable Conjecture. The Re ſon why the Mind cannot always perceive preſently the Agre ment or Diſagreement of two *Ideas* is, becauſe thoſe *Ideas* co cerning whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement the Enquiry is mad cannot by the Mind be ſo put together, as to ſhew it. In th Caſe then, when the Mind cannot ſo bring its *Ideas* together, by their immediate Compariſon, and as it were Juxta-poſitio or Application one to another, to perceive their Agreement Diſagreement, it is fain, by the intervention of other *Ideas* (o or more, as it happens) to diſcover the Agreement or Diſagr ment, which it ſearches; and this is that which we call *Reaſo ing*. Thus the Mind being willing to know the Agreement Diſagreement in bigneſs, between the three Angles of a Tri gle, and two right ones, cannot by an immediate View and co paring them, do it: Becauſe the three Angles of a Triangle c not be brought at once, and be compared with any one, or t Angles; and ſo of this the Mind has no immediate, no intuiti Knowledge. In this Caſe the Mind is fain to find out ſome oth Angles, to which the three Angles of a Triangle have Equality; and finding thoſe equal to two right ones, comes know their Equality to two right ones.

Depends on Proofs.

§. 3. Thoſe intervening *Ideas*, which ſerve ſhew the Agreement of any two others, are call *Proofs*; and where the Agreement or Diſagr ment is by this means plainly and clearly perceiv it is called *Demonſtration*, it being *ſhewn* to the Underſtandi and the Mind made ſee that it is ſo. A quickneſs in the Mi to find out theſe intermediate *Ideas*, that ſhall diſcover the

greem

ent or Disagreement of any other,) and to apply them is, I suppose, that which is called *Sagacity*.

4. *This Knowledge by intervening Proofs,* *But not so easy.*
gh it be certain, yet the evidence of it is *not* ether *so clear* and bright, nor the assent so , *as* in *intuitive* Knowledge. For though in *Demonstration*, lind does at last perceive the Agreement or Disagreement e *Ideas* it considers; yet 'tis not without Pains and Atten- There must be more than one transient View to find it. ddy Application and Pursuit is required to this Discovery: here must be a Progression by steps and degrees, before lind can in this way arrive at Certainty, and come to per- the Agreement or Repugnancy between two *Ideas* that Proofs, and the use of Reason to shew it.

5. *Another difference between intuitive and de-* *Not without precedent doubt.*
ative Knowledge, is, that though in the latter ubt be removed, when by the Intervention e intermediate *Ideas*, the Agreement or Disa- ent is perceived; yet before the Demonstration there was bt, which in intuitive Knowledge cannot happen to the that has its Faculty of Perception left to a degree capable tinct *Ideas*, no more than it can be a doubt to the Eye, can distinctly see White and Black,) Whether this Ink, his Paper be all of a Colour. If there be Sight in the it will at first glimpse, without Hesitation, perceive the ls printed on this Paper, different from the Colour of the : And so if the Mind have the Faculty of distinct Per- n, it will perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas* that produce intuitive Knowledge. If the Eyes have he Faculty of seeing, or the Mind of perceiving, we in enquire after the quickness of Sight in one, or clearness of ption in the other.

6. 'Tis true, the Perception, produced by *Not so clear.*
stration, is also very clear; yet it is often with t Abatement of that evident Lustre and full Assurance, lways accompany that which I call *intuitive*; like a Face ted by several Mirrors one to another, where as long as ins the similitude and agreement with the Object, it pro- a Knowledge; but 'tis still in every successive Reflection a lessening of that perfect Clearness and Distinctness, which he first, till at last, after many removes, it has a great mix- of Dimness, and is not at first Sight so knowable, especially eak Eyes. Thus it is with Knowledge, made out by a Train of Proofs.

§. 7.

Each ſtep muſt have intuitive Evidence.

§. 7. Now, *in every ſtep Reaſon makes in demonſtrative Knowledge, there is an intuitive Knowledge* of that Agreement or Diſagreement, it ſeeks with the next intermediate *Idea*, which it uſes as a Proof: For if it were not ſo, that yet would need a Proof. Since without the Perception of ſuch Agreement or Diſagreement, there is no Knowledge produced: If it be perceived by it ſelf, it is intuitive Knowledge: If it cannot be perceived by it ſelf, there is need of ſome intervening *Idea*, as a common meaſure to ſhew their Agreement or Diſagreement. By which it is plain, that every ſtep in Reaſoning, that produces Knowledge, has intuitive Certainty; which when the Mind perceives, there is no more required, but to remember it to make the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* concerning which we enquire, viſible and certain. So that to make any thing a *Demonſtration*, it is neceſſary to perceive the immediate Agreement of the intervening *Ideas*, whereby the Agreement or Diſagreement of the two *Ideas* under Examination (whereof the one is always the firſt, and the other the laſt in the Account) is found. This intuitive Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of the intermediate *Ideas*, in each Step and Progreſſion of the *Demonſtration*, muſt alſo be carried exactly in the Mind, and a Man muſt be ſure that no part is left out; which becauſe in long Deductions, and the uſe of many Proofs, the Memory does not always ſo readily and exactly retain: therefore it comes to paſs, that this is more imperfect than intuitive Knowledge, and Men embrace often Falſhood for Demonſtrations.

Hence the miſtake, ex præcognitis & præconceſſis.

§. 8. The neceſſity of this intuitive Knowledge, in each ſtep of ſcientifical or demonſtrative Reaſoning, gave occaſion, I imagine, to that *miſtaken Axiom, that all Reaſoning was ex præcognitis & præconceſſis*; which how far it is miſtaken, I ſhall have occaſion to ſhew more at large, where I come to conſider Propoſitions, and particularly thoſe Propoſitions, which are called Maxims; and to ſhew that 'tis by a miſtake, that they are ſuppoſed to be the foundations of all our Knowledge and Reaſonings.

Demonſtration not limited to quantity.

§. 9. It has been generally taken for granted, that Mathematicks alone are capable of demonſtrative Certainty: But to have ſuch an Agreement or Diſagreement, as may intuitively be perceived, being, as I imagine, not the Privilege of the *Ideas* of *Number*, *Extenſion*, and *Figure* alone, it may poſſibly be the want of

Method and Application in us; and not of sufficient evi-
n things, that Demonstration has been thought to have so
do in other parts of Knowledge, and been scarce so much
d at by any but Mathematicians. For whatever *Ideas* we
wherein the Mind can perceive the immediate Agreement
greement that is between them, there the Mind is capable
itive Knowledge; and where it can perceive the Agree-
r Disagreement of any two *Ideas*, by an intuitive Percep-
the Agreement or Disagreement they have with any in-
iate *Ideas*, there the Mind is capable of Demonstration,
is not limited to *Ideas* of Extension, Figure, Number,
ir Modes.

Why it has been so thought.

o. The Reason why it has been generally
for, and supposed to be only in those, I
e, has been, not only the general usefulness
se Sciences; But because, in comparing their
ty or Excess, the Modes of Numbers have every the least
nce very clear and perceivable: and though in Extension,
he least Excess is not so perceptible; yet the Mind has
out ways, to examine and discover demonstratively the
quality of two Angles, or Extensions, or Figures, and both
i. e. Numbers and Figures, can be set down, by visible
ing marks, wherein the *Ideas* under consideration are per-
determined, which for the most part they are not, where
re marked only by Names and Words.

1. But in other simple *Ideas*, whose Modes and Differences
de, and counted by degrees, and not quantity, we have
nice and accurate a distinction of their differences, as to
e, or find ways to measure their just Equality of the least
nces. For those other simple *Ideas*, being appearances or
ns, produced in us, by the Size, Figure, Number, and
of minute Corpuscles singly insensible, their different
also depend upon the variation of some, or all of those
; which since it cannot be observed by us in Particles of
, whereof each is too subtile to be perceived, it is impos-
r us to have any exact Measures of the different degrees
simple *Ideas*. For supposing the Sensation or *Idea* we
Whiteness, be produced in us by a certain number of Glo-
which having a verticity about their own Centers, strike
ne *Retina* of the Eye, with a certain degree of Rotation,
as progressive Swiftness; it will hence easily follow, that
re the superficial parts of any Body are so ordered, as to
the greater number of Globules of Light, and to give
them

them that proper Rotation, which is fit to produce this Sensation of White in us, the more White will that Body appear that, from an equal space sends to the *Retina* the greater number of such Corpuscles, with that peculiar sort of Motion. I do not say, that the Nature of Light consists in very small round Globules, nor of Whiteness, in such a texture of Parts as gives a certain Rotation to those Globules, when it reflects them; for I am not now treating physically of Light or Colours: But this I think, I may say, that I cannot (and I would be glad any one would make intelligible that he did) conceive how Bodies without us, can any ways affect our Senses, but by the immediate contact of the sensible Bodies themselves, as in Tasting and Feeling, or the impulse of some insensible Particles coming from them, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling; by the different impulse of which Parts, caused by their different Size, Figure, and Motion, the variety of Sensations is produced in us.

§. 12. Whether then they be Globules or no; or whether they have a Verticity about their own Centers, that produces the *Idea* of *Whiteness* in us, this is certain, that the more Particles of Light are reflected from a Body, fitted to give them this peculiar Motion, which produces the Sensation of Whiteness in us; and possibly too, the quicker that peculiar Motion is, the whiter does the Body appear, from which the greater number are reflected, as is evident in the same piece of Paper put in the Sun-beams, in the Shade, and in a dark Hole; in each of which, it will produce in us the *Idea* of Whiteness in far different degrees.

Why it has been so thought.

§. 13. Not knowing therefore what number of Particles, nor what Motion of them is fit to produce any precise degree of *Whiteness*, we cannot demonstrate the certain Equality of any two degrees of *Whiteness*, because we have no certain Standard to measure them by, nor Means to distinguish every the least real difference, the only Help we have being from our Senses, which in this point fail us. But where the difference is so great, as to produce in the Mind clearly distinct *Ideas*, whose differences can be perfectly retained, there these *Ideas* of Colours, as we see in different kinds, has Blue and Red, are as capable of Demonstration, as *Ideas* of Number and Extension. What I have here said of *Whiteness* and Colours, I think, holds true in all secondary Qualities, and their Modes.

§. 14.

14. These two, (*viz.*) Intuition and Demonn, are the degrees of our Knowledge; whatomes short of one of these, with what assufoever embraced, is but Faith, or Opinion, t Knowledge, at least in all general Truths. is, indeed, another *Perception* of the Mind, y'd about *the particular Existence of finite Beings* without hich going beyond bare probability, and yet not reachrfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, under the name of Knowledge. There can be nothing certain, than that the *Idea* we receive from an external t is in our Minds; this is intuitive Knowledge. But er there be any thing more than barely that *Idea* in our , whether we can thence certainly infer the Existence thing without us, which corresponds to that *Idea*, is whereof some Men think there may be a Question made, e Men may have such *Ideas* in their Minds, when no Thing exists, no such Object affects their Senses. But re, I think, we are provided with an Evidence, that s past doubting: For I ask any one, Whether he be not ibly conscious to himself of a different Perception, when ks on the Sun by Day, and thinks on it by Night; he actually tastes Wormwood, or smells a Rose, or only on that Savour, or Odour? We as plainly find the nce there is between any *Idea* revived in our Minds by wn Memory, and actually coming into our Minds by nses, as we do between any two distinct *Ideas*. If any y, a Dream may do the same thing, and all these *Ideas* e produced in us without any external Objects, he may to dream that I make him this Answer, 1. That 'tis no matter, whether I remove his Scruple, or no: Where all t Dream, Reasoning and Arguments are of no use, Truth knowledge nothing. 2. That I believe he will allow a manifest difference between dreaming of being in the nd being actually in it. But yet if he be resolved to apo sceptical, as to maintain, that what I call being actualthe Fire is nothing but a Dream; and that we cannot y certainly know, that any such thing as Fire actually without us: I answer, That we certainly finding, that re or Pain follows upon the application of certain Objects whose Existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive, Senses: This Certainty is as great as our Happiness, or , beyond which, we have no concernment to know, or to be.

Sensitive Knowledge of particular Existence.

So

So that, I think, we may add to the two former sorts of *Knowledge* this also, of the Existence of particular external Objects, by that Perception and Consciousness we have of the actual entrance of *Ideas* from them, and allow these *three degrees of Knowledge*, viz. *Intuitive*, *Demonstrative*, and *Sensitive*: in each of which there are different degrees and ways of Evidence and Certainty.

Knowledge not always clear, where the Ideas *are so.*

§. 15. But since our Knowledge is founded on, and employ'd about our *Ideas* only, will it not follow from thence, that it is conformable to our *Ideas*; and that where our *Ideas* are clear and distinct, or obscure and confused, our Knowledge will be so too? To which I answer, No: For our Knowledge consisting in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any two *Ideas*, its clearness or obscurity, consists in the clearness or obscurity of that Perception, and not in the clearness or obscurity of the *Ideas* themselves: *v. g.* a Man that has as clear *Ideas* of the Angles of a Triangle and of Equality to two right ones, as any Mathematician in the World, may yet have but a very obscure Perception of their Agreement, and so have but a very obscure Knowledge of it. But *Ideas*, which by reason of their Obscurity or otherwise, are confused, cannot produce any clear or distinct Knowledge; because as far as any *Ideas* are confused, so far the Mind cannot perceive clearly, whether they agree or disagree. Or to express the same thing in a way less apt to be mis-understood. He that hath not determined the *Ideas* to the Words he uses, cannot make Propositions of them, of whose Truth he can be certain.

CHAP. III.

Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge.

§. 1. KNowledge, as has been said, laying in the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement, of any of our *Ideas*, it follows from hence, That,

First, No farther than we have Ideas. *Secondly, No farther than we can perceive their Agreement or Disagreement.*

First, We can have *Knowledge* no farther than we have *Ideas*.

§. 2. *Secondly*, That we can have no *Knowledge* farther than we can have Perception of that Agreement, or Disagreement: Which Perception being, 1. Either, by *Intuition*, or

mmediate comparing any two *Ideas*; or, 2. By *Reason*, ex-ing the Agreement, or Disagreement of two *Ideas*, by the vention of some others: Or, 3. By *Sensation*, perceiving Existence of particular Things. Hence it also follows,

3. *Thirdly*, That we cannot have an *intui-Knowledge*, that shall extend it self to all our , and all that we would know about them; use we cannot examine and perceive all the ions they have one to another by Juxta-posi- or an immediate comparison one with ano- Thus having the *Ideas* of an obtuse, and an angled Triangle, both drawn from equal , and between Parallels, I can by intuitive wledge, perceive the one not to be the other; but cannot way know, whether they be equal, or no; because their ement or Disagreement in equality, can never be perceived n immediate comparing them: The difference of Figure es their parts uncapable of an exact immediate application; therefore there is need of some intervening Quantities to ure them by, which is Demonstration, or rational Know-e.

Thirdly, Intuitive Knowledge extends it self not to all the Relations of all our Ideas.

4. *Fourthly*, It follows also, from what is a- obserued, that our *rational Knowledge*, can-reach to the whole extent of our *Ideas*. Be- between two different *Ideas* we would exa-, we cannot always find such *Mediums*, as we can connect to another with an intuitive Knowledge, in all the parts e Deduction; and wherever that fails, we come short of wledge and Demonstration.

Fourthly, Nor demonstrative Knowledge.

5. *Fifthly*, *Sensative Knowledge* reaching arther than the Existence of Things a- ly present to our Senses, is yet much nar- r than either of the former.

Fifthly, Sensitive Knowledge narrower than either.

6. From all which it is evident, that *the nt of our Knowledge* comes not only short e Reality of Things, but even of the Ex- of our own *Ideas*. Though our Know- be limited to our *Ideas*, and cannot ex- them either in Extent or Perfection; and though these be narrow bounds, in respect of the extent of All-being, and nort of what we may justly imagine to be in some even cre- Understandings, not tied down to the dull and narrow In- ation, is received from some few, and not very acute ways

Sixthly, Our Knowledge therefore narrower than our Ideas.

ways of Perception, such as are our Senses; yet it would be well with us, if our Knowledge were but as large as our *Ideas*, and there were not many Doubts and Enquiries concerning the *Ideas* we have, whereof we are not, nor I believe ever shall be in this World, resolved. Nevertheless, I do not question, but that Humane Knowledge, under the present Circumstances of our Beings and Constitutions may be carried much farther, than it hitherto has been, if Men would sincerely, and with freedom of Mind, employ all that Industry and Labour of Thought, in improving the means of discovering Truth, which they do for the Colouring or Support of Falshood, to maintain a System, Interest or Party, they are once engaged in. But yet after all, I think I may, without Injury to humane Perfection, be confident, that our Knowledge would never reach to all we might desire to know concerning those *Ideas* we have; nor be able to surmount all the Difficulties, and resolve all the Questions might arise concerning any of them. We have the *Ideas* of a *Square*, a *Circle*, and *Equality*: and yet, perhaps, shall never be able to find a Circle equal to a Square, and certainly know that it is so. We have the *Ideas* of *Matter* and *Thinking*, * but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any mere material Being think, or

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* Against that Assertion of Mr. *Locke*, *That possibly we shall never be able to know whether any material Beings thinks or not*, &c. The Bishop of *Worcester* argues thus: *If this be true, then for all that we can know by our Ideas of* Matter *and* Thinking, *Matter may have a Power of Thinking: And if this hold, then it is impossible to prove a spiritual Substance in us, from the* Idea *of* Thinking: *For how can we be assured by our Ideas, that God hath not given such a power of Thinking, to Matter so disposed as our Bodies are? Especially since it is* † *said,*

† Essay of Humane Understd. B. 4. C. 3. §. 6.

" That in respect of our Notions, it is not much more remote from our Comprehension to conceive that God can, if he pleases, super-add to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he should super-add to it another Substance, with a Faculty of Thinking. *Whoever asserts this, can never prove a spiritual Substance in us from a Faculty of Thinking; because he cannot know from the Idea of Matter and Thinking, that Matter so disposed cannot think. And he cannot be certain, that God hath not framed the Matter of our Bodies so as to be capable of it.*

To which Mr. *Locke* * answers thus: Here your Lordship argues, that upon my Principles *it cannot be proved that there is a spiritual Substance in us.* To which give me leave, with Submission, to say, That I think it may be proved from my Principles, and I think I have done it

* In his *first Letter to the Bishop of Worcester*, p. 64, 65, &c.

d the Proof in my Book ſtands thus. First, We experiment in our Thinking. The Idea of this Action or Mode of *Thinking*, is inconſiith the Idea of Self-ſubſiſtence, and therefore has a neceſſary Conneewith a Support or Subject of Inheſion: The Idea of that Support is ve call *Subſtance*; and ſo from *Thinking* experimented in us, we have f of a *thinking Subſtance* in us, which in my Senſe is a *Spirit*. Againſt ur Lordſhip will argue, That by what I have ſaid of the Poſſibility od may, if he pleaſed, ſuper-add to Matter a Faculty of Thinking, it ver be proved that there is a Spiritual Subſtance in us, becauſe upon ppoſition it is poſſible it may be a material Subſtance that thinks in us. it; but add, that the general Idea of Subſtance being the ſame ehere, the Modification of *Thinking*, or the Power of *Thinking* joined makes it a *Spirit*, without conſidering what other Modifications it s, whether it has the Modification of *Solidity*, or no. As on the ole *Subſtance*, that has the Modification of *Solidity* is Matter, whether it e Modification of Thinking or no. And therefore, if your Lordſhip by a *ſpiritual*, and immaterial Subſtance, I grant I have not proved, on my Principles can it be proved, your Lordſhip meaning (as I think) demonſtratively proved, That there is an immaterial Subſtance in t thinks. Though I preſume, from what I have ſaid

the Suppoſition of a Syſtem of Matter, Thinking — B. 4. C. 10.
h there demonſtrate that God is immaterial) will — §. 16.

it in the higheſt degree probable, that the thinking ice in us is immaterial. But your Lordſhip thinks not Probability e-, and by charging the want of Demonſtration upon my Principles, e thinking thing in us is immaterial, your Lordſhip ſeems to conclude onſtrable from Principles of Philoſophy. That Demonſtration I ſhould oy receive from your Lordſhip, or any one. For

all the great Ends of Morality and Religion are well — B. 4. C. 3.
ſecured without it, as I have ſhewn, yet it would be a — §. 6.
dvance of our Knowledge in Nature and Philoſophy.

what I have ſaid in my Book, to ſhew that all the great Ends of Reand Morality are ſecured barely by the Immortality of the Soul, withecceſſary Suppoſition that the Soul is immaterial, I crave leave to add, mmortality may and ſhall be annexed to that, which in its own Na- neither immaterial nor immortal, as the Apoſtle

y declares in theſe words, * *For this Corruptible* — * 1 *Cor.* 15.
t on Incorruption, and this Mortal muſt put on Im- — 53.
ty.

aps my uſing the word *Spirit* for a thinking Subſtance, without ex- Materiality out of it, will be thought too great a Liberty, and ſuch rves a Cenſure, becauſe I leave Immateriality out of the Idea I make of. I readily own, That words ſhould be ſparingly ventured on in wholly new; and nothing but abſolute Neceſſity can excuſe the bolduſing any Term, in a Senſe whereof we can produce no Example. But reſent caſe, I think I have great Authorities to juſtifie me. The agreed, on all hands, to be that in us which thinks. And he that

will look into the first Book of *Cicero*'s *Tusculan* Questions, and into
6th Book of *Virgil*'s *Æneids*, will find that these two great Men, who of all
Romans best understood Philosophy, thought, or at least did not deny
Soul to be a subtil Matter, which might come under the Name of *Aura*,
Ignis, or *Æther*, and this Soul they both of them called *Spiritus*; in the N
tion of which, 'tis plain they included only Thought and active Motion, wi
out the total exclusion of Matter. Whether they thought right in this I
not say, that is not the Question; but whether they spoke properly, w
they called an active, thinking, subtil Substance, out of which they exclu
only gross and palpable Matter, *Spiritus*, *Spirit*. I think that no body
deny, That if any among the *Romans* can be allowed to speak proper
Tully and *Virgil* are the two who may most securely by depended on for
And one of them speaking of the Soul, says, *Dum spiritus hos regit art*
and the other, *Vita continetur corpore & spiritu*. Where 'tis plain by C
pus, he means (as generally every-where) only gross Matter that may
felt and handled, as appears by these words, *Si cor aut sanguis, aut*
brum est animus, certè, quoniam est Corpus, interibit cum reliquo Corpo
anima est, fortè dissipabitur, si ignis extinguetur, Tusc. Quest. l. 1. c. 11.
Cicero opposes *Corpus* to *Ignis* and *Anima*, i. e. *Aura* or *Breath*. And
foundation of that his Distinction of the Soul, from that which he calls
pus or Body, he gives a little lower in these words, *Tanta ejus tenuit*
fugiat aciem, Ib. c. 22. Nor was it the Heathen World alone that had this
tion of *Spirit*; the most enlightned of all the Ancient Pe
Eccl. 3. 19. of God, *Solomon* himself, speaks after the same manner,
which befalleth the Sons of Men, befalleth the Beasts, eve
thing befalleth them; *as the one dieth so dieth the other, yea, they hav*
one Spirit. So I translate the Hebrew word רוח here, for so I find it t
slated the very next Verse but one; *Who knoweth the S*
Ver. 21. *of a Man that goeth upward, and Spirit of a Beast that*
down to the Earth. In which places it is plain that *Solomo*
plies the Word רוח and our Translators of him the word *Spirit* to a Subst
out of which Immateriality was not wholly excluded, *unless the Spiri*
Beast that goeth downwards to the Earth be immaterial. Nor did the w
Speaking in our Saviour's time vary from this: St. *Luke*
Ch. 24. 37. us, That when our Saviour, after his Resurrection, stood
midst of them, *they were affrighted, and supposed that*
had seen πνεῦμα, the Greek word which always answers *Spirit* in Eng
and so the Translators of the Bible render it here, *They supposed that*
had seen a Spirit. But our Saviour says to them, *Behold my Hands a*
Feet, that it is I my self, handle me and see; for a Spirit hath no Fles
Bones, as you see me have. Which words of our Saviour put the san
stinction between *Body* and *Spirit*, that *Cicero* did in the place above-
viz. That the one was a gross Compages that could be felt and han
and the other such as *Virgil* describes the Ghost or Soul of *Anchises*,

Ter conatus ibi collo dare brachia circum
Lib. VI. *Ter frustra comprensa manus effugit imago,*
Par levibus ventis volucriq; simillima somnō.

ld not be thought hereby to say, That *Spirit* never does signifie a
immaterial Substance. In that Sense the Scripture, I take it, speaks,
it says, *God is a Spirit*; and in that sense I have us'd it; and in that
have proved from my Principles, that there is a *spiritual Substance*;
n *certain that there is a spiritual immaterial Substance*: which is, I
y conceive, a direct Answer to your Lordship's Question in the Begin-
f this Argument, *viz. How we come to be certain that there is a spi-
Substance*; *supposing this Principle to be true*, that the simple Ideas by
ion and Reflection, are the sole Matter and Foundation of all Reasoning?
is hinders not but that if God, that infinite, omnipotent, and perfect-
naterial Spirit, should please to give to a System of very subtil Matter,
and Motion, it might, with propriety of Speech, be called *Spirit*;
h Materiality were not excluded out of its complex Idea. Your Lord-
roceeds, *It is said indeed elsewhere*, " That it is re-
nt to the Idea of senseless Matter, that it should put B. 4. C. 13.
it self Sense, Perception, and Knowledge. *But this* §. 5.
*not reach the present case; which is not what Matter
of it self, but what Matter prepared by an omnipotent hand can do.
what certainty can we have that he hath not done it? We can have
from the Ideas, for those are given up in this case, and consequently,
n have no certainty upon these Principles, whether we have any spi-
Substance within us or not.*

ir Lordship in this Paragraph proves, that from what I say, *We can
no certainty whether we have any* spiritual Substance *in us or not.* If
ritual Substance your Lordship means an immaterial Substance in us,
speak p. 246. I grant what your Lordship says is true, That it can-
pon *these Principles*, be demonstrated. But I must crave leave to say
same time, That upon *these Principles*, it can be prov'd, to the highest
of Probability. If by *spiritual Substance* your Lordship means a
ng Substance, I must dissent from your Lordship, and say, *That we
ve a Certainty, upon my Principles, that there is a spiritual Substance*
In short, my Lord, *upon* my *Principles*, i. e. from the *Idea* of
ing, *we can have a Certainty* that there is a thinking Substance in us;
ence we have a Certainty that there is an eternal *thinking Substance*.
inking Substance, which has been from Eternity, I have proved to
naterial. This eternal, immaterial, thinking Substance, has put into
inking Substance, which whether it be a material or immaterial Sub-
cannot be infallibly demonstrated from our Ideas; though from them
be proved, that it is to the highest degree probable that it is imma-

in, the Bishop of *Worcester* undertakes to prove from Mr. *Locke*'s Prin-
that we may be certain, " That the first eternal Thinking Being or
ipotent Spirit cannot, if he would, give to certain Systems of created
ble Matter, put together as he sees fit, some degrees of Sense, Per-
ion and Thought.

which Mr. *Locke* has made the following Answer in his Third Letter,
, 397, &c.

Your first Argument I take to be this, That according to me, the Knowledge we have being by our Ideas, and our Idea of Matter in general being solid Substance, and our Idea of Body a solid extended figured Substance; if admit Matter to be capable of Thinking, I confound the Idea of Matter wit the Idea of a Spirit: To which I answer, No, no more than I confound th Idea of Matter with the Idea of an Horse, when I say that Matter in gener is *a solid extended Substance*; and that an Horse is a material Animal, o an extended solid Substance with Sense and spontaneous Motion.

The Idea of Matter is an extended solid Substance; where-ever there i such a Substance there is Matter; and the Essence of Matter, whatever othe Qualities, not contained in that Essence, it shall please God to superadd to it. For Example, God creates an extended solid Substance, without the superadding any thing else to it, and so we may consider it at rest: To some parts of it he superadds Motion, but it has still the Essence of Matter: Other parts of it he frames into Plants, with all the Excellencies of Vegetation, Life and Beauty, which is to be found in a Rose or a Peach-tree, *&c.* above the Essence of Matter in general, but it is still but Matter: To other parts he adds Sense and spontaneous Motion, and those other Properties that are to be found in an Elephant. Hitherto 'tis not doubted but the Power of God may go, and that the Properties of a Rose, a Peach, or an Elephant, superadded to Matter, change not the Properties of Matter; but Matter in these things Matter still. But if one venture to go one step farther and say God may give to Matter, Thought, Reason, and Volition, as well as Sense and spontaneous Motion, there are Men ready presently to limit the Power of the Omnipotent Creator, and tell us, he cannot do it; because it destroys the Essence, or *changes the essential Properties* of Matter. To make good which Assertion they have no more to say, but that Thought and Reason are not included in the Essence of Matter. I grant it; but whatever Excellency, not contained in its Essence, be superadded to Matter, it does not destroy the Essence of Matter, if it leaves it an extended solid Substance; where-ever that is, there is the Essence of Matter; and if every thing of greater Perfection, superadded to such a Substance, destroys the Essence of Matter, what will become of the Essence of Matter in a Plant, or an Animal whose Properties far exceed those of a meer extended solid Substance?

But 'tis farther urged, That we cannot conceive how Matter can Think. I grant it: but to argue from thence, that God therefore cannot give to Matter a Faculty of Thinking, is to say God's Omnipotency is limited to our narrow compass, because Man's Understanding is so; and bring down God's infinite Power to the size of our Capacities. If God can give no Power to any parts of Matter, but what Men can account for from the Essence of Matter in general: If all such Qualities and Properties must destroy the Essence, or *change the Essential Properties* of Matter, which are to our Conceptions above it, and we cannot conceive to be the natural Consequents of that Essence; it is plain, that the Essence of Matter is destroyed, and *essential Properties changed* in most of the sensible parts of this our System. For 'tis visible, that all the Planets have Revolutions about certain remote Centers, which I would have any one explain, or make conceivable by the ba

Essence or natural Powers depending on the Essence of Matter in gene-
without something added to that Essence, which we cannot conceive;
e moving of Matter in a crooked Line, or the attraction of Matter by
r, is all that can be said in the Case; either of which, it is above our
to derive from the Essence of Matter or Body in general; though one
se two must unavoidably be allowed to be superadded in this instance
Essence of Matter in general. The Omnipotent Creator advised not
is in the making of the World, and his ways are not the less Excellent,
e they are past our finding out.

he next place, the vegetable part of the Creation is not doubted to be
Material; and yet he that will look into it, will observe Excellencies
perations in this part of Matter, which he will not find contained in the
e of Matter in general, nor be able to conceive how they can be pro-
by it. And will he therefore say, That the Essence of Matter is de-
d in them, because they have Properties and Operations not contained
Essential Properties of Matter as Matter, nor explicable by the Essence
tter in general?

us advance one step farther, and we shall in the Animal World meet
et greater Perfections and Properties no ways explicable by the Essence
tter in general. If the Omnipotent Creator had not superadded to the
, which produced the irrational Animals, Qualities far surpassing those
dull dead Earth, out of which they were made Life, Sense, and spon-
s Motion, nobler Qualities than were before in it, it had still remained
enseless Matter; and if to the Individuals of each Species, he had not
dded a power of Propagation, the Species had perished with those In-
als: But by these Essences or Properties of each Species, superadded
Matter which they were made of, the Essences of Properties of Mat-
general were not destroyed or changed, any more than any thing that
the Individuals before, was destroyed or changed by the Power of
ation, superadded to them by the first Benediction of the Almighty.
ll such Cases, the superinducement of greater Perfections and nobler
ies, destroys nothing of the Essence or Perfections that were there
; unless there can be shewed a manifest Repugnancy between them:
the Proof offered for that, is only, That we cannot conceive how
, without such superadded Perfections, can produce such Effects;
is, in truth, no more than to say, Matter in general, or every part
ter, as Matter has them not; but is no Reason to prove, that God,
leases, cannot superadd them to some parts of Matter, unless it can
ved to be a Contradiction, that God should give to some parts of Mat-
ualities and Perfections, which Matter in general has not; though
not conceive how Matter is invested with them, or how it operates
ue of those new Endowments. Nor is it to be wonder'd that we
, whilst we limit all its Operations to those Qualities it had before,
ould explain them, by the known Properties of Matter in general,
t any such superinduced Perfections. For if this be a right Rule of
ing, to deny a thing to be, because we cannot conceive the manner
comes to be: I shall desire them who use it, to stick to this Rule,

and see what Work it will make both in Divinity, as well as Philosophy; and whether they can advance any thing more in favour of *Scepticism?*

For to keep within the present Subject of the Power of Thinking and Self-motion, bestow'd by Omnipotent Power on some Parts of Matter: The Objection to this is, I cannot conceive how Matter should Think: What is the Consequence? *Ergo*, God cannot give it a Power to Think. Let this stand for a good Reason, and then proceed in other Cases by the same. You cannot conceive how Matter can attract Matter at any distance, much less at the distance of 1000000 Miles; *Ergo*, God cannot give it such a Power; you cannot conceive how Matter should feel, or move it self, or affect an Immaterial Being, or be moved by it: *Ergo*, God cannot give it such Powers, which is in effect to deny Gravity and the Revolutions of the Planets about the Sun; to make Brutes meer Machines without Sense or spontaneous Motion, and to allow Man neither Sense nor voluntary Motion.

Let us apply this Rule one degree farther. You cannot conceive how an extended solid Substance should think, therefore God cannot make it think: Can you conceive how your own Soul, or any Substance, thinks? You find indeed that you do think, and so do I; but I want to be told how the Action of Thinking is performed: This, I confess, is beyond my Conception, and I would be glad any one, who conceives it, would explain it to me. God, I find, has given me this Faculty; and since I cannot but be convinced of his Power in this Instance, which though I every moment experiment in my self, yet cannot conceive the manner of; what would it be less than an insolent Absurdity, to deny his Power in other like Cases, only for this Reason, because I cannot conceive the manner how?

To explain this Matter a little farther. God has created a Substance; let it be, for example, a solid extended Substance. Is God bound to give it besides Being, a Power of Action? That, I think, no Body will say: He therefore may leave it in a state of Inactivity, and it will be nevertheless a Substance; for Action is not necessary to the Being of any Substance that God does create: God has likewise created and made to exist, *de novo*, an immaterial Substance, which will not lose its Being of a Substance, though God should bestow on it nothing more but this bare Being, without giving it any Activity at all. Here are now two distinct Substances, the one Material, the other Immaterial, both in a state of perfect Inactivity. Now I ask, What Power God can give to one of these Substances (supposing them to retain the same distinct Natures, that they had as Substances in their state of Inactivity) which he cannot give to the other? In that state, 'tis plain, neither of them thinks; for Thinking being an Action, it cannot be denied, that God can put an end to any Action of any created Substance, without annihilating of the Substance whereof it is an Action; and if it be so, he can also create or give Existence to such a Substance, without giving that Substance any Action at all. By the same Reason it is plain, that neither of them can move it self: Now, I would ask, why Omnipotency cannot give to either of these Substances, which are equally in a state of perfect Inactivity, the same Power, that it can give to the other? Let it be for

Example,

e, that of ſpontaneous or Self-motion, which is a Power that 'tis
d God can give to an unſolid Subſtance, but denied that he can give
id Subſtance.

be asked, Why they limit the Omnipotency of God, in reference to
rather than the other of the Subſtances? All that can be ſaid to
hat they cannot conceive, how the ſolid Subſtance ſhould ever be
move it ſelf. And as little, ſay I, are they able to conceive how a
unſolid Subſtance ſhould move it ſelf: But there may be ſomething
mmaterial Subſtance, that you do not know. I grant it; and in a
l one too: For Example, Gravitation of Matter towards Matter, and
ſeveral Proportions obſervable, inevitably ſhews, that there is ſome-
n Matter that we do not underſtand, unleſs we can conceive Self-
in Matter; or an inexplicable and inconceivable Attraction in Matter,
enſe and almoſt incomprehenſible Diſtances: It muſt therefore be
ed, that there is ſomething in ſolid, as well as unſolid Subſtances,
e do not underſtand. But this we know, that they may each of them
heir diſtinct Beings, without any Activity ſuperadded to them, unleſs
ll deny, That God can take from any Being its Power of Acting,
'tis probable will be thought too preſumptuous for any one to do;
ay, it is as hard to conceive Self-motion in a created immaterial as in a
al Being, conſider it how you will: And therefore this is no Reaſon
y Omnipotency to be able to give a Power of Self-motion to a ma-
Subſtance, if he pleaſes, as well as to an immaterial; ſince neither of
an have it from themſelves, nor can we conceive how it can be in ei-
them.

ſame is viſible in the other Operation of Thinking; both theſe Sub-
may be made, and exiſt without Thought; neither of them has,
have the Power of Thinking from it ſelf: God may give it to ei-
them, according to the good Pleaſure of his Omnipotency; and
h ever of them it is, it is equally beyond our Capacity to conceive,
ther of thoſe Subſtances thinks. But for that Reaſon, to deny that
who had Power enough to give them both a Being out of nothing,
the ſame Omnipotency give them what other Powers and Perfecti-
pleaſes, has no better a Foundation than to deny his Power of Cre-
becauſe we cannot conceive how it is performed; and there at laſt
y of Reaſoning muſt terminate.

t Omnipotency cannot make a Subſtance to be ſolid and not ſolid at
ne time, I think, with due Reverence, we may ſay; but that a ſolid
ce may not have Qualities, Perfections and Powers, which have no
l or viſibly neceſſary Connexion with Solidity and Extenſion, is too
or us (who are but of Yeſterday and know nothing) to be poſitive
God cannot join things together by Connexions inconceivable to us,
ſt deny even the Conſiſtency, and Being of Matter it ſelf; ſince e-
article of it having ſome Bulk, has its Parts connected by ways in-
vable to us. So that all the Difficulties, that are raiſed againſt the
ing of Matter from our Ignorance or narrow Conceptions, ſtand not
n the way of the Power of God, if he pleaſes to ordain it ſo; nor

proves any thing against his having actually endued some parcels of Mat
so disposed as he thinks fit, a Faculty of Thinking, till it can be she
that it contains a Contradiction to suppose it.

Though to me Sensation be comprehended under Thinking in general,
in the foregoing Discourse, I have spoke of Sense in Brutes, as dist
from Thinking. Because your Lordship, as I remember, speaks of Sens
Brutes. But here I take liberty to observe, That your Lordship allows Br
to have Sensation, it will follow, either that God can and doth give to s
parcels of Matter a Power of Perception and Thinking; or that all Anim
have immaterial, and consequently, according to your Lordship, immor
Souls, as well as Men; and to say that Fleas and Mites, *&c.* have imm
tal Souls as well as Men, will possibly be looked on, as going a great
to serve an Hypothesis.

I have been pretty large in making this Matter plain, that they who
so forward to bestow hard Censures or Names on the Opinions of th
whose differ from them, may consider whether sometimes they are not m
due to their own: And that they may be persuaded a little to temper t
Heat, which supposing the Truth in their current Opinion, gives them
they think) a Right to lay what Imputations they please on those
would fairly examine the Grounds they stand upon. For talking with a
position and Insinuations, that Truth and Knowledge, nay and Religion
stands and falls with their Systems; is at best but an imperious way of
ging the Question, and assuming to themselves, under the pretence of Z
for the Cause of God, a Title to Infallibility. It is very becoming t
Men's Zeal for Truth should go as far as their Proofs, but not go for Pr
themselves. He that attacks received Opinions with any thing but fair
guments, may, I own, be justly suspected not to mean well, nor to be
by the Love of Truth; but the same may be said of him too, who so
fends them. An Error is not the better for being common, nor Truth
worse for having lain neglected: And if it were put to the Vote any-wh
in the World, I doubt, as things are managed, whether Truth would h
the Majority, at least, whilst the Authority of Men, and not the exam
tion of Things must be its Measure. The imputation of *Scepticism* and th
broad Insinuations, to render what I have writ suspected, so frequent
that were the great Business of all this Pains you have been at about
has made me say thus much my Lord, rather as my Sense of the wa
establish Truth in its full Force and Beauty, than that I think the Wo
will need to have any thing said to it, to make it distinguish between y
Lordship's and my Design in Writing, which therefore I securely leave
the Judgment of the Reader, and return to the Argument in Hand.

What I have above said, I take to be a full Answer to all that y
Lordship would infer from my Idea of Matter, of Liber
* 1 Anf. and from the Power of Abstracting. You ask, * *How c*
p. 73. *my Idea of Liberty agree with the Idea that Bodies c*
operate only by Motion and Impulse? Answ. By the Om
† Essay B. 2. potency of God, who can make all things agree, th
Ch. 8. §. 11. involve not a Contradiction. 'Tis true, I say, † Th
Bod

es operate by impulse, and nothing else. And so I thought when I
:, and yet can conceive no other way of their Operation. But
nce convinced by the Judicious Mr. *Newton*'s incomparable Book,
tis too bold a Presumption to limit God's Power in this Point, by
arrow Conceptions. The Gravitation of Matter, towards Matter,
vs unconceivable to me, is not only a Demonstration that God can,
pleases, put into Bodies, Powers, and ways of Operation, above
an be derived from our Idea of Body, or can be explained by what
low of Matter, but also an unquestionable and every-where visible
ce, that he has done so. And therefore in the next Edition of my
I shall take care to have that Passage rectified.

o *Self-consciousness*, your Lordship ask, † *What is like Self-Consciousness in Matter?* Nothing at all in r as Matter. But that God cannot bestow on some s of Matter a Power of Thinking, and with it Self-consciousness ever be proved by asking, * *How it is possible to end that meer Body should perceive that it doth ve?* The Weakness of our Apprehension I grant in ase: I confess as much as you please, that we cannot conceive solid, no, nor how an unsolid created Substance thinks; but this ness of our Apprehensions, reaches not the Power of God, whose ness is strongerthan any thing in Men.

† 1. Ans. P. 74.

* ibid.

r Argument from Abstraction, we have in this Questi- *If it may be in the Power of Matter to think, how it to be so impossible for such organized Bodies as the have, to enlarge their Ideas by Abstraction? Answ.* This seems oose, that I place Thinking within the natural Power of Matter. be your Meaning, my Lord, I neither say, nor suppose, that all has naturally in it a Faculty of Thinking, but the direct contrary. you mean that certain parcels of Matter, ordered by the Divine as seems fit to him, may be made capable of receiving from his otency the Faculty of Thinking; that indeed I say, and that being d, the Answer to your Question is easy, since if Omnipotency can hought to any solid Substance, it is not hard to conceive, that ay give that Faculty in an higher or lower Degree, as it pleases ho knows what Disposition of the Subject is suited to such a pari- ay or degree of Thinking.

* 1. Answ. p. 76.

her Argument to prove, That God cannot endure any parcel of with the Faculty of Thinking, is taken from those of mine, * where I shew, by what Connexion of e may come to know, That God is an Immaterial ce. They are these, "The Idea of an eternal actual, ing Being, with the Idea of Immateriality, by the intervention of Idea of Matter, and of its actual Division, Divisibility and want of ption, *&c.* From whence your Lordship thus argues,

* 1. Let. p. 139.

the want of Perception is owned to be so essential ter, that God is therefore concluded to be Immate-

† 2. Answ. P. 77.

rial.

rial. Answ. Perception and Knowledge in that one Eternal Being where it has its Source, 'tis visible must be essentially inseparable, i not Matter: How far this makes the *want of Perception an essential Property of Matter*, I will not dispute; it suffices that it shews, That Perception is not an essential Property of Matter; and therefore Matter cannot be that eternal original Being, to which Perception and Knowledge is essential. Matter, I say, naturally is without Perception: *Ergo*, says your Lordship, *want of Perception is an essential Property of Matter, and God does not change the essential Properties of things, their Nature remaining.* From whence you infer, That God cannot bestow on any parcel of Matter (the Nature of Matter remaining) a Faculty of Thinking. If the Rules of Logick since my days be not changed, I may safely deny this Consequence. For an Argument that runs thus, *God does not*; *Ergo*, he cannot, I was taught when I came first to the University, would not hold. For I never said God *did*. But * "That I see no Contradiction in it,

* B. 4. C. 3. § 6. "that he should, if he pleased, to give some Systems of "senseless Matter, a Faculty of Thinking; and I know no Body, before *Des Cartes*, that ever pretended to shew that there was any Contradiction in it. So that at worst, my not being able to see in Matter any such Incapacity, as makes it impossible for Omnipotency to bestow on it a Faculty of Thinking, makes me opposite only to the Cartesians. For as far as I have seen or heard, the Fathers of the Christian Church never pretended to demonstrate that Matter, was incapable to receive a Power of Sensation, Perception and Thinking, from the Hand of the omnipotent Creator. Let us therefore, if you please, suppose the Form of your Argumentation right, and that your Lordship means, *God cannot*: And then if your Argument be good, it proves, That God could not give to *Balaam*'s Ass a Power to speak to his Master as he did, for the want of rational Discourse, being natural to that Species, 'tis but for your Lordship to call it an *Essential Property*, and then God cannot change the *Essential Properties of things, their Nature remaining*: Whereby it is proved, That God cannot with all his Omnipotency, give to an Ass a Power to speak as *Balaam*'s did.

† 1. Ans. p. 78. You say, † my Lord, *you do not set Bounds to God's Omnipotency. For he may if he please change a Body into an Immaterial Substance*, i. e. take away from a Substance the Solidity which it had before, and which made it Matter, and then give it a Faculty of thinking which it had not before, and which makes it a Spirit, the same Substance *remaining*. For if the same Substance remains not, *Body*, is not *changed into an immaterial Substance*. But the solid Substance and all belonging to it is Annihilated, and an Immaterial Substance Created, which is not change of one thing into another, but the destroying of one, and making another *de novo*. In this change therefore of a Body or Material Substance into an Immaterial, let us observe those distinct Considerations.

First, you say, *God may if He pleases* take away from a solid Substance Solidity, which is that which makes it a Material Substance or *Body*; and may

ake it *an Immaterial Substance*, i. e. a Substance without Solidity. s Privation of one Quality gives it not another; the bare taking lower or less Noble Quality does not give it an Higher or Nobler; ust be the Gift of God. For the bare Privation of one, and a meaner y cannot be the Position of an Higher and better: unless any one y, that Cogitation, or the Power of thinking, results from the Na- Substance it self; which if it do, then wherever there is Substance, nust be Cogitation, or a Power of thinking. Here then, upon your ip's own Principles is an *Immaterial Substance* without the Faculty nking.

he next place, you will not deny, but God may give to this Substance, prived of Solidity, a Faculty of thinking; for you suppose it made e of that by being made Immaterial, whereby you allow, that the material Substance may be sometimes wholly Incogitative, or without r of thinking, and at other times perfectly Cogitative, or indued Power of thinking.

her, you will not deny, but God can give it Solidity and make it l again. For I conclude it will not be denied, that God can make , what it was before. Now I crave leave to ask your Lordship, why ving given to this Substance the Faculty of thinking after Solidity en from it, cannot restore to it Solidity again, without taking away culty of thinking. When you have resolved this my Lord, you will oved it impossible for God's Omnipotence to give to a Solid Substance ty of thinking; but till then, not having proved it impossible, and yet g that God can do it, is to deny that he can do, what is in it self possi- hich as I humbly conceive is visibly *to set Bounds to mnipotency*, though you say here, † *you do not set* † 1. Ans. p. 78. *s to God's Omnipotency*,

should imitate your Lordship's way of Writing, I should not omit g in *Epicurus* here, and take notice that this was his Way, *Deum ponere, re tollere.* And then add, that *I am certain you do not think oted the great ends of Religion and Morality.* For 'tis with such and Kind Insinuations, as these, that you bring in *bbes*, † and *Spinosa* * into your Discourse here about † 1. Ans. eing able, if he please, to give to some parcels of p. 55. ordered as he thinks fit, a Faculty of thinking. Nei- * Ib. p. 79. those Authors having, as appears by any Passages ng out of them, said any thing to this Question, nor having, as it any other business here, but by their Names skilfully to give that ter to my Book, with which you would recommend it to the

tend not to enquire what measure of Zeal, nor for what, guides your ip's Pen in such a way of Writing, as yours has all along been with nly I cannot but consider, what Reputation it would give to the gs of the Fathers of the Church, if they should think Truth required, igion allowed them to imitate such Patterns. But God be thanked e those amongst them who do not admire such ways of managing the

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Cauſe of Truth or Religion. They being ſenſible, that if every one, who believes or can pretend he has Truth on his ſide, is thereby Authorized without proof, to inſinuate, what ever may ſerve to prejudice Mens Minds againſt the other ſide, there will be great ravage made on Charity and Practice, without any gain to Truth or Knowledge. And that the Liberties frequently taken by Diſputants to do ſo, may have been the cauſe that the World in all Ages has received ſo much harm, and ſo little Advantage from Controverſies in Religion.

Theſe are the Arguments which your Lordſhip has brought to confute one ſaying in my Book, by other Paſſages in it, which therefore being all but *Argumenta ad Hominem*, if they did prove what they do not, are of no other uſe, than to gain a Victory over me, a thing methinks ſo much beneath your Lordſhip, that it does not deſerve one of your Pages. The Queſtion is, whether God can, if he pleaſes, beſtow on any pacel of Matter ordered as he thinks fit, a Faculty of Perception and Thinking. You ſay, * *You look upon a Miſtake herein to be of dangerous Conſequence, as to the great ends of Religion and Morality.* If this be ſo, my Lord, I think one may well wonder, why your Lordſhip has brought no Arguments to Eſtabliſh the Truth it ſelf, which *You look on to be of ſuch dangerous Conſequence to be miſtaken in*; but have ſpent ſo many Pages only in a *Perſonal Matter* in endeavouring to ſhew, That I had Inconſiſtences in my Book, which if any ſuch thing had been ſhewed, the Queſtion would be ſtill as far from being decided, and the danger of miſtaking about it as little prevented, as if nothing of all this had been ſaid. If therefore your Lordſhip's Care of the *great ends of Religion and Morality* have made *You think it neceſſary* to clear this Queſtion, the World has reaſon to conclude there is little to be ſaid againſt that Propoſition, which is to be found in my Book concerning the Poſſibility, that ſome parcels of Matter might be ſo ordered by Omnipotence, as to be endued with a faculty of Thinking, if God ſo pleaſed, ſince your Lordſhip's Concern for the *promoting the great ends of Religion and Morality*, has not enabled you to produce one Argument againſt a Propoſition, *that you think of ſo dangerous Conſequence to them.*

* 1. Anſ. p. 79.

And here I crave leave to obſerve, That though in your Title Page you promiſe to prove; that my *Notion of Ideas is inconſiſtent with it ſelf*, (which if it were, it could hardly be proved to be inconſiſtent with any thing elſe,) *and with the Articles of the Chriſtian Faith*; Yet your Attempts all along have been to prove me in ſome Paſſages of my Book inconſiſtent with my ſelf, without having ſhewn any Propoſition in my Book inconſiſtent with any *Article of the Chriſtian Faith.*

I think, your Lordſhip has indeed made uſe of one Argument of your own: But it is ſuch an one, that I confeſs I do not ſee how it is apt much to promote Religion, eſpecially the Chriſtian Religion founded on Revelation. I ſhall ſet down your Lordſhip's Words, that they may be conſidered, you ſay: * *That you are of Opinion, that the great Ends of Religion and Morality are beſt ſecured by the Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul from its Nature and Properties*

* 1. Anſ. p. 54, 55.

rties; and which you think proves it immaterial. Your Lordſhip does not on whether God can give Immortality, to a Material Subſtance; but ry, it takes of *very much from the Evidence of Immortality, if it depend y upon God's giving that, which of its own Nature it is apable of,* &c. So likewiſe you ſay, † *If a Man cannot be in, but that Matter may think (as I affirm) then what be- of the Soul's Immateriality (and conſequently Immorta- from its Operation? But for all this, ſay I,* his aſſurance of Faith re- on its own Baſis. *Now you appeal to any Man of Sence, whether the find- he uncertainty of his own Principles which he went upon in point of n, doth not weaken the Credibility of theſe fundamental Articles, when are conſidered purely as Matters of Faith? For before there was a natu- redibility in them on the account of Reaſon; but by going on wrong ds of Certainty, all that is loſt; and inſtead of being Certain, he is doubtful than ever. And if the Evidence of Faith falls ſo much ſhort t of Reaſon, it muſt needs have leſs effect upon Mens Minds, when the rviency of Reaſon is taken away; as it muſt be when the grounds of inty by Reaſon are vaniſhed. Is it at all probable, That he who finds eaſon deceive him in ſuch Fundamental Points, ſhould have his Faith firm and unmoveable on the account of Revelation? For in Matters of lation, there muſt be ſome Antecedent Principles ſuppoſed before we can ve any thing on the Account of it.*

† 2. Anſ. p. 58.

ore to the ſame purpoſe we have ſome Paſſages farther, e from ſome of my Words, your Lordſhip ſays, * *You t but obſerve, That we have no Certainty upon my grounds, Self-conſciouſneſs depends upon an individual Immaterial Subſtance, onſequently that a Material Subſtance may, according to my Principles, Self-conſciouſneſs in it; at leaſt that I am not certain of the contrary. eupon your Lordſhip bids me conſider, whether this doth not a little affect hole Article of the Reſurrection?* What does all this tend to? But to the World believe, that I have *leſſened the Credibility* of the Immorta- f the Soul and the Reſurrection, by ſaying, That though it be moſt highly ble, that the Soul is Immaterial, yet upon my Principles it cannot be de- trated; becauſe it is not impoſſible to God's Omnipotency, if he pleaſes to w upon ſome parcels of Matter diſpoſed as he ſees fit, a Faculty of thinking. is your Accuſation of my *leſſening the Credibility* of theſe Articles of is founded on this, That the Article of the Immortality of the Soul abates Credibility, if it be allowed, That its Immateriality (which its he ſup- Proof from Reaſon and Philoſophy of its Immortality) cannot be de- trated from natural Reaſon: Which Argument of your Lordſhip's bot- as I humbly conceive, on this, That Divine Revelation abates of its *bility* in all thoſe Articles it propoſes proportionably, as Humane Rea- ails to ſupport the Teſtimony of God. And all that your Lordſhip in Paſſages has ſaid, when Examined, will I ſuppoſe be found to import nuch, *viz.* Does God promiſe any thing to Mankind to be believed? very fit and credible to be believed, if Reaſon can demonſtrate it to be But if Humane Reaſon comes ſhort in the Caſe, and cannot make

* Ib. p. 35.

it out, its *Credibility* is thereby *leſſened*; which is in effect to ſay, That the Veracity of God is not a firm and ſure Foundation of Faith to rely upon, without the concurrent Teſtimony of Reaſon, *i. e.* with Reverence be it ſpoken, God is not to be believed on his own Word, unleſs what he reveals be in it ſelf credible, and might be belived without him.

If this be a way to promote Religion, the Chriſtian Religion in all its Articles, I am not ſorry, that it is not a way to be found in any of my Writings, for I imagine any thing like this would, (and I ſhould think deſerv'd) to have other Titles than bare *Scepticiſm* beſtowed upon it, and would have raiſed no ſmall Out-cry againſt any one, who is not to be ſuppoſed to be in the right in all that ſays, and ſo may ſecurely ſay what he pleaſes. Such as I, the *Prophanum Vulgus*, who take too much upon us, if we would examine, have nothing to do but to hearken and believe, tho' what he ſaid ſhould ſubvert the very Foundations of the Chriſtian Faith.

What I have above obſerved, is ſo viſibly contained in your Lordſhip's Argument, That when I met with it in your Anſwer to my firſt Letter, it ſeem'd ſo ſtrange from a Man of your Lordſhip's Character, and in a Diſpute in defence of the Doctrine of the Trinity, that I could hardly perſwade my ſelf, but it was a ſlip of your Pen: But when I found it in your ſecond Letter * made uſe of again, and ſeriouſly enlarged as an Argument of Weight to be inſiſted upon, I was convinced, that it was a Principle, that you heartily embraced, how little favourable ſoever it was to the Articles of the Chriſtian Religion, and particularly thoſe which you undertook to defend.

* 2 Anſ. p. 28, & 29.

I deſire my Reader to peruſe the Paſſages as they ſtand in your Letters themſelves, and ſee whether what you ſay in them does not amount to this, That a Revelation from God is more or leſs credible according as it has a ſtronger or weaker Confirmation from Humane Reaſon. For,

1. Your Lordſhip ſays, † *You do not queſtion whether God can give Immortality to a material Subſtance; but you ſay it* takes off very much *from the evidence of Immortality, if it depends wholly upon God's giving that which of its own Nature it is not capable of.*

† 1 Anſ. p. 55.

To which I reply, any ones not being able to demonſtrate the Soul to be Immaterial, *takes off* not *very much*, nor at all from the *evidence of its Immortality*, if God has revealed, that it ſhall be Immortal, becauſe the Veracity of God is a Demonſtration of the Truth of what he has revealed, and the want of another Demonſtration of a Propoſition, that is demonſtratively true, takes not off from the Evidence of it. For where there is a clear Demonſtration, there is as much Evidence as any Truth can have, that is not Self-evident. God has revealed that the Souls of Men ſhall live for ever. But, ſays your Lordſhip, from this *Evidence it* takes off *very much if it depends wholly upon God's giving that, of its own Nature it is not capable of.* i. e. The Revelation and Teſtimony of God loſes much of its Evidence, if this depends wholly upon the good Pleaſure of God, and cannot not be demonſtratively made out by natural Reaſon, that the Soul is immaterial, and conſequently in its own Nature immortal. For that is all that here is or can

be

ant by these Words, *which of its own Nature it is not capable of*, to make to the purpose. For the whole of your Lordship's Discourse here, is ove, That the Soul cannot be material, because then the Evidence of ng immortal would be *very much lessened*. Which is to say, That 'tis credible upon divine Revelation, that a material Substance should be rtal, as an immaterial; or which is all one, That God is not equally believed, when he declares, that a material Substance shall be immor- when he declares, that an immaterial shall be so, because the Immor- of a material Substance, cannot be demonstrated from natural Reason. us try this Rule of your Lordship's a little farther. God had re- l, that the Bodies Men shall have after the Resurrection, as well as Souls, shall live to Eternity. Does your Lordship believe the eter- ife of the one of these, more than of the other, because you think an prove it of one of them by natural Reason, and of the other not? n any one who admits of divine Revelation in the Case, doubt of one of more than the other? Or think this Proposition less credibile, the Bo- Men, after the Resurrection, shall live for ever; than this, That the of Men shall, after the Resurrection, live for ever? For that he must he thinks either of them is less credible than the other. If this be eason is to be consulted, how far God is to be believed, and the credit ine Testimony, must receive its force from the Evidence of Reason; has evidently taken away the credibility of divine Revelation, in all su- ural Truths, wherein the Evidence of Reason fails. And how much such ciple as this tends to the support of the Doctrine of the Trinity, or the oting the Christian Religion, I shall leave it to your Lordship to consider. m not so well read in *Hobbes* or *Spinoza*, as to be able to say, what their Opinions in this Matter. But possibly there be those, who will your Lordship's Authority of more use to them in the Case, than those decried Names: And be glad to find your Lordship a Patron of the *es of Reason*, so little to the Advantage of the *Oracles* of Divine Reve- . This at least, I think, may be subjoined to the Words bottom of the next Page, † That *those who have about* to lessen the Credibility of Articles of Faith, evidently they do, who say they are less credible, because they cannot ide out demonstratively by Natural Reason, have not been thought to e several of the Articles of the Christian Faith, especially those of the *ty*, *Incarnation*, and *Resurrection* of the Body, which are those upon count of which I am brought by your Lordship into this Dispute.

† 1 Ans. p. 65.

hall not trouble the Reader with your Lordship's Endeavours in the ving Words, to prove, That if the Soul be not an immaterial Sub- e, it can be *nothing but Life*; your very first Words visibly confuting hat you alledge to that purpose. They are, * *If oul be a material Substance, it is really nothing but* ; which is to say, That if the Soul be really a *Sub- e*, it is not really a *Substance*, but *really nothing* else n affection of a Substance; for the Life, whether of a material or im- rial Substance, is not the Substance it self, but an affection of it.

* 1 Ans. p. 55.

2. You

2. You say, * *Although we think the separate State of the Soul after Death, is sufficiently revealed in the Scripture; yet it creates a great difficulty in understanding it, if the Soul be nothing but Life, or a material Substance, which must be dissolved when Life is ended. For if the Soul be a material Substance, it must be made up, as others are, of the Cohesion of solid and separate Parts, how minute and inviſible soever they be. And what is it which should keep them together, when Life is gone? So that it is no easy matter to give an Account,* how *the Soul should be capable of Immortality, unless it be an immaterial Substance; and then we know the Solution and Texture of Bodies cannot reach the Soul, being of a different Nature.*

* 1 Anſ. p. 57.

Let it be as hard *a matter*, as it will, *to give an Account what it is, that should keep the Parts of a material Soul together*, after it is separated from the Body; yet it will be always as easy to give an Account of it, as to *Account what it is which shall keep together* a material and immaterial Substance. And yet the Difficulty *that* there is *to give an Account of that*, I hope does not, with your Lordship, *weaken the Credibility* of the inseparable Union of Soul and Body to Eternity: And I perswade my self, that *the Men of Sense*, to whom your Lordship *appeals* in the Case, do not, find their belief of this *Fundamental Point*, much *weakened* by that difficulty. I thought heretofore (and by your Lordship's Permission, would think so still) that the Union of Parts of Matter, one with another, is as much in the Hands of God, as the Union of a material and immaterial Substance; and that is does not *take off very much*, or at all, *from the Evidence of Immortality*, which depends on that Union, that *it is no easy matter to give an Account what it is that should keep them together*: Though its *depending wholly upon the Gift and good Pleasure of God*, where the manner *creates great difficulty in the Understanding*, and our Reason cannot discover in the *Nature* of things, *how* it is, be that which your Lordship so positively *says lessens the Credibility of the Fundamental Articles of the Resurrection and Immortality.*

But, my Lord, to remove this Objection a little, and to shew of how small Force it is even with your self; give me leave to presume, That your Lordship as firmly believes the Immortality of the Body after the Resurrection, as any other Article of Faith: If so, then it being *no easy Matter to give an Account, what it is that shall keep together* the Parts of a material Soul, to one that believes it is material, can no more *weaken the Credibility* of its Immortality, than the like difficulty *weakens the Credibility* of the Immortality of the Body. For when your Lordship shall find it *an easie Matter to give an Account, what* it is besides the good Pleasure of God, *which shall keep together* the Parts of our material Bodies to Eternity, or even Soul and Body; I doubt not but any one, who shall think the Soul material, will also find it as *easie to give an Account, what it is that* shall *keep* those Parts of Matter also *together* to Eternity.

Were it not that the Warmth of Controversy is apt to make Men so far forget, as to take up those Principles themselves (when they will serve their turn) which they have highly condemned in others, I should wonder to find

your

ordſhip to argue, that becauſe it is a difficulty to *underſtand what keep together the minute Parts of a material Soul, when Life is gone*; cauſe *it is not an eaſie matter to give an Account* how *the Soul ſhould ble of Immortality, unleſs it be an immaterial Subſtance*: Therefore t ſo credible as if it *were eaſy to give an Account* by Natural Reaſon, *could be.* For to this it is, that all this your Diſcourſe tends as is by what is already ſet down out of Page *55*; and will be more fully ut by what your Lordſhip ſays in other places, though there needs Proofs, ſince it would all be nothing againſt me in any other Senſe. ought your Lordſhip had in other places aſſerted, and inſiſted on this That no part of Divine Revelation was the leſs to be believed, be- he thing it ſelf *created great difficulty in the Underſtanding*, and the r of it was hard to be explained; *and it was no eaſie matter to give ount* how it was. This, as I take it, your Lordſhip condemned in as a very unreaſonable Principle, and ſuch as would ſubvert all the s of the Chriſtian Religion, that were mere matters of Faith, as I t will: And is it poſſible, that you ſhould make uſe of it here your gainſt the Article of *Life and Immortality*, that Chriſt hath brought t through the Goſpel, and neither was, nor could be made out by l Reaſon without Revelation? But you will ſay, you ſpeak only of ul; and your Words are, That *it is no eaſy matter to give an Ac- how the Soul ſhould be capable of Immortality, unleſs it be an imma- Subſtance.* I grant it; but crave leave to ſay, That there is not e of thoſe Difficulties, that are, or can be raiſed about the manner material Soul can be immortal, which do not as well reach the Im- ity of the Body.

if it were not ſo, I am ſure this Principle of your Lordſhip's would ther Articles of Faith, wherein our natural Reaſon finds it not ſo give an Account *how* thoſe Myſteries are: And which therefore, ng to your Principles, muſt be leſs *credible*, than other Articles, *reate leſs difficulty to the Underſtanding.* For your ip ſays, * That *you appeal to any Man of Senſe,* * 2 Anſ. *r* to a Man who thought by his Principles, he could p. 28. atural Grounds demonſtrate the Immortality of the he *finding the uncertainty of thoſe Principles he went upon in point of*, i. e. the finding he could not certainly prove it by natural Reaſon, *ot weaken the credibility of that fundamental Article, when it is red purely as a Matter of Faith?* Which in effect, I humbly con- amounts to this, That a Propoſition divinely revealed, that cannot ved by natural Reaſon, is leſs credible than one that can: Which to me to come very little ſhort of this, with due reverence be it , That God is leſs to be believed when he affirms a Propoſition, nnot be proved by natural Reaſon, than when he propoſes what can ved by it. The direct contrary to which is my Opi- though you endeavour to make good, by theſe fol- † 2 Anſ. Words, † *If the evidence of Faith falls ſo much* p. 29. *f that of Reaſon, it muſt needs have leſs effect upon*

Mens Minds, when the Subserviency of Reason is taken away; as it must be when the Grounds of Certainty by Reason are vanished. Is it at all probable, that he who finds his Reason deceive him in such fundamental Points, should have his Faith stand firm and unmoveable on the Account of Revelation? Than which I think there are hardly plainer Words to be found out to declare, that the Credibility of God's Testimony depends on the natural Evidence or Probability of the things we receive from Revelation; and rises and falls with it: And that the Truths of God, or the Articles of meer Faith, lose so much of their *Credibility*, as they want Proof from Reason: Which if true, Revelation may come to have no *Credibility* at all. For if in this present Case, the Credibility of this Proposition, The Souls of Men shall live for ever, revealed in Scripture, be lessened by confessing it cannot be demonstratively proved from Reason; though it be asserted to be most highly probable: Must not by the same Rule its Credibility dwindle away to nothing, if natural Reason should not be able to make it out to be so much as probable; or should place the probability from natural Principles on the other side? For if meer want of Demonstration *lessens the Credibility* of any Proposition divinely revealed, must not want of Probability, or contrary Probability from natural Reason, quite take away its *Credibility?* Here at last it must end, if in any one Case the Veracity of God, and the *Credibility* of the Truths we receive from him by Revelation, be subjected to the Verdicts of Humane Reason, and be allowed to receive any Accession or Diminution from other Proofs, or want of other Proofs of its Certainty or Probability.

If this be your Lordship's way to promote Religion or defend its Articles, I know not what Argument the greatest Enemies of it could use more effectual for the Subversion of those you have undertaken to defend, this being to resolve all Revelation perfectly and purely into Natural Reason, or bound its *Credibility* by that, and leave no Room for Faith in other things than what can be accounted for by Natural Reason without Revelation.

† 1 Ans. p. 48. —54. * B. 2. C. 23.

Your Lordship † insists much upon it, as if I had contradicted what I had said in my *Essay*, * by saying, That upon my Principles it cannot be demonstratively proved, that it is an immaterial Substance in us that Thinks, however probable it be. He that will be at the Pains to read that Chapter of mine, and consider it, will find, that my Business there was to shew, that it was no harder to conceive an immaterial than a material Substance; and that from the Ideas of Thought, and and a Power of moving of Matter, which we experienced in our selves, (Ideas originally not belonging to Matter as Matter) there was no more difficulty to conclude there was an immaterial Substance in us, than that we had material Parts. These Ideas of Thinking, and Power of moving of Matter, I in another place shew'd did demonstratively lead us to the certain knowledge of the existence of an immaterial Thinking Being, in whom we have the Idea of Spirit in the strictest Sense; in which Sense I also applied it to the Soul, in that 23d Ch. of my *Essay*, the easily conceivable Possibility, nay great Probability that the thinking Substance in

us

mmaterial, giving me ſufficient ground for it: In which Senſe I hink I may ſafely attribute it to the thinking Subſtance in us, till Lordſhip ſhall have better proved from my Words, That it is impoſ- ſhould be immaterial. For I only ſay, That it is impoſſible, *i. e.* es no Contradiction, that God the omnipotent immaterial Spirit , if he pleaſes, give to ſome parcels of Matter, diſpoſed as he fit, a Power of Thinking and Moving: Which parcels of Mat- endued with a Power of Thinking and Motion, might properly be Spirits, in contradiſtinction to unthinking Matter. In all which, I ie, there is no manner of Contradiction.

tified my uſe of the Word *Spirit* in that Senſe from the Authorities *ero* and *Virgil*, applying the Latin Word *Spiritus*, from whence is derived, to the Soul as a thinking Thing, without excluding Ma- y out of it. To which your Lordſhip replies, *

Cicero in his *Tuſculan* Queſtions, *ſuppoſes the Soul not a finer ſort of Body, but of a different Nature from dy.——That he calls the Body the Priſon of the Soul.*

* 1 Anſ. p. 58.---60.

nd ſays, *That a wiſe Man's Buſineſs is to draw off his Soul from his*

And then your Lordſhip concludes, as is uſual, with a Queſtion, *Is ible now to think ſo great a Man look'd on the Soul but as a modifi- of the Body, which muſt be at an end with Life?* Anſw. No; it is ible that a Man of ſo good Senſe as *Tully*, when he uſes the Word or *Body* for the groſs and viſible parts of a Man, which he acknow- to be mortal, ſhould *look on the Soul to be a Modification of that Body*; Diſcourſe wherein he was endeavouring to perſuade another, that it mortal. It is to be acknowledg'd that truly *great Men*, ſuch as he re not wont ſo manifeſtly to contradict themſelves. He had there- Thought concerning the *Modification of the Body* of Man in the He was not ſuch a Trifler as to examine, whether the Modification Body of a Man was immortal, when that Body it ſelf was mortal: erefore that which he reports as *Dicæarchus*'s Opinion, he diſmiſſes beginning without any more ado, *c.* 11. But *Cicero*'s was a direct, nd ſenſible Enquiry, *viz.* What the Soul was, to ſee whether from he could diſcover its Immortality? But in all that Diſcourſe in his ook of *Tuſculan Queſtions*, where he lays out ſo much of his Reading aſon, there is not one Syllable ſhewing the leaſt Thought, that the Soul immaterial Subſtance; but many Things directly to the contrary: eed (1.) he ſhuts out the *Body* taken, in the Senſe s * *Corpus* all-a-long, for the ſenſible organical parts an; and is poſitive that is not the Soul: And *Body* Senſe, taken for the Humane Body, he calls the *Priſon of the Soul*; ys a wiſe Man, inſtancing in *Socrates* and *Cato*, is glad of a fair op- ity to get out of it. But he no where ſays any ſuch thing of Matter: ls not Matter in general the Priſon of the Soul, nor talks a Word of be- parate from it.

* Ch. 19, 22, 30, 31, &c.

He concludes, that the Soul is not like other Things here below, made a Compoſition of the Elements, *chap.* 27.

3. He excludes the two groſs Elements, Earth and Water, from being the Soul, *chap.* 26.

So far he is clear and poſitive: But beyond this he is uncertain; beyond this he could not get. For in ſome Places he ſpeaks doubtfully, whether the Soul be not Air, or Fire. *Anima ſit animus igniſve neſcio*, c. 25. And therefore he agrees with *Panætius*, that, if it be at all Elementary, it is, as he calls it, *Inflammata Anima, inflamed Air*; and for this he gives ſeveral Reaſons, *c.* 18, 19. And though he thinks it to be of a *peculiar Nature of its own*, yet he is ſo far from thinking it immaterial, that he ſays, *c.* 19. That the admitting it to be of an *aerial* or *igneous Nature*, would not be inconſiſtent with any thing he had ſaid.

That which he ſeems moſt to encline to is, That the Soul was not at all Elementary, but was of the ſame Subſtance with the Heavens; which *Ariſtotle*, to diſtinguiſh from the four Elements and the changeable Bodies here below, which he ſuppoſed made up of them, called *Quinta Eſſentia*. That this was *Tully*'s Opinion is in plain from theſe Words, *Ergo*, Animus *qui ut ego dico, divinus eſt, ut Euripides audet dicere Deus; & quidem ſi Deus, aut anima aut ignis eſt, idem eſt animus hominis. Nam ut illa naturæ cæleſtis & terra vacat & humore; ſic utriuſque harum rerum humanus animus eſt expiri. Sin autem eſt quinta quædam natura ab Ariſtotele inducta; primum hæc & deorum eſt & animorum. Hanc nos ſententiam ſecuti, his ipſis verbis in Conſolatione hæc expreſſimus*, ch. 26. And then he goes on, *c.* 27. to repeat thoſe his own Words, which your Lordſhip has quoted out of him, wherein he had affirmed, in his Treatiſe *de Conſolatione*, the Soul not to have its Original from the Earth, or mixed or made of any Thing earthly; but had ſaid, *Singularis eſt igitur quædam natura & vis animi ſejuncta ab his uſitatis notiſque naturis*: Whereby, he tells us, he meant nothing but *Ariſtotle*'s *Quinta Eſſentia*; which being unmixed, being that of which the Gods and Souls conſiſted, he calls it *divinum cæleſte*, and concludes it eternal, it being as he ſpeaks, *Sejuncta ab omni mortali concretione.* From which it is clear, That in all his Enquiry about the Subſtance of the Soul, his Thoughts went not beyond the four Elements, or *Ariſtotle*'s *Quinta Eſſentia* to look for it. In all which there is nothing of Immateriality, but quite the contrary.

He was willing to believe (as good and wiſe Men have always been) that the Soul was immortal; but for that 'tis plain he never thought of its Immateriality, but as the Eaſtern People do who believe the Soul to be immortal, but have nevertheleſs no Thought, no Conception of its Immateriality.

* *Loubère du Royaume de Siam*, T. 1. c. 19. §. 4.

It is remarkable what a very conſiderable and judicious Author * ſays in the Caſe. *No Opinion*, ſays he, *has been ſo univerſally received as that of the Immortality of the Soul: but its Immateriality is a Truth the knowledge whereof has not ſpread ſo far. And indeed it is extremely difficult to let into the Mind of a* Siamite, *the Idea of a pure Spirit. This the Miſſionaries, who have been longeſt among them, are poſitive in. All the Pagans of the Eaſt do truly believe, That there remains ſomething of a Man after his Death, which ſubſiſts independently and ſeparately from his Body.*

But

ey give Extenſion and Figure to that which remains, and attribute to the ſame Members, all the ſame Subſtances, both ſolid and liquid, which odies are compoſed of. They only ſuppoſe that the Souls are of a Matter enough to eſcape being ſeen or handled. —— *Such were the* Shades *and anes of the* Greeks *and the* Romans. *And 'tis by theſe Figures of the anſwerable to thoſe of the Bodies, that* Virgil *ſuppoſed* Æneas *knew* irus, Dido *and* Anchiſes *in the other World.*

is Gentleman was not a Man that travelled into thoſe Parts for his Plea- and to have the Opportunity to tell ſtrange Stories, collected by e, when he returned: But one choſen for the purpoſe (and he ſeems well for the purpoſe) to inquire into the Singularities of *Siam*. And he has l acquitted himſelf of the Commiſſion, which his Epiſtle Dedicatory tells had, to inform himſelf exactly of what was moſt remarkable there, that e but an Account of other Countries of the Eaſt, as he has given us of this om, which he was an Envoy to, we ſhould be much better acquainted than e, with the Manners, Notions and Religions of that part of the World, ted by civiliz'd Nations, who want neither good Senſe nor Acuteneſs aſon, though not caſt into the Mould of the Logick and Philoſophy of hools.

t, to return to *Cicero*. 'Tis plain, That in his Enquiries about the Soul houghts went not at all beyond Matter. Thus the Expreſſions that from him in ſeveral places of this Book, evidently ſhew. For Exam- That the Souls of excellent Men and Women aſcended into Heaven; of s that they remained here on Earth, *c.* 12. That the Soul is hot and s the Body: That at its leaving the Body it penetrates and divides, and s through our thick, cloudy, moiſt Air: That it ſtops in the Region e, and aſcends no farther, the equality of Warmth and Weight making ts proper place, where it is nouriſhed and ſuſtained with the ſame s, wherewith the Stars are nouriſhed and ſuſtained, and that by the enience of its Neighbourhood it ſhall there have a clearer View and ful- owledge of the Heavenly Bodies, *c.* 19. That the Soul alſo from this ſhall have a pleaſant and fairer Proſpect of the Globe of the Earth, ſpoſition of whoſe Parts will then lie before it in one View, *c.* 20. That ard to determine what Conformation, Size and Place, the Soul has in dy: That it is to ſubtil to be ſeen: That it is in the Humane Body as ouſe or a Veſſel, or a Receptacle, *c.* 22. All which are Expreſſions ufficiently evidence, that he who uſed them had not in his Mind ſepa- Materiality from the Idea of the Soul.

ay perhaps be replied, That a great part of this which we find in *chap.* ſaid upon the Principles of thoſe who would have the Soul to be *Anima mata, inflamed Air.* I grant it. But it is alſo to be obſerved, That in 9th, and the two following Chapters, he does not only not deny, but dmits, That ſo material a thing as inflamed Air may think.

e Truth of the Caſe in ſhort is this; *Cicero* was willing to believe the mmortal, but when he ſought in the Nature of the Soul it ſelf ſomething bliſh this his Belief into a Certainty of it, he found himſelf at a Loſs. feſſed he knew not what the Soul was; but the not knowing what it was,

he argues, *c.* 2. was no Reason to conclude it was not. And thereupon he proceeds to the repetition of what he had said in his 6th Book *de Repub.* concerning the Soul. The Argument, which borrowed from *Plato*, he there makes use of, if it have any force in it, not only proves the Soul to be immortal, but more than, I think, your Lordship will allow to be true: For it proves it to be eternal, and without beginning as without end, *Neque nata certa est, & æterna est*, says he.

Indeed from the Faculties of the Soul he concludes right, That it is of *divine Original*: But as to the Substance of the Soul, he at the end of this Discourse concerning its Faculties, *c.* 25. as well as at the beginning of it *c.* 22. is not ashamed to own his Ignorance, what it is; *Anima sit animus, ignisve, nescio; nec me pudet ut istos, fateri nescive quod nesciam. Illud, si ulla alia de re obscura affirmare possum, sive anima, sive ignis sit animus, eum jurarem esse divinum*, c. 25. So that all the Certainty he could to attain to about the Soul, was, That he was confident there was something divine in it, *i. e.* there were Faculties in the Soul that could not result from the Nature of Matter, but must have their Original from a Divine Power; but yet those Qualities, as Divine as they were, be acknowledged might be placed in Breath or Fire, which your Lordship will not deny to be material Substances, So that all those divine Qualities, which he so much and justly extols in the Soul, led him not, as appears, so much as to any the least Thought of Immateriality. This is Demonstration, That he built them not upon an exclusion of Materiality out of the Soul; for he avowedly professes he does not know, but Breath or Fire might be this Thinking Thing in us; And in all his Considerations about the Substance of the Soul it self, he stuck in *Air* or *Fire*, or *Aristotle*'s *Quinta Essentia*; for beyond those 'tis evident he went not.

But with all his Proofs out of *Plato*, to whose Authority he defers so much, with all the Arguments his vast Reading and great Parts could furnish him with for the Immortality of the Soul, he was so little satisfied, so far from being certain, so far from any Thought that he had, or could Prove it, that he over and over again professes his Ignorance and Doubt of it. In the beginning he enumerates the several Opinions of the Philosophers, which he had well studied, about it: And then full of Uncertainty says, *Harum Sententiarum quæ vera sit, Deus aliquis videret, quæ veri simillima magna quæstio*, c. 11. And towards the latter end having gone them all over again; and one after another examin'd them, he professes himself still at a loss, not knowing on which to pitch, nor what to determine. *Mentis acies*, says he, *seipsam intuens nonnunquam hebescit*, ob eamque causam *contemplandi diligentiam omittimus. Itaque dubitans, circumspectans, hæsitans multa adversa reverens tanquam in rate in mari immense, nostra vehitur oratio*, c. 30. And to conclude this Argument, when the Person he introduces as discoursing with him, tells him he is resolved to keep firm to the Belief of the Immortality: *Tully* answers, c. 82. *Laudo id quidem, et si nihil animi oportet confidere; movemur enim sæpe aliquo acute concluso, labamus, mutamusque sententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus; in his est enim aliqua obscuritas.*

So unmoveable is that Truth delivered by the Spirit of Truth, That

though

the Light of Nature gave some obscure glimmering, some unhopes of a future State; yet Humane Reason could attain to Clear- Certainty about it, but that it was JESUS CHRIST alone d *brought Life and Immortality to light, through el* *. Tho' we are now told, That to own the ina- f natural Reason to bring *Immortality to Light*, h passes for the same, to own Principles upon which the Immate- of the Soul (and as 'tis urged consequently its Immortality) can- demonstratively proved, *does lessen the Belief of* this Article of ion, which JESUS CHRIST alone *has brought to Light*, and onsequently the Scripture assures us is established and made certain Revelation. This would not perhaps have seemed strange from those e justly complained of, for slighting the Revelation of the Gospel, refore would not be much regarded, if they should contradict so Text of Scripture, in favour of their all-sufficient Reason: But se the *Promoters of Scepticism and Infidelity, in an Age* so much d by your Lordship, may make of what comes from one of your great ty and Learning, may deserve your Consideration.

thus my Lord, I hope I have satisfied you concerning *Cicero*'s Opi- out the Soul in his first Book of *Tusculan* Questions; which, tho' believe, as your Lordship says *you are no stranger to*, yet I humbly e you have not shewn (and upon a careful perusal of that Treatise think I may boldly say you cannot shew) one Word in it, that ex- ny thing like a Notion in *Tully* of the Soul's Immateriality, or its immaterial Substance.

what you bring out of *Virgil* your Lordship * con- * 1. Anf. p. *That he no more than* Cicero *does me any kindness* 62, 63. *Matter, being both Assertors of the Soul's Immorta-*

ly Lord, were not the Question of the Soul's Immaterirality, ac- to Custom, changed here into that of its *Immortality*, which I s an Assertor of than either of them, *Cicero* and *Virgil*, do me all *kness* I desired of *them in this Matter*; and that was to shew, that ributed the Word *Spiritus* to the Soul of Man, without any thought mmateriality; and this the Verses you your self t of *Virgil*, † † Æneid. 4. 385.

Et cum frigida mors animæ deduxerit artus.
Omnibus, umbra locis adero, dabis improbe pœnas.

as well as those I quoted out of his 6th Book; and for this Monsieur here shall be my Witness in the Words above set down out of him; shews, that there be those amongst the Heathens of our days, as *Virgil* and others amongst the ancient *Greeks* and *Romans*, who he Souls or Ghosts of Men departed, did not die with the Body, thinking them to be perfectly immaterial; the lattter being much omprehensible to them than the former,

† 1. Anſ. p. 64. 65.

Your Lordſhip's † Anſwer concerning what is ſaid, *Eccleſ.* 13. turns wholly upon *Solomon*'s taking the Soul to be immortal, which was not what I queſtioned: All that I quoted that place for, was to ſhew, that *Spirit* in Engliſh might properly be applied to the Soul, without any Notion of its Immateriality, as רוח was by *Solomon*, which whether he thought the Souls of Men to be immaterial, does little appear in that Paſſage, where he ſpeaks of the Souls of Men and Beaſts together, as he does. But further, what I contended for, is evident from that place in that the Word *Spirit* is there applyed, by our Tranſlators, to the Souls of Beaſts, which your Lordſhip I think does not rank amongſt the immaterial, and conſequently immmortal *Spirits*, though they have Senſe and Spontaneous Motion.

† 1. Anſw. p. 65.

But you ſay, † *If the Soul be not of it ſelf a free thinking Subſtance, you do not ſee what Foundation there is in Nature for a day of Judgment. Anſwer.* Though the Heathen World did *not of* old, nor do to this day, *ſee a Foundation in Nature for a day of Judgment*: Yet in Revelation, if that will ſatisfy your Lordſhip, every one may *ſee a Foundation for a day of Judgment*, becauſe God has poſitively declared it; though God has not by that Revelation taught us, what the Subſtance of the Soul is; nor has any where ſaid, That *the Soul* of it ſelf *is a free* Agent. Whatſoever any created Subſtance is, it is not *of it ſelf*, but is by the good Pleaſure of its Creator: Whatever degrees of Perfection, it has it has from the bountiful Hand of its Maker. For it is true in a natural, as well as a ſpiritual Senſe, what St. *Paul* ſays, * *Not that we are ſufficient* of our ſelves *to think any thing* as of our ſelves, *but our ſufficiency is of God.*

* 2. Cor 3. 5.

But your Lordſhip, as I gueſs, by your following Words, would argue, That a material Subſtance cannot be a free Agent; whereby I ſuppoſe you only mean, that you cannot *ſee* or conceive how a ſolid Subſtance ſhould begin, ſtop, or change its own Motion. To which give me leave to anſwer, That when you can make it conceivable, how any created, finite, dependent Subſtance can move it ſelf, or alter or ſtop its own Motion, which it muſt to be *a free* Agent; I ſuppoſe you will find it no harder for God to beſtow this Power on a ſolid, than an unſolid created Subſtance. *Tully* in the place above quoted, † could not conceive this Power to be in any thing, but what was from Eternity; *Cum patet igitur æternum id eſſe quod ſeipſum moveat quis eſt qui hanc naturam animis eſſe tributam neget?* But though you cannot *ſee* how any created Subſtance, ſolid, or not ſolid, can be *a free* Agent, (I pardon me, my Lord, if I put in both, till your Lordſhip pleaſe to explain it of either, and ſhew the manner how either of them can, *of it ſelf*, move it ſelf or any thing elſe) yet I do not think, you will ſo far deny Men to be free Agents, from the difficulty there is to *ſee* how they are free Agents, as to doubt, whether *there be Foundation* enough *for a day of Judgment.*

† Tuſculan Quæſtion. L. 1. C. 23.

10; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our
n *Ideas*, without Revelation, to discover, whether Omnipo-
:y has not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed, a
ver to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to Matter
lisposed, a thinking immaterial Substance: It being, in re-
ct of our Notions, not much more remote from our Com-
nension to conceive, that GOD can, if he pleases, superadd
Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he should super-

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is not for me to judge how far your Lordship's Speculations reach: finding in my self nothing to be truer than what the *Solomon* tells me, * *As thou knowest not what is the of the Spirit, nor how the Bones do grow in the Womb r that is with Child; even so thou knowest not the ks of God who maketh all things.* I gratefully receive and rejoice in Light of Revelation, which sets me at rest in many things; the manner reof my poor Reason can by no means make out to me: Omnipotency, ow, can do any thing that contains in it no Contradiction; so that I ily believe whatever God has declared, though my Reason find Difficul- in it, which it cannot master. As in the present Case, God having re- ed that there shall be a day of Judgment, I think that *Foundation* e- gh, to conclude Men are *free* enough to be made answerable for their A- ns, and to receive according to what they have done, though how Man *free* Agent, surpass my Explication or Comprehension.

* Eccl. 11. 5.

n answer to the place I brought out of St. *Luke*, * your dship asks, † *Whether, from these Words of our Sa- r, it follows, that a Spirit is only an Appearance. I wer.* No, nor do I know who drew such an Inference n them: But it follows, that in *Apparitions* there is ething that appears, and that which appears is not wholly immaterial; yet this was properly called πνεῦμα, and was often looked upon by se, who called it πνεῦμα in Greek, and now call it *Spirit* in English, e the Ghost or Soul of one departed, which I humbly conceive justifies use of the Word *Spirit*, for a thinking Voluntary Agent, whether ma- al or immaterial.

* C. 24. v. 39.
† 1 Anf. p. 66.

Your Lordship says, ‡ *That I grant*, that it cannot n these Principles, be demonstrated, that the spiritual stance in us is immaterial: From whence you conclude, *t then my Grounds of Certainty from Ideas, are plainly given up.* This g a way of arguing, that you often make use of, I have often had Oc- on to consider it, and cannot after all see the force of this Argument. cknowledge that this or that Proposition cannot upon my Principles be nonstrated; *Ergo*, I grant this Proposition to be false, That Certainty fists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas. that is my ground of Certainty, and till that be given up, *my grounds Certainty* are not *given up*.

‡ 1 Anf. p. 67.

add

add to it another Substance, with a Faculty of Thinking; since we know not wherein Thinking consists, nor to what sort of Substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that Power, which cannot be in any created Being, but merely by the good Pleasure and Bounty of the Creator. For I see no Contradiction in it, that the first eternal thinking Being, should, if he pleased, give to certain Systems of created senseless Matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of Sense, Perception, and Thought: Though, as I think, I have proved, *Lib.* 4. *Ch.* 10. it is no less than a contradiction to suppose Matter (which is evidently in its own Nature void of Sense and Thought) should be that Eternal first thinking Being. What Certainty of Knowledge can any one have that some Perceptions, such as, *v.g.* Pleasure and Pain, should not be in some Bodies themselves, after a certain manner modified and moved, as well as that they should be in an immaterial Substance, upon the Motion of the parts of Body: as far as we can conceive being able only to strike and affect Body; and Motion, according to the utmost reach of our *Ideas*, being able to produce nothing but Motion; so that when we allow it to produce Pleasure or Pain, or the *Idea* of a Colour, or Sound, we are fain to quit our Reason, go beyond our *Ideas*, and attribute it wholly to the good Pleasure of our Maker. For since we must allow he has annexed Effects to Motion, which we can no way conceive Motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude, that he could not order them as well to be produced in a Subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a Subject we cannot conceive the Motion of Matter can any way operate upon? I say not this, that I would any way lessen the belief of the Soul's Immateriality; I am not here speaking of Probability, but Knowledge; and I think not only, that it becomes the Modesty of Philosophy, not to pronounce Magisterially, where we want that Evidence that can produce Knowledge; but also, that it is of use to us, to discern how far our Knowledge does reach; for the state we are at present in, not being that of Vision, we must, in many Things, content our selves with Faith and Probability: and in the present Question about the Immateriality of the Soul, if our Faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative Certainty, we need not think it strange. All the great Ends of Morality and Religion, are well enough secured, without Philosophical Proofs of the Soul's Immateriality; since it is evident, that he who made us at first begin to subsist here, sensible intelligent Beings, and for several years continued us in such

a ſtate, can and will reſtore us to the like ſtate of Senſi-
in another World, and make us capable there to receive
Retribution he has deſigned to Men, according to their Do-
in this Life. And therefore 'tis not of ſuch mighty neceſſity
etermine one way or t'other, as ſome over zealous for, or
nſt the Immateriality of the Soul, have been forward to make
World believe. Who, either on the one ſide, indulging too
n their Thoughts immerſed altogether in Matter, can allow
xiſtence to what is not material: Or, who on the other ſide,
ng not *Cogitation* within the natural Powers of Matter, ex-
ed over and over again, by the utmoſt Intention of Mind,
the confidence to conclude, that Omnipotency it ſelf, can-
ive Perception and Thought to a Subſtance which has the
ification of Solidity. He that conſiders how hardly Senſa-
is, in our Thoughts, reconcilable to extended Matter; or
ence to any thing that hath no Extenſion at all, will confeſs,
he is very far from certainly knowing what his Soul is.
a Point, which ſeems to me, to be put out of the reach of
Knowledge: And he who will give himſelf leave to conſider
y, and look into the dark and intricate part of each Hypo-
s, will ſcarce find his Reaſon able to determine him fixedly
or againſt the Soul's Materiality. Since on which ſide ſo-
he views it, either as an unextended Subſtance, or as a
ing extended Matter; the Difficulty to conceive either,
whilſt either alone is in his Thoughts, ſtill drive him to
ontrary ſide. An unfair way which ſome Men take with
ſelves: who becauſe of the unconceivableneſs of ſomething
find in one, throw themſelves violently into the contrary
otheſis, though altogether as unintelligle to an unbiaſſed
rſtanding. This ſerves, not only to ſhew the Weakneſs
the Scantineſs of our Knowledge, but the inſignificant
nph of ſuch ſort of Arguments, which, drawn from our
View, may ſatisfy us that we can find no certainty on one
f the Queſtion; but do not at all thereby help us to Truth,
nning into the oppoſite Opinion, which, on examination,
e found clogg'd with equal difficulties. For what Safety,
Advantage to any one is it, for the avoiding the ſeeming
rdities, and, to him, unſurmountable Rubs he meets with
e Opinion, to take refuge in the contrary, which is built
mething altogether as inexplicable, and as far remote from
mprehenſion? 'Tis paſt controverſy, that we have in us
hing that thinks, our very Doubts about what it is, con-
the certainty of its being, though we muſt content our-

ſelves

ſelves in the Ignorance of what kind of *Being* it is: And 'tis in vain to go about to be ſceptical in this, as it is unreaſonable in moſt other caſes to be poſitive againſt the being of any thing, becauſe we cannot comprehend its Nature. For I would fain know what Subſtance exiſts that has not ſomething in it, which manifeſtly baffles our Underſtandings. Other Spirits, who ſee and know the Nature and inward Conſtitution of things, how much muſt they exceed us in Knowledge? To which if we add larger Comprehenſion, which enables them at one Glance to ſee the Connexion and Agreement of very many *Ideas*, and readily ſupplies to them the intermediate Proofs, which we by ſingle and ſlow Steps, and long poring in the dark, hardly at laſt find out, and are often ready to forget one before we have hunted out another, we may gueſs at ſome part of the Happineſs of ſuperior ranks of Spirits, who have a quicker and more penetrating Sight, as well as a larger Field of Knowledge. But to return to the Argument in hand, our *Knowledge*, I ſay, is not only limited to the Paucity and Imperfections of the *Ideas* we have, and which we employ it about, but even comes ſhort of that too: But how far it reaches let us now enquire.

How far Our Knowledge reaches.

§. 7. The Affirmations or Negations we make concerning the *Ideas* we have, may, as I have before intimated in general, be reduced to theſe four ſorts, *viz.* Identity, Co-exiſtence, Relation, and real Exiſtence. I ſhall examine how far our Knowledge extends in each of theſe:

First, Our Knowledge of Identity and Diverſity, as far as our Ideas.

§. 8. *Firſt, As to Identity and Diverſity*, in this way of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas, or intuitive Knowledge is as far extended as our Ideas* themſelves: and there can be no *Idea* in the Mind, which it does not preſently, by an intuitive Knowledge, perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other.

Secondly, Of Co-exiſtence a very little way.

§. 9. *Secondly, As to* the ſecond ſort, which is the *Agreement, or Diſagreement* of our *Ideas in Co-exiſtence*, in this our Knowledge is very ſhort, though in this conſiſts the greateſt and moſt material part of our Knowledge concerning Subſtances. For our *Ideas* of the Species of Subſtances, being, as I have ſhewed, nothing but certain Collections of ſimple *Ideas* united in one Subject, and ſo co-exiſting together: *v. g.* Our *Ideas* of *Flame* is a Body hot, luminous, and moving upward; of *Gold*,

dy heavy to a certain degree, yellow, malleable, and fusi-
Theſe, or ſome ſuch complex *Ideas* as theſe in Mens
ls, do theſe two Names of the different Subſtances, *Flame*
Gold, ſtand for. When we would know any thing farther
erning theſe, or any other ſort of Subſtances, what do we
ire but what other Qualities, or Powers, theſe Subſtances,
, or have not? which is nothing elſe but to know, what
ſimple *Ideas* do, or do not co-exiſt with thoſe that make
iat complex *Idea*?

Becauſe the connexion between moſt ſimple Ideas *is unknown.*

10. This, how weighty and conſiderable a ſoever of Humane Science, is yet very narrow, ſcarce any at all. The Reaſon whereof is, the ſimple *Ideas* whereof our complex *Ideas* ibſtances, are made up, are, for the moſt ſuch as carry with them, in their own Na- no viſible neceſſary Connexion, or inconſiſtency with any ſimple *Ideas*, whoſe *co-exiſtence* with them we would in- our ſelves about.

Eſpecially of Secondary Qualities.

11. The *Ideas*, that our complex ones of ances are made up of, and about which our wledge, concerning Subſtances, is moſt em- d, are thoſe of their *ſecondary Qualities*; which iding all (as has been ſhewn) upon the primary Qualities eir minute and inſenſible parts; or if not upon them, upon hing yet more remote from our Comprehenſion, 'tis im- le we ſhould know, which have a neceſſary union or in- tency one with another: For not knowing the Root they from not knowing what ſize, figure, and texture of Parts are, on which depend and from which reſult thoſe Qualities n make our complex *Idea* of Gold, 'tis impoſſible we ſhould what other Qualities reſult from, or are incompatible the ſame Conſtitution of the inſenſible parts of *Gold*; and ſequently muſt always *co-exiſt* with that complex *Idea* we of it, or elſe are *inconſiſtent* with it.

Becauſe all connexion between any ſecondary and primary Qualities is indiſcoverable.

12. Beſides this Ignorance of the primary ties of the inſenſible Parts of Bodies, on which d all their ſecondary Qualities, there is yet er and more incurable part of Ignorance, n ſets us more remote from a certain Know- of the *Co-exiſtence*, or *Inco-exiſtence* (if I may) of different *Ideas* in the ſame Subject; and s, that there is no diſcoverable Connexion between any *ſe- y Quality, and thoſe primary Qualities* that it depends on.

§. 13.

§. 13. That the Size, Figure and Motion of one Body ſhould cauſe a Change in the Size, Figure and Motion of another Body, is not beyond our Conception; the ſeparation of the Parts of one Body, upon the intruſion of another; and the Change from Reſt to Motion, upon impulſe; theſe, and the like, ſeem to us to have ſome *Connexion* one with another. And if we knew theſe Qualities of Bodies, we might have reaſon to hope, we might be able to know a great deal more of theſe Operations of them one upon another: But our Minds not being able to diſcover any *Connexion* betwixt theſe primary Qualities of Bodies, and the Senſations that are produced in us by them, we can never be able to eſtabliſh certain and undoubted Rules, of the Conſequence or *Co-exiſtence* of any ſecondary Qualities, though we could diſcover the Size, Figure, or Motion of thoſe inviſible Parts, which immediately produce them. We are ſo far from knowing what Figure, Size, or Motion of Parts produce a yellow Colour, a ſweet Taſte, or a ſharp Sound, that we can by no means conceive how any *Size*, *Figure*, or *Motion* of any Particles, can poſſibly produce in us the *Idea* of any *Colour*, *Taſte*, or *Sound* whatſoever; there is no conceivable *Connexion* betwixt the one and the other.

§. 14. In vain therefore ſhall we endeavour to diſcover by our *Ideas*, (the only true way of certain and univerſal Knowledge,) what other *Ideas* are to be found conſtantly joined with that of our complex *Idea* of any Subſtance: ſince we neither know the real Conſtitution of the minute Parts, on which their Qualities do depend; nor, did we know them, could we diſcover any neceſſary *Connexion* between them, and any of the *ſecondary Qualities*: which is neceſſary to be done, before we can certainly know their *neceſſary Co-exiſtence*. So that let our complex *Idea* of any Species of Subſtances, be what it will, we can hardly from the ſimple *Ideas* contained in it, certainly determine the *neceſſary Co-exiſtence* of any other Quality whatſoever. Our Knowledge in all theſe Enquiries, reaches very little farther than our Experience. Indeed, ſome few of the primary Qualities have a neceſſary Dependence, and viſible Connexion one with another, as Figure neceſſarily ſuppoſes Extenſion, receiving or communicating Motion by impulſe, ſuppoſes Solidity. But though theſe, and perhaps ſome others of our *Ideas* have: yet there are *ſo few* of them, that have a *viſible Connexion* one with another, that we can by Intuition or Demonſtration, diſcover the Co-exiſtence of very few of the Qualities are to be found united in Subſtances: and we are left only to the aſſiſtance of our Senſes, to make

known to us, what Qualities they contain. For of all the ities that are *co-existent* in any Subject, without this Depen- e and evident Connexion of their *Ideas* one with another, annot know certainly any two to *co-exist* any farther, than rience, by our Senies, informs us. Thus though we see the w Colour, and upon Tryal find the Weight, Malleableneſs, ility, and Fixedneſs, that are united in a piece of Gold; ecauſe no one of theſe *Ideas* has any evident *Dependence*, or ſary Connexion with the other, we cannot certainly know, where any four of theſe are, the fifth will be there alſo, highly probable ſoever it may be: Becauſe the higheſt Pro- ity, amounts not to Certainty; without which, there can o true Knowledge. For this *Co-exiſtence* can be no farther rn, than it is perceived: and it cannot be perceived but in particular Subjects, by the Obſervation of our Senſes, or neral, by the neceſſary *Connexion* of the *Ideas* themſelves.

15. *As to incompatibility or repugnancy to Co-ex-*, we may know, that any Subject can have h ſort of primary Qualities, but one particular ce, *v. g.* each particular Extenſion, Figure, ber of Parts, Motion, excludes all other of each kind. The lſo is certain of all ſenſible *Ideas* peculiar to each Senſe; for ver of each kind is preſent in any Subject, excludes all o- f that ſort; *v. g.* no one Subject can have two Smells, or Colours, at the ſame time. To this, perhaps, will be ſaid, ot an *Opall*, or the infuſion of *Lignum Nephriticum*, two Co- at the ſame time? To which I anſwer, that theſe Bodies, es differently placed, may at the ſame time afford different rs: But I take Liberty alſo to ſay, that to Eyes differently l, 'tis different parts of the Object, that reflect the Parti- f Light: And therefore 'tis not the ſame part of the Ob- and ſo not the very ſame Subject, which at the ſame time rs both yellow and azure. For 'tis as impoſſible that the ſame Particle of any Body, ſhould at the ſame time diffe- modify, or reflect the Rays of Light, as that it ſhould two different Figures and Textures at the ſame time.

Of Repugnancy to Co-exiſt larger.

16. But *as to the Power of Subſtances* to change ſible Qualities of other Bodies, which make t part of our Enquiries about them, and is ſiderable branch of our Knowledge; I doubt, theſe, whether *our Knowledge reaches* much r than our Experience; or whether we can come to the ery of moſt of theſe Powers, and be certain that they are

Of the Co-exiſtence of Powers a very little way.

in

in any Subject by the Connexion with any of those *Ideas*, which to us make its Essence. Because the Active and Passive Powers of Bodies, and their ways of operating, consisting in a Texture and Motion of Parts, which we cannot by any means come to discover: 'Tis but in very few Cases, we can be able to perceive their Dependence on, or Repugnance to any of those *Ideas*, which make our complex one of that sort of Things. I have here instanced in the corpuscularian Hypothesis, as that which is thought to go fartheſt in an intelligible Explication of the Qualities of Bodies; and I fear the Weakness of Humane Understanding is scarce able to substitute another, which will afford us a fuller and clearer Discovery of the necessary Connexion, and *Co-existence*, of the Powers, which are to be observed united in several sorts of them. This at least is certain, that which ever Hypothesis be clearest and truest, (for of that it is not my business to determine,) our Knowledge concerning corporeal Substances, will be very little advanced by any of them, till we are made see, what Qualities and Powers of Bodies have a *necessary Connexion* or *Repugnancy* one with another; which in the present State of Philosophy, I think, we know but to a very small degree: And, I doubt, whether with those Faculties we have, we shall ever be able to carry our general Knowledge (I say not particular Experience) in this part much farther. Experience is that, which in this part we must depend on. And it were to be wish'd, that it were more improved. We find the Advantages some Mens generous Pains have this way brought to the stock of natural Knowledge. And if others, especially the Philosophers by Fire, who pretend to it, had been so wary in their Observations, and sincere in their Reports, as those who call themselves Philosophers ought to have been, our Acquaintance with the Bodies here about us, and our insight into their Powers and Operations had been yet much greater.

Of Spirits yet narrower.

§. 17. If we are at a loss in respect of the Powers, and Operations of Bodies, I think it is easy to conclude, *we are much more in the dark in reference to Spirits*; whereof we naturally have no *Ideas*, but what we draw from that of our own, by reflecting on the Operations of our own Souls within us, as far as they can come within our Observation. But how inconsiderable a rank the Spirits that inhabit our Bodies hold amongst those various, and possibly innumerable, kinds of nobler Beings; and how far short they come of the Endowments and Perfections of Cherubims and Seraphims, and infinite sorts of Spirits above us, is what by a transient hint, in another place, I have offered to my Reader's Consideration.

§. 18.

8. As to the third sort of our Knowledge, e *Agreement or Disagreement of any of our* Ideas other *Relation*: This, as it is the largest Field Knowledge, so it is hard to determine how may extend: Because the Advances that are n this part of Knowledge, depending on our ty, in finding intermediate *Ideas*, that may shew the *Rela*nd *Habitudes* of *Ideas*, whose Co-existence is not consider- a hard Matter to tell, when we are at an end of such Dis- es; and when Reason has all the helps it is capable of, for ding of Proofs, or examining the Agreement or Disagree- of remote *Ideas*. They that are ignorant of *Algebra*, can- agine the Wonders in this kind are to be done by it: and farther Improvements and Helps, advantageous to other of Knowledge, the sagacious Mind of Man may yet find is not easy to determine. This at least I believe, that the of Quantity are not those alone that are capable of Demon- n and Knowledge; and that other, and perhaps more use- ts of Contemplation, would afford us Certainty, if Vices, ns, and domineering Interest did not oppose, or menace ndeavours.

Thirdly, Of other Relations it is not easy to say how far.

e *Idea* of a supreme Being, infinite in Power, ness and Wisdom, whose Workmanship we nd on whom we depend; and the *Idea* of ves, as understanding, rational Beings, being are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered, and d, afford such Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Acti- might place *Morality amongst the Sciences capable of Demon-* : wherein I doubt not, but from self-evident Propositi- y necessary Consequences, as incontestable as those in Ma- ick, the Measures of right and wrong might be made out, one that will apply himself with the same Indifferency ttention to the one, as he does to the other of these Sci- The *Relation* of other *Modes* may certainly be perceived, ll as those of Number and Extension: and I cannot see, hey should not also be capable of Demonstration, if due ods were thought on to examine, or pursue their Agree- or Disagreement. *Where there is no Property, there is no In-* is a Proposition as certain as any Demonstration in *Eu-* For the *Idea* of *Property*, being a right to any thing; and *ea* to which the name *Injustice* is given, being the Inva- Violation of that right; it is evident, that these *Ideas* be- us established, and these Names annexed to them, I can as nly know this Proposition to be true, as that a Triangle

Morality capable of Demonstration.

has three Angles equal to two right ones. Again, *No Government allows absolute Liberty*: The *Idea* of Government being the establishment of Society upon certain Rules or Laws, which require Conformity to them; and the *Idea* of absolute Liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases; I am as capable of being certain of the Truth of this Proposition, as of any in Mathematicks.

Two Things have made moral Ideas thought uncapable of Demonstration. Their Complexedness, and want of sensible Representation.

§. 19. That which in this respect has given the advantage to the *Ideas* of Quantity, and made them thought more capable of Certainty and Demonstration.

First, That they can be set down and represented by sensible Marks, which have a greater and nearer Correspondence with them than any Words or Sounds whatsoever. Diagrams drawn on Paper are Copies of the *Ideas* in the Mind, and not liable to the Uncertainty that Words carry in their Signification. An Angle, Circle, or Square, drawn in Lines, lies open to the view, and cannot be mistaken: It remains unchangeable, and may at leisure be considered, and examined, and the Demonstration be revised, and all the parts of it may be gone over more than once, without any danger of the least change in the *Ideas*. This cannot be thus done in *moral Ideas*, we have no sensible marks that resemble them, whereby we can set them down; we have nothing but Words to express them by: which though, when written, they remain the same, yet the *Ideas* they stand for, may change in the same Man; and 'tis very seldom, that they are not different in different Persons.

Secondly, Another thing that makes the greater difficulty in *Ethicks*, is, That *moral Ideas* are commonly more complex than those of the Figures ordinarily considered in Mathematicks. From whence these two Inconveniences follow. *First*, That their Names are of more uncertain Signification, the precise Collection of simple *Ideas* they stand for not being so easily agreed on, and so the Sign, that is used for them in Communication always, and in Thinking often, does not steadily carry with it the same *Idea*. Upon which the same Disorder, Confusion, and Error follows, as would if a Man, going to demonstrate something of an *Heptagon*, should in the Diagram he took to do it, leave out one of the Angles, or by over-sight make the Figure with one Angle more than the Name ordinarily imported, or he intended it should, when at first he thought of his Demonstration. This often happens, and is hardly avoidable in very complex moral *Ideas*, where the same Name being retained, one Angle

one simple *Idea* is left out or put in, in the complex ones called by the same Name) more at one time than another. *ly*, From the Complexedness of these moral *Ideas* there vs another Inconvenience, (*viz.*) that the Mind cannot ea- tain those precise Combinations, so exact and perfectly, as essary in the Examination of the Habitudes and Correspon- s, Agreements or Disagreements, of several of them one with er; especially where it is to be judg'd of by long Deductions, he Intervention of several other complex *Ideas*, to shew the ement or Disagreement of two remote ones.

ie great help against this, which Mathematicians find in Dia- s and Figures, which remain unalterable in their Draughts, y apparent, and the Memory would often have great diffi- otherwise to retain them so exactly, whilst the Mind went the parts of them, step by step, to examine their several espondencies: And though in casting up a long Sum, either *dition*, *Multiplication*, or *Division*, every part be only a Pro- on of the Mind, taking a view of its own *Ideas*, and consi- g their Agreement or Disagreement; and the Resolution of uestion be nothing but the Result of the whole, made up h particulars, whereof the Mind has a clear Perception: ithout setting down the several Parts by Marks, whose pre- ignifications are known, and by Marks, that last and re- in view, when the Memory had let them go, it would be impossible to carry so many different *Ideas* in Mind, with- nfounding, or letting slip some parts of the Reckoning, ereby making all our Reasonings about it useless. In which the Cyphers or Marks help not the Mind at all to perceive greement of any two, or more Numbers, their Equalities portions: That the Mind has only by Intuition of its own the Numbers themselves. But the numerical Characters ps to the Memory, to record and retain the several *Ideas* which the Demonstration is made, whereby a Man may ow far his intuitive Knowledge, in surveying several of the lars, has proceeded; that so he may without Confusion o what is yet unknown; and, at last, have in one view him the Result of all his Perceptions and Reasonings.

Remedies of those Difficulties.

9. One part of *these Disadvatages* in moral which has made them be thought not capable onstration, may in a good measure be *reme-* Definitions, setting down that Collection le *Ideas*, which every Term shall stand for; and then using ms stedily and constantly for that precise Collection. And lethods *Algebra*, or something of that kind, may hereafter

ſuggeſt, to remove the other difficulties, is not eaſy to fore-tell. Confident I am, that if Men would in the ſame Method, and with the ſame Indifferency, ſearch after moral, as they do mathematical Truths, they would find them to have a ſtronger Connexion one with another, and a more neceſſary Conſequence from our clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, and to come nearer perfect Demonſtration, than is commonly imagined. But much of this is not to be expected, whilſt the deſire of Eſteem, Riches, or Power, makes Men eſpouſe the well endowed Opinions in Faſhion, and then ſeek Arguments, either to make good their Beauty, or varniſh over, and cover their Deformity. Nothing being ſo beautiful to the Eye, as Truth is to the Mind; nothing ſo deformed and irreconcilable to the Underſtanding, as a Lye. For though many a Man can with ſatisfaction enough own a no very handſome Wife in his Boſom; yet who is bold enough openly to avow, that he has eſpouſed a Falſhood, and received into his Breaſt ſo ugly a thing as a Lye? Whilſt the Parties of Men, cram their Tenents down all Mens Throats, whom they can get into their Power, without permitting them to examine their Truth or Falſhood; and will not let Truth have fair play in the World, nor Men the Liberty to ſearch after it; What Improvements can be expected of this kind? What greater Light can be hoped for in the moral Sciences? The Subject part of Mankind, in moſt Places, might, inſtead thereof, with *Ægyptian* Bondage, expect *Ægyptian* Darkneſs, were not the Candle of the Lord ſet up by himſelf in Mens Minds, which it is impoſſible for the Breath or Power of Man wholly to extinguiſh.

Fourthly, of real Exiſtence we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own demonſtrative of God's ſenſible of ſome few other Things. Our Ignorance great.

§. 21. As to the fourth ſort of our Knowledge, *viz.* of the *real, actual Exiſtence*; of Things, we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own *Exiſtence*; a dmonſtrative Knowledge of the *Exiſtence* of a God; of the *Exiſtence* of any thing elſe, we have no other but a ſenſitive Knowledge, which extends not beyond the Objects preſent to our Senſes.

§. 22. Our Knowledge being ſo narrow, as I have ſhew'd, it will, perhaps, give us ſome Light into the preſent State of our Minds, if we look a little into the dark ſide, and take a view of *our Ignorance*: which being infinitely larger than our Knowledge, may ſerve much to the quieting of Diſputes, and Improvement of uſeful Knowledge; if diſcovering how far we have clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, we confine our Thoughts within the Contemplation of thoſe Things, that are within the reach of our Underſtandings, and lanch not out into that Abyſs of Darkneſs (where we have not Eyes to ſee, nor Faculties to perceive any thing,) out

of

resumption, that nothing is beyond our Comprehension,
be satisfied of the Folly of such a Conceit, we need not
. He that knows any thing, knows this in the first place,
e need not seek long for Instances of his Ignorance. The
est, and most obvious Things that come in our way, have
sides, that the quickest Sight cannot penetrate into. The
st, and most enlarged Understandings of thinking Men
hemselves puzzled, and at a loss, in every particle of Mat-
We shall the less wonder to find it so, when we consider
auses of our Ignorance, which, from what has been said, I sup-
will be found to be chiefly these three:

st, Want of *Ideas*.

ondly, Want of a discoverable Connexion between the *Ideas*
ave.

rdly, Want of tracing, and examining our *Ideas*.

23. *First*, There are some Things, and those few, that we are ignorant of for *want of*

First, one cause of it want of Ideas, either such as we have no Conception of, or such as particularly we have not.

st, All the simple *Ideas* we are confined (as I have
r) to those we receive from corporeal Objects
sation, and from the Operations of our own
s as the Objects of *Reflection*. But how much
few and narrow Inlets are disproportionate to
ast whole Extent of all Beings, will not be
o persuade those, who are not so foolish, as to
their Span the measure of all Things. What other simple
'tis possible the Creatures in other parts of the Universe may
by the Assistance of Senses and Faculties more or perfecter,
we have, or different from ours, 'tis not for us to determine:
o say, or think there are no such, because we conceive not
of them, is no better an Argument, than if a blind Man
d be positive in it, that there was no such thing as Sight and
urs, because he had no manner of Idea, of any such thing,
ould by any means frame to himself any Notions about
g. The Ignorance, and Darkness that is in us, no more
rs, nor confines the Knowledge, that is in others, than the
ness of a Mole is an Argument against the quick-sightedness
Eagle. He that will consider the infinite Power, Wisdom, and
ness of the Creator of all Things, will find Reason to think
s not all laid out upon so inconsiderable, mean, and impo-
Creature, as he will find Man to be; who in probability,
of the lowest of all intellectual Beings. What Faculties there
ther Species of Creatures have to penetrate into the Nature
most Constitutions of Things; what *Ideas* they may receive

of them, far different of ours, we know not. This we know, and certainly find, that we want several other views of them, besides those we have, to make Discoveries of them more perfect. And we may be convinced that the *Ideas*, we can attain to by our Faculties, are very disproportionate to Things themselves, when a positive clear distinct one of Substance it self, which is the Foundation of all the rest, concealed from us. But want of *Ideas* of this kind being a Part, as well as Cause of our Ignorance, cannot be described. Only this, I think, I may confidently say of it, that the intellectual and sensible World, are in this perfectly alike; That that part, which we see of either of them, holds no proportion with what we see not; And whatsoever we can reach with our Eyes, or our Thoughts of either of them, is but a point, almost nothing, in comparison of the rest.

Because of their Remoteness, or,

§. 24. *Secondly*, Another great Cause of Ignorance, is the *want of* Ideas *we are capable of*. As the want of *Ideas*, which our Faculties are not able to give us, shuts us wholly from those views of Things which 'tis reasonable to think other Beings, perfecter than we, have, of which we know nothing; so the want of *Ideas*, I now speak of, keeps us in Ignorance of Things we conceive capable of being known to us. *Bulk*, *Figure*, and *Motion*, we have *Ideas* of. But though we are not without *Ideas* of these primary Qualities of Bodies in general, yet not knowing what is the particular *Bulk*, *Figure*, and *Motion*, of the greatest part of the Bodies of the Universe, we are ignorant of the several Powers, Efficacies, and Ways of Operation, whereby the Effects, which we daily see, are produced. These are hid from us in some Things, by being *too remote*; *and* in others, by being *too minute*. When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the World, and the Reasons we have to think, that what lies within our Ken, is but a small part of the immense Universe, we shall then discover an huge Abyss of Ignorance. What are the particular Fabricks of the great Masses of Matter, which make up the whole stupendious frame of Corporeal Beings; how far they are extended, what is their Motion, and how continued, or communicated; and what Influence they have one upon another, are Contemplations, that at first glimpse our Thoughts lose themselves in. If we narrow our Contemplation, and confine our Thoughts to this little Canton, I mean this System of our Sun, and the grosser Masses of Matter, that visibly move about it, what several sorts of Vegetables, Animals, and intellectual corporeal Beings, infinitely different from those of our little spot of Earth, may there probably be in the other Planets,

Knowledge of which, even of their outward Figures and ve can no way attain, whilſt we are confined to this Earth, being no natural Means, either by Senſation or Reflection, ceive their certain *Ideas* into our Minds? They are out of ach of thoſe Inlets of all our Knowledge: and what ſorts niture and Inhabitants thoſe Manſions contain in them, we t ſo much as gueſs, much leſs have clear, and diſtinct *Ideas* n.

§. 25. If a great, nay far the greateſt part of veral ranks of *Bodies* in the Univerſe, ſcape otice by their Remoteneſs, there are others re no leſs concealed from us by their *Mi-*. Theſe inſenſible Corpuſcles, being the active parts atter, and the great Inſtruments of Nature, on which d not only all their ſecondary Qualities, but alſo moſt of natural Operations, our want of preciſe diſtinct *Ideas* of primary Qualities, keeps us in an uncurable Ignorance of we deſire to know about them. I doubt not but if we could er the Figure, Size, Texture, and Motion of the minute ituent parts of any two Bodies, we ſhould know without ſeveral of their Operations one upon another, as we do now roperties of a Square, or a Triangle. Did we know the anical Affections of the Particles of *Rhubarb*, *Hemlock*, *Opium*, *Man*, as a Watch-maker does thoſe of a Watch, whereby forms its Operations, and of a File which by rubbing on them lter the Figure of any of the Wheels, we ſhould be able beforehand, that *Rhubarb* will purge, *Hemlock* kill, and make a Man ſleep, as well as a Watch-maker can, that e piece of Paper laid on the Balance, will keep the Watch going, till it be removed; or that ſome ſmall part of it, rubb'd by a File, the Machin would quite loſe its Motion, e Watch go no more. The diſſolving of Silver in *aqua fortis* d Gold in *aqua Regia*, and not *vice verſa*, would be then, ps, no more difficult to know, than it is to a Smith to unnd, why the turning of one Key will open a Lock, and e turning of another. But whilſt we are deſtitute of Senſes enough, to diſcover the minute Particles of Bodies, and to s *Ideas* of their mechanical Affections, we muſt be content to orant of their properties and ways of Operation; nor can assured about them any farther, than ſome few Trials we are able to reach. But whether they will ſucceed again another time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain Knowof univerſal Truths concerning natural Bodies: and our Reaches us herein very little beyond particular matter of Fact.

Becauſe of their Minuteneſs.

Hence no Science of Bodies.

§. 26. And therefore I am apt to doubt that, how far soever humane Industry may advance useful and *experimental* Philosophy *in physical Things*, *scientifical* will still be out of our reach: because we want perfect and adequate *Ideas* of those very Bodies, which are nearest to us, and most under our Command. Those which we have ranked into Classes under Names, and we think our selves best acquainted with, we have but very imperfect, and incompleat *Ideas* of. Distinct *Ideas* of the several sorts of Bodies, that fall under the Examination of our Senses, perhaps we may have: but adequate *Ideas*, I suspect, we have not of any one amongst them. And tho' the former of these will serve us for common Use and Discourse: yet whilst we want the latter, we are not capable of *scientifical Knowledge*; nor shall ever be able to discover general, instructive, unquestionable Truths concerning them. *Certainty* and *Demonstration*, are Things we must not, in these Matters, pretend to. By the Colour, Figure, Taste, and Smell, and other sensible Qualities, we have as clear and distinct *Ideas* of Sage and Hemlock, as we have of a Circle and a Triangle: But having no *Ideas* of the particular primary Qualities of the minute parts of either of these Plants, nor of other Bodies which we would apply them to, we cannot tell what effects they will produce; Nor when we see those effects, can we so much as guess, much less know, their manner of production. Thus having no *Ideas* of the particular mechanical Affections of the minute parts of Bodies, that are within our view and reach, we are ignorant of their Constitutions, Powers, and Operations: and of Bodies more remote, we are yet more ignorant, not knowing so much as their very outward Shapes, or the sensible and grosser parts of their Constitutions.

Much less of Spirits.

§. 27. This, at first sight, will shew us how disproportionate our Knowledge is to the whole extent even of material Beings; to which, if we add the Consideration of that infinite number of Spirits that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our Knowledge, whereof we have no cognizance, nor can frame to our selves any distinct *Ideas* of their several ranks and sorts, we shall find this cause of Ignorance conceal from us, in an impenetrable obscurity, almost the whole intellectual World; a greater certainly, and more beautiful World than the material. For bating some very few, and those, if I may so call them, superficial *Ideas* of Spirit, which by reflection we get of our own, and from thence, the best we can collect, of the Father of all Spirits the eternal independent Author of them and us and all Things we have no certain information, so much as of the Existence of other

Spirits, but by revelation. Angels of all sorts are natural-
yond our discovery: And all those intelligences, whereof
kely there are more Orders than of corporeal Substances, are
gs, whereof our natural Faculties give us no certain account
. That there are Minds, and thinking Beings in other Men
ll as himself, every Man has a reason, from their Words
Actions, to be satisfied: And the Knowledge of his own
cannot suffer a Man, that considers, to be ignorant, that
is a GOD. But that there are degrees of Spiritual Beings
een us and the great GOD, who is there, that by his own
and ability can come to know? Much less have we di-
Ideas of their different Natures, Conditions, States, Pow-
nd several Constitutions, wherein they agree or differ from
nother, and from us. And therefore in what concerns their
ent Species and Properties, we are under an absolute igno-

Secondly, want of a discoverable connexion between Ideas we have.

28. *Secondly*, What a small part of the sub-
al Beings, that are in the Universe, the want
eas leave open to our Knowledge, we have
In the next place, another cause of Ignorance,
less moment, is a want of *a discoverable Con-*
n between those *Ideas* which we have. For
ever we want that, we are utterly uncapable of universal and
n Knowledge; and are, as in the former case, left only to
rvation and Experiment: which how narrow and confined
how far from general Knowledge, we need not be told.
l give some few Instances of this cause or our Ignorance, and
ve it. 'Tis evident that the Bulk, Figure, and Motion of
l Bodies about us, produce in us several Sensations, as of Co-
Sounds, Tastes, Smells, Pleasure and Pain, *&c.* These me-
cal Affections of Bodies, having no affinity at all with those
they produce in us, (there being no conceivable Conne-
between any impulse of any sort of Body, and any Percep-
of a Colour, or Smell, which we find in our Minds) we can
no distinct Knowledge of such Operations beyond our Ex-
nce; and can reason no otherwise about them, than as ef-
produced by the Appointment of an infinitely Wise Agent,
n perfectly surpass our Comprehensions. As the *Ideas* of sen-
secondary Qualities, which we have in our Minds, can, by
e no way deduced from bodily Causes, nor any Correspon-
or Connexion be found between them and those primary
ties which (Experience shews us) produce them in us; so
e other side, the Operation of our Minds upon our Bodies
nconceivable. How any Thought should produce a Mo-

tion

tion in Body is as remote from the Nature of our *Ideas*, as how any Body ſhould produce any Thought in the Mind. That it is ſo, if Experience did not convince us, the Conſideration of the Things themſelves would never be able, in the leaſt, to diſcover to us. Theſe, and the like, though they have a conſtant and regular Connexion, in the ordinary courſe of Things: yet that connexion being not diſcoverable in the *Ideas* themſelves, which appearing to have no neceſſary dependance one on another, we can attribute their connexion to nothing elſe, but the arbitrary Determination of that All-wiſe Agent, who has made them to be, and to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak Underſtandings to conceive.

Inſtances. §. 29. In ſome of our *Ideas* there are certain Relations, Habitudes, and Connexions, ſo viſibly included in the Nature of the *Ideas* themſelves, that we cannot conceive them ſeparable from them, by any Power whatſoever. And in theſe only, we are capable of certain and univerſal Knowledge. Thus the *Idea* of a right-lined Triangle neceſſarily carries with it an equality of its Angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive this Relation, this connexion of theſe two *Ideas*, to be poſſibly mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary Power, which of choice made it thus, or could make it otherwiſe. But the coherence and continuity of the Parts of Matter; the production of Senſation in us of Colours and Sounds, *&c.* by Impulſe and Motion; nay, the original Rules and Communication of Motion being ſuch, wherein we can diſcover no natural Connexion with any *Ideas* we have, we cannot but aſcribe them to the arbitrary Will and good Pleaſure of the Wiſe Architect. I need not, I think, here mention the Reſurrection of the dead, the future ſtate of his Globe of Earth, and ſuch other Things, which are by every one acknowledged to depend wholly on the Determination of a free Agent. The Things that, as far as our Obſervation reaches, we conſtantly find to proceed regularly, we may conclude, do act by a Law ſet them; but yet by a Law, that we know not: whereby, tho' Cauſes work ſteadily, and Effects conſtantly flow from them, yet their *Connexions* and *Dependencies* being not diſcoverable in our *Ideas*, we can have but an experimental Knowledge of them. From all which 'tis eaſy to perceive, what a darkneſs we are involved in, how little 'tis of Being, and the things that are, that we are capable to know. And therefore we ſhall do no Injury to our Knowledge when we modeſtly think with our ſelves, that we are ſo far from being able to comprehend the whole Nature of the Univerſe, and all the things contained in it, that we are not capable

of a philoſophical *Knowledge* of the Bodies that are about
id make a part of us: Concerning their ſecondary Quali-
Powers, and Operations, we can have no univerſal Cer-
. Several effects come every day within the notice of our
, of which we have ſo far *ſenſitive Knowledge*: but the cauſes,
er, and certainty of their production, for the two forego-
eaſons, we muſt be content to be ignorant of. In theſe we
no farther than particular Experience informs us of matter
t, and by Analogy to gueſs what Effects the like Bodies
pon other trials, like to produce. But as to a perfect *Sci-*
f natural Bodies, (not to mention ſpiritual Beings,) we
think, ſo far from being capable of any ſuch thing, that
lude it loſt labour to ſeek after it.

§ 9. *Thirdly*, Where we have adequate *Ideas*, *Thirdly, want of tracing our Ideas.*
here there is a certain and diſcoverable Con-
n between them, yet we are often ignorant,
ant of *tracing* thoſe *Ideas* which we have, or
ave; and for want of finding out thoſe intermediate *Ideas*,
may ſhew us, what Habitude of Agreement or Diſagree-
they have one with another. And thus many are ignorant
thematical Truths, not out of any imperfection of their
ties, or uncertainty in the Things themſelves; but for want
plication in acquiring, examining, and by due ways com-
g thoſe *Ideas*. That which has moſt contributed to hinder
ie *tracing* of our *Ideas*, and finding out their Relations, and
ments or Diſagreements one with another, has been, I ſup-
the ill uſe of *Words*. It is impoſſible that Men ſhould ever
ſeek, or certainly diſcover the Agreement or Diſagreement
as themſelves, whilſt their Thoughts flutter about, or ſtick
in Sounds of doubtful and uncertain Significations. Ma-
ticians abſtracting their Thoughts from Names, and ac-
ning themſelves to ſet before their Minds, the *Ideas* them-
that they would conſider, and not Sounds inſtead of them,
avoided thereby a great part of that Perplexity, Puddering,
Confuſion, which has ſo much hindred Mens Progreſs in o-
arts of Knowledge. For whilſt they ſtick in Words of un-
nined and uncertain Signification, they are unable to diſtin-
True from Falſe, Certain from Probable, Conſiſtent from
ſiſtent, in their own Opinions. This having been the Fate
sfortune of a great part of the Men of Letters, the Increaſe
ht into the Stock of real Knowledge, has been very little,
portion to the Schools, Diſputes, and Writings, the World
een fill'd with; whilſt Students, being loſt in the great
of Words, knew not whereabout they were, how far

their

their Discoveries were advanced, or what was wanting in the own, or the general Stock of Knowledge. Had Men, in t Discoveries of the material, done, as they have in those of t intellectual World, involved all in the obscurity of uncerta and doubtful ways of talking, Volumes writ of Navigation a Voyages, Theories and Stories of Zones and Tydes, multiplie and disputed; nay, Ships built, and Fleets set out, would nev have taught us the way beyond the Line; and the Antipod would be still as much unknown, as when it was declared H resy to hold there were any. But having spoken sufficiently Words, and the ill or careless use, that is commonly made them, I shall not say any thing more of it here.

Extent in respect of Universality.

§. 31. Hitherto we have examined the *extent* o our Knowledge, in respect of the several sorts o Beings that are. There is another *extent of it, i respect of Universality*, which will also deserve to b considered: and in this regard, our Knowledge follows the Na ture of our *Ideas*. If the *Ideas* are abstract, whose Agreement o Disagreement we perceive, our Knowledge is universal. Fo what is known of such general *Ideas*, will be true of every pa ticular thing, in whom that Essence, *i. e.* that abstract *Idea* is to be found: and what is once known of such *Ideas*, will be per petually, and for ever true. So that as to all general Knowledge, we must search and find it only in our own Minds, and 'tis only the examining of our own *Ideas*, that furnisheth us with that Truths belonging to Essences of Things, (that is, to abstract *Ideas*) are eternal, and are to be found out by the Contemplation only of those Essences: as the Existence of Things is to be known only from Experience. But having more to say of this in the Chapters, where I shall speak of general and real Knowledge, this may here suffice as to the Universality of our Knowledge in general.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Reality of Knowledge.

Objection, Knowledge placed in Ideas *may be all bare Vision.*

§. 1. I Doubt not but my Reader, by this time, may be apt to think, that I have been all this while only building a Castle in the Air; and be ready to say to me, To what purpose all this stir? Knowledge, say you,

y the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our *Ideas*: but who knows what those *Ideas* may be? Is there hing so extravagant, as the Imaginations of Mens Brains? re is the Head that has no *Chimera's* in it? Or if there be er and a wise Man, what difference will there be, by your , between his Knowledge, and that of the most extrava- Fancy in the World? They both have their *Ideas*, and per- their Agreement and Disagreement one with another. If be any difference between them, the advantage will be on arm-headed Man's side, as having the more *Ideas*, and the lively. And so, by your Rules, he will be the more know- If it be true, that all Knowledge lies only in the Percepti- the Agreement or Disagreement of our own *Ideas*, the Vi- of an Enthusiast, and the Reasonings of a sober Man, will ually certain. 'Tis no matter how Things are: so a Man re but the Agreement of his own Imaginations, and talk con- bly, it is all Truth, all Certainty. Such Castles in the Air, e as strong Holds of Truth, as the Demonstrations of *Euclid*. an Harpy is not a Centaur, is by this way as certain Know- , and as much a Truth, as that a Square is not a Circle. t *of what use is all this* fine *Knowledge of Mens own Imaginati-* o a Man that enquires after the reality of Things? It mat- ot what Mens Fancies are, 'tis the Knowledge of things s only to be prized: 'tis this alone gives a value to our Rea- gs, and preference to one Man's Knowledge over another's, it is of Things as they really are, and not of Dreams and ies.

2. To which I answer, That if our Know- of our *Ideas* terminate in them, and reach no r, where there is something farther intended, ost serious Thoughts will be of little more han the Reveries of a crazy Brain; and the s built thereon of no more weight, than the Discourses of n, who sees Things clearly in a Dream, and with great nce utters them. But, I hope, before I have done, to it evident, that this way of Certainty, by the Knowledge r own *Ideas*, goes a little farther than bare Imagination: I believe it will appear, that all the certainty of general hs a Man has, lies in nothing else.

Answer, Not so, where Ideas *agree with Things.*

3. 'Tis evident, the Mind knows not Things diately, but only by the Intervention of the it has of them. *Our Knowledge* therefore is only so far as there is a Conformity between *leas* and the reality of Things. But what shall be here the Criterion?

Answer, Not so, where Ideas *agree with Things.*

Criterion? How shall the Mind, when it perceives nothing but its own *Ideas*, know that they agree with Things themselves? This, tho' it seems not to want difficulty, yet, I think there be two sorts of *Ideas*, that, we may be assured, agree with Things.

First, All simple Ideas do.

§. 4. *First*, The first are simple *Ideas*, which since the Mind, as has been shewed, can by no means make to it self, must necessarily be the product of Things operating on the Mind in a natural way, and producing therein those Perceptions which by the Wisdom and Will of our Maker they are ordained and adapted to. From whence it follows, that *simple* Ideas *are not fictions* of our Fancies, but the natural and regular productions of Things without us, really operating upon us; and so carry with them all the conformity which is intended; or which our State requires: For they represent to us Things under those Appearances which they are fitted to produce in us: whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of particular Substances, to discern the States they are in, and so to take them for our Necessities, and apply them to our Uses. Thus the *Idea* of Whiteness, or Bitterness, as it is in the Mind, exactly answering that Power which is in any Body to produce it there, has all the real conformity it can, or ought to have, with Things without us. And this conformity between our simple *Ideas*, and the Existence of Things, is sufficient for real Knowledge.

Secondly, All complex Ideas, *except of Substances.*

§. 5. *Secondly, All our complex* Ideas, *except those of Substances*, being *Archetypes* of the Mind's own making, not intended to be the Copies of any thing, as to their Originals, *cannot want any conformity necessary to real Knowledge.* For that which is not designed to represent any thing but it self, can never be capable of a wrong representation, nor mislead us from the true apprehension of any thing, by its Dislikeness to it: and such, excepting those of Substances, are all our complex *Ideas*. Which, as I have shewed in another place, are Combinations of *Ideas*, which the Mind, by its free choice, puts together, without considering any connexion they have in Nature. And hence it is, that in all these sorts the *Ideas* themselves are considered as the *Archetypes*, and Things no otherwise regarded, but as they are conformable to them. So that we cannot but be infallibly certain, that all the Knowledge we attain concerning these *Ideas* is real, and reaches Things themselves. Because in all our Thoughts, Reasonings, and Discourses of this kind, we intend Things no farther, than as they are conformable to our *Ideas*. So that in these, we cannot miss of a certain undoubted reality.

§. 6.

. 6. I doubt not but it will be eafily granted, t the *Knowledge* we have *of Mathematical Truths*, ot only certain, but *real Knowledge*; and not the e empty Viſion of vain inſignificant *Chimera*'s of Brain: And yet, if we will conſider, we ſhall that it is only of our own *Ideas*. The Mathe- ician conſiders the Truth and Properties belonging to a Rect- le, or Circle, only as they are in *Idea* in his own Mind. For oſſible he never found either of them exiſting mathematically, preciſely true, in his Life. But yet the Knowledge he has ny Truths or Properties belonging to a Circle, or any other hematical Figure, are nevertheleſs true and certain, even of Things exiſting: becauſe real Things are no farther concer- , nor intended to be meant by any ſuch Propoſitions, than as ings really agree to thoſe *Archetypes* in his Mind. Is it true of *Idea* of a *Triangle*, that its three Angles are equal to two right ? It is true alſo of a *Triangle*, where-ever it really exiſts. What- other Figure exiſts, that is not exactly anſwerable to that I- of a *Triangle* in his Mind, is not at all concerned in that Propo- n. And thefore he is certain all his Knowledge concerning *Ideas*, is real Knowledge: becauſe intending Things no far- than they agree with thoſe his *Ideas*, he is ſure what he knows cerning thoſe Figures, when they have barely *an Ideal Exiſtence* is Mind, will hold true of them alſo, when they have a real ſtence in Matter; his conſideration being barely of thoſe Fi- s, which are the ſame, where-ever, or however they exiſt.

Hence the Reality of mathematical Knowledge.

of moral. §. 7. And hence it follows, that *moral Knowledge* is as *capable of real Certainty*, as Mathematicks. For ainty being but the Perception of the Agreement, or Diſa- ment of our *Ideas*; and Demonſtration nothing but the Percep- of ſuch Agreement, by the Intervention of other *Ideas*, or Me- s, our *moral Ideas*, as well as mathematical, being *Archetypes* nſelves, and ſo adequate, and complete *Ideas*, all the Agree- t, or Diſagreement, which we ſhall find in them, will produce Knowledge, as well as in mathematical Figures.

8. For the attaining of *Knowledge* and Cer- y it is requiſite, that we have determined *Ideas*: to make our Knowledge *real*, it is requiſite, the *Ideas* anſwer their *Archetypes*. Nor let it be dred, that I place the Certainty of our Knowledge in the Con- ation of our *Ideas*, with ſo little Care and Regard (as it may) to the real Exiſtence of Things: Since moſt of thoſe Diſ- ſes, which take up the Thoughts and engage Diſputes of who pretend to make it their Buſineſs to enquire after Truth and

Exiſtence not required to make it real.

and Certainty, will, I presume, upon Examination be found to be *general Propositions*, and Notions in which Existence is not at all concerned. All the Discourses of the Mathematicians about the squaring of a Circle, conick Sections, or any other part of Mathematicks, *concern not* the *Existence* of any of those Figures, but their Demonstrations, which depend on their *Ideas*, are the same, whether there be any Square or Circle existing in the World, or no. In the same manner, the Truth and Certainty of *moral* Discourses abstracts from the Lives of Men, and the Existence of those Vertues in the World, whereof they treat: Nor are *Tully's* Offices less true, because there is no Body in the World that exactly practises his Rules, and lives up to that Pattern of a vertuous Man, which he has given us, and which existed no where, when he writ, but in *Idea*. If it be true in Speculation, *i. e.* in *Idea*, that *Murther deserves Death*, it will also be true in Reality of any Action that exists conformable to that *Idea* of *Murther*. As for other Actions, the Truth of that Proposition concerns them not. And thus it is of all other Species of Things, which have no other Essences, but those *Ideas*, which are in the Minds of Men.

Nor will it be less true or certain, because moral Ideas are of our own making and naming.

§. 9. But it will here be said, that if *moral Knowledge* be placed in the Contemplation of our own *moral Ideas*, and those, as other Modes, be of our own making, What strange Notions will there be of *Justice* and *Temperance*? What confusion of Vertues and Vices, if every one may make what *Ideas* of them he pleases? No confusion nor disorder in the Things themselves, nor the Reasonings about them; no more than (in Mathematicks) there would be a Disturbance in the Demonstration, or a change in the Properties of Figures, and their Relations one to another, if a Man should make a Triangle with four Corners, or a *Trapezium* with four right Angles: that is, in plain *English*, change the Names of the Figures, and call that by one Name, which Mathematicians call'd ordinarily by another. For let a Man make to himself the *Idea* of a Figure with three Angles, whereof one is a right one, and call it, if he please, *Equilaterum* or *Trapezium*, or any thing else, the Properties of, and Demonstrations about that *Idea*, will be the same, as if he call'd it a *Rectangular Triangle*. I confess, the change of the Name, by the impropriety of Speech, will at first disturb him, who knows not what *Idea* it stands for: but as soon as the Figure is drawn, the Consequences and Demonstration are plain and clear. Just the same is it in *moral* Knowledge, let a Man have the *Idea* of taking from others, without their Consent, what their honest Industry has possessed them of, and call this *Justice*, if he please.

He

hat takes the Name here without the *Idea* put to it, will iſtaken, by joining another *Idea* of his own to that Name: ſtrip the *Idea* of that Name, or take it ſuch as it is in the ker's Mind, and the ſame Things will agree to it, as if you d it *Injuſtice*. Indeed, wrong Names in moral Diſcourſes, d uſually more diſorder, becauſe they are not ſo eaſily re-d, as in Mathematicks, where the Figure once drawn and makes the Name uſeleſs and of no force. For what need of n, when the Thing ſignified is preſent and in view? But oral Names, that cannot be ſo eaſily and ſhortly done, be-e of the many decompoſitions that go to the making up the plex *Ideas* of thoſe Modes. But yet for all the *miſcalling of* of thoſe *Ideas*, contrary to the uſual ſignification of the rds of that Language, hinders not, but that we may have ain and demonſtrative Knowledge of their ſeveral Agree-ts and Diſagreements, if we will carefully, as in Mathema-, keep to the ſame preciſe *Ideas*, and trace them in their ſe-l Relations one to another, without being led away by their nes. If we but ſeparate the *Idea* under conſideration from Sign that ſtands for it, our Knowledge goes equally on in Diſcovery of real Truth and Certainty, whatever Sounds make uſe of.

Miſ-naming diſturbs not the Certainty of the Knowledge.

10. One thing more we are to take notice of, t where GOD, or any other Law-maker, hath ed any Moral Names, there they have made Eſſence of that Species to which that Name ngs; and there it is not ſafe to apply or uſe otherwiſe: But in other caſes 'tis bare impro-y of Speech to apply them contrary to the common uſage he Country. But yet even this too diſturbs not the Cer-y of that Knowledge, which is ſtill to be had by a due templation and comparing of thoſe even nick-nam'd *Ideas*.

Ideas *of Subſtances have their Archetypes without us.*

11. *Thirdly*, There is another ſort of *complex* , which being referred to *Archetypes* without nay differ from them, and ſo our Knowledge t them, may come ſhort of being real. Such ur *Ideas* of Subſtances, which conſiſting of a ection of ſimple *Ideas*, ſuppoſed taken from Works of Nature, may yet vary from them, having more or different *Ideas* united in them, than are to und united in the things themſelves: From whence it comes aſs, that they may, and often do fail of being exactly con-iable to Things themſelves.

So far as they agree with those, so far our Knowledge concerning them is real.

§. 12. I say then, that to have *Ideas* of *Substances*, which, by being conformable to Things, may afford us *real* Knowledge, it is not enough, as in Modes, to put together such *Ideas* as have no inconsistence, though they did never before so exist. *V. g.* the *Ideas* of *Sacrilege* or *Perjury*, &c. were as real and true *Ideas* before, as after the Existence of any such Fact. But *our Ideas of Substances* being supposed Copies, and referred to *Archetypes* without us, must still be taken from something that does or has existed; they must not consist of *Ideas* put together at the pleasure of our Thoughts, without any real Pattern they were taken from, though we can perceive no inconsistence in such a Combination. The reason whereof is, because we knowing not what real Constitution it is of Substances, whereon our simple *Ideas* depend, and which really is the cause of the strict union of some of them one with another, and the exclusion of others; there are very few of them, that we can be sure are, or are not inconsistent in Nature, any farther than Experience and sensible Observation reaches. Herein therefore is founded the *reality* of our Knowledge concerning *Substances*, that all our complex *Ideas* of them must be such, and such only, as are made up of such simple ones, as have been discovered to co-exist in Nature. And our *Ideas* being thus true, though not, perhaps, very exact Copies, are yet the Subjects of *real* (as far as we have any) *Knowledge* of them. Which (as has been already shewed) will not be found to reach very far: But so far as it does, it will still be *real Knowledge*. Whatever *Ideas* we have, the Agreement we find they have with others, will still be Knowledge. If those *Ideas* be abstract, it will be general Knowledge. But to make it *real* concerning Substances, the *Ideas* must be taken from the real Existence of things. Whatever simple *Ideas* have been found to co-exist in any Substance, these we may with Confidence join together again, and so make abstract *Ideas* of Substances. For whatever have once had an union in Nature, may be united again.

In our Enquiries about Substances, we must consider Ideas, *and not confine our Thoughts to Names or Species supposed set out by Names.*

§. 13. This, if we rightly consider, an *confine not our Thoughts* and abstract *Ideas* t Names, as if there were, *or* could be no oth *Sorts* of Things, than what known Nam had already determined, and as it were out, we should think of Things with greate Freedom and less Confusion, than perhaps w

'Twould possibly be thought a bold Paradox, if not a very gerous Falshood, if I should say, that some *Changelings*, who 're lived forty Years together, without any appearance of Rea-, are something between a Man and a Beast: Which Preju- is founded upon nothing else but a false Supposition, that se two Names, *Man* and *Beast*, stand for distinct Species so out by real Essences, that there can come no other Species ween them: Whereas if we will abstract from those Names, the Supposition of such specifick Essences made by Nature, erein all Things of the same Denominations did exactly and ally partake; if we would not fancy, that there were a cer- number of these Essences, wherein all Things, as in Molds, e cast and formed, we should find that the *Idea* of the Shape, tion, and Life of a Man without Reason, is as much a di- t *Idea*, and makes as much a distinct *sort* of Things from n and Beast, as the *Idea* of the Shape of an *Ass* with Reason, ld be different from either that of Man or Beast, and be a ies of an Animal between, or distinct from both.

14. Here every body will be ready to ask, *angelings* may be supposed something between n and Beast, 'Pray what are they? I answer, *gelings*, which is as good a Word to signify thing different from the signification of *MAN EAST*, as the Names Man and Beast are to significations different one from the other. s, well considered, would resolve this matter, shew my meaning without any more ado. But not so unacquainted with the Zeal of some Men, which les them to spin Consequences, and to see Religion threatned, never any one ventures to quit their Forms of Speaking, ot to foresee, what Names such a Proposition as this is like e charged with: And without doubt it will be asked, If *gelings* are something between Man and Beast, what will me of them in the other World? To which I answer, concerns me not to know or enquire. To their own Ma- they stand or fall. It will make their state neither better worse, whether we determine any thing of it, or no. They n the Hands of a faithful Creator and a bountiful Father, disposes not of his Creatures according to our narrow ughts or Opinions, nor distinguishes them according to es and Species of our Contrivance. And we that know so of this present World we are in, may, I think, content elves without being peremptory in defining the different

Objection against a Changeling, being something between a Man and Beast, answered.

ſtates, which Creatures ſhall come into, when they go off this Stage. It may ſuffice us, that he hath made known to all thoſe, who are capable of Inſtruction, Diſcourſe, and Reaſoning, that they ſhall come to an account, and receive according to what they have done in this Body.

§. 15. But, *Secondly*, I anſwer, The force of theſe Mens Queſtion, (*viz.* will you deprive *Changelings* of a future ſtate?) is founded on one of two Suppoſitions, which are both falſe. The firſt is, that all Things that have the outward Shape and Appearance of a Man, muſt neceſſarily be deſigned to an immortal future Being, after this Life. Or, ſecondly, that whatever is of humane Birth, muſt be ſo. Take away theſe Imaginations, and ſuch Queſtions will be groundleſs and ridiculous. I deſire then thoſe, who think there is no more but an accidental difference between themſelves and *Changelings*, the Eſſence in both being exactly the ſame, to conſider, whether they can imagine Immortality annexed to any outward ſhape of the Body; the very propoſing it, is, I ſuppoſe, enough to make them diſown it. No one yet, that ever I heard of, how much ſoever immerſed in Matter, allow'd that Excellency to any Figure of the groſs ſenſible outward parts, as to affirm eternal Life due to it, or neceſſary conſequence of it; or that any Maſs of Matter ſhould, after its diſſolution here, be again reſtored hereafter to an everlaſting ſtate of Senſe, Perception, and Knowledge, only becauſe it was molded into this or that Figure, and had ſuch a particular frame of its viſible parts. Such an Opinion as this, placing Immortality in a certain ſuperficial Figure, turns out of doors all conſideration of Soul or Spirit, upon whoſe Account alone ſome corporeal Beings have hitherto been concluded immortal, and others not. This is to attribute more to the outſide, than inſide of Things; to place the Excellency of a Man, more in the external Shape of his Body, than internal Perfections of his Soul: which is but little better than to annex the great and ineſtimable Advantage of Immortality and Life everlaſting, which he has above other material Beings, to annex it, I ſay, to the Cut of his Beard, or the Faſhion of his Coat. For this or that outward Make of our Bodies, no more carries with it the Hopes of an eternal Duration, than the Faſhion of a Man's Suit gives him reaſonable grounds to imagine it will never wear out, or that it will make him immortal. 'Twill perhaps be ſaid, that no Body thinks that the Shape makes any thing immortal, but 'tis the Shape is the Sign of a rational Soul within, which is immortal. I

wonder

nder who made it the Sign of any ſuch Thing: for bare-ſaying it, will not make it ſo. It would require ſome oofs to perſuade one of it. No Figure that I know ſpeaks ſuch Language. For it may as rationally be concluded, t the head Body of a Man, wherein there is to be found more Appearance or Action of Life, than there is in a ue, has yet nevertheleſs a living Soul in it, becauſe of Shape; as that there is a rational Soul in a *Changeling*, auſe he has the Outſide of a rational Creature, when his ions carry far leſs Marks of Reaſon with them, in the ole courſe of his Life, than what are to be found in ny a Beaſt.

16. But 'tis the iſſue of rational Parents, *Monſters.* muſt therefore be concluded to have a ra-al Soul I know not by what Logick you muſt ſo con-e. I am ſure this is a Concluſion, that Men no where w of. For if they did, they would not make bold, as y-where they do, to deſtroy ill-formed and miſ-ſhaped luctions. Ay, but theſe are *Monſters*. Let them be ſo; at will your driveling, unintelligent, intractable *Change-* be? Shall a Defect in the Body make a *Monſter*; a De-in the Mind, (the far more Noble, and, in the common ſe, the far more Eſſential Part) not? Shall the want of ole, or a Neck, make a *Monſter*, and put ſuch Iſſue out e rank of Men; the want of Reaſon and Underſtanding, This is to bring all back again, to what was exploded now: This is to place all in the Shape, and to take Meaſure of a Man only by his Out-ſide. To ſhew that, ding to the ordinary way of Reaſoning in this Matter, le do lay the whole ſtreſs on the Figure, and reſolve whole Eſſence of the Species of Man (as they make it) the outward Shape, how unreaſonable ſoever they diſown e need but trace their Thoughts and Practice a little far-and then it will plainly appear. The well-ſhaped *Change-*; a Man, has a rational Soul, tho' it appear not; this is doubt, ſay you. Make the Ears a little longer, and more ed, and the Noſe a little flatter than ordinary, and then egin to boggle: Make the Face yet narrower, flatter, onger, and then you are at a ſtand: Add ſtill more more of the Likeneſs of a Brute to it, and let the Head rfectly that of ſome other Animal, then preſently 'tis *nſter*; and 'tis Demonſtration with you that it hath no nal Soul, and muſt be deſtroy'd. Where now (I ask)

ſhall be the juſt meaſure; which the utmoſt Bounds of that Shape, that carries with it a rational Soul? For ſince there has been Humane *Fœtus*'s produced, half Beaſt, and half Man; and others three parts one, and one part t'other; and ſo it is poſſible they may be in all the variety of Approaches to the one or the other Shape, and may have ſeveral degrees of Mixture of the Likeneſs of a Man, or a Brute, I would gladly know what are thoſe preciſe Lineaments, which according to this Hypotheſis, are, or are not capable of a rational Soul to be joined to them. What ſort of Outſide is the certain Sign that there is, or is not ſuch an Inhabitant within? For till that be done, we talk at random of *Man*: and ſhall always, I fear, do ſo, as long as we give our ſelves up to certain Sounds, and the Imaginations of ſettled and fixed Species in Nature, we know not what. But after all, I deſire it may be conſidered, that thoſe who think they have anſwered the Difficulty, by telling us, that a miſ-ſhaped *Fœtus* is a *Monſter*, run into the ſame Fault they are arguing againſt, by conſtituting a Species between Man and Beaſt. For what elſe, I pray, is their Monſter in the caſe, (if the Word *Monſter* ſignifies any thing at all) but ſomething neither Man nor Beaſt, but partaking ſomewhat of either? And juſt ſo is the *Changeling* before mentioned. So neceſſary is it to quit the common Notion of Species and Eſſences, if we will truly look into the Nature of Things, and examine them, by what our Faculties can diſcover in them as they exiſt, and not by groundleſs Fancies, that have been taken up about them.

Words and Species.

§. 17. I have mentioned this here, becauſe I think we cannot be too cautious that *Words* and *Species*, in the ordinary Notions which we have been uſed to of them, impoſe not on us. For I am apt to think, therein lies one great obſtacle to our clear and diſtinct Knowledge, eſpecially in reference to Subſtances; and from thence has roſe a great part of the Difficulties about Truth and Certainty. Would we accuſtom our ſelves to ſeparate Contemplations and Reaſonings from Words, we might, in a great meaſure, remedy this Inconvenience within our own Thoughts: But yet it would ſtill diſturb us in our Diſcourſe with others, as long as we retained the Opinion, that *Species* and their Eſſences were any thing elſe but our abſtract *Ideas*, (ſuch as they are) with Names annexed to them, to be the ſigns of them.

§. 18

18. Wherever we perceive the Agreement
isagreement of any of our *Ideas* there is cer- *Recapitula-*
Knowledge: and wherever we are sure *tion.*
Ideas agree with the reality of Things,
is certain real Knowledge. Of which Agreement of our
with the reality of Things, having here given the
s, I think I have shewn wherein it is, that *Certainty, real*
inty, consists. Which whatever it was to others, was,
fess, to me heretofore, one of those *Desiderata* which I
l great want of.

CHAP. V.

Of Truth in General.

WHat is *Truth*, was an Enquiry many Ages since; and it being that which all Mankind either r pretend to search after, it cannot but be worth our e carefully to examine wherein it consists; and so acquaint elves with the Nature of it, as to observe how the l distinguishes it from Falshood. *What Truth is.*

2. *Truth* then seems to me, in the proper rt of the Word, to signify nothing but *the g or separating of Signs, as the Things signified m, do agree or disagree one with another.* The g or *separating* of Signs here meant is what other Name, we call Proposition. So that h properly belongs only to Propositions: eof there are two Sorts, *viz.* Mental and Verbal; as are two sorts of Signs commonly made use of, *viz. Ideas* Words. *A right joining, or separating of Signs; i. e.* Ideas *or Words.*

3. To form a clear Notion of *Truth*, it is necessary to consider *Truth* of Thought, and of Words, distinctly one from another: et it is very difficult to treat of them asun- Because it is unavoidable, in treating of al Propositions, to make use of Words: and then the In- es given of *Mental Propositions*, cease immediately to be y Mental, *and* become *Verbal.* For a *mental Proposition* *Which make mental or verbal Propositions.*

being nothing but a bare Consideration of the *Ideas*, as they are in our Minds stripp'd of Names, they lose the Nature of purely *mental Propositions*, as soon as they are put into Words.

Mental Propositions are very hard to be treated of.

And that which makes it yet *harder to treat of mental* and verbal *Propositions separately*, is, That most Men, if not all, in their Thinking and Reasonings within themselves, make use of Words instead of *Ideas*, at least when the Subject of their Meditation contains in it complex *Ideas*. Which is a great Evidence of the Imperfection and Uncertainty of our *Ideas* of that kind, and may, if attentively made use of, serve for a mark to shew us, what are those Things, we have clear and perfect established *Ideas* of, and what not. For if we will curiously observe the way our Mind takes in Thinking and Reasoning, we shall find, I suppose, that when we make any Propositions within our own Thoughts, about *White* or *Black*, *Sweet* or *Bitter*, a *Triangle* or a *Circle*, we can and often do frame in our Minds the *Ideas* themselves, without reflecting on the Names. But when we would consider, or make Propositions about the more complex *Ideas*, as of a *Man*, *Vitriol*, *Fortitude*, *Glory*, we usually put the Name for the *Idea*: Because the *Ideas* these Names stand for, being for the most part imperfect, confused, and undetermined, we reflect on the *Names* themselves, because they are more clear, certain, and distinct, and readier occur to our Thoughts than the pure *Ideas*: and so we make use of these Words instead of the *Ideas* themselves, even when we would meditate and reason within our selves, and make tacit mental Propositions. In *Substances*, as has been already noted, this is occasioned by the Imperfection of our *Ideas*: we making the Name stand for the real Essence, of which we have no *Idea* at all. In *Modes*, it is occasioned by the great Number of simple *Ideas*, that go to the making them up. For many of them being compounded, the *Name* occurs much easier than the complex *Idea* it self, which requires Time and Attention to be recollected, and exactly represented to the Mind, even in those Men, who have formerly been at the Pains to do it; and is utterly impossible to be done by those, who though they have ready in their Memory, the greatest part of the common Words of their Language, yet perhaps, never troubled themselves in all their Lives, to consider what precise *Ideas* the most of them stood for. Some confused or obscure Notions have served their turns; and many who talk very much of *Religion* and *Conscience*, of *Church* and *Faith*, of *Power* and *Right*, of *Obstructions* and *Humours*, *Melancholy*,

, and *Choler*, would, perhaps, have little left in their oughts and Meditations, if one should desire them to think of the Things themselves, and lay by those Words, with ch they so often confound others, and not seldom them- es also.

Being nothing but the joining, or separating Ideas without Words.

. 5. But to return to the Consideration of ith. We must, I say, observe two sorts of Pro- tions, that we are capable of making. *irst, Mental, wherein* the *Ideas*, in our Under- dings *are* without the use of Words *put to- er, or separated* by the Mind, perceiving or ing of their Agreement, or Disagreement. *econdly, Verbal Propositions*, which *are Words* the Signs of our *s put together or separated in Affirmative or Negative Sentences.* which way of affirming or denying, these Signs, made by nds, are as it were put together or separated one from an- r. So that Proposition consists in joining, or separating ns, and Truth consists in the putting together, or separa- these Signs, according as the Things, which they stand agree or disagree.

When mental Propositions contain real Truth, and when verbal.

. 6. Every one's Experience will satisfy him, the Mind, either by perceiving or supposing Agreement or Disagreement of any of its *Ideas*, s tacitly within it self put them into a kind of position affirmative or negative, or negative, ch I have endeavoured to express by the Terms *ing together* and *Separating*. But this Action of the Mind, ch is so familiar to every Thinking and Reasoning Man, is r to be conceived by reflecting on what passes in us, when affirm or deny, than to be explained by Words. When a n has in his Mind the *Idea* of two Lines, *viz.* the *Side* and *gonal* of a Square, whereof the Diagonal is an Inch long, he have the *Idea* also of the Division of that Line, into a certain mber of equal Parts; *v. g.* into Five, Ten, an Hundred, a ousand, or any other Number, and may have the *Idea* of Inch Line, being divisible or not divisible, into such equal s, as a certain Number of them will be equal to the Side-line. w whenever he perceives, believes, or supposes such a kind Divisibility to agree or disagree to his *Idea* of that Line, he, as ere, *joins* or *separates* those two *Ideas*, *viz.* the *Idea* of that e, and the *Idea* of that kind of Divisibility, and so makes a ntal Proposition, which is true or false, according as such a d of Divisibility, a Divisibility into such *aliquot* Parts, does really

really agree to that Line or no. When *Ideas* are so put together, or separated in the Mind, as they, or the Things they stand for do agree, or not, that is, as I may call it, *mental Truth*. But *Truth of Words* is something more, and that is the affirming or denying of Words one of another, as the *Ideas* they stand for agree or disagree: And this again is two-fold. Either *purely Verbal*, and trifling, which I shall speak of, *Chap.* 10. *or Real* and instructive; which is the Object of that real Knowledge, which we have spoken of already.

Objection against verbal Truth, that thus it may all be chimerical.

§. 7. But here again will be apt to occur the same Doubt about Truth, that did about Knowledge: And it will be objected, That if Truth be nothing but the joining or separating of Words in Propositions, as the *Ideas* they stand for agree or disagree in Mens Minds, the Knowledge of *Truth is not so valuable a Thing*, it is taken to be; nor worth the Pains and Time Men imploy to the search of it: since *by this account*, it amounts to no more than the Conformity of Words, to the *Chimera's* of Mens Brains. Who knows not what odd Notions many Mens Heads are fill'd with, and what strange *Ideas* all Mens Brains are capable of? But if we rest here, we know the Truth of nothing by this Rule, but of the visionary World in our own Imaginations; nor have other Truth, but what as much concerns *Harpies* and *Centaurs*, as Men and Horses. For those, and the like, may be *Ideas* in our Heads, and have their Agreement and Disagreement there, as well as the *Ideas* of real Beings, and so have as true Propositions made about them. And 'twill be altogether as true a Proposition, to say all *Centaurs are Animals*, as that *all Men are Animals*; and the Certainty of one, as great as the other. For in both the Propositions, the Words are put together according to the Agreement of the *Ideas* in our Minds: And the Agreement of the *Idea* of *Animal*, with that of *Centaur*, is as clear and visible to the Mind, as the Agreement of the *Idea* of *Animal*, with that of *Man*; and so these two Propositions are equally true, equally certain. But of what use is all such Truth to us?

Answered, real Truth is about Ideas *agreeing to Things.*

§. 8. Though what has been said in the foregoing Chapter, to distinguish real from imaginary Knowledge, might suffice here, in answer to this Doubt, to distinguish *real Truth* from *chimerical*, or (if you please,) *barely nominal*, they depending both on the same foundation; yet it may not be amiss here again to consider, that though our Words signify nothing

ng but our *Ideas*, yet being designed by them to signify gs, the *Truth* they contain, when put into Propositions, be only *Verbal*, when they stand for *Ideas* in the Mind, have not an Agreement with the Reality of Things. therefore Truth, as well as Knowledge, may well come the distinction of *Verbal* and *Real*; that being only *ver- ruth*, wherein Terms are joined according to the Agree- or Disagreement of the *Ideas* they stand for, without re- ng whether our *Ideas* are such, as really have, or are ca- of having an existence in Nature. But then it is they in *real Truth*, when these Signs are joined, as our *Ideas* ; and when our *Ideas* are such as we know are capable ving an Existence in Nature: which in Substances she ot know, but by knowing that such have existed.

9. *Truth* is the marking down in Words, Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas* as it is. *ood* is the Marking down in Words, the A- nent or Disagreement of *Ideas* otherwise than And so far as these *Ideas* thus marked by ds, agree to their Archetypes, so far only is *ruth real.* The Knowledge of this Truth, ts in knowing what *Ideas* the Words stand for, and the ption of the Agreement or Disagreement of those *Ideas*, ding as it is marked by those Words.

Falshood is the joining of Names otherwise than their Ideas *agree.*

10. But because Words are looked on as the Conduits of Truth and Knowledge, and in conveying and receiving of Truth, and nonly in reasoning about it, we make use of ds and Propositions, I shall more at large en- , wherein the certainty of real Truths, contained in positions, consists, and where it is to be had; and endea- to shew in what sort of universal Propositions we are le of being *certain* of their real Truth, or Falshood. nall begin with general Propositions, as those which most y our Thoughts, and exercise our Contemplation. *Ge- Truths* are most looked after by the Mind, as those that enlarge our Knowledge; and by their Comprehensive- satisfying us at once of many Particulars, enlarge our and shorten our way to Knowledge.

General Propositions to be treated of more at large.

11. Besides, Truth taken in the strict before-mentioned, there are other sorts of ns; as, 1. *Moral Truth*, which is speaking gs according to the Persuasion of our own

Moral and metaphysical Truth.

Minds,

Minds, though the Proposition we speak agree not to the Re
lity of Things. 2. *Metaphysical Truth*, which is nothing b
the real Existence of Things, conformable to the *Ideas*
which we have annexed their Names. This, though it seer
to consist in the very Beings of Things, yet when consider
a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit Proposition, whe
by the Mind joins that particular Thing, to the *Idea* it h
before settled with a Name to it. But these Considerations
of Truth, either having been before taken Notice of,
not being much to our present purpose, it may suffice here on
to have mentioned them.

CHAP. VI.

Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty.

Treating of Words necessary to Knowledge.

§. 1. THough the examining and judging
Ideas by themselves, their Nam
being quite laid aside, be the be
and surest way to clear and distinct Knowledg
yet through the prevailing Custom of using Sounds for *Idea*
I think it is very seldom practised. Every one may obser
how common it is for Names to be made use of, instead of th
Ideas themselves, even when Men think and reason with
their own Breasts; especially if the *Ideas* be very complex, an
made up of a great Collection of simple ones. This mak
the consideration of Words, and Propositions, so necessary a part
the Treatise of Knowledge, that 'tis very hard to speak intelligibl
of the one, without explaining the other.

General Truths hardly to be understood, but in verbal Propositions.

§. 2. All the Knowledge we have, being onl
of particular or *general Truths*, 'tis evident, tha
whatever may be done in the former of these, th
latter, which is that, which with Reason is mo
sought after, can never be well made know
and is very *seldom apprehended, but as conceive*
and expressed in Words. It is not therefore out
our way, in the Examination of our Knowledge, to enqui
into the Truth and Certainty of universal Propositions.

§.

. But that we may not be misled in this
y that which is the Danger every-where, I
by the Doubtfulness of Terms, 'tis fit to ob-
hat Certainty is two-fold; *Certainty of Truth,*
rtainty of Knowledge. Certainty of Truth is, when Words are
together in Propositions, as exactly to express the Agree-
or Disagreement of the *Ideas* they stand for, as really it
rtainty of Knowledge is, to perceive the Agreement or Dis-
ment of *Ideas*, as expressed in any Proposition. This we
call knowing, or being certain of the Truth of any Pro-
n.

Certainty two-fold, of Truth and Knowledge

. Now because *we cannot be certain of the*
of any general Proposition, unless we know the
Bounds and Extent of the Species its Terms stand
is necessery we should know the Essence of
pecies, which is that which constitutes and
s it. This, in all simple *Ideas* and Modes,
ard to do. For in these, the real and nomi-
fence being the same; or which is all one,
stract *Idea*, which the general Term stands
eing the sole Essence and Boundary that is or can be sup-
of the *Species*, there can be no doubt, how far the *Spe-*
tends, or what Things are comprehended under each
: which, 'tis evident, are all, that have an exact Confor-
ith the *Idea* it stands for, and no other. But in Substan-
herein a real Essence distinct from the nominal, is suppo-
constitute, determine, and bound the Species, the Extent
general Word is very uncertain: because not knowing
l Essence, we cannot know what is, or is not of that
and consequently what may, or may not with Certainty
rmed of it. And thus speaking of a *Man*, or *Gold*, or
her *Species* of natural Substances, as supposed constituted
recise real Essence, which Nature regularly imparts to
ndividual of that Kind, whereby it is made to be of that
, we cannot be certain of the Truth of any Affirmation
ation made of it. For *Man*, or *Gold*, taken in this Sense,
ed for *Species* of Things, constituted by real Essences,
nt from the complex *Idea* in the Mind of the Speaker,
or we know not what, and the Extent of these Species,
ch Boundaries, are so unknown and undetermined, that
possible with any certainty, to affirm, that all Men are
l, or that all Gold is yellow. But where the nominal
: is kept to, as the Boundary of each Species, and Men
extend

No Proposition can be known to be true, where the Essence of each Species mentioned is not known.

extend the Application of any general Term no farther th to the particular Things, in which the complex *Idea* it ſtan for is to be found, there they are in no Danger to miſtake t Bounds of each *Species*, nor can be in doubt, on this Accou whether any Propoſitions be true, or no. I have choſe explain this Uncertainty of Propoſitions in this ſcholaſtick wa and have made uſe of the Terms of *Eſſences* and *Species*, purpoſe to ſhew the Abſurdity and Inconvenience there is think of them, as of any other ſort of Realities, than bare abſtract *Ideas* with Names to them. To ſuppoſe, that the *Species* of Things are any thing, but the ſorting of them under ge neral Names, according as they agree to ſeveral abſtract *Idea* of which we make thoſe Names the Signs, is to confoun Truth, and introduce Uncertainty into all general Propoſitions that can be made about them. Though therefore the Thing might, to People not poſſeſſed with ſcholaſtick Learning, b perhaps treated of, in a better and clearer way: yet thoſe wrong Notions of *Eſſences* or *Species*, having got root in moſt Peoples Minds, who have received any Tincture from the Learning which has prevailed in this part of the World, are to be diſcovered and removed, to make way for that uſe of Words, which ſhould convey certainty with it.

This more particularly concerns Subſtances.

§. 5. *The Names of Subſtances* then, *whenever made to ſtand for Species, which are ſuppoſed to b conſtituted by real Eſſence*, which we know not, *are not capable to convey Certainty to the Underſtanding*: Of the Truth of general Propoſitions made up of ſuch Terms we cannot be ſure. The Reaſon whereof is plain. For how can we be ſure that this or that Quality is in *Gold*, when we know not what is or is not *Gold*. Since in this way of ſpeaking nothing is *Gold*, but what partakes of an Eſſence, which we not knowing, cannot know where it is, or is not, and ſo cannot be ſure, that any parcel of Matter in the World is or is not in this Senſe *Gold*; being incurably ignorant, whether it has or has not that which makes any thing to be called *Gold*, *i. e.* that real Eſſence of *Gold* whereof we have no *Idea* at all. This being as impoſſible for us to know, as it is for a blind Man to tell in what Flower the Colour of a *Panſie* is, or is not to be found, whilſt he has no *Idea* of the Colour of a *Panſie* at all. Orif we could (which is impoſſible) certainly know where a real Eſſence, which we know not, is, *v. g.* in what parcels of Matter the real Eſſence of *Gold* is, yet could we not be ſure, that this or that Quality could with Truth be af-

firm'd

of *Gold*; since it is impossible for us to know, that this
at Quality or *Idea* has a necessary Connexion with a real
ce, of which we have no *Idea* at all, whatever Species
supposed real Essence may be imagined to constitute.

6. On the other side, the *Names of Substances*, made use of as they should be, for the *Ideas* have in their Minds, tho' they carry a clear determinate Signification with them, *will not ve us to make many universal Propositions, of Truth we can be certain.* Not because in e of them we are uncertain what Things gnified by them, but because the complex they stand for, are such Combinations of ones, as carry not with them any discoverable Conne- or Repugnancy, but with a very few other *Ideas.*

The Truth of few universal Propositions concerning Substances, is to be known.

7. The commplex *Ideas*, that our Names of ecies of Substances properly stand for, are tions of such Qualities, as have been obser- co-exist in an unknown *Substratum* which l *Substance*; but what other Qualities neces- co-exist with such Combinations, we can- rtainly know, unless we can discover their l Dependence; which in their primary Qualities, we can a very little way in; and in all their secondary Quali- e can discover no Connexion at all, for the Reasons ned, *Chap.* 3. *viz.* 1. Because we know not the real tutions of Substances, on which each *secondary Quality* larly depends. 2. Did we know that, it would serve for experimental (not universal) Knowledge; and reach certainty no farther, than that bare Instance. Because nderstandings can discover no conceivable Connexion n any *secondary Quality*, and any Modification whatso- f any of the *primary* ones. And therefore there are w general Propositions to be made concerning Substan- hich can carry with them *undoubted Certainty.*

Because Coexistence of Ideas in few Cases to be known.

All Gold is fixed, is a Proposition whose we cannot be certain of, how universally it be believed. For if, according to the Imagination of the Schools, any one sup- he Term *Gold* to stand for a Species of Things set out ure, by a real Essence belonging to it, 'tis evident he not what particular Substances are of that Species; cannot, with certainty, affirm any thing universally of

Instance in Gold.

Gold.

Gold. But if he makes *Gold* stand for a Species, determined by its nominal Essence, let the nominal Essence, for example, be the complex *Idea* of a *Body*, of a certain *yellow* Colour, *malleable*, *fusible* and *heavier* than any other known; in this proper use of the Word *Gold*, there is no Difficulty to know what is, or is not *Gold*. But yet no other Quality can with Certainty be universally affirmed or denied of *Gold*, but what hath a discoverable Connexion, or Inconsistency with that nominal Essence. *Fixedness*, for example, having no necessary Connexion, that we can discover, with the Colour, Weight, or any other simple *Idea* of our complex one, or with the whole Combination together; it is impossible that we should certainly know the Truth of this Proposition, That *all Gold is fixed.*

§. 9. As there is no discoverable Connexion between *Fixedness*, and the Colour, Weight, and other simple *Ideas* of that nominal Essence of *Gold*; so if we make our complex *Idea* of *Gold*, a *Body yellow*, *fusible*, *ductile*, *weighty*, and *fixed*, we shall be at the same Uncertainty concerning *Solubility* in *Aq. Regia*; and for the same Reason. Since we can never, from Consideration of the *Ideas* themselves, with Certainty affirm or deny, of a Body, whose complex *Idea* is made up of yellow, very weighty, ductile, fusible, and fixed, that it is soluble in *Aq. Regia*: And so on of the rest of its Qualities. I would gladly meet with one general Affirmation, concerning any Quality of *Gold*, that any one can certainly know is true. It will, no doubt, be presently objected, Is not this an universal certain Proposition, *All Gold is malleable*? To which I answer, It is a very certain Proposition, if *Malleableness* be a part of the complex *Idea* the word *Gold* stands for. But then here is nothing affirmed of *Gold*, but that that Sound stands for an *Idea* in which *Malleableness* is contained: And such a sort of Truth and Certainty as this, it is to say *a Centauris four-footed.* But if *Malleableness* makes not a part of the specifick Essence the Name *Gold* stands for, 'tis plain, *All Gold is malleable*, is not a certain Proposition. Because let the complex *Idea* of *Gold* be made up of which soever of its other Qualities you please, *Malleableness* will not appear to depend on that complex *Idea*, nor follow from any simple one contained in it. The Connexion that *Malleableness* has (if it has any) with those other Qualities, being only by the Intervention of the real Constitution of its insensible parts, which, since we know not, 'tis impossible we should perceive that Connexion, unless we could discover that which ties them together.

§. 1

10. The more, indeed, of these co-existing ties we unite into one complex *Idea*, under Name, the more precise and determinate we the Signification of that Word; but yet make it thereby more capable of *universal nty*, in respect of other Qualities, not con- in our complex *Idea*; since we perceive eir Connexion, or Dependance one on ano- being ignorant both of that real Constitu- in which they are all founded; and also hey flow from it. For the chief part of our ledge concerning Substances, is not, as in Things, barely of the Relation of two *Ideas*, nay exist separately; but is of the necessary Connexion Co-existence of several distinct *Ideas* in the same Subject, their Repugnances so to co-exist. Could we begin at her end, and discover what it was, wherein that Colour ted, what made a Body lighter or heavier, what Tex- f Parts made it malleable, fusible, and fix'd, and fit dissolv'd in this sort of Liquor, and not in another; if) we had such an *Idea* as this of Bodies, and could per- wherein all sensible Qualities originally consist, and they are produc'd; we might frame such abstract *Ideas* m, as would furnish us with Matter of more general ledge, and enable us to make universal Propositions, hould carry *general Truth* and *Certainty* with them. But our complex *Ideas* of the sorts of Substances, are so re- from that internal real Constitution, on which their le Qualities depend, and are made up of nothing but perfect Collection of those apparent Qualities our Senses iscover, there can be very few general Propositions con- g Substances, of whose real Truth we can be *certainly* ; since there are but few simple *Ideas*, of whose Con- n and necessary Co-existence, we can have certain and ubted Knowledge. I imagine, amongst all the *secondary ties* of Substances, and the Powers relating to them, there t any two be nam'd, whose necessary Co-existence, or gnance to co-exist, can certainly be known, unless in of the same Sense, which necessarily exclude one ano- as I have elsewhere shew'd. No one, I think, by the r that is in any Body, can certainly know what Smell, Sound, or tangible Qualities it has, nor what Altera- it is capable to make, or receive, on, or from other Bo-

As far as any such Co-existence can be known, so far universal Propositions may be certain. But this will go but a little way because

dies. The same may be said of the Sound or Taste, &c. Our specifick Names of Substances standing for any Collections of such *Ideas*, 'tis not to be wonder'd, that we can, with them make very few general Propositions of *undoubted real Certainty*. But yet so far as any complex *Idea*, of any sort of Substances, contains in it any simple *Idea*, whose necessary Co-existence with any other may be discover'd, so far *universal Propositions* may *with Certainty* be made concerning it: *v. g.* Could any one discover a necessary Connexion between *Malleableness*, and the *Colour* or *Weight* of *Gold*, or any other part of the complex *Idea* signify'd by that Name, he might make a *certain* universal Proposition concerning *Gold* in this respect; and the real Truth of this Proposition. That *all Gold is malleable*, would be as *certain* as of this, *The three Angles of all right-lin'd Triangles, are equal to two right ones.*

The Qualities which make our complex Ideas of Substances, depend mostly on external, remote, and unperceiv'd Causes.

§. 11. Had we such *Ideas* of Substances, as to know what real Constitutions produce those sensible Qualities we find in them, and how those Qualities flow'd from thence, we could, by the specifick *Ideas* of their real Essences in our Minds, more certainly find out their Properties, and discover what Qualities they had, or had not, than we can now by our Senses: And to know the Properties of *Gold*, it would be no more necessary that *Gold* should exist, and that we should make Experiments upon it, than it is necessary for the knowing the Properties of a Triangle, that a Triangle should exist in any Matter, the *Idea* in our Minds would serve for the one, as well as the other. But we are so far from being admitted into the Secrets of Nature, that we scarce so much as ever approach the first Entrance towards them. For we are wont to consider the Substances we meet with, each of them as an entire Thing by it self, having all its Qualities in it self, and independent of other Things; over-looking, for the most part, the Operations of those invisible Fluids they are encompass'd with; and upon whose Motions and Operations depend the greatest part of those Qualities which are taken Notice of in them, and are made by us the inherent Marks of Distinction, whereby we know and denominate them. Put a Piece of *Gold* any where by it self, separate from the Reach and Influence of all other Bodies, it will immediately lose all its Colour and Weight, and, perhaps, Malleableness too: Which, for ought

w, would be chang'd into a perfect Friability. *Water*, ich to us *Fluidity* is an essential Quality, left to it self, cease to be fluid. But if inanimate Bodies owe so of their present State to other Bodies without them, ney would not be what they appear to us, were those that inviron them remov'd, it is yet more so in *Vege-* which are nourish'd, grow, and produce Leaves, rs, and Seeds, in a constant Succession. And if we little nearer into the State of *Animals*, we shall find, eir Dependence, as to Life, Motion, and the most con- le Qualities to be observ'd in them, is so wholly on ical Causes and Qualities of other Bodies, that make t of them, that they cannot subsist a Moment without Though yet those Bodies on which they depend, are aken Notice of, and make no part of the complex *Ideas* me of those Animals. Take the Air but a Minute from eatest part of living Creatures, and they presently lose Life, and Motion. This the Necessity of Breathing has into our Knowledge. But how many other extrinsi- d possibly very remote Bodies, do the Springs of those ble Machines depend on, which are not vulgarly ob- or so much as thought on; and how many are there, the severest Enquiry can never discover? The Inhabi- of this Spot of the Universe, though remov'd so many ns of Miles from the Sun, yet depend so much on the emper'd Motion of Particles coming from, or agitated that were this Earth remov'd, but a small part of that ce out of its present Situation, and plac'd a little far- nearer that Source of Heat, 'tis more than probable, he greatest part of the Animals in it, would immedi- erish: Since we find them so often destroy'd by an or Defect of the Sun's Warmth, which an accidental n, in some parts of this our little Globe, exposes them he Qualities observ'd in a *Load-stone*, must needs have ource far beyond the Confines of that Body; and the e made often on several sorts of Animals, by invisible , the certain Death (as we are told) of some of them, ely passing the Line, or, as 'tis certain of others, by remov'd into a neighbouring Country, evidently shew, e Concurrence and Operation of several Bodies, with they are seldom thought to have any thing to do, is tely necessary to make them be what they appear to d to preserve those Qualities, by which we know and

distinguish them. We are then quite out of the Way, wh we think that Things contain within themselves the Q lities that appear to us in them: And we in vain search that Constitution within the Body of a Fly, or an Elepha upon which depend those Qualities and Powers we obse in them. For which, perhaps, to understand them aright we ought to look, not only beyond this our Earth and A mosphere, but even beyond the Sun, or remotest Star our Ey have yet discover'd. For how much the Being and Oper tion of particular Substances in this our Globe, depend Causes utterly beyond our view, is impossible for us to dete mine. We see and perceive some of the Motions, and gros Operations of Things here about us; but whence the Strea come that keep all these curious Machines in Motion an Repair, how convey'd and modify'd, is beyond our Notic and Apprehension; and the great Parts and Wheels, as I ma so say, of this stupendious Structure of the Universe, may for ought we know, have such a Connexion and Depend in their Influences and Operations one upon another, th perhaps, Things in this our Mansion, would put on quit another Face, and cease to be what they are, if some one o the Stars, or great Bodies incomprehensibly remote from u should cease to be, or move as it does. This is certain, Thing however absolute and entire they seem in themselves, are bu Retainers to other parts of Nature, for that which they ar most taken Notice of by us. Their observable Qualitie Actions, and Powers, are owing to someting without them and there is not so compleat and perfect a part, that w know, of Nature, which does not owe the Being it has, an the Excellencies of it, to its Neighbours; and we must no confine our Thoughts within the Surface of any Body, bu look a great deal farther, to comprehend perfectly those Qu lities that are in it.

§. 12. If this be so, it's not to be wonder'd, that *we ha very imperfect* Ideas *of Substances*; and that the real Essence on which depend their Properties and Operations, are unknow to us. We cannot discover so much as that *Size*, *Figur* and *Texture* of their minute and active Parts, which is real in them; much less the different Motions and Impulses mad in, and upon them by Bodies from without, upon which d pends, and by which is form'd the greatest and most rema kable Part of those Qualities we observe in them, and which our complex *Ideas* of them are made up. This Con

deratio

n alone is enough to put an end to all our Hopes of ving the *Ideas* of their real Essences; which, whilst we the nominal Essences, we make use of instead of them, able to furnish us but very sparingly with any *gene-owledge*, or universal Propositions capable of real *Cer-*

3. We are not therefore to wonder, if *Cer-* be to be found in very few general Propo- made concerning Substances: Our Know- f their Qualities and Properties go very farther than our Senses reach and inform ossibly inquisitive and observing Men may, ngth of *Judgment*, penetrate farther, and on Probabilities rom wary Observation, and Hints well laid together, ueſs right at what Experience has not yet discover'd n. But this is but guessing still; it amounts only to n, and has not that *Certainty* which is requisite to edge. For all *general Knowledge* lies only in our own nts, and consists barely in the Contemplation of our bstract *Ideas*. Where-ever we perceive any Agreement greement amongst them, there we have *general Know-* and by putting the Names of those *Ideas* together ac- ly in Propositions, can with *Certainty* pronounce *gene-hs*. But because the abstract *Ideas* of Substances, for their specifick Names stand, whenever they have any and determinate Signification, have a discoverable ion or Inconsistency with but a very few other *Ideas*, *ainty of universal Propositions concerning Substances*, is ve- ow and scanty in that part, which is our principal y concerning them; and there is scarce any of the of Substances, let the *Idea* it is apply'd to, be what it which we can generally, and with Certainty pro- , that it has or has not this or that other Quality be- to it, and constantly co-existing or inconsistent with *a*, where-ever it is to be found.

Judgment may reach farther, but that is not Knowledge.

4. Before we can have any tolerable Know- f this kind, we must first know what s the *primary Qualities* of one Body, do y produce in the *primary Qualities* of ano- nd how. *Secondly*, we must know what *Qualities* of any Body, produce certain ns, or *Ideas* in us. This is in Truth, no less than to ll the Effects of Matter, under it divers Modifications

What is requisite for our Knowledge of Substances.

of Bulk, Figure, Cohesion of Parts, Motion, and Re
Which, I think, every Body will allow, is utterly impossib
to be known by us, without Revelation. Nor if it were r
veal'd to us, what sort of Figure, Bulk, and Motion of Co
puscles, would produce in us the Sensation of a *yellow* C
lour, and what sort of Figure, Bulk, and Texture of Pa
in the Superfices of any Body, were fit to give such Corpu
cles their due Motion to produce that Colour. Would th
be enough to make *universal* Propositions with *Certainty*, co
cerning the several sorts of them, unless we had Faculti
acute enough to perceive the precise Bulk, Figure, Textur
and Motion of Bodies in those minute Parts, by which the
operate on our Senses, that so we might by those frame ou
abstract *Ideas* of them. I have mention'd here only *corporea*
Substances, whose Operations seem to lie more level to our
Understandings: For as to the *Operations of Spirits*, both the
thinking and moving of Bodies, we at first Sight find ou
selves at a loss; though perhaps, when we have apply'd ou
Thoughts a little nearer to the Consideration of Bodies, and
their Operations, and examin'd how far our Notions, even
in these, reach, with any Clearness, beyond sensible Matte
of Fact, we shall be found to confess, that even in these to
our Discourses amount to very little beyond perfect Ign
rance and Incapacity.

Whilst our Ideas of Substances contain not their real Constitutions, we can make but few general certain Propositions concerning them.

§. 15. This is evident, *the abstract complex Ide*
of Substances, for which their general Names stand,
not comprehending their real Constitutions, *a*
afford us but very little universal Certainty. Becau
our *Ideas* of them are not made up of that, o
which those Qualities we observe in them, an
would inform our selves about, do depend, o
with which they have any certain Connexion
V. g. Let the *Idea* to which we give the Nam
Man, be, as it commonly is, a Body of the o
dinary Shape, with Sense, voluntary Motion, an
Reason join'd to it. This being the abstract *Id*
and consequently the Essence of our Species *Ma*
we can make but very few general certain Pr
positions concerning *Man*, standing for such an *Idea*. Be
cause not knowing the real Constitution on which Sensation
Power of Motion, and Reasoning, with that peculiar Shape
depend, and whereby they are united together in the same
Subject, there are very few other Qualities, with which w
ca

erceive them to have a neceſſary Connexion; and there-
ve cannot with Certainty affirm, That *all Men ſleep by*
als; that *no Man can be nouriſh'd by Wood or Stones*;
all Men will be poyſon'd by Hemlock: Becauſe theſe *Ideas*
no Connexion nor Repugnancy with this our nominal
e of *Man*, with this abſtract *Idea* that Name ſtands for.
uſt in theſe and the like appeal to Tryal in particular
ts, which can reach but a little way. We muſt con-
ur ſelves with Probability in the reſt; but can have no
l Certainty, whilſt our ſpecifick *Idea* of *Man* contains
at real Conſtitution, which is the Root wherein all his
rable Qualities are united, and from whence they flow.
t our *Idea* the Word *Man* ſtands for, is only an im-
Collection of ſome ſenſible Qualities and Powers in
here is no diſcernible Connexion or Repugnance be-
our ſpecifick *Idea*, and the Operation of either the
of Hemlock or Stones, upon his Conſtitution. There
nimals that ſafely eat Hemlock, and others that are
h'd by Wood and Stones: But as long as we want
f thoſe real Conſtitutions of different ſorts of Animals,
n theſe, and the like Qualities and Powers depend,
uſt not hope to reach *Certainty* in univerſal Propoſitions
ning them. Thoſe few *Ideas* only, which have a diſ-
e Connexion with our nominal Eſſence, or any part
can afford us much ſuch Propoſitions. But theſe are
, and of ſo little Moment, that we may juſtly look
certain *general Knowledge of Subſtances*, as almoſt none

Wherein lies the general Certainty of Propoſitions.

6. To conclude, *general Propoſitions*, of
kind ſoever, are then only capable of *Cer-*
when the Terms uſed in them ſtand for
leas, whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement,
e expreſs'd, is capable to be diſcover'd by
nd we are then certain of their Truth or
od, when we perceive the *Ideas* the Terms ſtand for,
, or not agree, according as they are affirm'd or de-
ne of another. Whence we may take Notice, that
Certainty is never to be found but in our *Ideas*. When-
go to ſeek it elſewhere in Experiment, or Obſervati-
thout us, our Knowledge goes not beyond Particulars.
Contemplation of our own abſtract *Ideas*, that alone
to afford us *general Knowledge*.

CHAP. VII.

Of Maxims.

They are Self-evident.

§. 1. THere are a sort of Propositions, which under the Name of *Maxims* and *Axioms*, have pass'd for Principles of Science: And because they are *self-evident*, have been suppos'd innate, without that any Body (that I know) ever went about to shew the Reason and Foundation of their Clearness or Cogency. It may however be worth while to enquire into the Reason of their Evidence, and see whether it be peculiar to them alone, and also examine how far they influence and govern our other Knowledge.

Wherein that Self-evidence consists.

§. 2. *Knowledge*, as has been shewn, consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*: Now, where that Agreement or Disagreement is perceiv'd immediately by it self, without the Intervention or Help of any other, there our *Knowledge is self-evident*. This will appear to be so to any one, who will but consider any of those Propositions, which, without any Proof, he assents to at first Sight; for in all of them he will find, that the Reason of his Assent, is from that Agreement or Disagreement, which the Mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in those *Ideas* answering the Affirmation or Negation in the Proposition.

Self-evidence not peculiar to receiv'd Axioms.

§. 3. This being so, in the next Place let us consider, whether this *Self-evidence* be peculiar only to those Propositions which commonly pass under the Name of Maxims, and have the Dignity of Axioms allow'd them. And here 'tis plain, that several other Truths, not allow'd to be Axioms, partake equally with them in this *Self-evidence*. This we shall see, if we go over these several sorts of Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, which I have above-mention'd, *viz.* Identity, Relation, Co-existence, and real Existence; which will discover to us, that not only those few Propositions, which have had the Credit of *Maxims*

elf-evident, but a great many, even almoſt an infinite ıber of *other Propoſitions* are ſuch.

4. For, *Firſt*, the immediate Perception e Agreement or Diſagreement of *Identity*, g founded in the Mind's having diſtinct , this affords us as many *ſelf-evident* Pro- ions, as we have diſtinct *Ideas*. Every hat has any Knowledge at all, has, as the ıdation of it, various and diſtinct *Ideas*: it is the firſt Act of the Mind, (without which, it can be capable of any Knowledge) to know every one of *leas* by its ſelf, and diſtinguiſh it from others. Every finds in himſelf, that he knows the *Ideas* he has: he knows alſo, when any one is in his Underſtanding, what it is: And that when more than one are there, he vs them diſtinctly and confuſedly one from another. ch always being ſo, (it being impoſſible but that he ld perceive what he perceives) he can never be in doubt ı any *Idea* is in his Mind, that it is there, and is that t is; and that two diſtinct *Ideas*, when they are in his l, are there, and are not one and the ſame *Idea*. So that ıch Affirmations, and Negations, are made without any ıbility of Doubt, Uncertainty, or Heſitation, and muſt ſarily be aſſented to, as ſoon as underſtood; that is, as as we have, in our Minds, determin'd *Ideas*, which the ns in the Propoſition ſtand for. And therefore where- the Mind with Attention conſiders any Propoſition, ſo perceive the two *Ideas*, ſignify'd by the Terms, and af- d or deny'd one of the other, to be the ſame or diffe- it is preſently and infallibly certain of the Truth of a Propoſition, and this equally whether theſe Propoſiti- be in Terms ſtanding for more general *Ideas*, or ſuch as eſs ſo, *v. g.* whether the general *Idea* of *Being* be affirm'd ſelf, as in this Propoſition, *whatſoever is, is*; or a more cular *Idea* be affirm'd of it ſelf, as *a Man is a Man*, or *ever is White, is White*. Or whether the *Idea* of *Being* in al be deny'd of *not Being*, which is the only (if I may ll it) *Idea* different from it, as in this other Propoſition, *impoſſible for the ſame to be, and not to be*; or any *Idea* of particular Being be deny'd of another different from it, *Man is not a Horſe*; *Red is not Blue*. The Difference of *Ideas*, as ſoon as the Terms are underſtood, makes the n of the Propoſition preſently viſible, and that with an

First, As to Identity and Diverſity, all Propoſitions are equally ſelf-evident.

equal

equal Certainty and Easiness in the less, as well as the more general Propositions, and all for the same Reason, *viz.* because the Mind perceives in any *Ideas*, that it has the same *Idea* to the same with it self; and two different *Ideas* to be different, and not the same. And this it is equally certain of, whether these *Ideas* be more or less general, abstract, and comprehensive. It is not therefore alone to these two general Propositions, *Whatsoever is, is*; and, *It is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be*; that this Self-evidence belongs by any peculiar Right. The Perception of being, or not being, belongs no more to these vague *Ideas*, signify'd by the Terms *Whatsoever* and *Thing*, than it does to any other *Ideas*. These two general Maxims amounting to no more, in short, but this, that *the same is the same*, and *same is not different*, are Truths known in more particular Instances, as well as in these general Maxims, and known also in particular Instances, before these general Maxims are ever thought on, and draw all their Force from the Discernment of the Mind employ'd about particular *Ideas*. There is nothing more visible, than that the Mind, without the help of any Proof or Reflection on either of these general Propositions, perceives so clearly, and knows so certainly, that the *Idea* of White, is the *Idea* of White, and not the *Idea* of Blue; and that the *Idea* of White, when it is in the Mind, is there, and is not absent, that the Consideration of these Axioms can add nothing to the Evidence or Certainty of its Knowledge. Just so it is (as every one may experiment in himself) in all the *Ideas* a Man has in his Mind: He knows each to be it self, and not to be another; and to be in his Mind, and not away, when it is there, with a Certainty that cannot be greater; and therefore the Truth of no general Proposition can be known with a greater Certainty, nor add any thing to this. So that in respect of Identity, our intuitive Knowledge reaches as far as our *Ideas*. And we are capable of making as many self-evident Propositions, as we have Names for distinct *Ideas*. And I appeal to every one one's own Mind, whether this Proposition, *A Circle is a Circle*, be not as self-evident a Proposition, as that consisting of more general Terms, *Whatsoever is, is*: And again, whether this Proposition, *Blue is not Red*, be not a Proposition that the Mind can no more doubt of, as soon as it understands the Words, than it does of that Axiom, *It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*? And so of all the like.

§. 5. *Se-*

5. *Secondly*, As to *Co-existence*, or such ne- *Secondly, In Co-existence we have few self-evident Propositions.*
y Connexion between two *Ideas*, that in subject where one of them is suppos'd, the other must necessarily be also; of Agreement or Disagreement as this, the d has an immediate Perception but in re- w of them; and therefore in this Sort we but very little intuitive Knowledge. Nor are there to ound very many Propositions that are self-evident, tho' there are; *v. g.* the *Idea* of filling a Place equal to the tents of its Superficies, being annex'd to our *Idea* of Bo- I think it is a self-evident Proposition, *That two Bodies ot be in the same Place.*

6. *Thirdly*, As to the *Relations* of Modes, *Thirdly, In other Relations we may have.*
nematicians have fram'd many Axioms con- ng that one Relation of Equality. As *ls taken from Equals, the Remainder will be ls*; which, with the rest of that Kind, how- they are receiv'd for Maxims by the Mathematicians, and unquestionable Truths; yet, I think, that any one who iders them, will not find that they have a clearer Self-e- nce than these, that *one and one are equal to two*; that *if ake from the five Fingers of one Hand two, and from the five ers of the other Hand two, the remaining Numbers will be e-*

These, and a thousand other such Propositions, may be d in Numbers, which, at very first Hearing, force the As- and carry with them an equal, if not greater Clearness, those mathematical Axioms.

7. *Fourthly*, As to *real Existence*, since *Fourthly, Concerning real Existance, we have none.*
as no Connexion with any other of our , but that of our selves, and of a first Be- we have in that, concerning the real Ex- ce of all other Beings, not so much as de- strative, much less a self-evident Know- e; and therefore concerning those, there are no Maxims.

8. In the next Place let us consider, what *These Axioms do not much influence our other Knowledge.*
ence these receiv'd Maxims have upon the r Parts of our Knowledge. The Rules e- ish'd in the Schools, that all Reasonings *ex præcognitis, & præconcessis*, seem to lay foundation of all other Knowledge in these ims, and to suppose them to be *præcognita*; reby, I think, is meant these two Things; First, That

these

these Axioms are those Truths that are first known to the Mind; and secondly, that upon them the other Parts of our Knowledge depend.

Because they are not the Truths we first knew.

§. 9. *First*, That they are not the *Truths first known* to the Mind, is evident to Experience, as we have shewn in another Place, *B.* I. *Ch.* II. Who perceives not, that a Child certainly knows that a Stranger is not its Mother; that its Sucking-Bottle is not the Rod, long before he knows that *'tis impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be?* And how many Truths are there about Numbers, which it is obvious to observe, that the Mind is perfectly acquainted with, and fully convinc'd of, before it ever thought on these general Maxims, to which Mathematicians, in their Arguings, do sometimes refer them? Whereof the Reason is very plain: For that which makes the Mind assent to such Propositions, being nothing else but the Perception it has of the Agreement or Disagreement of its *Ideas*, according as it finds them affirm'd or deny'd one of another, in Words it understands, and every *Idea* being known to be what it is, and every two distinct *Ideas* being known not to be the same, it must necessarily follow, that such self-evident Truths must be *first* known, which consist of *Ideas* that are *first* in the Mind; and the *Ideas first* in the Mind, 'tis evident, are those of particular Things, from whence, by slow Degrees, the Understanding proceeds to some few general ones; which being taken from the ordinary and familiar Objects of Sense, are general Names to them. Thus particular *Ideas* are *first* receiv'd and distinguish'd, and so Knowledge got about them; and next to them, the less general, or specifick, which are next to particular: For abstract *Ideas* are not so obvious or easy to Children, or the yet unexercis'd Mind, as particular ones. If they seem to grow Men, 'tis only because by constant and familiar Use they are made so: For when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find, that general *Ideas* are Fictions and Contrivances of the Mind, that carry Difficulty with them, and do not easily offer themselves, as we are apt to imagine. For Example, Does it not require some Pains and Skill to form the general *Idea* of a *Triangle*, (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult) for it must be neither Oblique, nor Rectangle, neither Equilaterial, Equicrural, nor Scalenon; but all and none of these at once. In Effect it is something imperfect, that cannot

exiſt; an *Idea* wherein ſome Parts of ſeveral different and nſiſtent *Ideas* are put together. 'Tis true, the Mind in imperfect State has need of ſuch *Ideas*, and makes all the e to them it can, for the Conveniency of Communica- nd Enlargement of Knowledge; to both which it is na- lly very much enclin'd. But yet one has Reaſon to ſuſ- ſuch *Ideas* are Marks of our Imperfection; at leaſt, is enough to ſhew, that the moſt abſtract and general *I-* are not thoſe that the Mind is *firſt* and moſt eaſily ac- nted with, nor ſuch as its earlieſt Knowledge is conver- about.

Becauſe on them the other Parts of our Knowledge do not depend.

10. *Secondly*, From what has been ſaid, it ly follows, that theſe magnify'd *Maxims*, ot the Principles and *Foundations* of all our *Knowledge*. For if there be a great many Truths, which have as much Self-evi- e as they, and a great many that we know e them, it is impoſſible they ſhould be the *iples* from which we deduce all other Truths. Is it im- le to know that *one* and *two* are equal to *three*, but by ne of this, or ſome ſuch Axiom, *viz. The Whole is equal its Parts taken together?* Many a one knows that *one* and e equal to *three*, without having heard, or thought on or any other Axiom by which it might be prov'd; nows it as certainly as any other Man knows, that the *is equal to all its Parts*, or any other Maxim; and all the ſame Reaſon of Self-evidence; the Equality of thoſe being as viſible and certain to him without that, or a- ther Axiom, as with it, it needing no Proof to make it v'd. Nor after the Knowledge, *That the Whole is equal its Parts*, does he know that *one and two are equal to three*, , or more certainly than he did before. For if there y odds in thoſe *Ideas*, the *Whole* and *Parts* are more ob- or at leaſt more difficult to be ſettl'd in the Mind, thoſe of *one*, *two*, and *three*. And indeed I think I isk theſe Men, who will needs have all Knowledge be- hoſe general Principles themſelves, to *depend* on gene- nate, and ſelf-evident Principles? What Principle is ite to prove, that *one* and *one* are *two*, that *two* and *two ur*, that *three* times *two* are *ſix*? Which being known ut any Proof, do evince, that either all Knowledge does *pend* on certain *præcognita*, or general Maxims, call'd ples, or elſe that theſe are Principles; and if theſe

are

are to be counted Principles, a great Part of Numeratio will be so. To which, if we add all the self-evident Propositions which may be made about all our distinct *Ideas* Princeples will be almost infinite, at least innumerable, whic Men arrive to the Knowledge of at different Ages; and great many of these innate Principles, they never come t know all their Lives. But whether they come in View o the Mind earlier or later, this is true of them, that they ar all known by their native Evidence, are wholly independent receive no Light, nor any capable of any Proof one from a- nother, much less the more particular from the general; o the more simple from the more compounded; the more sim- ple, and less abstract, being the most familiar, and the eas- er and earlier apprehended. But which ever be the clearest *Ideas*, the Evidence and *Certainty* of all such Propositions is in this, That a Man sees the same *Idea* to be the same *Idea*, and infallibly perceives two different *Ideas* to be different *I- deas*. For when a Man has in his Understanding the *Ide- as* of *one* and of *two*, the *Idea* of *Yellow* and the *Idea* of *Blue*, he cannot but certainly know, that the *Idea* of one is the *I- dea* of one, and not the *Idea* of two; and that the *Idea* of Yellow is the *Idea* of Yellow, and not the *Idea* of Blue. For a Man cannot confound the *Ideas* in his Mind, which he has distinct: That would be to have them confus'd and di- stinct at the same Time, which is a Contradiction; and to have none distinct, is to have no Use of our Faculties, to have no Knowledge at all. And therefore what *Idea* soever is affirm'd of it self, or whatsoever two entire distinct *Ideas* are deny'd one of another, the Mind cannot but assent to such a Proposition, as infallibly true, as soon as it under- stands the Terms, without Hesitation or need of Proof, or regarding those made in more general Terms, and call'd Maxims.

What use these general Maxims have.

§. 11. What shall we then say? Are these *general Maxims* of no Use? By no Means; though perhaps their Use is not that which is commonly taken to be. But since doubting in the least of what hath been by some Men ascrib'd to these *Maxims*, may be apt to be cry'd out a- gainst, as overturning the Foundations of all the Sciences it may be worth while to consider them, with Respect to o- ther Parts of our Knowledge, and examine more particular- ly to what Purposes they serve, and to what not.

It is evident from what has been already said, that they f no Use to prove or confirm less general self-evident ositions.

'Tis as plain that they are not, nor have been the Foun- ns whereon any Science hath been built. There is, I , a great deal of Talk, propagated from Scholastick of Sciences and the *Maxims* on which they are built: has been my ill Luck, never no meet with any such es; much less any one built upon these two *Maxims*, *is, is*; and *It is impossible for the same to be, and not to be.* I would be glad to be shewn where any such Science d upon these, or any other general *Axioms* is to be ; and should be oblig'd to any one who would lay me the Frame and System of any Science so built on or any such like *Maxims*, that could not be shewn to as firm without any Consideration of them. I ask, ner these general *Maxims* have not the same Use in the of Divinity, and in Theological Questions, that they n the other Sciences? They serve here too, to silence glers, and put an end to Dispute. But I think that ody will therefore say, that the *Christian* Religion is on these *Maxims*, or that the Knowledge we have of leriv'd from these *Principles*. 'Tis from Revelation we eceiv'd it, and without Revelation, these *Maxims* had been able to help us to it. When we find out an *Idea*, ose Intervention we discover the Connexion of two this is a Revelation from God to us, by the Voice of . For we then come to know a Truth that we did ow before. When God declares any Truth to us, this velation to us by the Voice of his Spirit, and we are d in our Knowledge. But in neither of these do we our Light or Knowledge from *Maxims*. But in the e Things themselves afford it, and we see the Truth n by perceiving their Agreement or Disagreement. In er, God himself affords it immediately to us, and we Truth of what he says in his unerring Veracity.

hey are not of use to help Men forwards in the Ad- ent of Sciences, or new Discoveries of yet unknown , Mr. *Newton*, in his never enough to be admir'd has demonstrated several Propositions, which are so new Truths, before unknown to the World, and are Advances in Mathematical Knowledge: But for the ry of these it was not the general *Maxims*, *What is, is*;

is; or, *the Whole is bigger than a Part*, or the like, that help him. These were not the Clues that lead him into the Discovery of the Truth and Certainty of those Propositions. Nor was it by them that he got the Knowledge of those Demonstrations; but by finding out intermediate *Ideas*, that shew'd the Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas*, as expres'd in the Propositions he demonstrated. This is the great Exercise and Improvement of human Understanding in the enlarging of Knowledge, and advancing the Sciences; wherein they are far enough from receiving any Help from the Contemplation of these, or the like magnify'd *Maxims*. Would those who have this traditional Admiration of these Propositions, that they think no Step can be made in Knowledge without the Support of an *Axiom*, no Stone laid in the building of the Sciences without a general *Maxim*, but distinguish between the Method of acquiring Knowledge, and of communicating between the Method of raising any Science, and that of teaching it to others as far as it is advanced, they would see that those general *Maxims* were not the Foundations on which the first Discoveries raised their admirable Structures, nor the Keys that unlock'd and open'd those Secrets of Knowledge. Though afterwards, when Schools were erected, and Sciences had their Professors to teach what others had found out, they often made use of *Maxims*, *i. e.* laid down certain Proportions which were self-evident, or to be receiv'd for true, which being settl'd in the Minds of their Scholars, as unquestionable Verities, they on occasion made use of, to convince them of Truths in particular Instances, that were not so familiar to their Minds as those general *Axioms* which had before been inculcated to them, and carefully settl'd in their Minds. Though these particular Instances, when well reflected on, are no less self-evident to the Understanding, than the general *Maxims* brought to confirm them: And it was in those particular Instances, that the first Discoverer found the Truth, without the help of the general *Maxims*: And so may any one else do, who with Attention considers them.

To come therefore to the Use that is made of *Maxims*.

1. They are of Use, as has been observ'd, in the ordinary Methods of teaching Sciences as far as they are advanc'd: But of little or none in advancing them farther.

2. They are of Use in Disputes, for the silencing of obstinate Wranglers, and bringing those Contests to some Con-

clusion

on. Whether a need of them to that End, came not in, ıe Manner following, I crave Leave to enquire. The ols having made Diſputation the Touch-ſtone of Mens A- es, and the *Criterion* of Knowledge, adjudg'd Victory to that kept the Field; and he that had the laſt Word, was luded to have the better of the Argument, if not of the e. But becauſe by this Means there was like to be no ſion between skilful Combatants, whilſt one never fail'd *medius terminus* to prove any Propoſition, and the other l as conſtantly, without, or with a Diſtinction, deny *Major* or *Minor*. To prevent, as much as could be, the ing out of Diſputes into an endleſs Train of Syllogiſms, in general Propoſitions, moſt of them indeed ſelf-evi- were introduc'd into the Schools, which being ſuch as ſen allow'd and agreed in, were look'd on as general ures of Truth, and ſerv'd inſtead of Principles, (where Diſputants had not laid down any other between them) nd which there was no going, and which muſt not be ed from by either Side. And thus theſe *Maxims* getting Name of *Principles*, beyond which Men in Diſpute could etreat, were by Miſtake taken to be the Originals and es from whence all Knowledge began, and the Foun- ns whereon the Sciences were built; becauſe when in Diſputes they came to any of theſe, they ſtopp'd there, vent no farther, the Matter was determin'd. But how this is a Miſtake, hath been already ſhewn.

is Method of the Schools, which have been thought ountains of Knowledge, introduc'd, as I ſuppoſe, the Uſe of theſe Maxims, into a great Part of Converſation f the Schools, to ſtop the Mouth of Cavillers, whom a- ıe is excus'd from arguing any longer with, when they theſe general ſelf-evident Principles receiv'd by all rea- ıle Men, who have once thought of them; but yet Uſe herein, is but to put an End to Wrangling. They uth, when urg'd in ſuch Caſes, teach nothing; that ady done by the intermediate *Ideas* made uſe of in the te, whoſe Connexion may be ſeen without the Help of Maxims, and ſo the Truth known before the Maxim duc'd, and the Argument brought to a firſt Principle. would give off a wrong Argument before it came to if in their Diſputes they propos'd to themſelves the find- ad embracing of Truth, and not a Conteſt for Victo- And thus Maxims have their Uſe to put a Stop to their

Perverseness, whose Ingenuity should have yielded sooner. But the Method of the Schools having allow'd and encouraged Men to oppose and resist evident Truths, 'till they are baffl'd, *i. e.* 'till they are reduc'd to contradict themselves or some establish'd Principle, 'tis no Wonder that they should not, in civil Conversation, be asham'd of that which in the Schools is counted a Vertue and a Glory, *viz.* obstinately to maintain that Side of the Question they have chosen, whether true or false, to the last Extremity, even after Conviction: A strange Way to attain Truth and Knowledge; and that which I think the rational Part of Mankind, not corrupted by Education, could scarce believe should ever be admitted amongst the Lovers of Truth, and Students of Religion or Nature; or introduc'd into the Seminaries of those who are to propagate the Truths of Religion or Philosophy amongst the Ignorant and Unconvinc'd. How much such a Way of Learning is likely to turn young Mens Minds from the sincere Search and Love of Truth; nay, and to make them doubt whether there is any such Thing, or at least worth adhering to, I shall not now enquire. This, I think, that bating those Places which brought the *Peripatetick* Philosophy into their Schools, where it continu'd many Ages, without teaching the World any Thing but the Art of Wrangling; these Maxims were no where thought the Foundations on which the Sciences were built, nor the great Helps to the Advancement of Knowledge.

What Use these general Maxims have.

As to these *general Maxims* therefore, they are, as I have said, of great *Use* in Disputes, *to stop the Mouths of Wranglers*; but not of much *Use* to the Discovery of unknown Truths, or to help the Mind forwards in its Search after Knowledge: For whoever began to build his Knowledge on this general Proposition, *What is, is*; or, *it is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be*; and from either of these, as from a Principle of Science, deduc'd a *System* of useful Knowledge; wrong Opinions often involving Contradictions, one of these Maxims, as a Touch-stone, may *serve* well to shew whether they lead. But yet, however fit to lay open the Absurdity or Mistake of a Man's Reasoning or Opinion, they are of very little *Use* for enlightning the Understanding; and it will not be found, that the Mind receives much Help from them in its Progress in Knowledge; which would be neither less, nor less certain, were these two *general Propositions*

never thought on. 'Tis true, as I have said, they some-
es *serve* in Argumentation to stop a Wrangler's Mouth,
hewing the Absurdity of what he saith, and by exposing
to the Shame of contradicting what all the World knows,
he himself cannot but own to be true. But it is one
ng to shew a Man that he is in an Error, and another to
him in Possession of Truth; and I would fain know
t Truths these two Propositions are able to teach, and by
r Influence make us know, which we did not know be-
, or could not know without them. Let us reason from
n, as well as we can, they are only about Identical Pre-
tions, and *Influence*, if any at all, none but such. Each
icular Proposition concerning Identity or Diversity, is as
ly and certainly known in it self, if attended to, as ei-
of these general ones; only these general ones, as ser-
; in all Cases, are therefore more inculcated and insisted
As to other less general Maxims, many of them are
nore than bare verbal Propositions, and teach us nothing
the Respect and Import of Names one to another. *The*
le is equal to all its Parts: What real Truth, I beseech
, does it teach us? What more is contain'd in that Max-
than what the Signification of the Word *Totum*, or the
le, does of it self import? And he that knows that the
rd *Totum* stands for what is made up of all its Parts,
ws very little less, than that the *Whole* is equal to all its
s. And upon the same Ground, I think that this Pro-
ion, *A Hill is bigger than a Valley*, and several the like,
also pass for Maxims. But yet Masters of *Mathematicks*,
n they would, as Teachers of what they know, initiate
rs in that Science, do not without Reason place this,
some other such Maxims, at the Entrance of their *Sy-*
, that their Scholars, having in the Beginning perfectly
ainted their Thoughts with these Propositions made in
general Terms, may be us'd to make such Reflexions,
have these more general Propositions, as form'd Rules and
ngs, ready to apply to all particular Cases. Not that if
be equally weigh'd, they are more clear and evident,
the particular Instances they are brought to confirm;
that being more familiar to the Mind, the very naming
n, is enough to satisfy the Understanding. But this, I
is more from our Custom of using them, and the Esta-
ment they have got in our Minds, by our often think-
of them, than from the different Evidence of Things.

But before Cuſtom has ſettl'd Methods of Thinking and Reaſoning in our Minds, I am apt to imagine it is quite otherwiſe; and that the Child, when a Part of his Apple is taken away, knows it better in that particular Inſtance, than by this general Propoſition, *The Whole is equal to all its Parts*; and that if one of theſe have need to be confirm'd to him by the other, the general has more need to be let into his Mind by the particular, than the particular by the general. For in Particulars, our Knowledge begins, and ſo ſpreads it ſelf, by Degrees, to Generals; though afterwards the Mind takes the quite contrary Courſe, and having drawn its Knowledge into as general Propoſitions as it can, makes thoſe familiar to its Thoughts, and accuſtoms it ſelf to have Recourſe to them, as to the Standards of Truth and Falſhood. By which familiar *Uſe of them*, as Rules to meaſure the Truth of other Propoſitions, it comes in Time to be thought, that more particular Propoſitions have their Truth and Evidence from their Conformity to theſe more general ones, which, in Diſcourſe and Argumentation, are ſo frequently urg'd, and conſtantly admitted. And this I think to be the Reaſon why amongſt ſo many ſelf-evident Propoſitions, the moſt general only have had the Title of Maxims.

Maxims, if Care be not taken in the Uſe of Words, may prove Contradictions.

§. 12. One Thing farther, I think, it may not be amiſs to obſerve concerning theſe general Maxims, that they are ſo far from improving or eſtabliſhing our Minds in true Knowledge, that if our Notions be wrong, looſe, or unſteady, and we reſign up our Thoughts to the Sound of Words, rather than fix them on ſettl'd determin'd *Ideas* of Things; I ſay, theſe *general Maxims* will *ſerve* to confirm us in Miſtakes; and in ſuch a Way of Uſe of Words which is moſt common, will *ſerve* to prove Contradictions: *v. g.* He that with *Des Cartes* ſhall frame in his Mind an *Idea* of what he calls *Body*, to be nothing but Extenſion, may eaſily demonſtrate, that there is no *Vacuum*, *i. e.* no Space void of Body by this Maxim, *What is, is*: For the *Idea* to which he annexes the Name *Body*, being bare Extenſion, his Knowledge that Space cannot be without Body, is certain: For he knows his own *Idea* of Extenſion clearly and diſtinctly, and knows that it is *what it is*, and not another *Idea*, tho' it be call'd by theſe three Names, *Extenſion*, *Body*, *Space*. Which three Words ſtanding for one and the ſame *Idea*, may, no

doubt

t, with the ſame Evidence and Certainty, be affirm'd
f another, as each of it ſelf: And it is as certain, that
t I uſe them all to ſtand for one and the ſame *Idea*, this
cation is as true and identical in its Signification, *That*
is Body, as this Predication is true and identical, *that*
is Body, both in Signification and Sound.

13. But if another ſhall come, and make
nſelf another *Idea*, different from *Des Car-*
f the Thing, which yet, with *Des Cartes*,
ls by the ſame Name *Body*, and make his
which he expreſſes by the Word *Body*, to be of a Thing
ath both *Extenſion* and *Solidity* together, he will as ea-
emonſtrate, that there may be a *Vacuum*, or Space with-
Body, as *Des Cartes* demonſtrated the contrary. Be-
the *Idea* to which he gives the Name *Space*, being bare-
ſimple one of *Extenſion*; and the *Idea*, to which he
the Name *Body*, being the complex *Idea* of *Extenſion* and
ility, or *Solidity* together in the ſame Subject, theſe two
are not exactly one and the ſame, but in the Under-
ng as diſtinct as the *Ideas* of One and Two, White and
, or as of *Corporeity* and *Humanity*, if I may uſe thoſe
ous Terms: And therefore the Predication of them in
inds, or in Words ſtanding for them, is not identical,
e Negation of them one of another; *viz.* this Propoſi-
Extenſion, or *Space is not Body*, is as true and evidently
, as this Maxim, *It is impoſſible for the ſame Thing to be,*
t to be, can make any Propoſition.

Inſtance in Vacuum.

14. But yet, tho' both theſe Propoſitions
ſee) may be equally demonſtrated, *viz.*
here may be a *Vacuum*, and that there
t be a *Vacuum*, by theſe two certain Prin-
(*viz.*) *What is, is*, and *the ſame Thing*
be, and be; yet neither of theſe Principles will ſerve
ve to us, that any, or what Bodies do exiſt: For that
: left to our Senſes, to diſcover to us as far as they can.
univerſal and ſelf-evident Principles, being only our
nt, clear, and diſtinct Knowledge of our own *Ideas*,
general or comprehenſive, can aſſure us of nothing that
without the Mind, their Certainty is founded only
the Knowledge we have of each *Idea* by it ſelf, and of
ſtinction from others; about which, we cannot be
en whilſt they are in our Minds, tho' we may, and
are miſtaken, when we retain the Names without the

They prove not the Exiſtence of Things without us.

Ideas, or use them confusedly sometimes for one, and sometimes for another *Idea*. In which Cases, the Force of these *Axioms*, reaching only to the Sound, and not the Signification of the Word, *serves* only to lead us into Confusion, Mistake, and Error. 'Tis to shew Men, that these Maxims, however cry'd up for the great Guards to Truth, will not secure them from Error in a careless loose Use of their Words, that I have made this Remark. In all that is here suggested concerning their little Use for the Improvement of Knowledge, or dangerous Use in Undermin'd *Ideas*, I have been far enough from saying or intending they should be *laid aside*, as some have been too forward to charge me. I affirm them to be Truths, self-evident Truths; and so cannot be *laid aside*. As far as their Influence will reach, 'tis in vain to endeavour, nor would I attempt to abridge it. But yet, without any Injury to Truth or Knowledge, I may have Reason to think their Use is not answerable to the great Stress which seems to be laid on them, and I may warn Men not to make an ill Use of them, for the confirming themselves in Errors.

Their Application dangerous about complex Ideas.

§. 15. But let them be of what *Use* they will in verbal Propositions, they cannot discover or prove to us the least Knowledge of the Nature of Substances, as they are found and exist without us, any farther than grounded on Experience. And tho' the Consequence of these two Propositions, call'd Principles, be very clear, and their Use not dangerous or hurtful, in the Probation of such Things, wherein there is no need at all of them for Proof, but such as are clear by themselves without them, *viz.* where our *Ideas* are determin'd, and known by the Names that stand for them: Yet when these Principles, *viz. What is, is*; and, *It is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be*, are made use of in the Probation of Propositions, wherein are Words standing for complex *Ideas*, *v. g. Man*, *Horse*, *Gold*, *Vertue*; there they are of infinite Danger, and most commonly make Men receive and retain Falsehood for manifest Truth, and Uncertainty for Demonstration: Upon which follows Error, Obstinacy, and all the Mischiefs that can happen for wrong Reasoning. The Reason whereof is not, that these Principles are less true, or of less Force in proving Propositions made of Terms standing for complex *Ideas*, than where the Propositions are about simple *Ideas*. But because Men mistake

ly, thinking that where the same Terms are preserv'd, Propositions are about the same Things, tho' the *Ideas* they for, are in Truth different. Therefore these Maxims are e use of to support those, which in Sound and Appear- are contradictory Propositions; as is clear in the De- strations above-mention'd about a *Vacuum*. So that whilst take Words for Things, as usually they do, these Max- may and do commonly serve to prove contradictory ositions. As shall yet be farther made manifest.

16. For Instance: Let *Man* be that, con- ing which you would by these first Principles onstrate any Thing, and we shall see, that r as Demonstration is by these Principles, only verbal, and gives us no certain universal true Pro- ion, or Knowledge of any Being existing without us. a Child having fram'd the *Idea* of a *Man*, it is pro- e, that his *Idea* is just like that Picture which the ter makes of the visible Appearances join'd together; such a Complication of *Ideas* together in his Under- ling, makes up the single complex *Idea* which he calls , whereof White or Flesh-colour in *England* being one, Child can demonstrate to you, that *a Negro is not a* , because White-colour was one of the constant sim- *Ideas* of the complex *Idea* he calls *Man*: And therefore can demonstrate by the Principle, *It is impossible for ame Thing to be, and not to be*, that *a Negro is not a Man*; Foundation of his Certainty being not that universal Pro- ion, which, perhaps, he never heard nor thought of, but clear distinct Perception he hath of his own simple *Ideas* lack and White, which he cannot be perswaded to take, can ever mistake one for another, whether he knows that im or no: And to this Child, or any one who hath an *Idea*, which he calls *Man*, can you never demon- e that a *Man* hath a Soul, because his *Idea* of Man in- es no such Notion or *Idea* in it. And therefore to him, Principle of *What is, is*, proves not this Matter; but it nds upon Collection and Observation, by which he is to e his complex *Idea* call'd *Man*.

Instance in Man.

17. *Secondly*, Another that hath gone farther in framing collecting the *Idea* he calls *Man*, and to the outward e adds *Laughter*, and *rational Discourse*, may demonstrate, Infants and Changelings are no Men, by this Maxim, *impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be*: And I

have discours'd with very rational Men, who have actually deny'd that they are *Men.*

§. 18. *Thirdly*, Perhaps another makes up the complex *Idea* which he calls *Man*, only out of the *Ideas* of Body in general, and the Powers of Language and Reason, and leaves out the Shape wholly: This Man is able to demonstrate, that a Man may have no Hands, but be *Quadrupes*, neither of those being included in his *Idea* of *Man*; and in whatever Body or Shape he found *Speech* and *Reason* join'd, that was a *Man*: Because having a clear Knowledge of such a complex *Idea*, it is certain that *What is, is.*

Little Use of these Maxims in Proofs where we have clear and distinct Ideas.

§. 19. So that, if rightly consider'd, I think we may say, that where our *Ideas* are determin'd in our Minds, and have annex'd to them by us known and steady Names under those settl'd Determinations, there is *little Need*, or *no Use* at all of these *Maxims*, to prove the Agreement or Disagreement of any of them. He that cannot discern the Truth or Falshood of such Propositions, without the Help of these, and the like Maxims, will not be *help'd* by these Maxims to do it: Since he cannot be suppos'd to know the Truth of these Maxims themselves without Proof, if he cannot know the Truth of others without Proof, which are as self-evident as these. Upon this Ground it is, that intuitive Knowledge neither requires nor admits any Proof, one part of it more than another. He that will suppose it does, takes away the Foundation of all Knowledge, and Certainty: And he that needs any Proof to make him certain, and give his Assent to this Proposition, that *Two are equal to Two*, will also have need of a Proof to make him admit, that *What is, is.* He that needs a Probation to convince him, that *Two are not Three*, that *White is not Black, that a Triangle is not a Circle*, &c. or any other two determin'd distinct *Ideas* are not one and the same, will need also a Demonstration to convince him, that it is impossible *for the same Thing to be, and not to be.*

Their Use dangerous where our Ideas are confus'd.

§. 20. And as these Maxims are of *little Use* where we have determin'd *Ideas*, so they are, as I have shew'd, of *dangerous Use* where our *Ideas* are not determin'd, but such as are of a loose and wandering Signification, sometimes standing for one, and sometimes for another *Idea*; from which follows Mistake and Error,

which

h these Maxims (brought as Proofs to establish Propositions, wherein the Terms stand for undermin'd *Ideas*) do by Authority confirm and rivet.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Trifling Propositions.

Some Propositions bring no Increase to our Knowledge.

Whether the Maxims treated of in the fore-going Chapter, be of that o real Knowledge, as is generally suppos'd, e to be consider'd. This, I think, may dently be affirm'd, that there are univer- opositions; that tho' they be certainly yet they add no Light to our Understandings, bring no ise to our Knowledge. Such are,

As first, Identical Propositions.

2. *First, All purely identical Propositions.* obviously, and at first Blush, appear to nue no Instruction in them: For when irm the said Term of it self, whether it be verbal, or whether it contains any clear and real *Idea*, ws us nothing but what we must certainly know be- whether such a Proposition be either made by, or propos'd Indeed, that most general one, *What is, is*, may serve imes to shew a Man the Absurdity he is guilty of, when cumlocution, or equivocal Terms, he would, in particu- stances, deny the same Thing of it self; because no Bo- ill so openly bid Defiance to common Sense, as to affirm and direct Contradictions in plain Words: Or if he a Man is excus'd if he breaks off any farther Discourse him. But yet, I think, I may say, that neither that re- Maxim, nor any other identical Proposition teaches us ing: And tho' in such kind of Propositions, this great agnify'd Maxim, boasted to be the Foundation of De- ration, may be, and often is made use of to confirm yet all it proves, amounts to no more than this, That me Word may with great Certainty be affirm'd of it self, ut any doubt of the Truth of any such Proposition; t me add also, without any real Knowledge.

. For at this Rate, any very ignorant Person, who can ake a Proposition, and knows what he means when he says,

says, *Aye* or *No*, may make a Million of Propositions, whose Truths he may be infallibly certain, and yet not kn one Thing in the World thereby; *v. g.* what is a Soul, Soul; or *a Soul is a Soul*; a *Spirit is a Spirit*; *a Fetiche is a tiche*, *&c.* These all being equivalent to this Proposition, *What is, is*; i. e. *what hath Existence, hath Existence*; or, *who a Soul, hath a Soul.* What is this more than trifling w Words? It is but like a Monkey shifting his Oyster from Hand to the other; and had he had but Words, might, doubt, have said, Oyster in right Hand is *Subject*, and Oy in left Hand is *Predicate*; and so might have made a self- dent Proposition of Oyster, *i. e. Oyster is Oyster*; and yet, with this, not have been one Whit the wiser, or more knowing: A that way of handling the Matter, would much at one have sa fy'd the Monkey's Hunger, or a Man's Understanding; they two would have improv'd in Knowledge and Bulk toget

I know there are some, who because *identical Propositi* are self-evident, shew a great Concern for them, and th they do great Service to Philosophy, by crying them up, in them was contain'd all Knowledge, and the Understand were led into all Truth by 'em only. I grant, as forwardly a ny one, that they are all true, and self-evident. I grant fart that the Foundation of all our Knowledge lies in the Faculty have of perceiving the same *Idea* to be the same, and of dis ning it from those that are different, as I have shewn in fore-going Chapter. But how that vindicates the mak use of *identical Propositions*, for the Improvement of Kn ledge, from the Imputation of Trifling, I do not see. any one repeat, as often as he pleases, that the *Will is the* or lay what Stress on it he thinks fit; of what Use is this, an infinite the like Propositions, for the enlarging our Kn ledge? Let a Man abound as much as the Plenty of W which he has, will permit him in such Propositions as th *A Law is a Law*, and *Obligation is Obligation*: *Right is R* and *Wrong is Wrong*; will these and the like ever help hi an Acquaintance with *Ethicks*? or instruct him or other the Knowledge of *Morality*? Those who know not, nor haps ever will know, what is *Right*, and what is *Wrong*, the Measures of them, can with as much Assurance m and infallibly know the Truth of these and all such Pro tions, as he that is best instructed in *Morality*, can do. what Advance do such Propositions give in the Knowl of any Thing necessary, or useful for their Conduct.

e would be thought to do little less than trifle, who for the htning the Understanding in any part of Knowledge, ld be busy with *identical Propositions*, and insist on such ims as these; *Substance is Substance*, and *Body is Body*; *a um is a Vacuum*, and *a Vortex is a Vortex*: A *Centaure is a Cen-*, and *a Chimæra is a Chimæra*, &c. For these, and all such, equally true, equally certain, and equally self-evident, yet they cannot but be counted trifling, when made use s Principles of Instruction, and Stress laid on them, as s to Knowledge; since they teach nothing but what one, who is capable of Discourse, knows without be- old, *viz.* That the same Term is the same Term, and the Idea the same Idea. And upon this Account it was that I erly did, and do still think, the offering and inculcating such positions, in order to give the Understanding any new Light let into the Knowledge of Things, no better than trifling. nstruction lies in something very different, and he that ld enlarge his own, or another's Mind, to Truths he not yet know, must find out intermediate *Ideas*, and then them in such Order one by another, that the Understand- may see the Agreement, or Disagreement of those in Que- n. Propositions that do this, are instructive: But they are rom such as affirm the same Term of it self; which is no to advance ones self or others in any sort of Knowledge. o more helps to that, than it would help any one in his ning to read, to have such Propositions as these incul- d to him, *an A is an A*, and *a B is a B*; which a Man know as well as any School-Master, and yet never be a- to read a Word as long as he lives. Nor do these, or any identical Propositions help him one Jot forwards in the l of Reading, let him make what Use of them he can.

f those who blame my calling them *trifling Propositions*, but read, and been at the Pains to understand what I above writ in very plain *English*, they could not but have n that by *identical Propositions*, I mean only such wherein same Term importing the same *Idea*, is affirm'd of it self: nich I take to be the proper Signification of *identical Propos- s*; and concerning all such, I thing I may continue safely say, That to propose them as instructive, is no better than ling. For no one who has the Use of Reason, can miss them, ere it is necessary they should be taken Notice of; nor ubt of their Truth, when he does take Notice of them.

But if Men will call Propositions *identical*, wherein the same

Term

Term is affirm'd of it self, whether they speak more proper
than I, others must judge: This is certain, all that they say
Propositions that are not *identical*, in my Sense, concerns n
me, nor what I have said; all that I have said relating
those Propositions, wherein the same Term is affirm'd of
self. And I would fain see an Instance, wherein any such c
be made use of, to the Advantage and Improvement of any on
Knowledge. Instances of other kinds, whatever Use may be ma
of them, concern not me, as not being such as I call *identica*

Secondly, When a complex Idea *is predicated of the whole.*

§. 4. *Secondly*, Another sort of trifling Pr
positions is, *when a part of the complex* Idea
predicated of the Name of the whole; a part
the Definition of the Word defin'd. Such a
all Propositions wherein the *Genus* is pred
cated of the *Species*, or more comprehensive of l
comprehensive Terms: For what Information, what Knowled
carries this Proposition in it, *viz. Lead is a Metal*, to a Man w
knows the complex *Idea* the Name *Lead* stands for. All t
simple *Ideas* that go to the complex one signify'd by the Te
Metal, being nothing but what he before comprehended, a
signify'd by the Name *Lead*. Indeed, to a Man that kno
the Signification of the Word *Metal*, and not of the Wo
Lead, it is a shorter Way to explain the Signification of t
Word *Lead*, by saying it is a *Metal*, which at once expre
several of its simple *Ideas*, than to enumerate them one
one, telling him it is a Body very *heavy*, *fusible*, and *mallea*

As part of the Definition of the defin'd.

§. 5. A like trifling it is, *to predicate any*
ther part of the Definition of the Term defin'd,
to affirm any one of the simple *Ideas* of a co
plex one, of the Name of the whole comp
Idea; as *All Gold is fusible*. For *Fusibility* be
one of the simple *Ideas* that goes to the making up the co
plex one the Sound *Gold* stands for, what can it be but pl
ing with Sounds, to affirm that of the Name *Gold*, which
comprehended in its receiv'd Signification? 'Twould
thought little better than ridiculous, to affirm gravely, a
Truth of Moment, That *Gold is yellow*; and I see not how
is any jot more material to say, *It is fusible*, unless that Q
lity be left out of the complex *Idea*, of which the Sou
Gold is the Mark in ordinary Speech. What Instruction
it carry with it, to tell one that which he hath been told
ready, or he is suppos'd to know before? For I am suppo
to know the Signification of the Word another uses to

e he is to tell me. And if I know that the Name *Gold* s for this complex *Idea* of *Body, yellow, heavy, fusible,* ble, 'twill not much instruct me to put it solemnly af- rds in a Proposition, and gravely say, *All Gold is fusi-* Such Propositions can only serve to shew the Disinge- of one, who will go from the Definition of his own s, by reminding him sometimes of it; but carry no vledge with them, but of the Signification of Words, ver certain they be.

6. *Every* Man *is an Animal*, or living Bo- s as certain a Proposition as can be; but ıore conducing to the Knowledge of gs, than to say, *A Palfry is an ambling Horse*, or a neigh- mbling *Animal*, both being only about the Significati- Words, and make me know but this; That *Body*, and *Motion*, or Power of Sensation and Moving, are of those *Ideas* that I always comprehend and signify e Word *Man*; and where they are not to be found to- , the Name *Man* belongs not to that Thing: And so other, that *Body, Sense*, and *a certain Way of Going*, *a certain Kind of Voice*, are some of those *Ideas* which ys comprehend, and signify by the Word *Palfry*; and they are not to be found together, the Name *Palfry* s not to that Thing. 'Tis just the same, and to the Purpose, when any Term standing for any one or of the simple *Ideas*, that altogether make up that com- *Idea* which is call'd a *Man*, is affirm'd of the Term *v. g.* suppose a *Roman*, signify'd by the Word *Homo*: ese distinct *Ideas* united in one subject, *Corporeitas, Sen- , Potentia se movendi, Rationalitas, Risibilitas*, he might, ubt, with great Certainty, universally affirm one, more, of these together of the Word *Homo*, but did no more y, that the Word *Homo*, in his Country, comprehend- its Signification, all these *Ideas*. Much like a *Romance* , who by the Word *Palfry*, signify'd these *Ideas*; *Body rtain Figure, four-legg'd, with Sense, Motion, Ambling, ng, White, used to have a Woman on his Back*, might with e Certainty, universally affirm also any, or all of these Word *Palfry*: But did thereby teach no more, but e Word *Palfry*, in his, or Romance Language, stood these, and was not to be apply'd to any Thing, where these were wanting. But that shall tell me, that in er Thing *Sense, Motion, Reason*, and *Laughter* were

Instance Man and Palfry.

united,

united, that Thing had actually a Notion of God, or wo
be cast into a Sleep by *Opium*, made indeed an instruc
Proposition; because neither *having the Notion of God,*
being cast into Sleep by Opium, being contain'd in the *Idea*
nify'd by the Word *Man*, we are by such Propositions tau
something more than barely what the Word *Man* stands f
And therefore the Knowledge contain'd in it, is more t
verbal.

For this teaches but the Signification of Words.

§. 7. Before a Man makes any Prop
tion, he is suppos'd to understand the Ter
he uses in it, or else he talks like a Parrot,
ly making a Noise by Imitation, and fram
certain Sounds which he has learn'd of othe
but not as a rational Creature, using them
Signs of *Ideas* which he has in his Mind. The Hearer is a
suppos'd to understand the Terms as the Speaker uses the
or else he talks Jargon, and makes an unintelligible Noi
And therefore he trifles with Words, who makes such a P
position, which when it is made, contains no more than one
the Terms does, and which a Man was suppos'd to know
fore: *v. g. a Triangle hath three Sides*, or *Saffron is yellow.* A
this is no farther tolerable than where a Man goes to expl
his Terms, to one who is suppos'd, or declares himself not
understand him: And then *it teaches only the Significatio*
that Word, and the Use of that Sign.

But no real Knowledge.

§. 8. We can know then the Truth of t
Sorts of Propositions, with perfect *Certain*
the one is, of those trifling Propositions wh
have a Certainty in them, but 'tis but a
bal Certainty, but not instructive. And, secondly, we c
know the Truth, and so may be *certain* in Propositions, wh
affirm something of another, which is a necessary Consequen
of its precise complex *Idea*, but not contain'd in it. As th
the *external Angle of all Triangles, is bigger than either of the*
posite internal Angles; which Relation of the outward Angle
either of the opposite internal Angles, making no Part of
complex *Idea* signify'd by the Name Triangle; this is a r
Truth, and conveys with it instructive, *real Knowledge.*

General Propositions concerning Substances, are of-

§. 9. We having little or no Knowledge
what Combinations there be of simple *Id*
existing together in Substances, but by
Senses, we cannot make any universal *cert*
P

ositions concerning them, any further than nominal Essences lead us; which being very few and inconsiderable Truths, in Respect of those h depend on their real Constitutions, the general *Propo-s* that are made *about Substances, if they are certain, are, for ost part, but trifling*; and if they are instructive, are uncer- and such as we can have no Knowledge of their real h, how much soever constant Observation and Analogy assist our Judgments in guessing. Hence it comes to pass, one may often meet with very clear and coherent Dis-es, that amount yet to nothing. For 'tis plain, that ies of substantial Beings, as well as others, as far as they relative Significations affix'd to them, may, with great h, be join'd negatively and affirmatively in Propositions, eir relative Definitions make them fit to be so join'd; Propositions consisting of such Terms, may, with the Clearness, be deduc'd one from another, as those that ey the most real Truths; and all this, without any vledge of the Nature and Reality of Things existing out us. By this Method, one may make Demonstra- and undoubted Propositions in Words, and yet thereby nce not one Jot in the Knowledge of the Truth of Things; he that having learn'd these following Words with their ary, mutually, relative Acceptations annex'd to them, *Substance, Man, Animal, Form, Soul, Vegative, Sensative, nal*, may make several undouted Propositions about the without knowing at all what the Soul really is; and of ort, a Man may find an infinite Number of Propositions, nings, and Conclusions, in Books of Metaphysicks, l-Divinity, and some Sort of natural Philosophy; and all, know as little of God, *Spirits*, or *Bodies*, as he did he set out.

ten trifling.

10. He that hath Liberty to define, *i. e.* mine the Signification of his Names of ances, (as certainly every one does in Ef- who makes them stand for his own *Ideas*) and makes Significations at a Venture, taking them from his own ner Mens Fancies, and not from an Examination or En- into the Nature of Things themselves, may, with little ble, demonstrate them one of another, according to those d Respects, and mutual Relations he has given them one other; wherein, however Things agree, or disagree, in own Nature, he needs mind nothing but his own No-

And why.

tions,

tions, with the Names he hath bestow'd upon them: I thereby no more increases his own Knowledge, than he d his Riches, who taking a Bag of Counters, calls one i certain Place, a *Pound*, another in another Place, a *Shillin* and a third in a third Place, a *Penny*; and so proceedi may undoubtedly reckon right, and cast up a great Sum, cording to his Counters so plac'd, and standing for more less, as he pleases, without being one Jot the richer, or wi out even knowing how much a Pound, Shilling, or Pen is, but only that one is contain'd in the other twenty Tim and contains the other twelve; which a Man may also do the Signification of Words, by making them in Respect one another more or less, or equally comprehensive.

Thirdly, Using Words variously, is trifling with them.

§. 11. Though yet concerning most Wo us'd in Discourses, especially argumentat and controversial, there is this more to be co plain'd of, which is the worst Sort of *Trifli* and which sets us yet farther from the Certa ty of Knowledge we hope to attain, by th or find in them, *viz.* that most Writers are so far from structing us in the Nature and Knowledge of Things, t they *use their Words loosly* and uncertainly, and do not, using them constantly and steadily, in the same Signifie ons, make plain and clear Deductions of Words one fr another, and make their Discourses coherent and clear, (h little soever it were instructive) which were not difficult do, did they not find it convenient to shelter their Ig rance or Obstinacy, under the Obscurity and Perplexed of their Terms: To which, perhaps, Inadvertency and Custom does in many Men much contribute.

Marks of verbal Propositions, First, Predication in abstract,

§. 12. To conclude, *barely verbal Propos* may be known by these following *Marks*: *First*, All Propositions, wherein two abst Terms are affirm'd one of another, are ba about the Signification of Sounds. For si no abstract *Idea* can be the same with any ther but it self, when its abstract Name is affirm'd of other Term, it can signify no more but this, that it may, ought to be call'd by that Name; or that these two Na signify the same *Idea*. Thus should any one say, that *P mony is Frugality*, that *Gratitude is Justice*; that this, or t Action is, or is not *Temperance*: However specious these the like Propositions may at first sight seem, yet when

co

ıe to preſs them, and examine nicely what they contain, ſhall find, that it all amounts to nothing, but the Signi-ıion of thoſe Terms.

. 13. *Secondly*, All *Propoſitions, wherein a of the complex* Idea, which any Term ds for, *is predicated of that Term, are only* ɔal, *v. g.* to ſay, *that Gold is a Metal*, or y. And thus all Propoſitions, wherein ɛ comprehenſive Words, call'd *Genera*, are n'd of ſubordinate, or leſs comprehenſive, call'd *Species*, *Individuals*, are barely verbal.

Secondly, A part of the Definition predicated of any Term.

When by theſe two Rules, we have examin'd the Propoɔns that make up the Diſcourſes we ordinarily meet with, h in and out of Books, we ſhall, perhaps, find that a ıter part of them than is uſually ſuſpected, are purely a-ıt the Signification of Words, and contain nothing in n, but the Uſe and Application of theſe Signs.

his, I think, I may lay down for an infallible Rule, : were-ever the diſtinct *Idea* any Word ſtands for, is not ɔwn and conſider'd, and ſomething not contain'd in the , is not affirm'd, or deny'd of it, there our Thoughts ſtick ɔlly in Sounds, and are able to attain no real Truth or ſhood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might ſave us a ıt deal of uſeleſs Amuſement and Diſpute; and very ch ſhorten our Trouble and Wandering in the Search of and true Knowledge.

CHAP. IX.

Of our Knowledge of Existence.

. HItherto we have only conſider'd the Eſſences of Things, which being y abſtract *Ideas*, and thereby remov'd in Thoughts from particular Exiſtence, (that ıg the proper Operation of the Mind, in ſtraction, to conſider an *Idea* under no other Exiſtence, what it has in the Underſtanding) gives us no Know-ge of real Exiſtence at all. Where, by the Way, we may : Notice, that *univerſal Propoſitions*, of whoſe Truth or

General certain Propoſitions, concern not Exiſtence.

Falſhood we can have certain Knowledge, concern not *E*
iſtence; and farther, that all *particular Affirmations or Nega*
ons, that would not be certain, if they were made gener
are only concerning *Exiſtence*; they declaring only the ac
dental Union or Separation of *Ideas* in Things exiſting, whi
in their abſtract Natures, have no known neceſſary Uni
or Repugnancy.

A three-fold Knowledge of Exiſtence.

§. 2. But leaving the Nature of Propoſitio
and different Ways of Predication, to be co
ſider'd more at large in another Place, let
proceed now to enquire concerning our Kno
ledge of the *Exiſtence* of Things, and how
come by it. I ſay then, that we have the Knowledge of
own Exiſtence by Intuition; of the *Exiſtence of* GOD
Demonſtration; and of other Things by Senſation.

Our Knowledge of our own Exiſtence is intuitive.

§. 3. As for *our own* Exiſtence, we perce
it ſo plainly, and ſo certainly, that it neit
needs, nor is capable of any Proof. For
thing can be more evident to us, than our o
Exiſtence. *I think, I reaſon, I feel Pleaſure*
Pain: Can any of theſe be more evident
me, than my own Exiſtence? If I doubt of all other Thin
that very Doubt makes me perceive my own *Exiſtence*,
will not ſuffer me to doubt of that. For if I know *I*
Pain, it is evident I have as certain Perception of my o
Exiſtence, as of the Exiſtence of the Pain I feel: Or if I kn
I doubt, I have as certain Perception of the Exiſtence of
Thing doubting, as of that Thought which I call *do*
Experience then convinces us, that *we have an intuitive Kn*
ledge of our own Exiſtence, and an internal infallible Perc
t on that we are. In every Act of Senſation, Reaſoning,
Thinking, we are conſcious to our ſelves of our own Bei
and, in this Matter, come not ſhort of the higheſt Degree
Certainty.

CHA

CHAP. X.

f our Knowledge of the Existence of a GOD.

We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a GOD.

THough GOD has given us no innate *Ideas* of himself; though he ſtamp'd no original Characters on our ls, wherein we may read his Being; yet ng furniſh'd us with thoſe Faculties our ls are endow'd with, he hath not left elf without Witneſs; ſince we have Senſe, Perception, Reaſon, and cannot want a clear Proof of him, ong as we carry our ſelves about us. Nor can we complain of our Ignorance in this great Point, ſince he ſo plentifully provided us with the Means to diſcover, know him, ſo far as is neceſſary, to the End of our Being, the great Concernment of our Happineſs. But tho' this e moſt obvious Truth that Reaſon diſcovers, and tho' vidence be (if I miſtake not) equal to mathematical inty; yet it requires Thought and Attention, and the d muſt apply it ſelf to a regular Deduction of it from part of our intuitive Knowledge, or elſe we ſhall be as rtain and ignorant of this, as of other Propoſitions, h are in themſelves capable of clear Demonſtration. To therefore, that we are capable of *knowing*, i. e. *being n that there is a GOD*, and how we may come by this inty, I think we need go no farther than our ſelves, that undoubted Knowledge we have of our own Ex-e.

Man knows that he himſelf is.

2. I think it is beyond Queſtion, that *has a clear Perception of his own Being*; he vs certainly, that he exiſts, and that he is thing. He that can doubt, whether he be thing or no, I ſpeak not to, no more than I would with pure Nothing, or endeavour to convince Non-, that it were Something. If any one pretends to be ſo ical, as to deny his own Exiſtence, (for really to doubt , is manifeſtly impoſſible) let him for me enjoy his be-Happineſs of being Nothing, until Hunger, or ſome

other Pain convince him of the contrary. This then, I th
I may take for a Truth, which every one's certain Knowl
assures him of beyond the Liberty of doubtidg, *viz.* tha
is something that actually exists.

He knows also, that Nothing cannot produce a Being, therefore Something eternal.

§. 3. In the next Place, Man knows b
intuitive Certainty, that bare *Nothing can no*
produce any real Being, than it can be equal t
right Angles. If a Man knows that Not
tity, or the Absence of all Being, cannot
qual to two right Angles, it is impossibl
should know any Demonstration in E
If therefore we know there is some real B
and that Non-entity cannot produce any
Being, it is an evident Demonstration, that from Ete
there has been Something; since what was not from Eter
had a Beginning; and what had a Beginning, must be
duc'd by something else.

That eternal Being must be most powerful.

§. 4. Next, it is evident, that what ha
Being and Beginning from another, must
have all that which is in, and belongs
Being from another too. All the Power it
must be owing to, and receiv'd from the
Source. This eternal Source then of all Being, must al
the Source and Original of all Power; and so this *etern*
ing must be also the most powerful.

And most knowing.

§. 5. Again, a Man finds in himself
ception and *Knowledge.* We have then got
Step farther; and we are certain now,
there is not only some Being, but some kn
ing intelligent Being in the World.

There was a Time then, when there was no knowing
ing, and when Knowledge began to be; or else, ther
been also a *knowing Being from Eternity.* If it be said,
was a Time when no Being had any Knowledge, when
eternal Being was void of all Understanding, I reply,
then it was impossible there should ever have been any K
ledge. It being as impossible that Things wholly vo
Knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any
ception, should produce a knowing Being, as it is im
ble, that a Triangle should make it self three Angles b
than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the *Id*
senseless Matter, that it should put into it self Sense,
ception, and Knowledge, as it is repugnant to the *Idea*

ngle, that it should put into it self greater Angles than right ones.

6. Thus from the Consideration of our , and what we infallibly find in our own itutions, our Reason leads us to the vledge of this certain and evident Truth, *there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being*; n whether any one will please to call *God*, it matters not. Thing is evident, and from this *Idea* duly consider'd, will be deduc'd all those other Attributes which we ought scribe to this eternal Being. If nevertheless any one d be found so senseless arrogant, as to suppose Man a- knowing and wise, but yet the Product of mere Igno- and Chance; and that all the rest of the Univerſe acted by that blind Hap-hazard; I shall leave with him that rational and emphatical Rebuke of *Tully*, L. 2. *de Leg.* consider'd at his Leisure, 'What can be more sillily ar- nt and misbecoming, than for a Man to think that he a Mind and Understanding in him, but yet in all the iverse beside, there is no such Thing? Or that those ngs, which with the utmost Srtetch of his Reason he can e comprehend, should be mov'd and manag'd without a- Reason at all? *Quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse o- e tam stulte arrogantem, ut in se mentem & rationem putet in cœlo mundoq; non putet? Aut ea quæ vix summa ingenii e comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putet?*

And therefore God.

om what has been said, it is plain to me we have a more n Knowledge of the Existence of a God, than of any g our Senses have not immediately discover'd to us. Nay, sume I may say, that we more certainly know that is a God, than there is any Thing else without us. n I say we *know*, I mean there is such a Knowledge with- r Reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but apply Minds to that, as we do to several other Enquiries.

7. *How far the* Idea *of a most perfect Being*, n a Man may frame in his Mind, does, or not prove the *Existence of a God*, I will not examine. For in the different Make of Tempers, and Application of their ghts, some Arguments prevail more on and some on another, for the Confirma- of the same Truth. But yet, I think, this I may say, t is an ill Way of establishing this Truth, and silencing

Our Idea *of a most perfect Being, not the sole Proof of a God.*

Atheists, to lay the whole Stress of so important a Poin this, upon that sole Foundation: And take some Mens ving that *Idea* of God in their Minds, (for 'tis evident, s Men have none, and some worse than none, and the mos ry different) for the only Proof of a Deity; and out o Over-fondness of that darling Invention, cashier, or at endeavour to invalidate all other Arguments, and forbi to hearken to those Proofs, as being weak or fallaci which our own Existence, and the sensible Parts of the verse, offer so clearly and cogently to our Thoughts, t deem it impossible for a considering Man to withstand t For I judge it as certain and clear a Truth, *That the inv Things of God are clearly seen from the Creation of the World ing understood by the Things that are made, even his eternal P and God-head.* Tho' our own Being furnishes us, as I shewn, with an evident, and incontestable Proof of a ty; and I believe no Body can avoid the Cogency of it, will but as carefully attend to it, as to any other Demon tion of so many Parts; yet this being so fundament Truth, and of that Consequence, that all Religion and g ine Morality depend thereon, I doubt not but I shall be given by my Reader, if I go over some Parts of this A ment again, and enlarge a little more upon them.

Something from Eternity.

§. 8. There is no Truth more evident, that *Something* must be *from Eternity*. I n yet heard of any one so unreasonable, or could suppose so manifest a Contradictio a Time wherein there was perfectly Nothing. This bei all Absurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure Not the perfect Negation and Absence of all Beings, should produce any real Existence.

It being then unavoidable for all rational Creature conclude that something has existed from Eternity, le see what Kind of Thing that must be.

Two Sorts of Beings, Cogitative and Incogitative.

§. 9. There are but two Sorts of Being the World, that Man knows or conceives. *First*, Such as are purely material, wit Sense, Reception, or Thought, as the pings of our Beards, and Paring of our Na *Secondly*, Sensible, thinking, perceiving ings, such as we find our selves to be; which, if you pl we will hereafter call *cogitative and incogitative* Beings; wh

ur present Purpose, if for nothing else, are, perhaps, bet-
Terms, than material and immaterial.

§. 10. If then there must be something eter-
:ogitative nal, let us see what Sort of Being it must be.
g cannot And to that, it is very obvious to Reason,
ice a co- that it must necessarily be a *cogitative* Being.
ive. For it is as impossible to conceive that ever
bare incogitative Matter should produce a
king intelligent Being, as that nothing should of it self
uce Matter. Let us suppose any Parcel of Matter eternal,
or small, we shall find it, in it self, able to produce
hing. For Example, Let us suppose the Matter of the
Pebble we meet with, eternal, closely united, and
Parts firmly at Rest together, if there were no other
g in the World, must it not eternally remain so, a dead,
tive Lump? Is it possible to conceive it can add Moti-
o it self, being purely Matter, or produce any Thing?
ter then, by its own Strength, cannot produce in it self
uch as Motion: The Motion it has, must also be from
nity, or else be produc'd, and added to Matter by some
r Being more powerful than Matter: Matter, as is evi-
, having no Power to produce Motion in it self. But
s suppose Motion eternal too; yet Matter, *incogitative*
ter and Motion, whatever Changes it might produce of
are and Bulk, *could never produce Thought.* Knowledge
still be as far beyond the Power of Motion and Matter
roduce, as Matter is beyond the Power of *Nothing*, or
-entity to produce. And I appeal to every one's own
ughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive Matter pro-
d by *Nothing*, as Thought to be produc'd by pure Matter,
n before there was no such Thing as Thought, or an in-
gent Being existing. Divide Matter into as minute Parts
ou will, which we are apt to imagine a Sort of spirituali-
, or making a thinking Thing of it, vary the Figure and
ion of it, as much as you please, a Globe, Cube, Cone,
n, Cylinder, *&c.* whose Di-
ters are but 10000000th Part
Gry (a) will operate no
rwise upon other Bodies of
portionable Bulk, than those
n Inch or Foot Diameter;
you may as rationally ex-
to produce Sense Thought,

(a) A Gry is $\frac{1}{10}$ of a Line, a Line $\frac{1}{10}$ of an Inch, an Inch $\frac{1}{10}$ of a philosophical Foot, a philosophical Foot $\frac{1}{3}$ of a Pendulum, whose Diadroms, in the Latitude of 45 Degrees, are each e-

and

qual to one Second of Time, or $\frac{1}{60}$ *of a Minute. I have affectedly made use of this Measure here, and the Parts of it, under a decimal Division, with Names to them; because I think it would be of general Convenience, that this should be the common Measure in the Common-wealth of Letters.*

and Knowledge, by puttin together, in a certain Figu and Motion, gross Particles Matter, as by those that are t very minutest, that do a where exist. They knock, i pel, and resist one another, j as the greater do, and that all they can do. So that if will suppose nothing first, or ternal; *Matter* can never beg to be: If we will suppose bare Matter, without Motion eterna *Motion* can never begin to be: If we suppose only Matter a Motion first, or eternal; *Thought* can never begin to be. F it is impossible to conceive that Matter either with or witho Motion, could have originally in and from it self, Sense, Pe ception, and Knowledge, as is evident from hence, th then Sense, Perception, and Knowledge, must be a Proper eternally inseparable from Matter and every Particle of Not to add, that though our general or specifick Conce tion of Matter makes us speak of it as one Thing, yet real all Matter is not one individual Thing, neither is there a such Thing existing as one material Being, or one single Bod that we know or can conceive. And therefore, if Matter we the eternal first cogitative Being, there would not be one ternal infinite cogitative Being, but an infinite Number of et nal finite cogitative Beings, independent one of another, of mited Force, and distinct Thoughts, which could never pr duce that Order, Harmony, and Beauty, which is to found in Nature. Since therefore whatsoever is the first ternal *Being*, must necessarily be cogitatave; and whatsoev is first of all Things, must necessarily contain in it, and act ally have, at least, all the Perfections that can ever after e ist; nor can it ever give to another any Perfection that it ha not, either actually in it self, or at least in a higher Degre It necessarily follows, that the first eternal Being cannot Matter.

Therefore there has been an eternal Wisdom.

§. 11. *If* therefore it be evident, that *Som thing* necessarily must *exist from Eternity*, 'tis al as evident, that *that Something must* necessaril be *a cogitative Being*: For it is as impossible, th incogitative Matter should produce a cog gitati

re Being, as that nothing, or the Negation of all Being, ld produce a positive Being or Matter.

12. Though this Discovery of the *necessary Existence of an eternal Mind*, does sufficiently lead us into the Knowledge of GOD, e it will hence follow, that all other knowing gs that have a Beginning, must depend on , and have no other Ways of Knowledge, xtent of Power, than what he gives them; and therefore e made those, he made also the less excellent Pieces of Universe, all inanimate Beings, whereby his *Omniscience*, r, and *Providence* will be establish'd, and all his other ributes necessarily follow: Yet to clear up this a little ner, we will see what Doubts can be rais'd against it.

Therefore there has been an eternal Wisdom.

13. *First*, Perhaps it will be said, that tho' e as clear as Demonstration can make it, there must be an eternal Being, and that g must also be knowing; yet it does not ow, but that thinking Being may also be material. Let it o; it equally still follows, that there is a GOD: For if e be an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent Being, it is cer- that there is a GOD, whether you imagine that Being to naterial, or no. But herein, I suppose, lies the Danger Deceit of that Supposition: There being no Way to a- the Demonstration, that there is an eternal knowing g, Men, devoted to Matter, would willingly have it ted, that this knowing Being is material; and then let- slide out of their Minds, or the Discourse, the Demon- ion whereby an eternal knowing Being was prov'd neces- y to exist, would argue all to be Matter, and so deny a D, that is, an eternal cogitative Being; whereby they o far from establishing, that they destroy their own Hy- esis. For if there can be, in their Opinion, eternal Mat- without any eternal cogitative Being, they manifestly se- te Matter and Thinking, and suppose no necessary Con- on of the one with the other, and so establish the Ne- y of an eternal Spirit, but not of Matter, since it has prov'd already, that an eternal cogitative Being is una- ably to be granted. Now, if thinking Matter may be rated, *the eternal Existence of Matter will not follow from ternal Existence of a cogitative Being*, and they suppose it o Purpose.

Whether material or no.

§. 14. But

§. 14. But now let us see how they can
Not material, first, because every Particle of Matter is not cogitative. tisfy themselves, or others, that this *eternal thin*
ing Being, is material.

First, I would ask them, whether they im
gine that all Matter, *every Particle of Matt*
thinks? This, I suppose, they will scarce s
since then there would be as many eter
thinking Beings, as there are Particles of Matter, and so
Infinity of Gods. And yet, if they will not allow Matter
Matter, that is, every Particle of Matter to be as well co
tative as extended, they will have as hard a Task to make
to their own Reasons, a cogitative Being out of incogitat
Particles, as an extended Being out of unextended Parts, i
may so speak.

§. 15. *Secondly*, If all Matter does not thi
Secondly, One Particle alone of Matter, cannot be cogitative. I next ask, whether it be *only one Atom t*
does so? This has as many Absurdities as
other; for then this Atom of Matter must
alone eternal, or not. If this alone be eter
then this alone, by its powerful Thought
Will, made all the rest of Matter. And
we have the Creation of Matter by a powerful Thou
which is that the Materialists stick at: For if they supp
one single thinking Atom to have produc'd all the rest
Matter, they cannot ascribe that Pre-eminency to it u
any other Account, than that of its Thinking, the only
pos'd Difference. But allow it to be by some other W
which is above our Conception, it must be still Creati
and these Men must give up their great Maxim, *Ex nihilo*
fit. If it be said, that all the rest of Matter is equall
ternal, as that thinking Atom, it will be to say any Th
at Pleasure, though never so absurd: For to suppose all M
ter eternal, and yet one small Particle in Knowledge
Power infinitely above all the rest, is without any the
Appearance of Reason to frame any Hypothesis. Every
ticle of Matter, as Matter, is capable of all the same Fig
and Motions of any other; and I challenge any one in
Thoughts, to add any Thing else to one above another.

§. 16. *Thirdly*, If then neither one pecu
Thirdly, A System of incogitative Matter, can- Atom alone can be this eternal thinking
ing, nor all Matter, as Matter, *i. e.* every
ticle of Matter can be it, it only remains,
it is *some certain System of Matter* duly put
get

ıer, that is this *thinking eternal Being*. This hat, which I imagine is that Notion ch Men are apteſt to have of GOD, who uld have him a material Being, as moſt readily ſuggeſted them, by the ordinary Conceit they have of themſelves, other Men, which they take to be material thinking Be-s. But this Imagination, hower more natural, is no leſs urd than the other: For to ſuppoſe the eternal thinking ng to be nothing elſe but a Compoſition of Particles of tter, each whereof is incogitative, is to aſcribe all the ſdom and Knowledge of that eternal Being only to the *cta*-Poſition of Parts; than which, nothing can be re abſurd. For unthinking Particles of Matter, however together, can have nothing thereby added to them, but a v Relation of Poſition, which 'tis impoſſible ſhould give ought and Knowledge to them.

not be cogitative.

§. 17. But farther, this *corporeal Syſtem* either all its Parts at Reſt, or it is a certain Mo-n of the Parts wherein its Thinking con-s. If it be perfectly at Reſt, it is but one mp, and ſo can have no Priviledges above Atom.

Whether in Motion, or at Reſt.

f it be the Motion of its Parts on which its Thinking de-ds, all the Thoughts there muſt be unavoidably acciden-, and limited, ſince all the Particles that by Motion cauſe ought, being each of them in it ſelf without any Thought, not regulate its own Motions, much leſs be regulated by Thought of the whole, ſince that Thought is not the Cauſe Motion, (for then it muſt be antecedent to it, and ſo thout it) but the Conſequence of it, whereby Freedom, wer, Choice, and all rational and wiſe Thinking or Act-, will be quite taken away: So that ſuch a thinking Be- will be no better nor wiſer, than pure blind Matter, ſince reſolve all into the accidental unguided Motions of blind tter, or into Thought depending on unguided Motions of nd Matter, is the ſame Thing; not to mention the Nar-vneſs of ſuch Thoughts and Knowledge that muſt depend the Motion of ſuch Parts. But there needs no Enumera-n of any more Abſurdities and Impoſſibilities in this Hy-theſis, (however full of them it be) than that before-men-n'd, ſince let this thinking Syſtem be all, or a Part of the tter of the Univerſe, it is impoſſible that any one Parti-ſhould either know its own, or the Motion of any other

e

Pra-

Particle, or the Whole know the Motion of every Particular and so regulate its own Thoughts or Motions, or indeed hav any Thought resulting from such Motion.

Matter not co-eternal with an eternal Mind.

§. 18. Others would have *Matter* to be *eter nal*, notwithstanding that they allow an eter nal, cogitative, immaterial Being. This, th it take not away the Being of a GOD, y since it denies one and the first great Piece his Workmanship, the Creation, let us con der it a little. *Matter* must be allow'd eternal; why? B cause you cannot conceive how it can be made out of N thing; why do you not also think your self eternal? Yo will answer perhaps, because about twenty or forty Yea since, you began to be. But if I ask you what that *You* i which began then to be, you can scarce tell me. The Ma ter whereof you are made, began not then to be; for if did, then it is not eternal; but it began to be put togeth in such a Fashion and Frame as makes up your Body; b yet that Frame of Particles is not You, it makes not th thinking Thing You are; (for I have now to do with on who allows an eternal, immaterial, thinking Being, b would have unthinking Matter eternal too;) therefore whe did that thinking Thing begin to be? If it did never begi to be, then have you always been a thinking Thing from t ternity; the Absurdity whereof I need not confute, 'till meet with one who is so void of Understanding, as to ow it. If therefore you can allow a thinking Thing to be ma out of nothing, (as all Things that are not eternal must b why also can you not allow it possible, for a material Bei to be made out of nothing, by an equal Power, but th you have the Experience of the one in View, and not of t other? Though, when well consider'd, Creation of a Spi will he found to require no less Power, than the Creation Matter. Nay, possibly, if we would emancipate our selv from vulgar Notions, and raise our Thoughts as far as th would reach, to a closer Contemplation of Things, we mig be able to aim at some dim and seeming Conception ho Matter might at first be made, and begin to exist by the Po er of that eternal first Being; but to give Beginning and B ing to a Spirit, would be found a more inconceiveable Effe of omnipotent Power. But this being what would perha lead us too far from the Notions on which the Philosoph now in the World is built, it would not be pardonable to d

via

te so far from them, or to enquire so far as Grammar it would authorize, if the common settl'd Opinion oppo- it; especially in this Place, where the receiv'd Doctrine ves well enough to our present Purpose, and leaves this t Doubt, that the Creation or Beginning of any one BSTANCE out of Nothing, being once admitted, the eation of all other, but the CREATOR himself, may, h the same Ease, be suppos'd.

§. 19. But you will say, is it not impossi- to admit of the *making any Thing out of No-* *ng*, since we cannot possibly conceive it? I wer, No; 1. Because it is not reasonable to y the Power of an infinite Being, because cannot comprehend its Operations. We do deny other Effects upon this Ground, because we cannot sibly conceive the Manner of their Production. We can- conceive how any Thing but Impulse of Body can move ly; and yet that is not a Reason sufficient to make us y it possible, against the constant Experience we have of n our selves, in all our voluntary Motions, which are duc'd in us only by the free Action or Thought of our n Minds; and are not, nor can be the Effects of the Impulse Determination of the Motion of blind Matter, in or upon our lies; for then it could not be in our Power or Choice to r it. For Example: My right Hand writes, whilst my left nd is still; what Causes rest in one, and Motion in the er? Nothing but my Will, a Thought of my Mind; Thought only changing, the right Hand rests, and the Hand moves. This is Matter of Fact, which cannot be y'd: Explain this, and make it intelligible, and then the t Step will be to understand Creation: For the giving a r Determination to the Motion of the animal Spirits, nich some make Use of to explain voluntary Motion) clears the Difficulty one Jot, to alter the Determination of Mo- n being in this Case no easier nor less, than to give Mo- n it self; since the new Determination given to the ani- Spirits, must be either immediately by Thought, or to e other Body put in their way by Thought, which was in their way before, and so must owe its Motion by ught; either of which leaves voluntary Motion as unin- gible as it was before. In the mean Time, 'tis an over- ing our selves, to reduce all to the narrow Measure of Capacities; and to conclude all Things impossible to be done,

Matter not co-eternal with an eternal Mind.

done, whose Manner of doing exceeds our Comprehensio This is to make our Comprehension infinite, or GOD nite, when what he can do, is limited to what we can co ceive of it. If you do not understand the Operations your own finite Mind, that thinking Thing within you, not deem it strange that you cannot comprehend the Ope tions of that eternal infinite Mind, who made and gover all Things, and whom the Heaven of Heavens cannot co tain.

CHAP. XI.

Of our Knowledge of the Existence of other Thing

It is to be had only by Sensation.

§. 1. THE Knowledge of our own B ing, we have by Intuition. T Existence of a GOD, Reason clearly mak known to us, as has been shewn.

The *Knowledge of the Existence* of any other Thing we c have only by *Sensation*: For there being no necessary Co nexion of *real Existence*, with any *Idea* a Man hath in h Memory, nor of any other Existence, but that of GOD, wi the Exestence of any particular Man; no particular Man c know the *Existence* of any other Being, but only when b actual operating upon him, it makes it self perceiv'd by hi For the having the *Idea* of any Thing in our Mind, no mo proves the Existence of that Thing, than the Picture of a Ma evidences his being in the World, or the Visions of a Drea make thereby a true History.

Instance Whiteness of this Paper.

§. 2. 'Tis therefore the actual receiving *Ideas* from without, that gives us Notice of t *Existence* of other Things, and make us know that something doth exist at that Time with out us, which causes that *Idea* in us, tho' pe haps we neither know nor consider how it does it: For takes not from the Certainty of our Senses, and the *Ideas* w receive by them, that we know not the Manner wherein the are produc'd; *v. g.* whilst I write this, I have, by the P per affecting my Eyes, that *Idea* produc'd in my Mind, whic whatever Object causes, I call *White*; by which I know tha

tha

Quality or Accident (*i. e.* whose Appearance before my always causes that *Idea*) doth really exist, and hath a without me. And of this, the greatest Assurance I possibly have, and to which my Faculties can attain, is testimony of my Eyes, which are the proper and sole es of this Thing, whose Testimony I have reason to rely s so certain, that I can no more doubt, whilst I write that I see White and Black, and that something really , that causes that Sensation in me, than that I write ove my Hand; which is a Certainty as great as human re is capable of, concerning the Existence of any Thing, Man's self alone, and of GOD.

This tho' not so certain as Demonstration, yet may be call'd Knowledge, and proves the Existence of Things without us.

3. *The Notice we have by our Senses, of the ng of Things without us*, tho' it be not al- ner so certain as our intuitive Know- , or the Deductions of our Reason, em- l about the clear abstract *Ideas* of our Minds; yet it is an Assurance that *de- the Name of Knowledge.* If we perswade elves, that our Faculties act and inform ght concerning the Existence of those ts that affect them, it cannot pass for an ounded Confidence: For I think no Body can, in ear- be so sceptical, as to be uncertain of the Existence of Things which he sees and feels. At least, he that can so far, (whatever he may have with his own Thoughts) never have any Controversy with me; since he can be sure I say any thing contrary to his Opinion. As y self, I think GOD has given me Assurance enough Existence of Things without me; since by their dif- Application, I can produce in my self both Pleasure Pain, which is one great Concernment of my present This is certain, the Confidence that our Faculties do erein deceive us, is the greatest Assurance we are capa- , concerning the Existence of material Beings. For we t act any thing, but by our Faculties; nor talk of ledge it self, but by the Help of those Faculties, which ed to apprehend even what Knowledge is. But besides ssurance we have from our Senses themselves, that they t err in the Information they give us of the Existence ngs without us, when they are affected by them, we ther confirm'd in this Assurance, by other concurrent ns.

§. 4. *First*,

First, Because we cannot have them but by the Inlet of the Senses.

§. 4. *First*, 'Tis plain those Perceptions produc'd in us by exterior Causes affecting Senses; because *those that want the Organs of Sense, never can have the* Ideas *belonging to Sense* produc'd in their Minds. This is evident to be doubted; and therefore we not but be assur'd, that they come in by Organs of that Sense, and no other Way. Organs themselves, 'tis plain, do not produce them; then the Eyes of a Man in the Dark, would produce Colo and his Nose smell Roses in the Winter: But we see Body gets the Relish of a Pine-Apple, 'till he goes to *Indies* where it is, and tastes it.

Because an Idea from actual Sensation, and another from Memory, are very distinct Perceptions.

§. 5. *Secondly*, Because *sometimes I find I cannot avoid the having those* Ideas *produc'* *my Mind*: For tho' when my Eyes are s or Windows fast, I can at Pleasure re-cal my Mind the *Ideas* of *Light*, or the *Sun*, w former Sensations had lodg'd in my Mem so I can at Pleasure lay by that *Idea*, take into my View that of the *Smell* of a R or *Taste* of Sugar. But if I turn my Eye Noon towards the Sun, I cannot avoid the *Ideas* which Light or Sun then produces in me. So that there is a nifest Difference between the *Ideas* laid up in my Mem over which, if they were there only, I should have stantly the same Power to dispose of them, and lay t by at Pleasure) and those which force themselves upon and I cannot avoid having. And therefore it must need some exterior Cause, and the brisk acting of some Obj without me, whose Efficacy I cannot resist, that prod those *Ideas* in my Mind, whether I will or no. Bes there is no Body who doth not perceive the Differenc himself, between contemplating the Sun, as he hath the of it in his Memory, and actually looking upon it: which two, his Perception is so distinct, that few of his are more distinguishable one from another: And therefo hath certain Knowledge, that they are not both Memory the Actions of his Mind, and Fancies only within him; that actual Seeing hath a Cause without.

§. 6. *Thi*

6. *Thirdly*, Add to this, that *many of those* s *are produc'd in us with Pain, which after-* *s we remember without the least Offence.* Thus Pain of Heat or Cold, when the *Idea* of it eviv'd in our Minds, gives us no Disturbe; which, when felt, was very trouble-, and is again, when actually repeated; h is occasion'd by the Disorder the exter-Object causes in our Bodies, when apply'd : And we remember the Pain of *Hunger*, *t*, or the *Head-ach*, without any Pain at which would either never disturb us, or constantly do it, as often as we thought , were there nothing more but *Ideas* floating in our ls, and Appearances entertaining our Fancies, without the Existence of Things affecting us from abroad. The same be said of Pleasure, accompanying several actual Sensa-: And tho' mathematical Demonstration depends not Sense, yet the examining them by Diagrams, gives Credit to the Evidence of our Sight, and seems to give Certainty approaching to that of the Demonstration it For it would be very strange, that a Man should allow r an undeniable Truth, that two Angles of a Figure, h he measures by Lines and Angles of a Diagram, should gger one than the other; and yet doubt of the Existence ose Lines and Angles, which by looking on, he makes f to measure that by.

Thirdly, Pleasure or Pain which accompanies actual Sensation, accompanies not the returning of those Ideas *without the external Objects.*

7. *Fourthly*, Our *Senses*, in many Cases, *witness* to the Truth of each other's Re-, concerning the Existence of sensible gs without us. He that sees a *Fire*, may, doubt whether it be any thing more than e Fancy, feel it too; and be convinc'd, tting his Hand in it. Which certainly l never be put into such exquisite Pain bare *Idea* or Phantom, unless that the Pain be a Fancy Which yet he cannot, when the Burn is well, by rai-he *Idea* of it, bring upon himself again.

Fourthly, Our Senses assist one anothers Testimony of the Existence of outward Things.

us I see, whilst I write this, I can change the Appear-of the Paper; and by designing the Letters, tell before-what new *Idea* it shall exhibit the very next Moment, y by drawing my Pen over it; which will neither ap-(let me fancy as much as I will) if my Hand stands still;

or tho' I move my Pen, if my Eyes be shut: Nor when th Characters are once made on the Paper, can I chuse afi wards but see them as they are; that is, have the *Idea* such Letters as I have made. Whence it is manifest, t they are not barely the Sport and Play of my own Imagi tion, when I find that the Characters, that were made at Pleasure of my own Thoughts, do not obey them; nor cease to be, whenever I shall fancy it, but continue to fect my Senses constantly and regularly, according to Figures I made them. To which, if we will add, that Sight of those shall, from another Man, draw such Sou as I before-hand design they shall stand for, there will little Reason left to doubt that those Words I write really exist without me, when they cause a long Series of gular Sounds to affect my Ears, which could not be Effect of my Imagination, nor could my Memory retain th in that Order.

This Certainty is as great as our Condition needs.

§. 8. But yet, if after all this, any one be so sceptical, as to distrust his Senses, to affirm, that all we see and hear, feel taste, think and do, during our whole ing, is but the Series and deluding App ances of a long Dream, whereof there is Reality, and therefore will question the stence of all Things, or our Knowledge of any Thing; I n desire him to consider, that if all be a Dream, then he d but dream that he makes the Question; and so it is much matter, that a waking Man should answer him. yet, if he pleases, he may dream that I make him this swer, That *the Certainty of* Things existing *in rerum Nat* when we have *the Testimony of our Senses* for it, is not o *as great* as our Frame can attain to, but *as our Condition ne* For our Faculties being suited not to the full Extent of ing, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive Knowledge Things free from all Doubt and Scruple, but to the Pre vation of Us, in whom they are, and accommodated to Use of Life; they serve to our Purpose well enough, if t will but give us certain Notice of those Things, which convenient or inconvenient to us. For he that sees a C dle burning, and hath experimented the Force of its Fla by putting his Finger in it, will little doubt that thi Something existing without him, which does him Ha and puts him to great Pain: Which is Assurance enou

wh

en no Man requires greater Certainty, to govern his A-
ns by, than what is as certain as his Actions themselves.
l if our Dreamer pleases to try whether the glowing
t of a Glass Furnace, be barely a wandering Imagination
drowsy Man's Fancy, by putting his Hand into it, he
, perhaps, be waken'd into a Certainty greater than he
d wish, that it is something more than bare Imagina-
So that this Evidence is as great as we can desire, be-
as certain to us as our Pleasure or Pain, *i. e.* Happiness
Misery; beyond which we have no Concernment, either
Knowing or Being. Such an Assurance of the Existence
things without us, is sufficient to direct us in the attain-
the Good, and avoiding the Evil, which is caused by
n, which is the important Concerment we have of being
e acquainted with them.

But reaches no farther than actual Sensation.

9. In fine then, when our Senses do a-
lly convey into our Understandings any
we cannot but be satisfy'd that there
something at that Time really exist with-
us, which doth affect our Senses, and by
n give Notice of it self to our apprehensive
ilties, and actually produce that *Idea* which we then
ive: And we cannot so far distrust their Testimony, as
loubt that such Collections of simple *Ideas*, as we have
rv'd by our Senses to be united together, do really exist
ther. But *this Knowledge extends as far as the present Te-
ny of our Senses*, employ'd about particular Objects, that
hen affect them, *and no farther*. For if I saw such a
ection of simple *Ideas*, as is wont to be call'd *Man*, ex-
g together one Minute since, and am now alone, I can-
be certain that the same Man exists now, since there is
necessary Connexion of his Existence a Minute since, with
Existence now: By a thousand Ways he may cease to be,
I had the Testimoy of my Senses for his Existence. And
cannot be certain that the Man I saw last to Day, is
in Being, I can less be certain that he is so, who hath
longer remov'd from my Senses, and I have not seen
Yesterday, or since the last Year; and much less can I
ertain of the Existence of Men that I never saw. And
efore, tho' it be highly probable that Millions of Men
now exist, yet whilst I am alone writing this, I have
that Certainty of it, which we strictly call Knowledge;
the great Likelihood of it, puts me past Doubt, and it

be reasonable for me to do several Things upon the Confide that there are Men (and Men also of my Acquaintance, w whom I have to do) now in the World: But this is Probability, not Knowledge.

Folly to expect Demonstration in every Thing.

§. 10. Whereby yet we may observe h foolish and vain a Thing it is for a Man a narrow Knowledge, who having Rea given him to judge of the different Evide and Probability of Things, and to be swa accordingly; how *vain*, I say, it is *to exp Demonstration* and Certainty *in Things not capable of it*, a refuse Assent to very rational Propositions, and act contr to very plain and clear Truths, because they cannot be m out so evident, as to surmount every the least (I will say Reason, but) Pretence of Doubting. He that in ordinary Affairs of Life, would admit of nothing but di plain Demonstration, would be sure of nothing in World, but of perishing quickly. The Wholesomeness his Meat or Drink, would not give him Reason to vent on it: And I would fain know what 'tis he could do u such Grounds as were capable of no Doubt, no Objection.

Past Existence is known by Memory.

§. 11. As when our Senses are actually e ploy'd about any Object, we do know tha does exist; so *by our Memory*, we may be sur'd, that heretofore Things that affected Senses, have existed. And thus *we have Kn ledge of the past Existence* of several Things, whereof our S ses having inform'd us, our Memories still retain the *Id* and of this we are past all Doubt, so long as we remem well. But this Knowledge also reaches no farther than Senses have formerly assur'd us. Thus seeing Water at t instant, 'tis an unquestionable Truth to me, that Wa doth exist: And remembering that I saw it Yesterday, will also be always true; and as long as my Memory tains it, always an undoubted Proposition to me, that W ter did exist 10th *July*, 1688, as it will also be equally t that a certain Number of very fine Colours did exist, whi at the same Time, I saw upon a Bubble of that Water: being now quite out of the Sight both of the Water a Bubbles too, it is no more certainly known to me, that Water doth now exist, than that the Bubbles or Colo therein do so; it being no more necessary that Water sho exist to Day, because it existed Yesterday, than that the C lo

s or Bubbles exist to Day, because they existed Yesterday, it be exceedingly much more probable, because Water been observ'd to continue long in Existence, but Bub- and the Colours on them, quickly cease to be.

12. What *Ideas* we have of Spirits, and we come by them, I have already shewn. tho' we have those *Ideas* in our Minds, know we have them there, the having the of Spirits, does not make us *know* that such Things do exist without us, or *that there are any finite ts*, or any other spiritual Beings, but the eternal GOD. have Ground from Revelation, and several other Reasons, elieve with Assurance, that there are such Creatures; our Senses not being able to discover them, we want the ns of knowing their particular Existences. For we can more know, that there are finite Spirits really existing ne *Idea* we have of such Beings in our Minds, than by *deas* any one has of Fairies, or Centaurs, he can come now, that Things answering those *Ideas*, do really exist. nd therefore concerning the Existence of finite Spirits, ell as several other Things, we must content our selves the Evidence of Faith; but universal certain Proposi- concerning this Matter, are beyond our Reach. For ever true it may be, *v. g.* that all the intelligent Spirits GOD ever created, do still exist; yet it can never e a part of our certain Knowledge. These, and the like ositions, we may assent to, as highly probable, but are I fear, in this State, capable of knowing. We are not to put others upon Demonstrating, nor our selves upon h of universal Certainty in all those Matters wherein re not capable of any other Knowledge, but what our s give us in this or that Particular.

The Existence of Spirits not knowable.

13. By which it appears, that there are Sorts of *Propositions*. 1. There is one Sort ropositions *concerning* the *Existence* of any g answerable to such an *Idea*; as having *dea* of an *Elephant*, *Phœnix*, *Motion*, or an *l*, in my Mind, the first and natural En- y is, Whether such a Thing does any where exist? this Knowledge is only of *Particulars*. No Existence of Thing without us, but only of GOD, can certainly nown farther than our Senses inform us. 2. There is her Sort of *Propositions*, wherein is expressed the Agree-

Particular Propositions concerning Existence, are knowable.

ment or Disagreement of our abstract *Ideas*, and their Depe dance one on another. Such Propositions may be *univer* and certain. So having the *Idea* of GOD, and my se of Fear and Obedience, I cannot but be sure that GOD to be fear'd and obey'd by me: And this Proposition w be certain, concerning *Man* in general, if I have made abstract *Idea* of such a Species, whereof I am one Particul But yet this Proposition, how certain soever, That M ought to fear and obey GOD, proves not to me the E stence of Men in the World, but will be true of all su Creatures, whenever they do exist: Which *Certainty* of su general Propositions, depends on the Agreement or Disagr ment is to be discover'd in those abstract *Ideas*.

And general Propositions concerning abstract Ideas.

§. 14. In the former Case, our Knowled is the Consequence of the Existence of Thi producing *Ideas* in our Minds by our Sens In the latter, Knowledge is the Consequer of the *Ideas* (be they what they will) that in our Minds producing there general cert Propositions. Many of these are call'd *æternæ Veritates*, a all of them indeed are so; not from being written all or a of them in the Minds of all Men, or that they were a of them Propositions in any one's Mind, 'till he, having the abstract *Ideas*, join'd or separated them by Affirmati or Negation. But wheresoever we can suppose such a C ture as *Man* is, endow'd with such Faculties, and ther furnish'd with such *Ideas* as we have, we must conclude must needs, when he applies his Thoughts to the Consid tion of his *Ideas*, know the Truth of certain Proposit that will arise from the Agreement or Disagreement wh he will perceive in his own *Ideas*. Such Propositions therefore call'd *eternal Truths*, not because they are eter Propositions actually form'd, and antecedent to the Und standing, that at any time makes them; nor because t are imprinted on the Mind from any Patterns that are where of them out of the Mind, and existed before: But cause being once made about abstract *Ideas*, so as to be t they will, whenever they can be suppos'd to be made ag at any Time past or to come, by a Mind having those I always actually be true. For Names being suppos'd to st perpetually for the same *Ideas*; and the same *Ideas* hav immutably the same Habitudes one to another, Propositi

cerning any abſtract *Ideas*, that are once true, muſt needs
ternal Verities.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Improvement of our Knowledge.

Knowledge is not from Maxims.

. IT having been the common receiv'd O-
pinion amongſt Men of Letters, that
xims were the Foundation of all Know-
e; and that the Sciences were each of
n built upon certain *Præcognita*, from whence the Un-
ſtanding was to take its Riſe, and by which it was to
duct it ſelf, in its Enquiries, into the Matters belonging
that Science; the beaten Road of the Schools has been
y down in the Beginning, one or more general Propoſi-
s, as Foundations whereon to build the Knowledge that
to be had of that Subject. Theſe Doctrines thus laid down
Foundations of any Science, were call'd *Principles*, as
Beginnings from which we muſt ſet out, and look no
ner backwards in our Enquiries, as we have already ob-
'd.

(The Occaſion of that Opinion.)

. 2. One Thing, which might probably give
Occaſion to this Way of Proceeding in o-
Sciences, was (as I ſuppoſe) the good Suc-
it ſeem'd to have in *Mathematicks*, where-
Men being obſerv'd to attain a great Certainty of Know-
e, theſe Sciences came by Pre-eminence to be call'd
ήματα, and Μάθησις, Learning, or Things learn'd,
ughly, learn'd, as having, of all others, the greateſt Cer-
ty, Clearneſs, and Evidence in them.

But from the comparing clear and diſtinct Ideas.

3. But if any one will conſider he will (I
s) find that the *great Advancement* and
ainty of *real Knowledge*, which Men ar-
l to in theſe Sciences, was not owing to
Influence of theſe Principles, nor deriv'd
n any peculiar Advantage they receiv'd from two or three
eral Maxims laid down in the Beginning; but *from* the
, *diſtinct*, *compleat Ideas* their Thoughts were employ'd
ut, and the Relation of Equality and Exceſs ſo clear be-

tween ſome of them, that they had an intuitive Knowledg and by that, a Way to diſcover it in others, and this witho the Help of thoſe *Maxims*. For I ask, Is it not poſſible for young Lad to know that his whole Body is bigger tha his little Finger, but by Virtue of this Axiom, that *the wh is bigger than a Part*; nor be aſſur'd of it, 'till he has learn that *Maxim?* Or cannot a Country Wench know, that h ving receiv'd a Shilling from one that owes her three, and Shilling alſo from another that owes her three, that the maining Debts in each of their Hands are equal? Cann ſhe, I ſay, know this without ſhe fetch the Certainty of from this Maxim, That *if you take Equals from Equals, Remainder will be Equals*, a Maxim which poſſibly ſhe nev heard or thought of? I deſire any one to conſider, fro what has been elſewhere ſaid, which is known firſt and cl eſt by moſt People, the particular Inſtance, or the gene Rule; and which it is that gives Life and Birth to t other. Theſe general Rules are but the comparing our mo general and abſtract *Ideas*, which are the Workmanſhip the Mind, made, and Names given to them, for the e ſier Diſpatch in its Reaſonings, and drawing into compr henſive Terms, and ſhort Rules, its various and multiply Obſervations. But Knowledge began in the Mind, and w founded on Particulars, though afterwards, perhaps, Notice be taken thereof; it being natural for t Mind (forward ſtill to enlarge its Knowledge) moſt atte tively to lay up thoſe general Notions, and make the prop Uſe of them, which is to disburthen the Memory of the cu berſome Load of Particulars. For I deſire it may be conſide what more Certainty there is to a Child, or any one, th his Body, little Finger and all, is bigger than his little Fi ger alone, after you have given to his Body the Name *who* and to his little Finger the Name *Part*, than he could ha had before; or what new Knowledge concerning his Bod can theſe two relative Terms give him, which he could not ha without them? Could he not know that his Body was bi ger than his little Finger, if his Language were yet ſo imp fect, that he had no ſuch relative Terms as *Whole* and *Par* I ask farther, When he has got theſe Names, how is he mo certain that his Body is a *Whole*, and his little Finger a *Pa* than he was, or might be certain before he learn'd tho Terms, that his Body was bigger than his little Finger? A one may as reaſonably doubt, or deny, that his little Fing

s a Part of his Body, as that it is leſs than his Body. And e that can doubt whether it be leſs, will as certainly doubt whether it be a Part. So that the Maxim, *The whole is bigger than a Part*, can never be made uſe of to prove the little finger leſs than the Body, but when it is uſeleſs, by being brought to convince one of a Truth which he knows already. For he that does not certainly know that any Parcel of Matter, with another Parcel of Matter join'd to it, is bigger than either of them alone, will never be able to know it by the Help of theſe two relative Terms, *Whole* and *Part*, make of them what Maxims you pleaſe.

Dangerous to build upon precarious Principles.

§. 4. But be it in the Mathematicks as it will, whether it be clearer, that taking an Inch from a black Line of two Inches, and an Inch from a red Line of two Inches, the remaining Parts of the two Lines will be equal; or that *if you take Equals from Equals, the Remainder will be Equals*: Which, I ſay, of theſe two is the clearer and firſt known, I leave to any one to determine, it not being material to my preſent Occaſion. That which I have here to do, is to enquire, whether if it be the readieſt Way to Knowledge, to begin with general Maxims, and build upon them, it be yet a ſafe Way to take the *Principles*, which are laid down in any other Science, as unqueſtionable Truths; and ſo receive them without Examination, and adhere to them without ſuffering to be doubted of, becauſe Mathematicians have been ſo happy, or ſo fair, to uſe none but ſelf-evident and undeniable. If this be ſo, I know not what may not paſs for Truth in Morality, what may not be introduc'd and prov'd in natural Philoſophy.

Let that Principle of ſome of the Philoſophers, that all is Matter, and that there is nothing elſe, be receiv'd for certain and indubitable, and it will be eaſy to be ſeen by the Writings of ſome that have reviv'd it again in our Days, what Conſequences it will lead us into. Let any one, with *Pomponatius*, take the World; or with the *Stoicks*, the *Æther*, or the Sun; or with *Anaximenes*, the Air to be *God*, and what a Divinity, Religion, and Worſhip, muſt we needs have! *Nothing* can be *ſo dangerous as Principles* thus *taken up without Queſtioning or Examination*; eſpecially if they be ſuch as concern Morality, which influences Mens Lives, and gives a Baſis to all their Actions. Who might not juſtly expect another Kind of Life in *Ariſtippus*, who plac'd Happineſs in bodily

bodily Pleasure; and in *Antisthenes*, who made Vertue su cient to Felicity? And he, who with *Plato*, shall place B titude in the Knowledge of God, will have his Thoug rais'd to other Contemplations than those who look not yond this Spot of Earth, and those perishing Things wh are to be had in it. He that, with *Archelaus*, shall lay down as a Principle, That Right and Wrong, Honest a Dishonest, are defin'd only by Laws, and not by Natu will have other Measures of moral Rectitude and Prav than those who take it for granted, that we are under O gations antecedent to all human Constitutions.

This is no certain Way to Truth.

§. 5. If therefore those that pass for *Pri ples*, are *not certain*, (which we must have so Way to know, that we may be able to dist guish them from those that are doubtful) are only made so to us by our blind Asse we are liable to be misled by them; and instead of be guided into Truth, we shall, by Principles, be only confir in Mistake and Error.

But to compare clear compleat Ideas *under steady Names.*

§. 6. But since the Knowledge of the C tainty of Principles, as well as of all ot Truths, depends only upon the Percept we have of the Agreement or Disagreem of our *Ideas*, *the Way to improve our Knowle* is not, I am sure, blindly, and with an plicit Faith, to receive and swallow Pri ples; but is, I think, *to* get and *fix in our Minds clear*, *stinct*, *and compleat* Ideas, as far as they are to be had, *annex to them proper and constant Names.* And thus, perh without any other Principles, but barely considering th *Ideas*, and by *comparing them one with another*, finding t Agreement and Disagreement, and their several Relati and Habitudes, we shall get more true and clear Knowle by the Conduct of this one Rule, than by taking up Princip and thereby putting our Minds into the Disposal of other

The true Method of advancing Knowledge, is by considering our abstract Ideas.

§. 7. *We must* therefore, if we will procee Reason advises, *adapt our Methods of Enq to the Nature of the* Ideas *we examine*, and Truth we search after. General and cert Truths are only founded in the Habitudes Relations of abstract *Ideas*. A sagacious methodical Application of our Thoughts, the finding out these Relations, is the only Way to disc

l that can be put, with Truth and Certainty concerning 'em, nto general Propoſitions. By what Steps we are to proceed in ieſe, is to be learn'd in the Schools of the Mathematicians, who, om very plain and eaſy Beginnings, by gentle Degrees, and a ontinu'd Chain of Reaſonings, proceed to the Diſcovery and Demonſtration of Truths that appear at firſt Sight beyond hu-an Capacity. The Art of finding Proofs, and the admirable Methods they have invented for the ſingling out, and lay-ng in order thoſe intermediate *Ideas*, that demonſtratively ſhew he Equality or Inequality of unapplicable Quantities, is that hich has carry'd them ſo far, and produc'd ſuch wonderful nd unexpected Diſcoveries: But whether ſomething like this, n reſpect of other *Ideas*, as well as thoſe of Magnitude, may ot in Time be found out, I will not determine. This, I ink, I may ſay, that if other *Ideas*, that are the real as ell as nominal Eſſences of their Species, were purſu'd in the ay familiar to Mathematicians, they would carry our houghts farther, and with greater Evidence and Clearneſs than oſſibly we are apt to imagine.

By which Morality alſo may be made clearer.

§. 8. This gave me the Confidence to advance at Conjecture which I ſuggeſt, *Chap* 3. viz. That *Morality is capable of Demonſtration*, as well as Mathematicks. For the *Ideas* that Ethicks are nverſant about, being all real Eſſences, and ch, as I imagine, have a diſcoverable Connexion and Agree-ent one with another; ſo far as we can find their Habi-ides and Relations, ſo far we ſhall be poſſeſs'd of certain, al, and general Truths; and I doubt not, but if a right ethod were taken, a great part of Morality might be made t with that Clearneſs, that could leave, to a conſidering an, no more Reaſon to doubt, than he could have to doubt of e Truth of Propoſitions in Mathematicks, which have been monſtrated to him.

But Knowledge of Bodies is to be improved only by Experience.

§. 9. In our Search after the Knowledge of *Sub-nces*, our want of *Ideas*, that are ſuitable to ch a way of proceeding, obliges us to a quite fferent Method. We advance not here, as the other, (where our abſtract *Ideas* are real, as ell as nominal Eſſences) by contemplating ur *Ideas*, and conſidering their Relations and orreſpondencies; that helps us very little, for the Reaſons at in another place we have at large ſet down. By which, think, it is evident that Subſtances afford Matter of very little

little general Knowledge; and the bare Contemplation of th abſtract *Ideas*, will carry us but a very little way in the Sea of Truth and Certainty. What then are we to do for the I provement of our *Knowledge in ſubſtantial Beings?* Here we to take a quite contrary Courſe, the want of *Ideas* of their r *Eſſences*, ſend us from our own Thoughts, to the Things the ſelves, as they exiſt. *Experience here muſt teach me* wh Reaſon cannot: And 'tis by trying alone, that I can certai ly know what other Qualities co-exiſt with thoſe of my co plex *Idea*, *v. g.* whether that *yellow*, *heavy*, *fuſible* Body I c *Gold*, be *malleable* or no; which Experience (which way ver it prove in that particular Body I examine) makes not certain that it is ſo in all or any other *yellow*, *hea fuſible* Bodies, but that which I have try'd. Becauſe it is no Co ſequence one way or t'other from my complex *Idea*, the N ceſſity or Inconſiſtence of *Malleability* hath no viſible Co nexion with the Combination of that *Colour*, *Weight*, and *F ſibility* in any Body. What I have ſaid here of the nomi Eſſence of *Gold*, ſuppoſ'd to conſiſt of a Body of ſuch a deter nate *Colour*, *Weight*, and *Fuſibility*, will hold true, if *Mall bleneſs*, *Fixedneſs*, and *Solubility* in *Aqua Regine* be added to Our Reaſonings from theſe *Ideas*, will carry us but a lit way in the certain Diſcovery of the other Properties in th Maſſes of Matter wherein all theſe are to be found. Beca the other Properties of ſuch Bodies depending not on theſe, b on that unknown real Eſſence, on which theſe alſo depend, cannot by them diſcover the reſt; we can go no farther than ſimple *Ideas* of our nominal Eſſence will carry us, which is v little beyond themſelves; and ſo afford us but very ſparin any certain, univerſal, and uſeful Truths. For upon Try having found that particular Piece (and all others of t Colour, Weight, and Fuſibility, that I ever try'd) *malleal* that alſo makes now perhaps a part of my complex *Idea*, p of my nominal Eſſence of *Gold*: Whereby, though I make complex *Idea*, to which I affix the Name *Gold*, to conſiſt more ſimple *Ideas* than before; yet ſtill, it not contain the real Eſſence of any Species of Bodies, it helps me not c tainly to know (I ſay to know, perhaps, it may to co cture) the other remaining Properties of that Body, fart than they have a viſible Connexion with ſome or all of ſimple *Ideas* that make up my nominal Eſſence. For Exa ple, I cannot be certain, from this complex *Idea*, whether G be fix'd or no; becauſe, as before, there is no neceſſary C

exion or Inconsistence to be discover'd betwixt a complex *I-ea* of a Body, *yellow*, *heavy*, *fusible*, *malleable*; betwixt these, I say, nd *Fixedness*, so that I may certainly know, that in whatsoever ody these are found, there *Fixedness* is sure to be. Here again, or Assurance, I must apply my self to *Experience*; as far as iat reaches, I may have certain Knowledge, but no farther.

§. 10. I deny not, but a Man accustom'd to tional and regular Experiments, shall be able to e farther into the Nature of Bodies, and guess ghter at their yet unknown Properties, than ne that is a Stranger to them: But yet, as I ave said, this is but Judgment and Opini-n, not Knowledge and Certainty. This *way of nproving our Knowledge in Substances only by Experience* and listory, which is all that the Weakness of our Faculties in his State of *Mediocrity*, which we are in in this World, can ttain to, makes me suspect that natural Philosophy is not apable of being made a Science. We are able, I imagine, to each very little general Knowledge concerning the Species f Bodies, and their several Properties. Experiments and Hi-orical Observations we may have, from which we may draw dvantages of Ease and Health, and thereby increase our Stock f Conveniences for this Life; but beyond this, I fear our Ta-nts reach not, nor are our Faculties, as I guess, able to advance.

This may procure us Convenience, not Science.

§. 11. From whence it is obvious to conclude, iat since our Faculties are not fitted to pene-ate into the internal Fabrick and real Essences f Bodies, but yet plainly discover to us the eing of a GOD, and the Knowledge of our lves, enough to lead us into a full and clear iscovery of our Duty, and great Concern-ient, it will become us, as rational Creatures, to employ hose Faculties we have about what they are most adapted to, and llow the Direction of Nature, where it seems to point us ut the way. For 'tis rational to conclude, that our proper mployment lies in those Enquiries, and in that sort of Know-dge which is most suited to our natural Capacities, and car-es in it our greatest Interest, *i. e.* the Condition of our e-rnal Estate. Hence I think I may conclude, that *Morality the proper Science and Business of Mankind in general*, (who e both concern'd and fitted to search out their *Summum onum*) as several Arts, conversant about several parts of lature, are the Lot and private Talent of particular Men,

We are fitted for moral Knowledge and natural Improvements.

for

for the common Use of human Life, and their own parti
lar Subsistence in this World. Of what Consequence the D
covery of one natural Body and its Properties may be to
man Life, the whole great Continent of *America* is a c
vincing Instance; whose Ignorance in useful Arts, a
want of the greatest part of the Conveniences of Life, in
Country that abounded with all sorts of natural Plenty,
think may be attributed to their Ignorance, of what was
be found in a very ordinary despicable Stone, I mean
Mineral of *Iron*. And whatever we think of our Parts
Improvements in this part of the World, where Knowle
and Plenty seem to vie each with other; yet to any one t
will seriously reflect on it, I suppose it will appear past dou
that were the Use of *Iron* lost among us, we should in a
Ages be unavoidably reduc'd to the Wants and Ignorance
the ancient savage *Americans*, whose natural Endowme
and Provisions come no way short of those of the most fl
rishing and polite Nations; so that he who first made kno
the Use of that one contemptible Mineral, may be truly sti
the Father of Arts, and Author of Plenty.

But must beware of Hypothesis, and wrong Principles.

§. 12. I would *not therefore* be thought dis-esteem, or *dissuade the Study of Nature.* readily agree the Contemplation of his Wo gives us Occasion to admire, revere, a glorify their Author: And if rightly direct may be of greater Benefit to Mankind, t the Monuments of exemplary Charity, t have, at so great Charge, been raised by the Founders Hospitals and Alms-houses. He that first invented Printi discover'd the Use of the Compass; or made publick Virtue and right Use of *Kin Kina*, did more for the P pagation of Knowledge, for the Supplying and Increase useful Commodities, and sav'd more from the Grave, t those who built Colleges, Work-houses, and Hospitals.

that I would say, is, that we should not be too forwar possess'd with the Opinion, or Expectation of Knowle where it is not to be had, or by Ways that will not att it: That we should not take doubtful Systems, for comp Sciences; nor unintelligible Notions, for scientifical Dem strations. In the Knowledge of Bodies, we must be con to glean, what we can, from particular Experiments; s we cannot, from a Discovery of their real Essences, gras a time whole Sheaves; and in Bundles comprehend the

ıre and Properties of whole Species together. Where our nquiry is concerning Co-existence, or Repugnacy to co-ex-t, which by Contemplation of our *Ideas*, we cannot disco-er; there Experience, Observation, and natural History, ıust give us, by our Senses, and by Retail, an Insight in-o corporeal Substances. The Knowledge of Bodies we must et by our Senses, warily employ'd in taking Notice of ieir Qualities and Operations on one another: And what e hope to know of separate Spirits in this World, we ıust, I think, expect only from Revelation. He that shall onsider, *how little general Maxims, precarious Principles, and Hypotheſis laid down at Pleasure, have promoted true Knowledge*, t help'd to satisfy the Enquiries of rational Men after real mprovements: How little, I say, the setting out at that nd, has for many Ages together advanc'd Mens Progress wards the Knowledge of natural Philosophy, will think, e have Reason to thank those, who, in this latter Age, ive taken another Course, and have trod out to us, tho' not easier Way to learn'd Ignorance, yet a surer Way to pro-able Knowledge.

§. 13. Not that we may not, to explain a-y *Phœnomena* of Nature, make Use of any pro-able *Hypotheſis* whatsoever. *Hypotheſes*, if they e well made, are at least great Helps to the lemory, and often direct us to new Discoveries. But my leaning is, that we should *not take up any one too hastily*, vhich the Mind, that would always penetrate into the Cau-s of Things, and have Principles to rest on, is very apt to o) 'till we have very well examin'd Particulars, and made veral Experiments in that Thing which we would explain r our Hypotheſis, and see whether it will agree to them all; hether our Principles will carry us quite through, and not as inconsistent with our *Phœnomenon* of Nature, as they em to accommodate, and explain another. And at least at we take Care that the Name of *Principles* deceive us ot, nor impose on us, by making us receive that for an un-uestionable Truth, which is really, at best, but a very doubt-l Conjecture, such as are most (I had almost said all) of e *Hypotheſes* in natural Philosophy.

The true Use of Hypotheſes.

§. 14. But whether natural Philosophy be ca-ble of Certainty or no, the *Ways to enlarge r Knowledge*, as far as we are capable, seem to e, in short, to be these two:

Clear and distinct Ideas *with settl'd Names, and the*

First,

finding of those which shew their Agreement or Disagreement, are the Ways to increase our Knowledge.

First, The *first* is *to get and settle in our Min* determin'd *Ideas* of those Things, whereof w have general or specifick Names; at least so many of them as we would consider ar improve our Knowledge in, or Reason abou And if they be *specifick* Ideas of *Substances*, w should endeavour also to make them as com pleat as we can, whereby I mean that w should put together as many simple *Ideas*, being constantly observ'd to co-exist, may perfectly dete mine the *Species*; and each of those simple *Ideas*, which a the Ingredients of our complex, one should be clear and d stinct in our Minds: For it being evident that our Know ledge cannot exceed our *Ideas*, as far as they are either impe fect, confus'd, or obscure, we cannot expect to have certai perfect, or clear Knowledge.

Secondly, The other is the Art of *finding out* those *interm diate Ideas*, which may shew us the Agreement or Repugnan cy of other *Ideas*, which cannot be immediately compar'd.

Mathematicks an Instance of it.

§. 15. That these two (and not the relyin on Maxims, and drawing Consequences fro some general Propositions) are the right M thod of improving our Knowledge in the *Ide* of other Modes, besides those of Quantity, t Consideration of Mathematical Knowledge will easily i form us. Where first we shall find, that he that has not perfect and clear *Idea* of those Angles or Figures of which desires to know any Thing, is utterly thereby uncapable of ny Knowledge about them. Suppose but a Man not to ha a perfect exact *Idea* of a *right Angle*, a *Scalenum*, or *Trapezium* and there is nothing more certain, than that he will in va seek any Demonstration about them. Farther it is evider that it was not the Influence of those Maxims which are t ken for Principles in Mathematicks, that hath led the Mast of that Science into those wonderful Discoveries they ha made. Let a Man of good Parts know all the Maxims g nerally made Use of in Mathematicks never so perfectly, ar contemplate their Extent and Consequences as much as pleases, he will, by their Assistance, I suppose, scarce ev come to know, that *the Square of the Hypotenuse in a right a gl'd Triangle, is equal to the Squares of the two other Sides.* T Knowledge that *the Whole is equal to all its Parts*, and *if take Equals from Equals, the Remainder will be equal*, &c. help

hi

im not, I presume, to this Demonstration: And a Man ay, I think, pore long enough on those Axioms, without er seeing one Jot the more of Mathematical Truths. They ave been discover'd by the Thoughts otherwise apply'd; the lind had other Objects, other Views before it, far different om those Maxims, when it first got the Knowledge of such ind of Truths in Mathematicks, which Men well enough quainted with those receiv'd Axioms, but ignorant of their lethod who first made these Demonstrations, can never sufciently admire. And who knows what Methods, to enrge our Knowledge in other Parts of Science, may hereafr be invented, answering that of *Algebra* in Mathematicks, hich so readily finds out *Ideas* of Quantities to measure oers by, whose Equality or Proportion we could otherwise ry hardly, or perhaps never come to know?

CHAP. XIII.

ome farther Considerations concerning our Knowledge.

Our Knowledge partly necessary, partly voluntary.

1. OUR *Knowledge*, as in other Things, so in this, has a great Conformity ith our Sight, that it is neither *wholly necessa-*, *nor wholly voluntary.* If our Knowledge ere altogether necessary, all Mens Knowledge ould not only be alike, but every Man would know all at is knowable; and if it were wholly voluntary, some en so little regard or value it, that they would have exeam little, or none at all. Men that have Senses, cannot use but receive some *Ideas* by them; and if they have Meory, they cannot but retain some of them; and if they have y distinguishing Faculty, cannot but perceive the Agreeent or Disagreement of some of them one with another; as that has Eyes, if he will open them by Day, cannot but e some Objects, and perceive a Difference in them. But o' a Man with his Eyes open in the Light, cannot but see; t there be certain Objects, which he may chuse whether he ill turn his Eyes to; there may be in his Reach a Book conining Pictures and Discourses, capable to delight or instruct

him, which yet he may never have the Will to open, neve take the Pains to look into.

The Application voluntary; but we know as Things are, not as we please.

§. 2. There is also another Thing in a Man Power, and that is, though he turns his Eye sometimes towards an Object, yet he ma chuse whether he will curiously survey it, an with an intent Application endeavour to ob serve accurately all that is visible in it. Bu yet, what he does see, he cannot see otherwi than he does. It depends not on his Will t see that *Black* which appears *Yellow*; nor to perswade himsel that what actually *scalds* him, feels *cold*: The Earth will n appear painted with Flowers, nor the Fields cover'd wit Verdure, whenever he has a Mind to it: In the cold Wi ter, he cannot help seeing it white and hoary, if he will loo Abroad. Just thus is it with our Understanding; all that *voluntary* in our Knowledge, is the *employing*, or with-hol ing any of *our Faculties* from this or that Sort of Objects, an a more or less accurate Survey of them; but they being em ploy'd, *our Will hath no Power to determine the Knowledge of t Mind* one way or other; that is done only by the Objec themselves, as far as they are clearly discover'd. And ther fore, as far as Mens Senses are conversant about external O jects, the Mind cannot but receive those *Ideas* which are p sented by them, and be inform'd of the Existence of Thin without; and so far as Mens Thoughts converse with th own determin'd *Ideas*, they cannot but in some Measure o serve the Agreement and Disagreement that is to be found mongst some of them, which is so far Knowledge; and they have Names for those *Ideas* which they have thus con der'd, they must needs be assur'd of the Truth of those Pro sitions, which express that Agreement or Disagreement th perceive in them, and be undoubtedly convinc'd of th Truths: For what a Man sees, he cannot but see, and wh he perceives, he cannot but know that he perceives.

Instance in Numbers.

§. 3. Thus he that has got the *Ideas* of Nu bers, and hath taken the Pains to compare o *two*, and *three*, to *six*, cannot chuse but kn that they are equal. He that hath got the I of a Triangle, and found the Ways to measure its Ang and their Magnitudes, is certain that its three Angles equal to two right ones: And can as little doubt of that,

this Truth, that *it is impossible for the same to be, and not to*

He also that hath the *Idea* of an intelligent, it frail and weak Being, made by and depending on another, who is eternal, omnipont, perfectly wise and good, will as certain- know that Man is to honour, fear, and obey GOD, as at the Sun shines when he sees it. For if he hath but the *eas* of two such Beings in his Mind, and will turn his houghts that Way, and consider them, he will as certainly nd, that the inferior, finite, and dependent, is under an bligation to obey the supream and infinite, as he is certain find, that *three*, *four*, and *seven*, are less than *fifteen*, if he ill consider and compute those Numbers; nor can he be rer in a clear Morning, that the Sun is risen, if he will t open his Eyes, and turn them that Way. But yet these ruths being never so certain, never so clear, he may be igrant of either, or all of them, who will never take the ins to employ his Faculties as he should, to inform himself out them.

In natural Religion.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Judgment.

1. THE understanding Faculties being given to Man, not barely for Spelation, but also for the Conduct of his Life, an would be at a great Loss, if he had noing to direct him, but what has the Certinty of true *Knowledge*. For that being very ort and scanty, as we have seen, he would be often utterly the Dark, and in most of the Actions of his Life, perctly at a Stand, had he nothing to guide him in the Abnce of clear and certain Knowledge. He that will not eat, ll he has Demonstration that it will nourish him; he that ill not stir, 'till he infallibly knows the Business he goes out will succeed, will have little else to do, but sit still nd perish.

Our Knowledge being short, we want something else.

What Use to be made of this twilight State.

§. 2. Therefore, as God has ſet ſome Thin in broad Day-light, as he has given us ſon certain Knowledge, though limited to a fe Things in Compariſon, probably, as a Ta of what intellectual Creatures are capable to excite in us a Deſire and Endeavour after a better Stat ſo, in the greateſt Part of our Concernment, he has afford us only the Twilight, as I may ſo ſay, of *Probability*, ſuit ble, I preſume, to that State of Mediocrity and Probation ſhip he has been pleas'd to place us in here; wherein, check our Over-confidence and Preſumption, we might, every Day's Experience, be made ſenſible of our Short-ſighte neſs, and Liableneſs to Error; the Senſe whereof might be conſtant Admonition to us, to ſpend the Days of this o Pilgrimage with Induſtry and Care, in the Search, and fo lowing of that Way, which might lead us to a State greater Perfection. It being highly rational to think, ev were Revelation ſilent in the Caſe, that as Men empl thoſe Talents God has given them here, they ſhall accordin ly receive their Rewards at the Cloſe of the Day, wh their Sun ſhall ſet, and Night ſhall put an End to th Labours.

Judgment ſupplies the Want of Knowledge.

§. 3. The Faculty which God has given M to ſupply the Want of clear and certain Kno ledge, in Caſes where that cannot be had, *Judgment*: Whereby the Mind takes its *Id* to agree or diſagree; or which is the ſame, ny Propoſition to be true or falſe, witho perceiving a demonſtrative Evidence in the Proofs. T Mind ſometimes exerciſes this *Judgment* out of Neceſſi where demonſtrative Proofs and certain Knowledge are n to be had; and ſometimes out of Lazineſs, Unskilfulneſs, Haſte, even where demonſtrative and certain Proofs are to had. Men often ſtay not warily to examine the Agreeme or Diſagreement of two *Ideas*, which they are deſirous concern'd to know; but either incapable of ſuch Attenti as is requiſite in a long Train of Gradations, or impatie of Delay, lightly caſt their Eyes on, or wholly paſs by t Proofs; and ſo, without making out the Demonſtratio determine of the Agreement or Diſagreement of two *Ide* as it were; by a View of them as they are at a Diſtance, a take it to be the one or the other, as ſeems moſt likely them upon ſuch a looſe Survey. This Faculty of the Min

wh

ıen it is exercis'd immediately about Things, is call'd *Judgnt*; when about Truths deliver'd in Words, is moſt comonly call'd *Aſſent* or *Diſſent*: Which being the moſt uſual ay wherein the Mind has occaſion to employ this Faculty, hall, under theſe Terms, treat of it as leaſt liable in our nguage to Equivocation.

§. 4. Thus the Mind has two Faculties, nverſant about Truth and Falſhood. *First*, *Knowledge*, whereby it certainly perves, and is undoubtedly ſatisfy'd of the Aement or Diſagreement of any *Ideas*. *Secondly*, *Judgment*, which is the putting *Ideas* gether, or ſeparating them from one another in the Mind, ıen their certain Agreement or Diſagreement is not perceiv'd t *preſum'd* to be ſo, which is, as the Word imports, taken be ſo, before it certainly appears. And if it ſo unites, or arates them, as in Reality Things are, it is *right Judgment*.

Judgment is, the preſuming Things to be ſo without perceiving it.

CHAP. XV.

Of Probability.

1. AS Demonſtration is the ſhewing the Agreement or Diſagreement of two *as*, by the Intervention of one or more oofs, which have a conſtant, immutable, l viſible Connexion one with another; ſo *bability* is nothing but the Appearanne of h an Agreement or Diſagreement, by the Intervention of oofs, whoſe Connexion is not conſtant and immutable, or eaſt is not perceiv'd to be ſo, but is, or appears, for the ſt part, to be ſo, and is enough to induce the Mind to ge the Propoſition to be true or falſe, rather than the ıtrary. For Example: In the Demonſtration of it, a Man ceives the certain immutable Connexion there is of Equa- between the three Angles of a *Triangle*, and thoſe inıediate ones, which are made uſe of, to ſhew their Equa- to two right ones; and ſo, by an intuitive Knowledge he Agreement or Diſagreement of the intermediate *Ideas* each Step of the Progreſs, the whole Series is continu'd h an Evidence, which clearly ſhews the Agreement or

Probability is the Appearance of Agreement upon fallible Proofs.

Disagreement of those three Angles, in Equality to tw right ones: And thus he has certain Knowledge that it is s But another Man, who never took the Pains to observe t Demonstration, hearing a Mathematician, a Man of Credi affirm the three Angles of a Triangle, to be equal to tw right ones, *assents* to it, *i. e.* receives it for true. In whi Case, the Foundation of his Assent is the Probability of t Thing, the Proof being such as for the most part carri Truth with it: The Man, on whose Testimony he receiv it, not being wont to affirm any thing contrary to, or besi his Knowledge, especially in Matters of this kind. So th that which causes his Assent to this Proposition, that t three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, th which makes him take these *Ideas* to agree, without kno ing them to do so, is the wonted Veracity of the Speaker other Cases, or his suppos'd Veracity in this.

It is to supply the Want of Knowledge.

§. 2. Our Knowledge, as has been shew being very narrow, and we not happy enou to find certain Truth in every Thing which have occasion to consider, most of the Propo tions we think, reason, discourse, nay, act upo are such as we cannot have undoubted Knowledge of th Truth; yet some of them border so near upon Certain that we make to doubt at all about them, but *assent* to th as firmly, and act, according to that Assent, as resolutely if they were infallibly demonstrated, and that our Kno ledge of them was perfect and certain. But there being grees herein, from the very Neighbourhood of Certainty a Demonstration, quite down to Improbability and Unlik ness, even to the Confines of Impossibility; and also Deg of *Assent* from full *Assurance* and Confidence, quite down *Conjecture*, *Doubt*, and *Distrust*; I shall come now, (havi as I think, found out the Bounds of human Knowledge a Certainty) in the next Place, to consider *the several Deg and Grounds of Probability, and Assent or Faith.*

Being that which makes us presume Things to be true, before we know them to be so.

§. 3. *Probability* is Likeliness to be true, very Notation of the Word signifying suc Proposition, for which there be Arguments Proofs, to make it pass, or be receiv'd for t The Entertainment the Mind gives this Sor Propositions, is call'd *Belief*, *Assent*, or *Op on*, which is the admitting or receiving Proposition for true, upon Arguments

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roofs that are found to perſwade us to receive it as true, ithout certain Knowledge that it is ſo. And herein lies the *ifference between Probability* and *Certainty*, *Faith*, and *Know-lge*, that in all the Parts of Knowledge, there is Intuition; ch immediate *Idea*, each Step has its viſible and certain nnexion; in Belief not ſo. That which makes me believe, ſomething extraneous to the Thing I believe; ſomething t evidently join'd on both ſides to, and ſo not manifeſtly ewing the Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe *Ideas* that e under Conſideration.

The Grounds of Probability are two; Conformity with our own Experience, or the Teſtimony of others Experience.

§. 4. *Probability* then being to ſupply the efect of our Knowledge, and to guide us here that fails, is always converſant about opoſitions whereof we have no Certainty, t only ſome Inducements to receive them true. The *Grounds of it* are, in ſhort, theſe following:

First, The Conformity of any Thing with r own Knowledge, Obſervation, and Expe-nce.

Secondly, The Teſtimony of others, vouching their Obſer-tion and Experience. In the Teſtimony of others, is to conſider'd, 1. The Number. 2. The Integrity. 3. The ll of the Witneſſes. 4. The Deſign of the Author, where s a Teſtimony out of a Book cited. 5. The Conſiſtency the Parts, and Circumſtances of the Relation. 6. Con-ry Teſtimonies.

In this, all the Agreements pro *and* con, *ought to be examin'd, before we come to a Judgment.*

§. 5. Probability wanting that intuitive E-lence which infallibly determines the Un-ſtanding, and produces certain Knowledge, *Mind, if it will proceed rationally, ought to mine all the Grounds of Probability*, and ſee w they make more or leſs, *for or againſt* any obable Propoſition, before it aſſents to, or ſents from it, and upon a due ballancing Whole, reject or receive it, with a more leſs firm Aſſent, proportionably to the Preponderancy of greater Grounds of Probability on one ſide or the other. r Example:

If I my ſelf ſee a Man walk on the Ice, it is paſt *Probabi-*, 'tis Knowledge: But if another tells me he ſaw a Man *England*, in the midſt of a ſharp Winter, walk upon ater harden'd with Cold; this has ſo great Conformity

with what is usually observ'd to happen, that I am dispos'
by the Nature of the Thing it self, to assent to it, unless so
manifest Suspicion attend the Relation of that Fact. But
the same Thing be told to one born between the Tropick
who never saw nor heard of any such Thing before, th
the whole Probability relies on Testimony: And as the R
lators are more in Number, and of more Credit, and ha
no Interest to speak contrary to the Truth; so that Matter
Fact is like to find more or less Belief. Though to a Ma
whose Experience has been always quite contrary, and h
never heard of any Thing like it, the most untainted Cre
of a Witness will scarce be able to find Belief. And as
happen'd to a *Dutch* Ambassador, who entertaining the Ki
of *Siam* with the Particularities of *Holland*, which he was i
quisitive after, amongst other Things, told him, That t
Water in his Country would sometimes, in cold Weath
be so hard, that Men walk'd upon it, and that it would be
an Elephant, if he were there. To which the King reply
*Hitherto I have believ'd the strange Things you have told me, b
cause I look upon you as a sober, fair Man; but now I am sure y
lie.*

They being capable of great Variety.

§. 6. Upon these Grounds depends the *Pr
bability* of any Proposition: And as the Co
formity of our Knowledge, as the Certainty
Observations, as the Frequency and Constan
of Experience, and the Number and Credibility of Testimoni
do more or less agree or disagree with it, so is any Propositi
in it self, more or less probable. There is another, I confe
which, though by it self it be no true Ground of *Probabili*
yet is often made use of for one, by which Men most co
monly regulate their Assent, and upon which they pin th
Faith more than any Thing else, and that is *the Opinion
others*; though there cannot be a more dangerous Thing
relie on, nor more likely to mislead one, since there is mu
more Falshood and Error among Men, than Truth and Kno
ledge. And if the Opinions and Perswasions of others, who
we know and think well of, be a Ground of Assent, M
have Reason to be Heathens in *Japan*, Mahometans in *Tu
key*, Papists in *Spain*, Protestants in *England*, and Luthera
in *Sweden*. But of this wrong Ground of Assent, I sh
have Occasion to speak more at large in another Place.

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CHAP. XVI.

Of the Degrees of Assent.

Our Assent ought to be regulated by the Grounds of Probability.

1. THE Grounds of Probability we have laid down in the foregoing hapter, as they are the Foundations on which ur *Assent* is built, so are they also the Mea- ure whereby its several Degrees are, or ought be *regulated*: Only we are to take Notice, hat whatever Grounds of Probability there may be, they yet perate no farther on the Mind, which searches after Truth, nd endeavours to judge right, than they appear, at least the first Judgment or Search that the Mind makes. I con- fs, in the Opinions Men have, and firmly stick to, in the World, their *Assent* is not always from an actual View of he Reasons that at first prevail'd with them; it being in ma- any Cases almost impossible, and in most very hard, even or those who have very admirable Memories, to retain all he Proofs, which upon a due Examination, made them em- race that Side of the Question. It suffices that they have nce, with Care and Fairness, sifted the Matter as far as they ould; and that they have search'd into all the Particulars hat they could imagine, to give any Light to the Question, nd with the best of their Skill, cast up the Account upon he whole Evidence: And thus having once found on which de the Probability appear'd to them, after as full and ex- ct an Enquiry as they can make, they lay up the Conclusion their Memories, as a Truth they have discover'd; and for he future they remain satisfy'd with the Testimony of their Memories, that this is the Opinion, that, by the Proofs they ave once seen of it, deserves such a *Degree* of their *Assent* they afford it.

These cannot always be actually in View, and then we must content our selves

§. 2. This is all that the greatest Part of len are capable of doing, in regulating their *pinions* and Judgments, unless a Man will act of them, either to retain distinctly in heir Memories all the Proofs concerning any robable Truth, and that too in the same Or-

der,

with the Remembrance that we once saw Ground for such a Degree of Assent.

der, and regular Deduction of Consequence in which they have formerly plac'd or see them; which sometimes is enough to fill large Volume upon one single Question: C else they must require a Man, for every Opin on that he embraces, every Day to examine t Proofs; both which are impossible. It is un voidable therefore, that the Memory be rely'd on in the Ca and that *Men be perswaded of several Opinions, whereof t Proofs are not actually in their Thoughts*; nay, which perha they are not able actually to recal. Without this, the grea est Part of Men must be either very Scepticks, or change ev ry Moment, and yield themselves up to whoever, havi lately study'd the Question, offers them Arguments; whic for want of Memory, they are not able presently to a swer.

The ill Consequence of this, if our former Judgment were not rightly made.

§. 3. I cannot but own, that Mens *stic ing* to their *past Judgment*, and adhering firm ly to Conclusions formerly made, is often t Cause of great Obstinacy in Error and M stake. But the Fault is not that they re on their Memories for what they have befo well-judg'd, but because they judg'd befo they had well examin'd. May we not find great Number (not to say the greatest Part) of Men, th think they have form'd right Judgments of several Matte and that for no other Reason, but because they never thoug otherwise? That imagine themselves to have judg'd rig only because they never question'd, never examin'd their ow Opinions? Which is indeed to think they judg'd rig because they never judg'd at all: And yet these, of all Me hold their Opinions with the greatest Stiffness; those bei generally the most fierce and firm in their Tenets, w have least examin'd them. What we once know, v are certain is so; and we may be secure that there a no latent Proofs undiscover'd, which may overturn o Knowledge, or bring it in Doubt. But in Matters of Pr bability, 'tis not in every Case we can be sure that we ha all the Particulars before us, that any way concern t Question; and that there is no Evidence behind, and y unseen, which may cast the Probability on the other sid and out-weigh all that at present seems to prepondera with us. Who almost is there that hath the Leisure, P

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ence, and Means to collect together all the Proofs concern-
ng most of the Opinions he has, so as safely to conclude,
at he hath a clear and full View, and that there is no more
be alledg'd for his better Information? And yet we are
rc'd to determine our selves on the one Side or other. The
onduct of our Lives, and the Management of our great
oncerns, will not bear Delay; for those depend, for the
ost part, on the Determination of our Judgment in Points
herein we are not capable of certain and demonstrative
nowledge, and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace the
ne Side, or the other.

The right Use of it, mutual Charity and Forbearance.

§. 4. Since therefore it is unavoidable to the
eatest part of Men, if not all, to have seve-
l *Opinions*, without certain and indubitable
roofs of their Truths; and it carries too great
n Imputation of Ignorance, Lightness, or
olly, for Men to quit and renounce their for-
er Tenets presently upon the Offer of an Argument which
ey cannot immediately answer, and shew the Insufficiency
; it would methinks become all Men to maintain *Peace*,
nd the common Offices of Humanity *and Friendship, in the*
iversity of Opinions, since we cannot reasonably expect, that
ny one should readily and obsequiously quit his own Opini-
n, and embrace ours with a blind Resignation to an Au-
ority which the Understanding of Man acknowledges not.
or however it may often mistake, it can own no other
uide but Reason, nor blindly submit to the Will and Di-
ates of another. If he you would bring over to your Sen-
ments, be one that examines before he assents, you must
ve him Leave at his Leisure to go over the Account again,
nd recalling what is out of his Mind, examine all the Par-
culars, to see on which side the Advantage lies; and if he
ill not think our Arguments of Weight enough to engage
im anew in so much Pains, 'tis but what we do often
ur selves in the like Case; and we should take it amiss, if
thers shou'd prescribe to us what Points we should study:
nd if he be one who takes his Opinions upon Trust, how
an we imagine that he should renounce those Tenets which
ime and Custom have so settl'd in his Mind, that he thinks
hem self-evident, and of an unquestionable Certainty; or
which he takes to be Impressions he has receiv'd from GOD
imself, or from Men sent by him? How can we expect, I say,
hat Opinions thus settl'd, should be given up to the Argu-

ments

ments of Authority of a Stranger or Adversary, especially i there be any Suspicion of Interest or Design, as there neve fails to be where Men find themselves ill treated? We shoul do well to commiserate our mutual Ignorance, and endea vour to remove it in all the gentle and fair Ways of Infor mation, and not instantly treat others ill, as obstinate an perverse, because they will not renounce their own, and re ceive our Opinions, or at least those we would force upo them, when 'tis more than probable that we are no less ob stinate in not embracing some of theirs. For where is th Man that has uncontestable Evidence of the Truth of all tha he holds, or of the Falshood of all he condems; or can say that he has examin'd, to the Bottom, all his own, or othe Mens Opinions? The Necessity of believing without Know ledge, nay, often upon very slight Grounds, in this fleeting Stat of Action and Blindness we are in, should make us more bus and careful to inform our selves, than constrain others; a least those who have not throughly examin'd to the Botto all their own Tenets, must confess they are unfit to prescrib to others, and are unreasonable in imposing that as Truth o other Mens Belief, which they themselves have not search' into, nor weigh'd the Arguments of Probability on whic they should receive or reject it. Those who have fairly an truly examin'd, and are thereby got past Doubt, in all th Doctrines they profess, and govern themselves by, would hav a juster Pretence to require others to follow them: But the are so few in Number, and find so litttle Reason to be ma gisterial in their Opinions, that nothing insolent and imp rious is to be expected from them; and there is Reason t think, that if Men were better instructed themselves, the would be less imposing on others.

Probability is either of Matter of Fact, or Speculation.

§. 5. But to return to the Grounds of A sent, and the several Degrees of it, we are t take Notice, that the Propositions we recei upon Inducements of *Probability*, are *of t Sorts*, either concerning some particular Ex stence, or, as it is usually term'd, Matter Fact, which falling under Observation, is capable of huma Testimony, or else concerning Things, which being beyon the Discovery of our Senses, are not capable of any such T timony.

§. 6. Co

§. 6. Concerning the *first* of these, *viz. particular Matter of Fact*,

The concurrent Experience of all other Men with ours, produces Assurance approaching to Knowledge.

First, Where any particular Thing, consonant to the constant Observation of our selves nd others, in the like Case, comes attested by e concurrent Reports of all that mention it, e receive it as easily, and build as firmly upn it, as if it were certain Knowledge; and e reason and act thereupon with as little oubt, as if it were perfect Demonstration. Thus, if all *ngliſh*-Men, who have occasion to mention it, should am, that it froze in *England* the last Winter, or that there ere Swallows seen there in the Summer, I think a Man uld almost as little doubt of it, as that seven and four are ven. The first therefore, and *highest Degree of Probability*, when the general Consent of all Men, in all Ages, as far it can be known, concurs with a Man's constant and ner-failing Experience in like Cases, to confirm the Truth of y particular Matter of Fact attested by fair Witnesses; ch are all the stated Constitutions and Properties of Bo-es, and the regular Proceedings of Causes and Effects in e ordinary Course of Nature. This we call an Argument m the Nature of Things themselves: For what our own d other Mens constant Observation has found always to after the same Manner, that we with Reason conclude to the Effects of steady and regular Causes, though they come t within the Reach of our Knowledge. Thus that Fire rm'd a Man, made Lead fluid, and chang'd the Colour Consistency in Wood or Charcoal; that Iron sunk in Wa-, and swam in Quicksilver. These, and the like Propoions about particular Facts, being agreeable to our constant perience, as often as we have to do with these Matters, l being generally spoke of, (when mention'd by others) as lings found constantly to be so, and therefore not so much controverted by any Body, we are put past Doubt, that a lation affirming any such Thing to have been, or any Prelation that it will happen again in the same Manner, is ve-rue. These *Probabilities* rise so near to *Certainty*, that they vern our Thoughts as absolutely, and influence all our Actis as fully, as the most evident Demonstration; and in at concerns us, we make little or no Difference between m and certain Knowledge. Our Belief thus grounded, ri-to *Assurance*.

§. 7. *Se-*

Unquestionable Testimony and Experience for the most Part produce Confidence.

§. 7. *Secondly*, *The next Degree of Probabi* is, when I find by my own Experience, a the Agreement of all others that mention a Thing to be for the most part so; and t the particular Instance of it is attested by n ny and undoubted Witnesses, *v. g.* Hist giving us such an Account of Men in all ges, and my own Experience, as far as I had an Opportu ty to observe, confirming it, that most Men prefer their p vate Advantage, to the publick. If all Historians that w of *Tiberius*, say that *Tiberius* did so, it is extreamly probal And in this Case, our Assent has a sufficient Foundation raise it self to a Degree which we may call *Confidence*.

Fair Testimony, and the Natude of the Thing indifferent, produces also confident Belief.

§. 8. *Thirdly*, In Things that happen ind ferently, as that a Bird should fly this or t Way, that it should thunder on a Man's ri or left Hand, *&c.* when any particular M ter of Fact is vouch'd by the concurrent stimony of unsuspected Witnesses, there Assent is also unavoidable. Thus, t there is such a City in *Italy* as *Rome*; that bout 1700 Years ago, there liv'd in it a M call'd *Julius Cæsar*; that he was a General, and that he w a Battel against another call'd *Pompey:* This, though in Nature of the Thing there be nothing for nor against it, being related by Historians of Credit, and contradicted no one Writer, a Man cannot avoid believing it, and can little doubt of it, as he does of the Being and Actions of own Acquaintance, whereof he himself is a Witness.

Experience and Testimonies clashing, infinitely vary the Degrees of Probability.

§. 9. Thus far the Matter goes easy enou Probability upon such Grounds carries so m Evidence with it, that it naturally determi the Judgment, and leaves us as little Libe to believe or disbelieve, as a Demonstrat does, whether we will know or be ignora The Difficulty is, when Testimonies cont dict common Experience, and the Reports History and Witnesses, clash with the ordinary Course of N ture, or with one another; there it is, where Diligence, tention, and Exactness is requir'd to form a right Judgme and to proportion the *Assent* to the different Evidence a Probability of the Thing, which rises and falls according those two Foundations of Credibility, *viz.* Common Ob

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ion in like Cases, and particular Testimonies in that par-
ular Instance, favour or contradict it. These are liable to
great Variety of contrary Observations, Circumstances,
ports, different Qualifications, Tempers, Designs, Over-
hts, *&c.* of the Reporters, that 'tis impossible to reduce to
cise Rules, the various Degrees wherein Men give their
sent. This only may be said in general, that as the Argu-
nts and Proofs, *pro* and *con*, upon due Examination, nice-
weighing every particular Circumstance, shall to any one
pear, upon the whole Matter, in a greater or less Degree,
preponderate on either Side, so they are fitted to produce
the Mind such different Entertainment, as we call *Belief*,
jecture, *Guess*, *Doubt*, *Wavering*, *Distrust*, *Disbelief*, &c.

§. 10. This is what concerns *Assent* in Mat-
s where Testimony is made Use of; con-
ning which, I think it may not be amiss
take Notice of a Rule observ'd in the Law
England, which is, that though the attested
py of a Record be good Proof, yet the
py of a Copy never so well attested, and by
ver so credible Witnesses, will not be admitted as a Proof
Judicature. This is so generally approv'd as reasonable,
l suited to the Wisdom and Caution to be us'd in our En-
ry after material Truths, that I never yet heard of any one
t blam'd it. This Practice, if it be allowable in the De-
ons of Right and Wrong, carries this Observation along
h it, *viz.* That any Testimony, the farther off it is from
original Truth, the less Force and Proof it has. The Be-
and Existence of the Thing it self, is what I call the ori-
al Truth. A credible Man vouching his Knowledge of
is a good Proof: But if another equally credible do wit-
s it from his Report, the Testimony is weaker; and a
d that attests the Hear-say of an Hear-say, is yet less con-
rable. So that *in traditional Truths, each Remove weakens the
e of the Proof*; and the more Hands the Tradition has suc-
vely pass'd through, the less Strength and Evidence does
ceive from them. This I thought necessary to be taken
tice of, because I find amongst some Men the quite con-
y commonly practis'd, who look on Opinions to gain
ce by growing older; and what a thousand Years since
uld not, to a rational Man, contemporary with the first
ucher, have appear'd at all probable, is now urg'd as cer-
n beyond all Question, only because several have since,

Traditional Testimonies, the farther remov'd, the less their Proof.

from

from him, said it one after another. Upon this ground P positions, evidently false or doubtful enough in their beginning, come by an inverted Rule of Probability, to for authentick Truths; and those which found or deser little Credit from the Mouths of their first Authors, thought to grow venerable by Age, and are urg'd as un niable.

Yet History is of great Use.

§. 11. I would not be thought here to le the Credit and Use of *History*: 'Tis all Light we have in many Cases; and we rece from it a great part of the useful Truths have, with a convincing Evidence. I think nothing m valuable than the Records of Antiquity: I wish we more of them, and more uncorrupted. But this Truth self forces me to say, That no *Probability* can arise higher t its first Original. What has no other Evidence than the gle Testimony of one only Witness, must stand or fall his only Testimony, whether good, bad, or indifferent; a tho' cited afterwards by Hundreds of others, one after a ther, is so far from receiving any Strength thereby, that it only the weaker. Passion, Interest, Inadvertency, Mist of his Meaning, and a thousand odd Reasons or Caprici Mens Minds are acted by, (impossible to be discover'd) m make one Man quote another Man's Words or Meani wrong. He that has but ever so little examin'd the Citati of Writers, cannot doubt how little Credit the Quotati deserve, where the Originals are wanting; and consequen ly how much less Quotations of Quotations can be rely'd This is certain, that what in one Age was affirm'd upon sli Grounds, can never after come to be more valid in futu Ages, by being often repeated. But the farther still it is fr the Original, the less valid it is, and has always less Force the Mouth or Writing of him that last made use of it, th in his from whom he receiv'd it.

In Things which Sense cannot discover, Analogy is the great Rule of Probability.

§. 12. The Probabilities we have hithe mention'd, are only such as concern Matter Fact, and such Things as are capable of O servation and Testimony. There remains t other sort *concerning* which Men enterta Opinions with Variety of Assent, though t *Things* be such, *that falling not under the Re of our Senses, they are not capable of Testimon*

Such are, 1. The Existence, Nature, and Operations of fini immater

nmaterial Beings without us; as Spirits, Angels, Devils, *c.* or the Existence of material Beings; which either r their Smallness in themselves, or Remoteness from us, ur Senses cannot take Notice of, as whether there be any lants, Animals, and intelligent Inhabitants in the Planets, nd other Mansions of the vast Universe. 2. Concerning e manner of Operation in most parts of the Works of Na-re; wherein, tho' we see the sensible Effects, yet their Cau-s are unknown, and we perceive not the Ways and Man-r how they are produc'd. We see Animals are generated, ourish'd, and move; the Load-stone draws Iron; and the rts of a Candle successively melting, turn into Flame, and ve us both Light and Heat. These and the like Effects we and know; but the Causes that operate, and the Man-r they are produc'd in, we can only guess, and pro-bly conjecture. For these, and the like, coming not ithin the Scrutiny of human Senses, cannot be examin'd by em, or be attested by any Body, and therefore can appear ore or less probable, only as they more or less agree to uths that are establish'd in our Minds, and as they hold oportion to other parts of our Knowledge and Observati-. *Analogy* in these Matters, is the only Help we have, and s from that alone we draw all our Grounds of Probability. ius observing that the bare Rubbing of two Bodies vio-ntly one upon another, produces Heat, and very often re it self, we have Reason to think, that what we call Heat d Fire, consists in a violent Agitation of the imperceptible nute Parts of the burning Matter: Observing likewise at the different Refractions of pellucid Bodies produce in r Eyes the different Appearances of several Colours; and o that the different ranging and laying the superficial rts of several Bodies, as of Velvet, water'd Silk, *&c.* es the like, we think it probable that the Colour and Shi-ng of Bodies, is in them nothing but the different Arange-nt and Refraction of their minute and insensible Parts. ius finding in all parts of the Creation, that fall under man Observation, that there is a gradual Connexion of one th another, without any great or discernable Gaps between, all that great Variety of Things we see in the World, nich are so closely link'd together, that, in the several Ranks Beings, it is not easy to discover the Bounds betwixt them, e have Reason to be perswaded, that by such gentle Steps, nings ascend upwards in Degrees of Perfection. 'Tis an

hard Matter to say where Sensible and Rational begin, a where Insensible and Irrational end: And who is th quick-sighted enough to determine precisely, which is t lowest Species of living Things, and which the first of th which have no Life? Things, as far as we can observe, les and augment as the Quantity does in a regular Co where, tho' there be a manifest Odds betwixt the Bigness the Diameter at remote Distance, yet the Difference betwe the upper and under, where they touch one another, is ha ly discernable. The Difference is exceeding great betwe some Men, and some Animals; but if we will compare t Understanding and Abilities of some Men, and some Brut we shall find so little Difference, that 'twill be hard to s that that of the Man is either clearer or larger. Observi I say, such gradual and gentle Descents downwards in th Parts of the Creation that are beneath Man, the Rule of nalogy may make it probable, that it is so also in Thi above us, and our Observation; and that there are seve Ranks of intelligent Beings, excelling us in several Degr of Perfection, ascending upwards towards the infinite P fection of the Creator, by gentle Steps and Differences, th are every one at no great Distance from the next to it. T fort of Probability, which is the best Conduct of ratio Experiments, and the Rise of Hypothesis, has also its U and Influence; and a wary Reasoning from Analogy, le us often into the Discovery of Truths, and useful Produc ons, which would otherwise lie conceal'd.

One Case where contrary Experience lessens not the Testimony.

§. 13. Tho' the common Experience, a the ordinary Course of Things, have justly mighty Influence on the Minds of Men, make them give or refuse Credit to any Thi propos'd to their Belief; yet there is one Ca wherein the Strangeness of the Fact lessens n the Assent to a fair Testimony given of it. F where such supernatural Events are suitable to Ends aim'd by him, who has the Power to change the Course of Natu there, under such Circumstances, they may be the fitter procure Belief, by how much the more they are beyond, contrary to ordinary Observation. This is the proper Case *Miracles*, which, well attested, do not only find Cred themselves, but give it also to other Truths, which ne such Confirmation.

§. 14. B

§. 14. Besides those we have hitherto mention'd, there is one sort of Propositions that challenge the highest Degree of our Assent, upon bare Testimony, whether the Thing propos'd, agree or disagree with common Experience, and the ordinary Course of Things, or no. The Reason whereof is, because the Testimony is of such an one as cannot deceive, nor be deceiv'd, and that is of God himself. This carries with it Assurance beyond Doubt, Evidence beyond Exception. This is call'd by a peculiar Name, *Revelation*, and our Assent to it, *Faith*: Which as absolutely determines our Minds, and as perfectly excludes all wavering, as our Knowledge it self; and we may as well doubt of our own Being, as we can, whether any Revelation from God be true. So that Faith is a settl'd and sure Principle of Assent and Assurance, and leaves no manner of room for Doubt or Hesitation. Only we must be sure, that it be a divine Revelation, and that we understand it right; else we shall expose our selves to all the Extravagancy of Enthusiasm, and all the Error of wrong Principles, if we have Faith and Assurance in what is not divine Revelation. And therefore, in those Cases, our Assent can be rationally no higher than the Evidence of its being a Revelation, and that this is the Meaning of the Expressions it is deliver'd in. If the Evidence of its being a Revelation, or that this its true Sense, be only on probable Proofs, our Assent can reach no higher than an Assurance or Diffidence, arising from the more or less apparent Probability of the Proofs. But of Faith, and the Precedency it ought to have before other Arguments of Perswasion, I shall speak more hereafter, where I treat of it as it is ordinarily plac'd, in Contradistinction to Reason; tho', in Truth, it be nothing else but an Assent founded on the highest Reason.

The bare Testimony of Revelation, is the highest Certainty.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Reason.

Various Significations of the Word Reason.

§. 1. THE *Word Reason* in the *English* Language, *has different Significations:* Sometimes it is taken for true and clear Principles; sometimes for clear and fair Deductions from those Principles; and sometimes for the Cause, and particularly the final Cause. But the Consideration I shall have of it here, is in a Signification different from all these; and that is, as it stands for a Faculty in Man. That Faculty, whereby Man is suppos'd to be distinguish'd from Beasts, and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them.

Wherein Reasoning consists.

§. 2. If general Knowledge, as has been shewn, consists in a Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our own *Ideas*, and the Knowledge of the Existence of all Things without us, (except only of a God, whose Existence every Man may certainly know and demonstrate to himself from his own Existence) be had only by our Senses. What Room then is there for the Exercise of any other Faculty, but outward Sense, and inward Perception? What Need is there of Reason? Very much; both for the Enlargement of our Knowledge, and regulating our Assent: For it hath to do both in Knowledge and Opinion, and is necessary and assisting to all our other intellectual Faculties, and indeed contains two of them, *viz. Sagacity and Illation.* By the one it finds out, and by the other, it so orders the intermediate *Ideas*, as to discover what Connexion there is in each Link of the Chain, whereby the Extreams are held together; and thereby, as it were, to draw into View the Truth sought for, which is that we call *Illation* or *Inference*, and consists in nothing but the Perception of the Connexion there is between the *Ideas* in each Step of the Deduction, whereby the Mind comes to see either the certain Agreement or Disagreement of any two *Ideas*, as in Demonstration, in which it arrives at

Know

Knowledge ; or their probable Connexion, on which it gives or with-holds its Aſſent, as in Opinion. Senſe and Intuition reach but a very little way. The greateſt Part of our Knowledge, depends upon Deductions and intermediate *Ideas* : And in thoſe Caſes, where we are fain to ſubſtitute Aſſent inſtead of Knowledge, and take Propoſitions for true, without being certain they are ſo, we have Need to find out, examine, and compare the Grounds of their Probability. In both theſe Caſes, the Faculty, which finds out the Means, and rightly applies them to diſcover Certainty in the one, and Probability in the other, is that which we call Reaſon. For as Reaſon perceives the neceſſary and indubitable Connexion of all the *Ideas* or Proofs one to another, in each Step of any Demonſtration that produces Knowledge; ſo it likewiſe perceives the probable Connexion of all the *Ideas* or Proofs one to another, in every Step of a Diſcourſe to which it will think Aſſent due. This is the loweſt Degree of that which can be truly call'd Reaſon. For where the Mind does not perceive this probable Connexion ; where it does not diſcern whether there be any ſuch Connexion or no, there Mens Opinions are not the Product of Judgment, or the Conſequence of Reaſon, but the Effects of Chance and Hazard of a Mind floating at all Adventures, without Choice, and without Direction.

§. 3. So that we may in *Reaſon* conſider theſe *four Degrees* ; the firſt and higheſt, is the diſcovering and finding out of Proofs ; the ſecond, the regular and methodical Diſpoſition of them, and laying them in a clear and fit Order, to make their Connexion and Force be plainly and eaſily perceiv'd ; the third is the perceiving their Connexion ; and the fourth, is making a right Concluſion. Theſe ſeveral Degrees may be obſerv'd in any mathematical Demonſtration : It being one Thing to perceive the Connexion of each Part, as the Demonſtration is made by another ; another to perceive the Dependence of the Concluſion on all the Parts ; a third to make out a Demonſtration clearly and neatly one's ſelf ; and ſomething different from all theſe, to have firſt found out thoſe intermediate *Ideas* or Proofs by which it is made. *Its four Parts.*

Syllogism not the great Instrument of Reason.

§. 4. There is one Thing more, which I shall desire to be consider'd concerning Reason; and that is, Whether *Syllogism*, as is generally thought, be the proper Instrument of it, and the usefullest Way of exercising this Faculty. The Causes I have to doubt, are these

First, Because Syllogism serves our Reason but in one only of the fore-mention'd Parts of it; and that is, to shew the Connexion of the Proofs in any one Instance, and no more; but in this it is of no great Use, since the Mind can perceive such Connexion where it really is, as easily, nay perhaps, better without it.

If we will observe the Actings of our own Minds, we shall find that we reason best and cleareſt, when we only observe the Connexion of the Proof, without reducing our Thoughts to any Rule of Syllogism. And therefore we may take Notice, that there are many Men that reason exceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a Syllogism. He that will look into many Parts of *Asia* and *America*, will find Men reason there, perhaps, as acutely as himself, who yet never yet heard of a Syllogism, nor can reduce any one Argument to those Forms: And I believe scarce any one ever makes Syllogisms in reasoning within himself. Indeed Syllogism is made use of on Occasion to discover a Fallacy hid in a rhetorical Flourish, or cunningly wrapp'd up in a smooth Period; and stripping an Absurdity of the Cover of Wit and good Language, shew it in its naked Deformity. But the Weakness or Fallacy of such a loose Discourse, it shews, by the artificial Form it is put into, only to those who have throughly study'd *Mode and Figure*, and have so examin'd the many Ways that three Propositions may be put together, as to know which of them does certainly conclude right, and which not, and upon what Grounds it is that they do so. All who have so far consider'd Syllogism as to see the Reason why, in three Propositions laid together in one Form, the Conclusion will be certainly right; but in another not certainly so, I grant are certain of the Conclusion they draw from the Premisses in the allow'd *Modes* and *Figures*. But they who have not so far look'd into those Forms are not sure, by Virtue of Syllogism, that the Conclusion certainly follows from the Premisses: They only take it to be so by an implicit Faith in their Teachers, and a Confidence in those Forms of Argumentation; but this is still but believing

ving, not being certain. Now, if of all Mankind, those
ho can make Syllogisms, are extreamly few in Comparison
those who cannot, and if of those few who have been taught
gick there is but a very small Number who do any more
an believe that Syllogisms in the allow'd *Modes* and *Figures*
conclude right, without knowing certainly that they do
If Syllogisms must be taken for the only proper Instru-
ent of Reason and Means of Knowledge, it will follow,
at before *Aristotle* there was not one Man that did, or could
ow any Thing by Reason; and that since the Invention
Syllogisms, there is not one of ten thousand that doth.
But God has not been so sparing to Men, to make them
rely two-legg'd Creatures, and left it to *Aristotle* to make
em rational, *i. e.* those few of them that he could get so to
amine the Grounds of Syllogisms, as to see, that in above
reescore Ways, that three Propositions may be laid together,
ere are but about fourteen wherein one may be sure that
e Conclusion is right, and upon what Ground it is, that
these few the Conclusion is certain, and in the other not.
od has been more bountiful to Mankind than so: He has
ven them a Mind that can reason without being instructed
Methods of Syllogizing: The Understanding is not taught
reason by these Rules; it has a native Faculty to perceive
e Coherence or Incoherence of its *Ideas*, and can range
em right, without any such perplexing Repetitions. I say not
is any way to lessen *Aristotle*, whom I look on as one of the
eatest Men amongst the Ancients; whose large Views, Acute-
ss, and Penetration of Thought and Strenght of Judgment,
w have equall'd: And who in this very Invention of Forms
Argumentation, wherein the Conclusion may be shewn to
rightly inferr'd, did great Service against those who were
t asham'd to deny any Thing. And I readily own, that
l right Reasoning may be reduc'd to his Forms of Syllo-
sm. But yet I think, without any Diminution to him, I
ay truly say, that they are not the only, nor the best Way
Reasoning, for the leading of those into Truth who are
illing to find it, and desire to make the best Use they may
their Reason, for the Attaintment of their Knowledge.
nd he himself, it is plain, found out some Forms to be
nclusive, and others not, not by the Forms themselves,
ut by the original Way of Knowledge, *i. e.* by the visible
greement of *Ideas*. Tell a Country Gentlewoman, that
e Wind is South-West, and the Weather louring, and like

to Rain, and she will easily understand, 'tis not safe for h to go Abroad thin Clad, in such a Day, after a Feve She clearly sees the probable Connexion of all these, *vi* South-West Wind, and Clouds, Rain, Wetting, taki Cold, Relapse, and Danger of Death, without tying the together in those artificial and cumbersome Fetters of seve *Syllogisms*, that clog and hinder the Mind, which procee from one part to another quicker and clearer without then And the Probability which she easily perceives in Thin thus in their native State, would be quite lost, if this Arg ment were manag'd learnedly, and propos'd in Mode a Figure. For it very often confounds the Connexion: An I think, every one will perceive in Mathematical Demo strations, that the Knowledge gain'd thereby, comes short and cleareſt without *Syllogism.*

Inference is look'd on as the great Act of the rational F culty, and so it is, when it is rightly made; but the Min either very desirous to enlarge its Knowledge, or very apt favour the Sentiments it has once imbib'd, is very forwa to make Inferences, and therefore often makes too mu haste, before it perceives the Connexion of the *Ideas* that m hold the Extreams together.

To infer, is nothing but by Virtue of one Proposition la down as true, to draw in another as true, *i. e.* to see suppose such a Connexion of the two *Ideas* of the infer Proposition. *v. g.* Let this be the Proposition laid dow *Men shall be punish'd in another World*, and from thence inferr'd this other, *Then Men can determine themselves.* T Question now is to know, whether the Mind has made t Inference right, or no; if it has made it, by finding out t intermediate *Ideas*, and taking a View of the Connexion them, plac'd in a due Order, it has proceeded rational and made a right Inference. If it has done it without su a View, it has not so much made an Inference that w hold, or an Inference of right Reason, as shewn a Willingn to have it be, or be taken for such. But in neither Case is *Syllogism*, that discover'd those *Ideas*, or shew'd the Connexi of them, for they must be both found out, and the Co nexion every where perceiv'd, before they can rationally made Use of in *Syllogism*; unless it can be said, that a *Idea*, without considering what Connexion it hath with t two other, whose Agreement should be shewn by it, will well enough in a *Syllogism*, and may be taken at a venture

he *Medius Terminus*, to prove any Conclusion. But this no ody will say, because it is by Virtue of the perceiv'd A-reement of the intermediate *Idea*, with the Extreams, that he Extreams are concluded to agree, and therefore each in-ermediate *Idea* must be such, as in the whole Chain hath a isible Connexion with those two it is plac'd between, or lse thereby the Conclusion cannot be inferr'd or drawn n; for where-ever any Link of the Chain is loose, and vithout Connexion, there the whole Strength of it is lost, nd it hath no Force to infer or draw in any Thing, In the nstance above-mention'd, what is it shews the Force of the nference, and consequently the Reasonableness of it, but a *'iew* of the Connexion of all the intermediate *Ideas* that raw in the Conclusion, or Proposition inferr'd; *v. g. Men all be punish'd,------God the Punisher,------just Punishment,---- e Punish'd guilty,-----could have done otherwise,-----Freedom,---- elf-determination*; by which Chain of *Ideas* thus visibly link'd ogether in Train, *i. e.* each intermediate *Idea* agreeing on ach side with those two, it is immediately plac'd between, he *Ideas* of Men and Self-determination appear to be con-ected, *i. e.* this Proposition, *Men can determine themselves*, is rawn in, or inferr'd from this, *that they shall be punish'd in e other World.* For here the Mind seeing the Connexion here is between the *Idea of Mens Punishment in the other World*, nd the *Idea of God punishing*; between *God punishing*, and *e Justice of the Punishment*; between *Justice of Punishment* and *uilt*; between *Guilt* and a *Power to do otherwise*; between a *ower to do otherwise* and *Freedom*, and between *Freedom* and *elf-determination*, sees the Connexion between *Men* and *Self-etermination.*

Now, I ask, whether the Connexion of the Extreams be ot more clearly seen in this simple and natural Disposition, han in the perplex'd Repetitions, and Jumble of five or six *yllogisms?* I must beg Pardon for calling it Jumble, 'till ome Body shall put these *Ideas* into so many *Syllogisms*, and hen say, that they are less jumbl'd, and their Connexion nore visible, when they are transpos'd and repeated, and oun out to a greater Length in artificial Forms, than in hat short natural plain Order they are laid down in ere, wherein every one may see it; and wherein they nust be seen, before they can be put into a Train of *Syllo-isms.* For the natural Order of the connecting *Ideas*, nust direct the Order of the *Syllogisms*, and a Man must

see

see the Connexion of each intermediate *Idea* with those th
it connects, before he can with Reason make use of it in
Syllogism. And when all those *Syllogisms* are made, neith
those that are, nor those that are not *Logicians*, will see t
Force of the Argumentation, *i. e.* the Connexion of the E
treams one Jot the better. [For those that are not Men
Art, not knowing the true Forms of *Syllogism*, nor the Re
sons of them, cannot know whether they are made in rig
and conclusive *Modes* and *Figures*, or no, and so are not
all help'd by the Forms they are put into, though by the
the natural Order, wherein the Mind could judge of the
respective Connexion, being disturb'd, renders the Illatio
much more incertain than without them.] And as for *L*
gicians themselves, they see the Connexion of each intermed
ate *Idea* with those it stands between, (on which the For
of the Inference depends) as well before as after the *Syl*
gism is made, or else they do not see it all. For a *Syllogi*
neither shews nor strengthens the Connexion of any two
deas immediately put together, but only by the Connexi
seen in them, shews what Connexion the Extreams have o
with another. But what Connexion the Intermediate h
with either of the Extreams in that *Syllogism*, that no *Syl*
gism does or can shew. That the Mind only doth, or c
perceive as they stand there in that *juxta Position*, only by
own View, to which the Syllogistical Form it happens to
in, gives no Help or Light at all; it only shews, that if t
intermediate *Idea* agrees with those it is on both sides imm
diately apply'd to, then those two remote ones, or as th
are call'd *Extreams*, do certainly agree, and therefore the i
mediate Connexion of each *Idea* to that which it is apply
to on each side, on which the Force of the Reasoning
pends, is as well seen before as after the *Syllogism* is ma
or else he that makes the *Syllogism*, could never see it at a
This, as has been already observ'd, is seen only by the E
or the perceptive Faculty of the Mind, taking a View
them laid together, in a *juxta Position*, which View of a
two it has equally, whenever they are laid together in a
Proposition, whether that Proposition be plac'd as a *Ma*
or a *Minor*, in a *Syllogism*, or no.

Of what Use then are *Syllogisms?* I answer, Their ch
and main Use is in the Schools where Men are allow
without Shame, to deny the Agreement of *Ideas*, that do n
nifestly agree; or out of the Schools, to those who fr
the

nce have learn'd, without Shame, to deny the Connexion *deas*, which even to themselves is visible. But to an inuous Searcher after Truth, who has no other Aim, but to it, there is no need of any such Form, to force the aling of the Inference; the Truth and Reasonableness of s better seen in ranging of the *Ideas* in a simple and plain ler. And hence it is, that Men in their own Enquiries r Truth, never use *Syllogisms* to convince themselves, [or in hing others to instruct willing Learners] because before y can put them into a *Syllogism*, they must see the Connexthat is between the intermediate *Idea*, and the two o- *Ideas* it is set between, and apply'd to, to shew their Aement; and when they see that, they see whether the Innce be good or no, and so *Syllogism* comes too late to le it. For to make Use again of the former Instance, I whether the Mind, considering the *Idea* of Justice, plac'd n intermediate *Idea* between the *Punishment* of Men, and Guilt of the Punish'd, (and 'till it does so consider it, Mind cannot make Use of it as a *medius terminus*) does as plainly see the Force and Strength of the Inference, vhen it is form'd into Syllogism? To shew it in a very n and easy Example, let *Animal* be the intermediate *I-* or *medius terminus*, that the Mind makes Use of to shew Connexion of *Homo* and *vivens*; I ask whether the Mind s not more readily and plainly see that Connexion, in the ple and proper Position of the connecting *Idea* in the ldle? Thus,

Homo ----- *Animal* ----- *vivens*,

han in this perplex'd one,

Animal ----- *vivens* ----- *Homo* ----- *Animal.*

hich is the Position these *Ideas* have in a Syllogism, to w the Connexion between *Homo* and *vivens* by the Intertion of *Animal.*

ndeed Syllogism is thought to be of necessary Use, even he Lovers of Truth, to shew them the Fallacies that are en conceal'd in florid, witty, or involv'd Discourses. But that s is a Mistake, will appear, if we consider that the Reason y sometimes Men, who sincerely aim at Truth, are im-'d upon by such loose, and as they are call'd, rhetorical

Dis-

Discourses, is, that their Fancies being struck with so lively metaphorical Representations, they neglect to obser or do not easily perceive what are the true *Ideas* upon wh the Inference depends. Now, to shew such Men the Wea ness of such an Argumentation, there needs no more but strip it of the superfluous *Ideas*, which blended and confou ded with those on which the Inference depends, seem to sh a Connexion where there is none, or at least do hinder Discovery of the want of it; and then to lay the naked *deas* on which the Force of the Argumentation depends, their due Order; in which Position the Mind taking a Vi of them, sees what Connexion they have, and so is able judge of the Inference, without any need of a Syllogism all.

I grant that *Mode* and *Figure* is commonly made Use in such Cases, as if the Detection of the Incoherence of s loose Discourses, were wholly owing to the Syllogistical For and so I my self formerly thought, 'till upon a stricter E mination, I now find that laying the intermediate *Ideas* ked in their due Order, shews the Incoherence of the Ar mentation better than Syllogism; not only as subjecting e Link of the Chain to the immediate View of the Mind its proper Place, whereby its Connexion is best obsery but also because Syllogism shews the Incoherence only those (who are not one of ten thousand) who perfectly derstand *Mode* and *Figure*, and the Reason upon which th Forms are establish'd; whereas a due and orderly placing the *Ideas* upon which the Inference is made, makes every both Logician or not Logician, who understands the Ter and hath the Faculty to perceive the Agreement or Di greement of such *Ideas*, (without which, in or out of Sy gism, he cannot perceive the Strength or Weakness, Co rence or Incoherence of the Discourse) see the Want of C nexion in the Argumentation, and the Absurdity of Inference.

And thus I have known a Man unskilful in Syllogi who at first hearing could perceive the Weakness and clusiveness of a long artificial and plausible Discourse, wh with others better skill'd in Syllogism have been misled; I believe there are few of my Readers who do not kn such. And indeed, if it were not so, the Debates of n Princes Councils, and the Business of Assemblies, would in Danger to be mismanag'd, since those who are rely'd

and have uſually a great Stroke in them, are not always
n, who have the good Luck to be perfectly knowing in
Forms of *Syllogiſm*, or expert in *Mode* and *Figure*. And
yllogiſm were the only, or ſo much as the ſureſt Way
letect the Fallacies of artificial Diſcourſes, I do not think
all Mankind, even Princes in Matters that concern their
wns and Dignities, are ſo much in Love with Falſhood
Miſtake, that they would every where have neglected to
ig Syllogiſm into the Debates of Moment, or thought it
culous ſo much as to offer them in Affairs of Conſe-
nce; a plain Evidence to me, that Men of Parts and Pe-
ration, who were not idly to diſpute at their Eaſe, but
e to act according to the Reſult of their Debates, and of-
pay for their Miſtakes with their Heads or Fortunes,
nd thoſe Scholaſtick Forms were of little Uſe to diſcover
th or Fallacy, whilſt both the one and the other might
hewn, and better ſhewn without them to thoſe who would
refuſe to ſee what was viſibly ſhewn them.

econdly, Another Reaſon that makes me doubt whether
ogiſm be the only proper Inſtrument of Reaſon in the
covery of Truth, is, that of whatever Uſe *Mode* and *Fi-*
is pretended to be in the laying open of Fallacy, (which
been above conſider'd) thoſe Scholaſtick Forms of Diſ-
rſe are not leſs liable to Fallacies, than the plainer Ways
Argumentation; and for this I appeal to common Obſer-
on, which has always found theſe artificial Methods of
ſoning more adapted to catch and intangle the Mind,
n to inſtruct and inform the Underſtanding. And hence
, that Men even when they are baffl'd and ſilenc'd in
Scholaſtick Way, are ſeldom or never convin'd, and ſo
ight over to the conquering Side; they perhaps acknow-
e their Adverſary to be the more skilful Diſputant, but
nevertheleſs perſwaded of the Truth on their Side; and
way, worſted as they are, with the ſame Opinion they
ight with them, which they could not do, if this Way of
umentation carry'd Light and Conviction with it, and
le Men ſee where the Truth lay; and therefore Syllogiſm
been thought more proper for the attaining Victory in
pute, than for the Diſcovery or Confirmation of Truth,
air Enquiries: And if it be certain, that Fallacy can be
ch'd in Syllogiſms, as it cannot be deny'd, it muſt be
ething elſe, and not Syllogiſm, that muſt diſcover them.

I have had Experience how ready ſome Men are, whe
the Uſe which they have been wont to aſcribe to any Th
is not allow'd to cry out, that I am for laying it wholl
ſide. But to prevent ſuch unjuſt and groundleſs Impu
ons, I tell them, that I am not for taking away any Hel
the Underſtanding, in the Attainment of Knowledge;
if Men skill'd in, and us'd to Syllogiſms, find them aſſi
to their Reaſon in the Diſcovery of Truth, I think
ought to make Uſe of them. All that I aim at, is,
they ſhould not aſcribe more to theſe Forms, than belon
them; and think, that Men have no Uſe, or not ſo fu
Uſe of their reaſoning Faculty, without them. Some
want Spectacles to ſee Things clearly and diſtinctly; bu
not thoſe that uſe them therefore ſay no Body can ſee cl
without them: Thoſe who do ſo, will be thought in Fa
with Art (which perhaps they are beholding to) a littl
much to depreſs and diſcredit Nature. Reaſon, by
own Penetration, where it is ſtrong and exercis'd, uſuall
quicker and clearer without Syllogiſm. If Uſe of thoſe
ctacles has ſo dimn'd its Sight, that it cannot without t
ſee Conſequences or Inconſequences in Argumentation,
not ſo unreaſonable as to be againſt the uſing them. E
one knows what beſt fits his own Sight; but let him
thence conclude all in the Dark, who uſe not juſt the
Helps that he finds a need of.

Helps little in Demonſtration, leſs in Probability.

§. 5. But however it be in Knowled
think I may truly ſay it is of *far* leſs,
Uſe at all *in Probabilities*. For the Aſſent
being to be determin'd by the Prepondera
after a due weighing of all the Proofs,
all Circumſtances on both Sides, nothi
ſo unfit to aſſiſt the Mind in that, as Syllogiſm; w
running away with one aſſum'd Probability, or one to
Argument, purſues that 'till it has led the Mind quite
of Sight of the Thing under Conſideration; and forci
upon ſome remote Difficulty, holds it faſt there inta
perhaps, and as it were manacl'd in the Chain of Syllog
without allowing it the Liberty, much leſs affording i
Helps requiſite to ſhew on which Side, all Things conſid
is the greater Probability.

§. 5.

§. 6. But let it help us (as perhaps may be aid) in convincing Men of their Errors and Mistakes; (and yet I would fain see the Man hat was forc'd out of his Opinion by Dint f *Syllogism*) yet still it fails our *Reason* in that art which, if not its highest Perfection, is et certainly its hardest Task, and that which e most need its Help in; and that is, *the finding out of roofs, and making new Discoveries.* The Rules of *Syllogism* erve not to furnish the Mind with those intermediate *Ideas*, hat may shew the Connexion of remote ones. This Way of easoning discovers no new Proofs, but is the Art of marshalling and ranging the old ones we have already. The 7th Proposition of the first Book of *Euclid*, is very true; ut the Discovery of it, I think, not owing to any Rules f common Logick. A Man knows first, and then he is able to prove Sylogistically: So that *Syllogism* comes after nowledge, and then a Man has little or no need of it. But is chiefly by the finding out those *Ideas* that shew the Connexion of distant ones, that our Stock of Knowledge is increas'd, and that useful Arts and Sciences are advanc'd. *Syllogism*, at best, is but the Art of fencing with the little nowledge we have, without making any Addition to it; nd if a Man should employ his Reason all this Way, he ill not do much otherwise than he who having got some on out of the Bowels of the Earth, should have it beaten o all into Swords, and put it into his Servants Hands to nce with, and bang one another. Had the King of *Spain* nploy'd the Hands of his People, and his *Spanish* Iron so, had brought to Light but little of that Treasure that lay long hid in the dark Entrails of *America*. And I am apt think, that he who shall employ all the Force of his Reason only in brandishing of *Syllogisms*, will discover very litt of that Mass of Knowledge which lies yet conceal'd in the cret Recesses of Nature; and which, I am apt to think, itive rustick Reason (as it formerly has done) is likelier to en a Way to, and add to the common Stock of Mankind, ther than any Scholastick Proceeding by the strict Rules of ode and Figure.

Serves not to increase our Knowledge, but fence with it.

§. 7. I doubt not, nevertheless, but there are ays to be found to assist our Reason in this ost useful Part; and this the judicious *ooker* encourages me to say, who in his *Eccl.*

Other Helps should be sought.

Pol.

Pol. l. 1. §. 6. ſpeaks thus: *If there might be added the ri Helps of true Art and Learning, (which Helps, I muſt plainly c feſs, this Age of the World carrying the Name of a learn'd A doth neither much know, nor generally regard) there would i doubtedly be almoſt as much Difference in Maturity of Judgme between Men therewith inur'd, and that which now Men are, between Men that are now, and Innocents.* I do not pretend have found or diſcover'd here any of thoſe *right Helps of A* this greas Man of deep Thought mentions: But this is plai that *Syllogiſm*, and the Logick now in Uſe, which were well known in his Days, can be none of thoſe he means. is ſufficient for me, if by a Diſcourſe perhaps ſomething o of the Way, I am ſure as to me wholly new and unborrow' I ſhall have given Occaſion to others to caſt about for ne Diſcoveries, and to ſeek in their own Thoughts for the *right Helps of Art* which will ſcarce be found, I fear, i thoſe who ſervilely confine themſelves to the Rules and D ctates of others: For beaten Tracts lead theſe ſort of Ca tel, (as an obſerving *Roman* calls them) whoſe Thoughts rea only to Imitation, *non quo eundem eſt, ſed quo itur.* But I ca be bold to ſay, that this Age is adorn'd with ſome Men that Strength of Judgment, and Largeneſs of Comprehenſio that if they would employ their Thoughts on this Subjec could open new and undiſcover'd Ways to the Advanceme of Knowledge.

We reaſon about Particulars.

§. 8. Having here had an Occaſion to ſpea of *Syllogiſm* in general, and the Uſe of it, Reaſoning, and the Improvement of o Knowledge, 'tis fit, before I leave this Subjec to take Notice of one manifeſt Miſtake in t Rules of *Syllogiſm*; *viz.* That no Syllogiſtical Reaſoning ca be right and concluſive, but what has, at leaſt, one gener Propoſition in it. As if we could not *reaſon*, and ha Knowledge *about Particulars*. Whereas, in Truth, the Ma ter rightly conſider'd, the immediate Object of all our Re ſoning and Knowledge, is nothing but Particulars. Eve Man's Reaſoning and Knowledge, is only about the *Ide* exiſting in his own Mind, which are truly, every one them, particular Exiſtences; and our Knowledge and Reaſo ing about other Things, is only as they correſpond wi thoſe our particular *Ideas*. So that the Perception of the greement or Diſagreement of our particular *Ideas*, is t whole and utmoſt of all our Knowledge. Univerſality

ut accidental to it, and conſiſts only in this, That the par-
cular *Ideas* about which it is, are ſuch, as more than one
articular Thing can correſpond with, and be repreſented by.
ut the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of a-
y two *Ideas*, and conſequently, our Knowledge is equally
lear and certain, whether either, or both, or neither of thoſe
leas be capable of repreſenting more real Beings than one,
r no. One Thing more I crave leave to offer about Syllo-
iſm, before I leave it, *viz.* May one not upon juſt Ground
nquire whether the Form Syllogiſm now has, is that which
i Reaſon it ought to have? For the *Medius Terminus* being
) join the Extreams, *i. e.* the intermediate *Ideas* by its In-
rvention, to ſhew the Agreement or Diſagreement of the
vo in Queſtion, would not the Poſition of the *Medius Ter-*
inus be more natural, and ſhew the Agreement or Diſa-
eement of the Extreams clearer and better, if it were plac'd
i the Middle between them? Which might be eaſily done
/ tranſpoſing the Propoſitions, and making the *Medius*
erminus the Predicate of the firſt, and the Subject of the
cond. As thus,

Omnis Homo eſt Animal,
Omne Animal eſt vivens,
Ergo omnis Homo eſt vivens.

Omne Corpus eſt extenſum & ſolidum,
Nullum extenſum & ſolidum eſt pura extenſio,
Ergo corpus non eſt pura extenſio.

I need not trouble my Reader with Inſtances in *Syllogiſms*,
hoſe Concluſions are particular. The ſame Reaſon holds
r the ſame Form in them, as well as in the general.

§. 9. *Reaſon*, tho' it penetrates into the
epths of the Sea and Earth, elevates our
houghts as high as the Stars, and leads us
ro' the vaſt Spaces, and large Rooms of this
ighty Fabrick, yet it comes far ſhort of the
ıl Extent of even corporeal Being; and there are many
ſtances wherein it *fails us:* As,

First, It perfectly fails us, *where our* Ideas *fail.* It neither
es, nor can extend it ſelf farther than they do. And there-
re where-ever we have no *Ideas*, our Reaſoning ſtops, and
: are at an End of our Reckoning: And if at any Time

First, Reaſon fails us for want of Ideas.

we reason about Words, which do not stand for any *Ide* 'tis only about those Sounds, and nothing else.

Secondly, Because of obscure and imperfect Ideas.

§. 10. *Secondly*, Our Reason is often puzzl and at a Loss, *because of the Obscurity, Conf sion, or Imperfection of the* Ideas *it is employ'd bout*; and there we are involv'd in Difficulti and Contradictions. Thus, not having a perfect *Idea* of the least Extension of Matt nor of Infinity, we are at a Loss about the Divisibility Matter; but having perfect, clear, and distinct *Ideas* of Nu ber, our Reason meets with none of those inextricable D ficulties in Numbers, nor finds it self involv'd in any Co tradictions about them. Thus we having but imperfect *deas* of the Operations of our Minds, and of the Beginni of Motion or Thought how the Mind produces either of the in us, and much imperfecter yet, of the Operation of GO run into great Difficulties about free created Agents, whi Reason cannot well extricate it self out of.

Thirdly, For want of intermediate Ideas.

§. 11. *Thirdly*, Our Reason is often at Stand, *because it perceives not those* Ideas, *wh could serve to shew the certain or probable Agre ment, or Disagreement of any two other* Idea And in this some Mens Faculties far out- others. 'Till *Algebra*, that great Instrume and Instance of human Sagacity, was discover'd, Men, wi Amazement, look'd on several of the Demonstrations of a cient Mathematicians, and could scarce forbear to think t finding several of those Proofs to be something more tha human.

Fourthly, Because of wrong Principles.

§. 12. *Fourthly*, The Mind *by proceeding up false Principles*, is often engag'd in Absurditi and Difficulties, brought into Straits and Co tradictions, without knowing how to free self: And in that Case it is in vain to in plore the Help of Reason, unless it be to di cover the Falshood, and reject the Influence of those wron Principles. Reason is so far from clearing the Difficulti which the Building upon false Foundations brings a Ma into, that if he will pursue it, it entangles him the mor and engages him deeper in Perplexities.

§. 13. *Fifthly*

§. 13. *Fifthly*, As obscure and imperfect *Ideas* often involve our Reason, so, upon the same Ground, do *dubious Words*, and uncertain Signs, *often*, in Discourses and Arguings, when not warily attended to, *puzzle Mens Reasons* and bring them to a *Nonplus*: But these two latter are our Fault, and not the Fault of Reason. But yet the Consequences of them are nevertheless obvious; and the Perplexities or Errors they fill Mens Minds with, are every where observable.

Fifthly, Because of doubtful Terms.

§. 14. Some of the *Ideas* that are in the Mind, are so there, that they can be by themselves, immediately compar'd one with another: And in these, the Mind is able to perceive, that they agree, or disagree, as clearly as that it has them. Thus the Mind perceives, that an Arch of a Circle, is less than the whole Circle, as clearly as it does the *Idea* of a Circle: And this therefore, as has been said, I call *intuitive Knowledge*, which is certain, beyond all Doubt, and needs no Probation, nor can have any; this being the highest of all human Certainty. In this consists the Evidence of all those *Maxims* which no Body has any Doubt about, but every Man (does not, as is said, only to assent to, but) knows to be true, as soon as ever they are propos'd to his Understanding. In the Discovery of, and Assent to these Truths, there is no Use of the discursive Faculty, *no need of Reasoning*, but they are known by a superior, and higher Degree of Evidence. And such, if I may guess at Things unknown, I am apt to think, that Angels have now, and the Spirits of just Men made perfect, shall have, in a future State, of thousands of Things, which now, either wholly escape our Apprehensions, or which our short-sighted Reason having got some faint Glimpse of, we, in the dark, grope after.

Our highest Degree of Knowledge, is intuitive, without Reasoning.

§. 15. But though we have here and there a little of this clear Light, some Sparks of bright Knowledge; yet the greatest Part of our *Ideas* are such, that we cannot discern their Agreement, or Disagreement, by an immediate Comparing them. And in all these we have *Need of Reasoning*, and must, by Discourse and Inference, make our Discoveries. Now, of these there are two Sorts, which I shall take the Liberty to mention here again.

The next is Demonstration by Reasoning.

First, Those whose Agreement or Disagreement, thou it cannot be seen by an immediate putting them togethe yet may be examin'd by the Intervention of other *Ideas*, whic can be compar'd with them. In this Case, when the Agre ment or Disagreement of the intermediate *Idea*, on both sid with those which we would compare, is plainly discern'd there it amounts to Demonstration, whereby Knowledge produc'd, which, though it be certain, yet it is not so eas nor altogether so clear, as *intuitive Knowledge*; because i that there is barely one simple Intuition, wherein there is n Room for any the least Mistake or Doubt; the Truth is seen a perfectly at once. In Demonstration, 'tis true, there is Intu ition too, but not altogether at once, for there must be Remembrance of the Intuition of the Agreement of th *Medium*, or intermediate *Idea*, with that we compar'd with before, when we compare it with the other; an where there be many *Mediums*, there the Danger of th Mistake is the greater. For each Agreement or Disagre ment of the *Ideas* must be observ'd and seen in each Step o the whole Train, and retain'd in the Memory, just as it i and the Mind must be sure that no Part of what is necessar to make up the Demonstration, is omitted or over-look'd. Th makes some Demonstration long and perplex'd, and too har for those who have not Strength of Parts distinctly to perceiv and exactly carry so many Particulars orderly in their Head And even those, who are able to master such intricate Specu lations, are fain sometimes to go over them again, and the is need of more than one Review before they can arrive Certainty. But yet where the Mind clearly retains the In tuition it had of the Agreement of any *Idea* with anothe and that with a third, and that with a fourth, *&c.* the the Agreement of the first and the fourth is a Demonstration and produces certain Knowledge, which may be call'd *Rat onal Knowledge*, as the other is *Intuitive*.

To supply the Narrowness of this, we have nothing but Judgment upon probable Reasoning.

§. 16. *Secondly*, There are other *Ideas*, who Agreement, or Disagreement, can no othe wise be judg'd of, but by the Intervention others, which have not a certain Agreme with the Extreams, but an usual or likely on And in these it is, that the *Judgment* is proper exercis'd, which is the acquiescing of th Mind, that any *Ideas* do agree, by comparin them with such probable *Mediums*. Thi though it never amounts to Knowledge, no, not to that whic

the lowest Degree of it; yet sometimes the intermediate *Ideas* tie the Extreams so firmly together, and the Probability so clear and strong, that Assent as necessarily follows it, Knowledge does Demonstration. The great Excellency d Use of the Judgment, is to observe right, and take a ue Estimate of the Force and Weight of each Probability; d then casting them up all right together, chuse that side ich has the Over-ballance.

§. 17. *Intuitive Knowledge* is the Perception the certain Agreement, or Disagreement two *Ideas*, immediately compar'd toge- r. *Intuition, Demonstration, Judgment.*

Rational Knowledge is the Perception of the certain Agreent or Disagreement of any two *Ideas*, by the Intervenn of one or more other *Ideas*.

Judgment is the thinking or taking two *Ideas* to agree or agree by the Intervention of one or more *Ideas*, whose tain Agreement or Disagreement with them it does not ceive, but hath observ'd to be frequent and usual.

§. 18. Though the deducing one Propositn from another, or making *Inferences in rds*, be a great Part of Reason, and that ich it is usually employ'd about; yet the ncipal Act of Ratiocination is the finding Agreement or Disagreement of two *Ideas* with another, by the Intervention of a d. As a Man, by a Yard, finds two Houses to be of the e Length, which could not be brought together to mea- their Equality by *juxta-position*; Words have their nsequences, as the Signs of such *Ideas*: And Things e, or disagree, as really they are; but we observe it ony our *Ideas*. *Consequences of Words, and Consequences of Ideas.*

§. 19. Before we quit this Subject, it may be th our while a little to reflect on *four Sorts Arguments*, that Men in their Reasonings h others do ordinarily make Use of, to pre- on their Assent; or at least so to awe n, as to silence their Opposition. *Four Sorts of Arguments. First*, Ad Verecundiam.

First, The first is, to alledge the Opinions of Men, whose s, Learning, Effeminacy, Power, or some other Cause, has d a Name, and settl'd their Reputation in the common em with some Kind of Authority. When Men are esta- d in any Kind of Dignity, 'tis thought a Breach of

Modesty for others to derogate any Way from it, and qu
stion the Authority of Men, who are in Possession of it. This
apt to be censur'd, as carrying with it too much of Pride, wh
a Man does not readily yield to the Determination of a
prov'd Authors, which is wont to be receiv'd with Resp
and Submission by others; and 'tis look'd upon as Insolen
for a Man to set up, and adhere to his own Opinion,
gainst the current Stream of Antiquity, or to put in the B
lance against that of some learned Doctor, or otherwise a
prov'd Writer. Whoever backs his Tenets with such A
thorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the Cause, and
ready to stile it Impudence in any one who shall stand o
against them. This I think may be call'd *Argumentum*
Verecundiam.

Secondly, Ad Ignorantiam.

§. 20. *Secondly*, Another Way that Men
dinarily use to drive others, and force them
submit their Judgments, and receive the
pinion in Debate, is to require the Adversa
to admit what they alledge as a Proof, or to assign a bett
And this I call *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam.*

Thirdly, Ad Hominem.

§. 21. *Thirdly*, A third Way is to press a M
with Consequences drawn from his own Pri
ciples or Concessions. This is already know
under the Name of *Argumentum ad Hominem*

Fourthly, Ad Judicium.

§. 22. *Fourthly*, The fourth is the using
Proofs drawn from any of the Foundations
Knowledge or Probability. This I call *Arg*
mentum ad Judicium. This alone of all the fo
brings true Instruction with it, and advances us in
Way to Knowledge. For 1. It argues not another Man's
pinion to be right, because I ought of Respect, or any ot
Consideration, but that of Conviction, will not contrad
him. 2. It proves not another Man to be in the right W
nor that I ought to take the same with him, because I kn
not a better. 3. Nor does it follow, that another Man is
the right Way, because he has shewn me that I am in
wrong. I may be modest, and therefore not oppose anot
Man's Perswasion; I may be ignorant, and not be able to p
duce a better; I may be in an Error, and another may sh
me that I am so. This may dispose me perhaps for the R
ception of Truth, but helps me not to it; that must co
from Proofs and Arguments, and Light arising from the N
ture of Things themselves, and not from my Shamefacedne
Ignorance, or Error. §. 23. I

§. 23. By what has been before said of *Rea-*
n, we may be able to make some Guess at
he Distinction of Things, into those that are
ccording to, above, and contrary to Reason.
According to Reason are such Propositions,
hose Truth we can discover, by examining
nd tracing those *Ideas* we have from *Sensation*
n, and by natural Deduction find to be true or probable.
Above Reason are such Propositions, whose Truth or Proba-
ility we cannot by Reason derive from those Principles. 3.
ntrary to Reason are such Propositions, as are inconsistent
ith, or irreconcileable to our clear and distinct *Ideas*. Thus
e Existence of one GOD, is according to Reason; the Ex-
tence of more than one GOD, contrary to Reason; the
esurrection of the Dead, above Reason. Farther, as *above*
eason may be taken in a double Sense, *viz.* either as signify-
g above Probability, or above Certainty, so in that large
nse also *contrary to Reason* is, I suppose, sometimes taken.

Above, contrary, and according to Reason.

§. 24. There is another Use of the Word
eason, wherein it is *oppos'd to Faith*; which,
ough it be in it self a very improper Way of
eaking, yet common Use has so authoriz'd
that it would be Folly either to oppose or
pe to remedy it; only I think it may not be amiss to take
otice, that however *Faith* be oppos'd to Reason, *Faith* is
thing but a firm Assent of the Mind; which if it be regu-
ed, as is our Duty, cannot be afforded to any Thing, but
on good Reason, and so cannot be opposite to it. He that
lieves, without having any Reason for believing, may be
Love with his own Fancies; but neither seeks Truth as he
ght, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker, who would
ve him use those discerning Faculties he has given him,
keep him out of Mistake and Error. He that does not this
the best of his Power, however he sometimes lights on
uth, is in the right but by Chance; and I know not whe-
r the Luckiness of the Accident will excuse the Irregula-
y of his Proceeding. This at least is certain, that he must
accountable for whatever Mistakes he runs into; where-
he that makes Use of the Light and Faculties GOD has
en him, and seeks sincerely to discover Truth, by those
lps and Abilities he has, may have this Satisfaction in do-
; his Duty as a rational Creature, that though he should
ss Truth, he will not miss the Reward of it: For he go-

Reason and Faith not opposite.

verns his Assent right, and places it as he should, who in any Case or Matter whatsoever, believes or disbelieves according as Reason directs him. He that does otherwise, transgresses against his own Light, and misuses those Faculties which were given him to no other End, but to search and follow the clearer Evidence, and greater Probability. But since Reason and Faith are by some Men oppos'd, we will so consider them in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Province.

Necessary to know their Boundaries.

§. 1. IT has been above shewn, 1. That we are of Necessity ignorant, and want Knowledge of all Sorts, where we want *Ideas*. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational Knowledge, where we want Proofs. 3. That we want general Knowledge and Certainty, as far as we want clear and determin'd specifick *Ideas*. 4. That we want Probability to direct our Assent in Matters where we have neither Knowledge of our own, nor Testimony of other Men to bottom our Reason upon.

From these Things thus premis'd, I think we may come to lay down the Measures and *Boundaries between Faith and Reason*; the Want whereof may possibly have been the Cause if not of great Disorders, yet at least of great Disputes, and perhaps Mistakes in the World: For 'till it be resolv'd how far we are to be guided by Reason, and how far by Faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavour to convince one another in Matters of Religion.

Faith and Reason what as contradistinguish'd.

§. 2. I find every Sect, as far as Reason will help them, make Use of it gladly; and when it fails them, they cry out, *'Tis Matter of Faith and above Reason.* And I do not see how any can argue with any one, or ever convince a Gain-sayer, who makes Use of the same Plea, without setting down strict Boundaries between *Faith* and *Reason*, which ought to be the first Point establish'd in all Questions, where *Faith* has any Thing to do.

Reason

Reason therefore here, as contradistinguish'd to *Faith*, I take to be the Discovery of the Certainty or Probability of such Propositions or Truths, which the Mind arrives at by Deduction made from such *Ideas* which it has got by the Use of its natural Faculties, *viz.* by Sensation or Reflexion.

Faith, on the other Side, is the Assent to any Proposition, not thus made out by the Deductions of Reason, but upon the Credit of the Proposer, as coming from GOD in some extraordinary Way of Communication. This Way of discovering Truths to Men, we call *Revelation.*

§. 3. *First*, Then I say, that *no Man inspir'd by GOD, can by any Revelation communicate to others any new simple Ideas* which they had not before from Sensation or Reflexion: For whatever Impressions he himself may have from the immediate Hand of GOD, this Revelation, if it be of new simple *Ideas*, cannot be conveyed to another, either by Words, or any other Signs; because Words, by their immediate Operation on us, cause no other *Ideas* but of their natural Sounds; and 'tis by the Custom of using them for Signs, that they excite and revive in our Minds latent *Ideas*; but yet only such *Ideas* as were there before. For Words seen or heard recal to our Thoughts those *Ideas* only, which to us they have been wont to be Signs of; but cannot introduce any perfectly new, and formerly unknown simple *Ideas.* The same holds in all other Signs, which cannot signify to us Things of which we have before never had any *Idea* at all.

No new simple Idea *can be convey'd by traditional Revelation.*

Thus whatever Things were discover'd to St. *Paul* when he was rapp'd up into the third Heaven, whatever new *Ideas* his Mind there receiv'd, all the Description he can make to others of that Place, is only this, that there are such Things as *Eye hath not seen, nor Ear heard, nor hath it enter'd into the Heart of Man to conceive.* And supposing GOD should discover to any one, supernaturally, a Species of Creatures inhabiting, for Example, *Jupiter* or *Saturn*, (for that it is impossible there may be such, no Body can deny) which had six Senses, and imprint on his Mind the *Ideas* convey'd to theirs by that sixth Sense, he could no more, by Words, produce in the Minds of other Men those *Ideas*, imprinted by that sixth Sense, than one of us could convey the *Idea* of any Colour by the Sounds of Words into a Man, who having the other four Senses perfect, had always totally wanted the fifth

of

of Seeing. For our simple *Ideas* then, which are the Foun dation, and sole Matter of all our Notions and Knowledg we must depend wholly on our Reason, I mean, our natura Faculties, and can by no Means receive them, or any o them, from *traditional Revelation*; I say, *traditional Revelat on*, in Distinction to *original Revelation*. By the one I mea that first Impression which is made immediately by GOD on the Mind of any Man, to which we cannot set any Bound and by the other, those Impressions deliver'd over to othe in Words, and the ordinary Ways of conveying our Conce tions one to another.

Traditional Revelation may make us know Propositions knowable also by Reason, but not with the same Certainty that Reason doth.

§. 4. *Secondly*, I say, that *the same Truths m be discover'd, and convey'd down from Revelatio which are discoverable to us by Reason*, and b those *Ideas* we naturally may have. So GO might, by Revelation, discover the Truth of ny Proposition in *Euclid*; as well as Men, b the natural Use of their Faculties, come t make the Discovery themselves. In all Thing of this Kind, there is little Need or Use of Re velation, GOD having furnish'd us with na tural, and surer Means to arrive at the Know ledge of them. For whatsoever Truth we com to the clear Discovery of, from the Knowledge and Conten plation of our own *Ideas*, will always be certainer to us, tha those which are convey'd to us by *traditional Revelation*: Fo the Knowledge we have that this *Revelation* came at fir from GOD, can never be so sure as the Knowledge we hav from the clear and distinct Perception of the Agreement o Disagreement of our own *Ideas*, *v. g.* if it were reveal' some Ages since, that the three Angles of a Triangle were e qual to two right ones, I might assent to the Truth of tha Proposition, upon the Credit of the Tradition, that it wa reveal'd: But that would never amount to so great a Ce tainty as the Knowledge of it, upon the comparing and mea suring my own *Ideas* of two right Angles, and the three An gles of a Triangle. The like holds in Matter of Fact, know ably by our Senses, *v. g.* the History of the Deluge is con vey'd to us by Writings, which had their Original from Re velation; and yet no Body, I think, will say he has as ce tain and clear a Knowledge of the Flood, as *Noah* that sa it; or that he himself would have had, had he then been a live, and seen it. For he has no greater an Assurance, tha

tha

that of his Senses, that it is writ in the Book suppos'd writ by *Moses* inspir'd; but he has not so great an Assurance that *Moses* writ that Book, as if he had seen *Moses* write it. So that the Assurance of its being a Revelation, is less still than the Assurance of his Senses.

Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear Evidence of Reason.

§. 5. In Propositions then, whose Certainty is built upon the clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our *Ideas* attain'd either by immediate Intuition, ai in self-evident Propositions, or by evident Deductions of Reason in Demonstrations, we need not the Assistance of *Revelation*, as necessary to gain our Assent, and introduce them into our Minds; because the natural Ways of Knowledge could settle them there, or had done it already, which is the greatest Assurance we can possibly have of any Thing, unless where GOD immediately reveals it to us; and there too our Assurance can be no greater than our Knowledge is, that it is a *Revelation* from GOD. But yet nothing I think can, under that Title, shake or over-rule plain Knowledge, or rationally prevail with any Man to admit it for true, in a direct Contradiction to the clear Evidence of his own Understanding: For since no Evidence of our Faculties by which we receive such *Revelations*, can exceed, if equal the Certainty of our intuitive Knowledge, we can never receive for a Truth any Thing, that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct Knowledge, *v. g.* the *Ideas* of one Body and one Place do so clearly agree, and the Mind has so evident a Perception of their Agreement, that we can never assent to a Proposition that affirms the same Body to be in two distant Places at once, however it should pretend to the Authority of a divine *Revelation*, since the Evidence, *First*, That we deceive not our selves in ascribing it to GOD. *Secondly*, That we understand it right, can never be so great, as the Evidence of our own intuitive Knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for the same Body to be in two Places at once. And therefore *no Proposition can be receiv'd for divine Revelation*, or obtain the Assent due to all such, *if it be contradictory to our clear and intuitive Knowledge*, because this would be to subvert the Principles and Foundations of all Knowledge, Evidence, and Assent whatsoever; and there would be left no Difference between Truth and Falshood, no Measures of credible and incredible in the World, if doubtful Propositions shall take Place before self-evi-

evident; and what we certainly know, give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. In Propositions therefore contrary to the clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our *Ideas*, 'twill be in vain to urge them as Matters of *Faith*. They cannot move our Assent under that, or any other Title whatsoever: For *Faith* can never convince us of any Thing, that contradicts our Knowledge, because, tho' *Faith* be founded on the Testimony of GOD, (who cannot lye) revealing any Proposition to us yet we cannot have an Assurance of the Truth of its being a divine Revelation, greater than our own Knowledge; since the whole Strength of the Certainty depends upon our Knowledge, that GOD reveal'd it, which, in this Case, where the Proposition suppos'd reveal'd contradicts our Knowledge or Reason, will always have this Objection hanging to it, *(viz.)* that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from GOD, the bountiful Author of our Being, which, if receiv'd for true, must overturn all the Principles and Foundations of Knowledge he has given us; render all our Faculties useless; wholly destroy the most excellent Part of his Workmanship, our Understandings; and put a Man in a Condition, wherein he will have less Light, less Conduct, than the Beast that perisheth. For if the Mind of Man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not so clear) Evidence of any Thing to be a divine *Revelation*, as it has of the Principles of its own Reason, it can never have a Ground to quit the clear Evidence of its Reason, to give Place to a Proposition, whose *Revelation* has not a greater Evidence than those Principles have.

Traditional Revelation much less.

§. 6. Thus far a Man has Use of Reason and ought to hearken to it, even in immediate and original *Revelation*, where it is supposed to be made to himself: But to all those who pretend not to immediate *Revelation*, but are requir'd to pay Obedience, and to receive the Truths reveal'd to others, which, by the Tradition of Writings, or Word of Mouth, are convey'd down to them, Reason has a great deal more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive them. For Matter of Faith being only divine Revelation and nothing else, *Faith* (as we use the Word call'd commonly *divine Faith*) has to do with no Propositions, but those which are suppos'd to be divinely reveal'd. So that I do not see how those, who make Revelation alone the sole

Object

Object of *Faith*, can say, that it is a Matter of *Faith*, and not of *Reason*, to believe, that such or such a Proposition, to be found in such or such a Book, is of divine Inspiration; unless it be reveal'd, that that Proposition, or all in that Book, was communicated by divine Inspiration. Without such a *Revelation*, the believing or not believing that Proposition, or Book, to be of divine Authority, can never be Matter of *Faith*, but Matter of Reason; and such, as I must come to an Assent to, only by the Use of my Reason, which can never require or enable me to believe that, which is contrary to it self: It being impossibe for Reason ever to procure any Assent to that, which to it self appears unreasonable.

In all Things therefore, where we have clear Evidence from our *Ideas*, and those Principles of Knowledge I have abovemention'd, *Reason* is the proper Judge; and *Revelation*, tho' it may, in consenting with it, confirm its Dictates, yet cannot in such Cases invalidate its Decrees: *Nor can we be oblig'd, where we have the clear and evident Sentence of Reason, to quit it, for the contrary Opinion, under a Pretence that it is Matter of Faith*; which can have no Authority against the plain and clear Dictates of *Reason*.

Things above Reason.

§. 7. But *Thirdly*, There being many things, wherein we have very imperfect Notions, or none at all; and other Things, of those past, present, or future Existence, by the natural Use of our Faculties, we can have no Knowledge at all; these, as being beyond the Discovery of our natural Faculties, and above *Reason*, are, when reveal'd, *the proper Matter of Faith*. Thus that Part of the Angels rebell'd against GOD, and thereby lost their first happy State; and that the Dead shall rise, and live again: These, and the like, being beyond the Discovery of *Reason*, are purely Matters of *Faith*; with which *Reason* has, directly, nothing to do.

Or not contrary to Reason, if reveal'd, are Matter of Faith.

§. 8. But since GOD in giving us the Light of *Reason* has not thereby ty'd up his own Hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the Light of *Revelation* in any of those Matters, wherein our natural Faculties are able to give a probable Determination, *Revelation*, where God has been pleas'd to give it, *must carry it, against the probable Conjectures of Reason*; because the Mind not being

ing

ing certain of the Truth of that it does not evidently kno but only yielding to the Probability that appears in it, bound to give up its Assent to such a Testimony, which, is satisfy'd, come from one who cannot err, and will n deceive. But yet it stills belongs to *Reason*, to judge of t Truth of its being a Revelation, and of the Signification the Words wherein it is deliver'd. Indeed, if any Thi shall be thought *Revelation*, which is contrary to the pla Principles of Reason, and the evident Knowledge the Mi has of its own clear and distinct *Ideas*, there *Reason* must hearken'd to, as to a Matter within its Province. Since Man can never have so certain a Knowledge, that a Propo tion, which contradicts the clear Principles and Eviden of his own Knowledge, was divinely reveal'd, or that understands the Words rightly, wherein it is deliver'd, as has, that the contrary is true, and so is bound to consid and judge of it, as a Matter of Reason, and not swallow without Examination, as a Matter of *Faith*.

Revelation, in Matters where Reason cannot judge, or but probably, ought to be hearken'd to.

§. 9. *First*, Whatever Proposition is reveal of whose Truth our Mind, by its natural F culties and Notions, cannot judge, that purely *Matter of Faith*, and above Reason.

Secondly, All Propositions, whereof t Mind, by the Use of its natural Faculties, c come to determine and judge, from natural acquir'd *Ideas*, are *Matter of Reason*; with th Difference still, that in those, concerning which it has b an uncertain Evidence, and so is perswaded of their Trut only upon probable Grounds, which still admit a Possibili of the contrary to be true, without doing Violence to t certain Evidence of its own Knowledge, and overturning t Principles of all Reason, in such probable Propositions, say, an evident *Revelation* ought to determine our Assent ven against Probability. For where the Principles of Reas have not evidenc'd a Proposition to be certainly true falsc, there clear *Revelation*, as another Principle of Trut and Ground of Assent, may determine; and so it may Matter of *Faith*, and be also above *Reason*, because *Reaso* in that particular Matter, being able to reach no high than Probability, *Faith* gave the Determination where *Reas* came short; and *Revelation* discover'd on which side t Truth lay.

§. 10. Th

§. 10. Thus far the Dominion of *Faith* reaches, and that without any Violence, or Hindrance to *Reason*; which is not injur'd, or disturb'd, but assisted and improv'd, by new Discoveries of Truth, coming from the eternal Fountain of all Knowledge. Whatever God hath reveal'd, is certainly true; no Doubt can be made of it. This is the proper Object of *Faith*: But whether it be a divine Revelation, or no, *Reason* must judge; which can never permit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to entertain Probability in Opposition to Knowledge and Certainty. There can be no Evidence, that any traditional Revelation is of divine Original, in the Words we receive it, and in the Sense we understand it, so clear, and so certain, as that of the Principles of Reason: And therefore, *nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent with the clear and self-evident Dictates of Reason, has a Right to be urg'd, or assented to, as a Matter of Faith, wherein Reason hath nothing to do.* Whatsoever divine *Revelation*, ought to over-rule all our Opinions, Prejudices, and Interests, and hath a Right to be receiv'd with full Assent: Such a Submission as this of our *Reason* to *Faith*, takes not away the Land-marks of Knowledge: This takes not the Foundations of Reason, but leaves us that Use of our Faculties, for which they were given us.

In Matters where Reason can afford certain Knowledge that is to be hearken'd to.

§. 11. *If the Provinces of Faith and Reason are kept distinct by these Boundaries*, there will, in Matter of Religion, be no Room for *Reason* at all; and those extravagant Opinions and Ceremonies, that are to be found in the several Religions of the World, will not deserve to be blam'd. For to this crying up of *Faith*, in Opposition to *Reason*, we may, I think, in good Measure, ascribe those Absurdities that almost all the Religions which possess and divide Mankind. For Men having been principl'd with an Opinion, that they must not consult *Reason* in the Things of Religion, however apparently contradictory to common Sense, and the very Principles of all their Knowledge, have let loose their Fancies, and natural Superstition; and have been, by them, led into so strange Opinions, and extravagant Practices in Religion, that a considerate Man cannot but stand amaz'd at their Follies, and judge them

If the Boundaries be not set between Faith and Reason, no Enthusiasm, or Extravagancy in Religion, can be contradicted.

them so far from being acceptable to the great and wi
GOD, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous, an
offensive to a sober good Man. So that, in Effect, Religio
which should most distinguish us from Beasts, and ough
most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational Creatures, abo
Brutes, is that wherein Men often appear most irrationa
and more senseless than Beasts themselves. *Credo, quia in
possibile est: I believe, because it is impossible*, might, in a goo
Man, pass for a Sally of Zeal; but would prove a very i
Rule for Men to chuse their Opinions, or Religion by.

CHAP. IXX.

Of Enthusiasm.

Love of Truth necessary.

§. 1. HE that would seriously set upo the Search of Truth, ought in t first Place to prepare his Mind with a Love it: For he that loves it not, will not ta much Pains to get it, nor be much concern'd when misses it. There is no Body in the Common-wealth Learning, who does not profess himself a Lover of Truth And there is not a rational Creature that would not take amiss to be thought otherwise of. And yet for all this o may truly say, there are very few Lovers of Truth for Truth Sake, even amongst those who perswade themselves that th are so. How a Man may know whether he be so in earne is worth Enquiry: And I think there is this one unerri Mark of it, *viz.* The not entertaining any Proposition wi greater Assurance than the Proofs it is built upon will wa rant. Whoever goes beyond this Measure of Assent, plain, receives not Truth in the Love of it; loves not Tru for Truth's Sake, but for some other By-End. For the vidence that any Proposition is true, (except such as are se evident) lying only in the Proofs a Man has of it, what ever Degrees of Assent he affords it beyond the Degrees that Evidence, 'tis plain all that Surplusage of Assurance owing to some other Affection, and not to the Love Truth: It being as impossible, that the Love of Truth shou carry my Assent above the Evidence, that there is to m th

hat it is true, as that the Love of Truth should make me ssent to any Proposition, for the Sake of that Evidence, hich it has not, that it is true; which is, in Effect, to love as a Truth, because it is possible or probable that it may ot be true. In any Truth that gets not Possession of our minds by the irresistible Light of Self-evidence, or by the orce of Demonstration, the Arguments that gain it Assent, re the Vouches and Gage of its Probability to us; and we an receive it for no other than such as they deliver it to ur Understandings. Whatsoever Credit or Authority we ive to any Proposition more than it receives from the Prinples and Proofs it supports it self upon, is owing to our nclinations that Way, and is so far a Derogation from the ove of Truth, as such: Which, as it can receive no Evidence rom our Passions or Interests, so it should receive no Tinture from them.

§. 2. The assuming an Authority of dictaing to others, and a Forwardness to prescribe their Opinions, is a constant Concomitant f this Byas and Corruption of our Judgents: For how almost can it be otherwise, ut that he should be ready to impose on others Belief, who as already impos'd on his own? Who can reasonably exect Arguments and Conviction from him, in dealing with thers, whose Understanding is not accustom'd to them in is dealing with himself? Who does Violence to his own aculties, tyrannizes over his own Mind, and usurps the rerogative that belongs to Truth alone, which is to command ssent by only its own Authority, *i. e.* by and in Proporon to that Evidence which it carries with it.

A Forwardness to dictate from whence.

§. 3. Upon this Occasion, I shall take the iberty to consider a third Ground of Assent, hich, with some Men, has the same Authoty, and is as confidently rely'd on as either *aith* or *Reason*; I mean *Enthusiasm*. Which, laying by Reaon, would set up Revelation without it: Whereby in Effect it takes away both Reason and Revelation, and substiutes, in the Room of it, the ungrounded Fancies of a Man's wn Brain, and assumes them for a Foundation, both of Onion and Conduct.

Force of Enthusiasm.

§. 4. *Reason* is natural *Revelation*, whereby e eternal Father of Light, and Fountain of l Knowledge, communicates to Mankind that ortion of Truth which he has laid within the

Reason and Revelation.

Reach of their natural Faculties. *Revelation* is natural *Reason* enlarg'd by a new Set of Discoveries communicated by GOD immediately, which *Reason* vouches the Truth of, by the Testimony and Proofs it gives, that they come from GOD. So that he that takes away *Reason*, to make Way for *Revelation*, puts out the Light of both: And does much what the same, as if he would perswad a Man to put out his Eyes, the better to receive the remote Light of an invisible Star, by a Telescope.

Rise of Enthusiasm.

§. 5. Immediate *Revelation* being a much easier Way for Men to establish their Opinions, and regulate their Conduct, than the tedious, and not always successful Labour of strict Reasoning, it is no Wonder that some have been very apt to pretend to Revelation, and to perswade themselves, that they are under the peculiar Guidance of Heaven in their Actions and Opinions, especially in those of them which they cannot account for by the ordinary Methods of Knowledge and Principles of Reason. Hence we see, that in all Ages, Men in whom Melancholly has mix'd with Devotion or whose Conceit of themselves has rais'd them into an Opinion of a greater Familiarity with GOD, and a nearer Admittance to his Favour, than is afforded to others, have often flatter'd themselves with a Perswasion of an immediate Intercourse with the Deity, and frequent Communications from the divine Spirit. GOD, I own, cannot be deny'd to be able to enlighten the Understanding by a Ray darted into the Mind immediately from the Fountain of Light. That they understand he has promis'd to do, and who then has so good a Title to expect it, as those who are his peculiar People, chosen by him, and depending on him?

Enthusiasm.

§. 6. Their Minds being thus prepar'd, whatever groundless Opinion comes to settle it self strongly upon their Fancies, is an Illumination from the Spirit of GOD, and presently of divine Authority. And whatsoever odd Action they find in themselves a strong Inclination to do, that Impulse is concluded to be a Call or Direction from Heaven, and must be obey'd; 'tis a Commission from above, and they cannot err in executing it.

§. 7. This I take to be properly Enthusiasm, which though founded neither on Reason, nor divine Revelation, but arising from the Conceits of a warm'd or over-weening Brain, works yet, where it once gets footing, more powerfully on

the Perswasions and Actions of Men, than either of those two, or both together: Men being most forwardly obedient to the Impulses they receive from themselves; and the whole Man is sure to act more vigorously, where the whole Man is carry'd by a natural Motion. For strong Conceit, like a new Principle, carries all easily with it; when got above common Sense, and freed from all Restraint of Reason, and Check of Reflexion, it is heighten'd into a divine Authority, in Concurrence with our own Temper and Inclination.

Enthusiasm mistaken for Seeing and Feeling.

§. 8. Though the odd Opinions and extravagant Actions *Enthusiasm* has run Men into, were enough to warn them against this wrong Principle so apt to misguide them both in their Belief and Conduct; yet the Love of something extraordinay, the Ease and Glory it is to be inspir'd and be above the common and natural Ways of Knowledge, so flatters many Mens Laziness, Ignorance, and Vanity, that when once they are got into this Way of immediate Revelation, of Illumination without Search, and of Certainty without Proof, and without Examination, 'tis a hard Matter to get them out of it. Reason is lost upon them; they are above it: They see the Light infus'd into their Understandings, and cannot be mistaken; 'tis clear and visible there; like the Light of bright Sun-shine, shews it self, and needs no other Proof, but its own Evidence; they feel the Hand of GOD moving them within, and the Impulses of the Spirit, and cannot be mistaken in what they feel. Thus they support themselves, and are sure Reason hath nothing to do with what they see and feel in themselves; what they have a sensible Experience of, admits no Doubt, needs no Probation. Would he not be ridiculous, who should require to have it prov'd to him, that the Light shines, and that he sees it? It is its own Proof, and can have no other. When the Spirit brings Light into our Minds, it dispels Darkness. We see it, as we do that of the Sun at Noon, and need not the Twilight of Reason to shew it us. This Light from Heaven is strong, clear, and pure; carries its own Demonstration with it; and we may as rationally take a Glow-worm to assist us to discover the Sun, as to examine the celestial Ray by our dim Candle, Reason.

§. 9. This is the way of talking of these Men; they are sure, because they are sure; and their Perswasions are right, only because they are strong in them. For, when what they say is

ſtripp'd of the Metaphor of ſeeing and feeling, this is all i amounts to; and yet theſe Similes ſo impoſe on them, tha they ſerve them, for Certainty in themſelves, and Demon ſtration to others.

Enthuſiaſm, how to be diſcover'd.

But to examine a little ſoberly this interna Light, and this Feeling on which they buil ſo much. Theſe Men have, they ſay, clea Light, and they ſee: They have an awaken' Senſe, and they feel: This cannot, they ar ſure, be diſputed them. For when a Man ſays he ſees o he feels, no Body can deny it him, that he does ſo. Bu here let me ask: This Seeing, is it the Perception of th Truth of the Propoſition, or of this, that it is a Revelatio from God? This Feeling, is it a Perception of an Inclinati on or Fancy to do Something, or of the Sprit of God mo ving that Inclination? Theſe are two very different Percep tions, and muſt be carefully diſtinguiſh'd, if we would no impoſe upon our ſelves. I may perceive the Truth of a Pro poſition, and yet not perceive that is an immediate Revela tion from God. I may perceive the Truth of a Propoſitio in *Euclid*, without its being, or my perceiving it to be a Re velation: Nay, I may perceive I came not by this Know ledge in a natural Way, and ſo may conclude it reveal'd without perceiving that it is a Revelation from God; becauſ there be Spirits which, without being divinely commiſſion'd may excite thoſe *Ideas* in me, and lay them in ſuch Orde before my Mind, that I may perceive their Connexion. S that the Knowledge of any Propoſition coming into m Mind, I know not how, is not a Perception that it is fron God. Much leſs is a ſtrong Perſwaſion, that it is true, Perception that it is from God, or ſo much as true. Bu however it be call'd Light and Seeing, I ſuppoſe, it is at moſ but Belief and Aſſurance; and the Propoſition taken for Revelation, is not ſuch as they know to be true, but tak to be true. For where a Propoſition is known to be true Revelation is needleſs: And it is hard to conceive how there can be a Revelation to any one of what he knows al ready. If therefore it be a Propoſition which they are per ſwaded, but do not know, to be true, whatever they may call it, it is not Seeing, but Believing. For theſe are two Ways, whereby Truth comes into the Mind, wholly diſtinct ſo that one is not the other. What I ſee I know to be ſ by the Evidence of the Thing it ſelf; what I believe, I tak

to be so upon the Testimony of another: But this Testimony I must know to be given, or else what Ground have I of of Believing? I must see that it is God that reveals this to me, or else I see nothing. The Question then here is, How do I know that God is the Revealer of this to me; that this Impression is made upon my Mind by his holy Spirit, and that therefore I ought to obey it? If I know not this, how great soever the Assurance is, that I am possess'd with, it is groundless; whatever Light I pretend to, it is but an *Enthusiasm*. For whether the Proposition suppos'd to be reveal'd, be in it self evidently true, or visibly probable, or by the natural Ways of Knowledge uncertain, the Proposition that must be well grounded, and manifested to be true, is this, that God is the Revealer of it, and that what I take to be a Revelation, is certainly put into my Mind by him, and is not an Illusion, drop'd in by some other Spirit, or rais'd by my own Fancy. For if I mistake not, these Men receive it for true, because they presume God reveal'd it. Does it not then stand them upon, to examine upon what Grounds they presume it to be a Revelation from God? Or else all their Confidence is meer Presumption; and this Light they are so dazl'd with, is nothing but an *ignis fatuus*, that leads them continually round in this Circle. *It is a Revelation, because they firmly believe it*; and *they believe it, because it is a Revelation.*

Enthusiasm fails of Evidence, that the Proposition is from God.

§. 11. In all that is of divine *Revelation*, there is need of no other Proof, but that it is an Inspiration from God: For he can neither deceive, nor be deceiv'd. But how shall it be known, that any Proposition in our Minds, is a Truth infus'd by God; a Truth that is reveal'd to us by him, which he declares to us, and therefore we ought to believe? Here it is that *Enthusiasm* fails of the Evidence it pretends to. For Men thus possess'd, boast of a Light whereby, they say, they are enlighten'd, and brought into the Knowledge of this or that Truth. But if they know it to be a Truth, they must know it to be so either by its own Self-evidence to natural Reason, or by the rational Proofs that make it ought to be so. If they see and know it to be a Truth either of these two Ways, they in vain suppose it to be a Revelation. For they know it to be true by the same Way that any other Man naturally may know that it is so, without the Help of Revelation. For thus all

the Truths, of what kind soever, that Men uninspir'd an enlighten'd with, came into their Minds, and are establish'd there. If they say they know it to be true, because it is *Revelation* from God, the Reason is good: But then it will be demanded, how they know it to be a *Revelation* from God? If they say by the Light it brings with it, which shines bright in their Minds, and they cannot resist; I beseech them to consider, whether this be any more than what we have taken Notice of already, *viz.* that it is a *Revelation*, because they strongly believe it to be true. For all the Light they speak of, is but a strong, tho' ungrounded Persuasion of their own Minds, that it is a Truth. For rational Grounds from Proofs that it is a Truth they must acknowledge to have none, for then it is not receiv'd as a *Revelation*, but upon the ordinary Grounds, that other Truths are receiv'd. And if they belief it to be true, because it is a *Revelation*, and have no other Reason for its being a *Revelation*, but because they are fully perswaded, without any other Reason, that it is true, they believe it to be a *Revelation* only because they strongly believe it to be a *Revelation*, which is a very unsafe Ground to proceed on, either in our Tenets, or Actions. And what readier Way can there be to run our selves into the most extravagant Errors and Miscarriages, than thus to set up Fancy for our supream and sole Guide, and to believe any Proposition to be true, any Action to be right, only because we believe it to be so? The Strength of our Persuasions are no Evidence at all of their own Rectitude: Crooked Things may be as stiff and unflexible as streight; and Men may be as positive and peremptory in Error as in Truth. How come else the untractable Zealots in different and opposite Parties? For if the Light, which every one thinks he has in his Mind, which in this Case is nothing but the Strength of his own Perswasion, be an Evidence that it is from God, contrary Opinions may have the same Title to be Inspirations; and God will be not only the Father of Lights but of opposite and contradictory Lights, leading Men contrary Ways; and contradictory Propositions will be divine Truths, if an ungrounded Strength of Assurance be an Evidence that any Proposition is a divine Revelation.

Firmness of Perswasion, no Proof that a Right.

§. 12. This cannot be otherwise, whilst Firmness of Perswasion is made the Cause of Believing, and Confidence of being in the Right, is made an Argument of Truth. St.

Paul

Paul himself believ'd he did well, and that he had a Call to it, when he persecuted the Christians, whom he confidently thought in the Wrong: But yet it was he, and not they, who were mistaken. Good Men are Men still liable to Mistakes, and are sometimes warmly engag'd in Errors, which they take for divine Truths, shining in their Minds with the clearest Light. *ny Propositio^n is from God.*

§. 13. Light, true Light in the Mind, is, or can be nothing else but the Evidence of the Truth of any Proposition; and if it be not a self-evident Proposition, all the Light it has, or can have, is from the Clearness and Validity of those Proofs upon which it is receiv'd. To talk of any other Light in the Understanding, is to put our selves in the Dark, or in the Power of the Prince of Darkness, and, by our own Consent, to give our selves up to Delusion, to believe a Lie: For if Strength of Perswasion be the Light which must guide us, I ask how shall any one distinguish between the Delusions of Satan, and the Inspirations of the Holy Ghost? He can transform himself into an Angel of Light. And they who are led by this Son of the Morning, are as fully satisfy'd of the Illumination, *i. e.* are as strongly perswaded that they are enlighten'd by the Spirit of God, as any one who is so: They acquiesce and rejoyce in it, are acted by it; and no Body can be more sure, nor more in the Right, (if their own strong Belief may be Judge) than they. *Light in the Mind, what.*

§. 14. He therefore that will not give himself up to all the Extravagancies of Delusion and Error, must bring this Guide of his *Light within* to the Tryal. God, when he makes the Prophet, does not unmake the Man: He leaves all his Faculties in their natural State, to enable him to judge of his Inspirations, whether they be of divine Original or no. When he illuminates the Mind with supernatural Light, he does not extinguish that which is natural. If he would have us assent to the Truth of any Proposition, he either evidences that Truth by the usual Methods of natural Reason, or else makes it known to be a Truth, which he would have us assent to, by his Authority, and convinces us that it is from him, by some Marks which Reason cannot be mistaken in. *Reason* must be our last Judge and Guide in every Thing. I do not mean, that we must consult Reason, and examine whether a Proposition reveal'd from God, *Revelation must be judg'd of by Reason.*

can be made out by natural Principles; and if it cannot, th then we may reject it: But consult it we must, and by examine whether it be a *Revelation* from God or no: An if *Reason* finds it to be reveal'd from God, *Reason* then d clares for it, as much as for any other Truth, and makes one of her Dictates. Every Conceit that throughly warm our Fancies, must pass for an Inspiration, if there be no thing but the Strength of our Perswasions, whereby to judg of our Perswasions. If *Reason* must not examine their Trut by something extrinsical to the Perswasions themselves; In spirations and Delusions, Truth and Falshood, will have th same Measure, and will not be possible to be distinguish'd.

Belief no Proof of Revelation.

§. 15. If this internal Light, or any Propo sition, which under that Title we take for in spir'd, be conformable to the Principles of Rea son, or to the Word of God, which is attested Revelation, *Reason* warrants it, and we ma safely receive it for true, and be guided by it in our Belie and Actions: If it receive no Testimony nor Evidence fro either of these Rules, we cannot take it for a *Revelation*, o so much as for true, 'till we have some other Mark that it i a *Revelation*, besides our believing that it is so. Thus we se the holy Men of Old, who had *Revelations* from God, ha something else besides that internal Light of Assurance i their own Minds, to testify to them that it was from God They were not left to their own Perswasions alone, that thos Perswasions were from God, but had outward Signs to con vince them of the Author of those Revelations. And whe they were to convince others, they had a Power given them to justify the Truth of their Commission from Heaven; and by visible Signs to assert the divine Authority of a Messag they were sent with. *Moses* saw the Bush burn without be ing consum'd, and heard a Voice out of it. This was some thing besides finding an Impulse upon his Mind to go t *Pharaoh*, that he might bring his Brethren out of *Egypt*; and yet he thought not this enough to authorize him to go with that Message, 'till God, by another Miracle of his Rod turn'd into a Serpent, had assur'd him of a Power to testify his Mis sion by the same Miracle repeated before them whom he was sent to. *Gideon* was sent by an Angel to deliver *Israel* from the *Mideanites*, and yet he desir'd a Sign to convince him that this Commission was from God. These, and several the like Instances to be found among the Prophets of Old, are e-

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ough to shew, that they thought not an inward Seeing or Perwasion of their own Minds, without any other Proof, a sufficient vidence that it was from *God*, tho' the Scripture does not evey where mention their demanding or having such Proofs.

§. 16. In what I have said, I am far from denying that God can, or doth sometimes enlighten Mens Minds in the pprehending of certain Truths, or excite them to good Actins, by the immediate Influence and Assistance of the holy pirit, without any extraordinary Signs accompanying it. ut in such Cases too we have Reason and the Scripture, unerng Rules to know whether it be from God or no. Where he Truth embrac'd is consonant to the *Revelation* in the writn Word of God, or the Action conformable the Dictates of ght *Reason*, or holy Writ, we may be assur'd that we run o Risk in entertaining it as such, because though perhaps it e not an immediate Revelation from God, extraordinarily perating on our Minds, yet we are sure it is warranted by hat Revelation which he has given us of Truth. But it is ot the Strength of our private Perswasion within our selves, hat can warrant it to be a Light or Motion from Heaven; othing can do that, but the written Word of God without s, or that Standard of Reason which is common to us with l Men. Where Reason or Scripture is expres for any Opiion or Action, we may receive it as of divine Authority; ut 'tis not the Strength of our own Perswasions which can y self give it that Stamp. The Bent of our Minds may favour it as much as we please; that may shew it to be a Fondng of our own, but will by no Means prove it to be an fspring of Heaven, and of divine Original.

CHAP. XX.

Of wrong Assent, or Error.

1. KNowledge being to be had only of visible certain Truth, *Error* is not a ault of our Knowledge, but a Mistake of our dgment giving Assent to that which is not true. *Causes of Error.*

But if Assent be grounded on Likelihood, if the proper Obct and Motive of our Assent, be Probability, and that Probbility consists in what is laid down in the foregoing hapters, it will be demanded how Men come to give their Assents

Assents contrary to Probability? For there is nothing mo common, than Contrariety of Opinions; nothing more ob vious, than that one Man wholly disbelieves what another c ly doubts of, and a third stedfastly believes, and firmly adher to. The Reasons whereof, though they may be very variou yet, I suppose, may be all reduc'd to these four.

1. *Want of Proofs.*
2. *Want of Ability to use them.*
3. *Want of Will to use them.*
4. *Wrong Measures of Probability.*

First, Want of Proofs.

§. 2. *First*, By *Want of Proofs*. I do n mean only the Want of those Proofs which a no where extant, and so are no where to had; but the Want even of those Proofs whi are in Being, or might be procur'd. And thus Men wa Proofs, who have not the Convenience or Opportunity make Experiments and Observations themselves, tending the Proof of any Proposition; nor likewise the Convenien to enquire into, and collect the Testimonies of others: A in this State are the greatest Part of Mankind, who are giv up to Labour, and enslav'd to the Necessity of their me Condition, whose Lives are worn out only in the Provisio for Living. These Mens Opportunity of Knowledge and E quiry, are commonly as narrow as their Fortunes, and th Understandings are but little instructed, when all their whc Time and Pains is laid out to still the Croaking of their ov Bellies, or the Cries of their Children. 'Tis not to be expe ed, that a Man who drudges on, all his Life, in a laborio Trade, should be more knowing in the Variety of Thin done in the World, than a Pack-horse, who is driven co stantly forwards and backwards in a narrow Lane, and di Road, only to Market, should be skill'd in the Geography the Country. Nor is it at all more possible, that he w wants Leisure, Books, and Languages, and the Opportuni of conversing with Variety of Men, should be in a Condi on to collect those Testimonies and Observations which are Being, and are necessary to make out many, nay, most of t Propositions, that, in the Societies of Men, are judg'd of t greatest Moment; or to find out Grounds of Assurance great, as the Belief of the Points he would build on them, thought necessary. So that a great Part of Mankind are, by natural and unalterable State of Things in this World, a the Constitution of human Affairs, unavoidably given o

invincible Ignorance of those Proofs on which others build, nd which are necessary to establish those Opinions; the great- t Part of Men having much to do to get the Means of Li- ing, are not in a Condition to look after those of learned nd laborious Enquiries.

§. 3. What shall we say then? Are the reatest Part of Mankind, by the Necessity of eir Condition, subjected to unavoidable Ig- orance in those Things which are of great- t Importance to them? (for of those 'tis obvi- us to enquire.) Have the Bulk of Mankind o other Guide, but Accident and blind Chance, to conduct em to their Happiness or Misery? Are the current Opinions, nd licens'd Guides of every Country, sufficient Evidence and ecurity to every Man, to venture his greatest Concernments n, nay, his everlasting Happiness or Misery? Or can those e the certain and infallible Oracles and Standards of Truth, hich teach one Thing in *Christendom*, and another in *Tur- y*? Or shall a poor Country-man be eternally happy, for aving the Chance to be born in *Italy*; or a Day-Labourer e unavoidably lost, because he had the ill Luck to be born *England*? How ready some Men may be to say some of ese Things, I will not here examine; but this I am sure, at Men must allow one or other of these to be true, (let em chuse which they please) or else grant, that God has rnish'd Men with Faculties sufficient to direct them in the Way they should take, if they will but seriously employ 'em at Way, when their ordinary Vocations allow them the eisure. No Man is so wholly taken up with the Atten- nce on the Means of Living, as to have no spare Time at l to think of his Soul, and inform himself in Matters of eligion. Were Men as intent upon this, as they are on hings of lower Concernment, there are none so enslav'd to e Necessities of Life, who might not find many Vacancies at might be husbanded to this Advantage of their Knowledge.

Obj. *What shall become of these who want them, answer'd.*

§. 4. Besides those whose Improvements and nformations are straiten'd by the Narrowness their Fortunes, there are others, whose Large- ss of Fortune would plentifully enough sup- y Books, and other Requisites for clearing of oubts, and discovering of Truth; but they are *coop'd in* close *the Laws of* their Countries, and the strict Guards of those hose Interest it is to keep them ignorant, lest, knowing more, they

People hin- der'd from Enquiry.

they should believe the less in them. These are as far, nay, f ther *from the Liberty and Opportunities of a fair Enquiry*, than th poor and wretched Labourers we before spoke of; and, how ver they may seem high and great, are confin'd to Narrown of Thought, and enslav'd in that which should be the fre Part of Man, their Understandings. This is general the Case of all those who live in Places where Care is tak to propagate Truth without Knowledge, where Men a forc'd, at a Venture, to be of the Religion of the Counti and must therefore swallow down Opinions, as silly Peo do Empiricks Pills, without knowing what they are ma of, or how they will work, and have nothing to do, but b lieve that they will do the Cure; but in this, are much mo miserable than they, in that they are not at Liberty to refu swallowing what perhaps they had rather let alone, or to cho the Physician to whose Conduct they would trust themselve

Secondly, Want of Skill to use them.

§. 5. *Secondly*, Those who *want Skill to u those Evidences they have* of Probabilities, wh cannot carry a Train of Consequences in the Heads, nor weigh exactly the Preponderan of contrary Proofs and Testimonies, makin every Circumstance its due Allowance, may be easily misl to assent to Positions that are not probable. There are son Men of one, some but of to Syllogisms, and no more; an others that can but advance one Step farther. These cann always discern that Side on which the strongest Proofs s cannot constantly follow that which in it self is the more pr bable Opinion. Now, that there is such a Difference b tween Men, in Respect of their Understandings, I think n Body, who has had any Conversation with his Neighbour will question; though he never was at *Westminster-hall*, or th *Exchange* on the one Hand, nor at *Alms-houses*, or *Bedlam* o the other: Which great Difference in Mens Intellectual whether it rises from any Defect in the Organs of the Bod particularly adapted to Thinking; or in the Dulness or Un tractableness of those Faculties, for want of Use; or, as som think, in the natural Differences of Mens Souls themselves; t some, or all of these together, it matters not here to examine Only this is evident, that there is a Difference of Degrees i Mens Understandings, Apprehensions, and Reasonings, to s great a Latitude, that one may, without doing Injury to Man kind, affirm, that there is a greater Distance between som Men and others, in this Respect, than between some Me

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d some Beasts. But how this comes about, is a Speculati-, though of great Consequence, yet not necessary to our esent Purpose.

§. 6. *Thirdly*, There are another Sort of Peo- that *want Proofs*, not because they are out their Reach, but *because they will not use them*; no, though they have Riches and Leisure e- ugh, and want neither Parts nor other Helps, yet never the better for them. Their hot Pursuit of Plea- re, or constant Drudgery in Business, engages some Mens oughts elsewhere; Laziness and Oscitancy in general, or a rticular Aversion for Books, Study, and Meditation, keep ers from any serious Thoughts at all; and some out of ar, that an impartial Enquiry would not favour those O- nions which best suit their Prejudices, Lives, and Designs, ntent themselves without Examination, to take upon Trust hat they find convenient, and in Fashion. Thus most Men, en of those that might do otherwise, pass their Lives with- t an Acquaintance with, much less a rational Assent to obabilities they are concern'd to know, tho' they lie so ich within their View, that to be convinc'd of them, they ed but turn their Eyes that Way. But we know some Men ll not read a Letter, which is suppos'd to bring ill News; d many Men forbear to cast up their Accompts, or so much think upon their Estates, who have Reason to fear their fairs are in no very good Posture. How Men, whose plenti- Fortunes allow them Leisure to improve their Understand- s, can satisfy themselves with a lazy Ignorance, I cannot ; but methinks they have a low Opinion of their Souls, o lay out all their Incomes in Provisions for the Body, employ none of it to procure the Means and Helps of owledge, who take great Care to appear always in a neat splendid Outside, and would think themselves miserable coarse Cloths, or a patch'd Coat, and yet contentedly suf- their Minds to appear Abroad in a pie-bald Livery of rse Patches, and borrow'd Shreds, such as it has pleas'd ance, or their Country-Taylor, (I mean the common O- ion of those they have convers'd with) to cloath them in. will not here mention how unreasonable this is for Men t ever think of a future State, and their Concernment in which no rational Man can avoid to do sometimes; nor ll I take Notice what a Shame and Confusion it is, to the test Contemners of Knowledge, to be found ignorant

Thirdly, Want of Will to use them.

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in Things they are concern'd to know. But this, at leas is worth the Consideration of those who call themselve Gentlemen, That however they may think Credit, Respec Power, and Authority the Concomitants of their Birth an Fortune, yet they will find all these still carry'd away fro them by Men of lower Condition, who surpass them i Knowledge. They who are blind, will always be led b those that see, or else fall into the Ditch: And he is certain ly the most subjected, the most enslav'd, who is so in h Understanding. In the fore-going Instances, some of th Causes have been shewn of wrong Assent, and how it com to pass, that probable Doctrines are not always receiv'd wit an Assent proportionable to the Reasons which are to be ha for their Probability: But hitherto we have consider'd onl such Probabilities, whose Proofs do exist, but do not appe to him that embraces the Error.

Fourthly, Wrong Measures of Probability, whereof.

§. 7. *Fourthly*, There remains yet the la Sort, who, even where the real Probabiliti appear, and are plainly laid before them, c not admit of the Conviction, nor yield unt manifest Reasons, but do either ἐπέχειν, su pend their Assent, or give it to the less probab Opinion. And to this Danger are those e pos'd, who have taken up *wrong Measures of Probability*, whi are,

1. *Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evide but doubtful and false, taken up for Principles.*
2. *Receiv'd Hypotheses.*
3. *Predominant Passions, or Inclinations.*
4. *Authority.*

First, Doubtful Propositions taken for Principles.

§. 8. *First*, The first and firmest Ground Probability, is the Conformity any Thi has to our own Konwledge; especially th Part of our Knowledge which we have e brac'd, and continue to look on as Prin ples. These have so great an Influence upon our Opinio that 'tis usually by them we judge of Truth, and measu Probability to that Degree, that what is inconsistent wi our *Principles*, is so far from passing for probable with that it will not be allow'd possible. The Reverence bo to these *Principles*, is so great, and their Authority so pa mount to all other, that the Testimony not only of otl Men, but the Evidence of our own Senses are often rejec

wh

hen they offer to vouch any Thing contrary to these esta-ish'd Rules. How much the Doctrine of innate *Principles*, d that *Principles* are not to be prov'd or question'd, has ntributed to this, I will nor here examine. This I readi-grant, that one Truth cannot contradict another; but ithal, I take Leave also to say, that every one ought very refully to beware what he admits for a *Principle*, to examine strictly, and see whether he certainly knows it to be true it self by its own Evidence, or whether he does only with ssurance believe it to be so upon the Authority of others: or he hath a strong Byas put into his Understanding, which ill unavoidably misguide his Assent, who hath imbib'd *ong Principles*, and has blindly given himself up to the Au-ority of any Opinion in it self not evidently true.

§. 9. There is nothing more ordinary, than that *Children* ould receive into their Minds Propositions (especially a-ut Matters of Religion) from their Parents, Nurses, or ose about them; which being insinuated into their unwa-, as well as unbyas'd Understandings, and fasten'd by De-ees, are at last (equally, whether true or false) riveted ere, by long Custom and Education, beyond all Possibility being pull'd out again. For Men, when they are grown , reflecting upon their Opinions, and finding those of is Sort to be as ancient in their Minds as their very Me-ories, not having observ'd their early Insinuation, nor by hat Means they got them, they are apt to reverence them as cred Things, and not to suffer them to be prophan'd, touch'd, question'd: They look on them as the *Urim* and *Thummim* t up in their Minds immediately by GOD himself, to be e great and unerring Deciders of Truth and Falshood, and e Judges to which they are to appeal in all manner of ntroversies.

§. 10. This Opinion of his *Principles* (let them be what ey will) being *once establish'd in any one's Mind*, it is easy be imagin'd, what Reception any Proportion shall find, w clearly soever prov'd, that shall invalidate their Autho-y, or at all thwart with these internal Oracles: Whereas, e grossest Absurdities and Improbabilities, being but agree-le to such Principles, go down glibly, and are easily di-sted. The great Obstinacy that is to be found in Men firm-believing quite contrary Opinions, though many times ually absurd in the various Religions of Mankind, are as ident a Proof, as they are an unavoidable Consequence of this

this Way of Reasoning from receiv'd traditional Principles. So that Men will disbelieve their own Eyes, renounce the Evidence of their Senses, and give their own Experience the Lie, rather than admit of any Thing disagreeing with these sacred Tenets. Take an intelligent *Romanist*, that from the very first Dawning of any Notions in his Understanding, hath had this Principle constantly inculcated, *viz.* That he must believe as the Church (*i. e.* those of his Communion) believes, or that the Pope is infallible; and this he never so much as heard question'd, 'till at forty or fifty Years old he met with one of other Principles: How is he prepar'd easily to swallow, not only against all Probability, but even the clear Evidence of his Senses, the Doctrine of *Transubstantiation*? This Principle has such an Influence on his Mind that he will believe that to be Flesh, which he sees to be Bread. And what Way will you take to convince a Man of any improbable Opinion he holds, who, with some Philosophers, hath laid down this as Foundation of a Reasoning That he must believe his Reason (for so Men improperly call Arguments drawn from their Principles) against their Senses. Let an *Enthusiast* be principl'd that he or his Teacher is inspir'd, and acted by an immediate Communication of the divine Spirit, and you in vain bring the Evidence of clear Reasons against his Doctrine. Whoever therefore have imbib'd wrong *Principles*, are not, in Things inconsistent with these Principles, to be mov'd by the most apparent and convincing Probabilities, 'till they are so candid and ingenuous to themselves, as to be perswaded to examine even those very *Principles*, which many never suffer themselves to do.

Secondly, Receiv'd Hypothesis.

§. 11. *Secondly*, Next to these, are Men whose Understandings are cast into a Mold, and fashion'd just to the Size of a *receiv'd Hypothesis*. The Difference between these and the former, is, that they will admit of Matter of Fact, and agree with Dissenters in that; but differ only in assigning Reasons, and explaining the Manner of Operation. These are not at that open Defiance with their Senses, as the former; they can endure to hearken to their Information a little more patiently; but will by no Means admit of their Reports, in the Explanation of Things; nor be prevail'd on by Probabilities, which would convince them, that Things are not brought about just after the same Manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are. Would it not

insufferable Thing, for a learn'd Professor, and that which s Scarlet would blush at, to have his Authority of forty ears standing, wrought out of hard Rock *Greek* and *Latin*, ith no small Expence of Time and Candle, and confirm'd general Tradition, and a reverend Beard, in an Instant er-turn'd by an upstart Novelist? Can any one expect that should be made to confess, That what he taught his Scho- s thirty Years ago, was all Error and Mistake; and that sold them hard Words and Ignorance at a very dear Rate? hat Probabilities, I say, are sufficient to prevail in such a ase? And whoever, by the most cogent Arguments, will prevail'd with to disrobe himself at once of all his old pinions, and Pretences to Knowledge and Learning, which, th hard Study, he hath all his Time been labouring for; d turn himself out stark naked in Quest a-fresh of new No- ns? All the Arguments can be us'd, will be as little able prevail, as the Wind did with the Traveller, to part with s Cloak, which he held only the faster. To this of wrong ypothesis, may be reduc'd the Errors that may be occasion'd a true Hypothesis, or right Principles, but not rightly un- rstood. There is nothing more familiar than this. The stances of Men contending for different Opinions, which ey all derive from the infallible Truth of the Scripture, are undeniable Proof of it. All that call themselves Christi- s, allow the Text that says, μετανοεῖτε, to carry in it the bligation to a very weighty Duty. But yet however erro- ous will one of their Practices be, who, understanding thing but the *French*, take this Rule with one Translation be *repentes vous*, repent; or with the other *faites Penitence*, Penance.

§. 12. *Thirdly*, Probabilities, which cross ens Appetites, and *prevailing Passions*, run the ne Fate. Let never so much Probability hang one side of a covetous Man's Reasoning, d Money on the other, and it is easy to fore- which will outweigh. Earthly Minds, like Mud-Walls, ist the strongest Batteries; and tho', perhaps, sometimes the rce of a clear Argument may make some Impression, yet ey nevertheless stand firm, keep out the Enemy Truth, that ould captivate or disturb them. Tell a Man, passionately Love, that he is jilted; bring a score of Witnesses of the lshood of his Mistress, 'tis ten to one but three kind Words hers shall invalidate all their Testimonies. *Quod volumus, facile*

Thirdly, Predominant Passions.

facile credimus; *what suits our Wishes, is forwardly believ'd*, is, I suppose, what every one hath more than once experimented and tho' Men cannot always openly gain-say, or resist th Force of manifest Probabilities, that make against them, ye yield they not to the Argument; not but that it is the Na ture of the Understanding constantly to close with the mo probable side, but yet a Man hath a Power to suspend an restrain its Enquiries, and not permit a full and satisfactor Examination, as far as the Matter in Question is capabl and will bear it to be made. Until that be done, there wi be always these *two Ways left of evading the most apparent Pr babilities.*

The Means of evading Probabilities, first, Suppos'd Fallacy.

§. 13. *First*, That the Arguments being (as fo the most part they are) brought in Words, *the may be a Fallacy latent* in them; and the Cons quences being, perhaps, many in Train, the may be some of them incoherent. There b very few Discourses are so short, clear, an consistent, to which most Men may not, with Satisfaction nough to themselves, raise this Doubt; and from who *Conviction* they may not, without Reproach of Disingenuit or Unreasonableness, set themselves free with the old Repl *Non persuadebis, etiam si persuaseris*; *tho' I cannot answer, I w not yield.*

Secondly, Suppos'd Arguments for the contrary.

§. 14. *Secondly*, Manifest Probabilities ma be evaded, and the Assent with-held upon th Suggestion, That *I know not yet all that may said on the contrary side.* And therefore, tho' be beaten, 'tis not necessary I should yiel not knowing what Forces there are in Reser behind. This is a Refuge against *Conviction*, so open and wide, that it is hard to determine, when a Man is quite o of the Verge of it.

What Probabilities determine the Assent.

§. 15. But yet there is some End of it, an a Man having carefully enquir'd into all th Grounds of Probability and Unlikeliness; do his utmost to inform himself in all Particula fairly, and cast up the Sum total on both side may in most Cases come to acknowledge, upon the who Matter, on which side the Probability rests; wherein som Proofs in Matter of Reason, being Suppositions upon univers Experience, are so cogent and clear, and some Testimonies i Matter of Fact so universal, that he cannot refuse his Assen

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o that, I think, we may conclude, that in Propositions, here tho' the Proofs in view are of most Moment, yet there re sufficient Grounds to suspect that there is either Fallacy Words, or certain Proofs, as considerable, to be produc'd the contrary side, their Assent, Suspense, or Dissent, are ten voluntary Actions: But *where* the Proofs are such as ake it highly probable, and there is not sufficient Ground suspect, that there is either Fallacy of Words, (which ber and serious Consideration may discover) nor equally lid Proofs yet undiscover'd latent on the other side, (which so the Nature of the Thing, may, in some Cases, make ain to a considerate Man) there, I think, *a Man*, who has eigh'd them, *can scarce refuse his Assent* to the side on which e greater Probability appears. Whether it be probable, that promiscuous Jumble of printing Letters should often fall to a Method and Order, which should stamp on Paper a herent Discourse; or that a blind fortuitous Concourse of toms, not guided by an understanding Agent, should frequently constitute the Bodies of any Species of Animals: these and the like Cases, I think no Body that considers em, can be one jot at a stand, which side to take, nor at waver in his Assent. *Lastly*, when there can be no Supposition, (the Thing in its own Nature indifferent, and holly depending upon the Testimony of Witnesses) that ere is as fair Testimony against, as for the Matter of Fact tested; which by Enquiry is to be learn'd, *v. g.* whether ere was 1700 Years agone such a Man at *Rome* as *Julius Cæsar*: In all such Cases, I say, I think it is not in any rational Man's Power to refuse his Assent; but that it necessary follows, and closes with such Probabilities. In other less ear Cases, I think it is in a Man's Power to suspend his ssent; and, perhaps, content himself with the Proofs he has, they favour the Opinion that suits with his Inclination or terest, and so stop from farther Search. But that a Man ould afford his Assent to that side, on which the less Probability appears to him, seems to me utterly impracticable, d as impossible, as it is to believe the same Thing probable d improbable at the same Time.

§. 16. As Knowledge is no more arbitrary in Perception; so, I think, Assent is no more in our Power than Knowledge. When e Agreement of any two *Ideas* appears to our minds, whether immediately, or by the Assistance of Rea-

Where it is in our Power to suspend it.

son, I can no more refuse to perceive, no more avoid know ing it, than I can avoid seeing those Objects which I tur my Eyes to, and look on in Day-light: And what, upo full Examination, I find the most probable, I cannot den my Assent to. But though we cannot hinder our Know ledge, where the Agreement is once perceiv'd; nor our A sent, where the Probability manifestly appears upon du Consideration of all the Measures of it; yet *we can kind both Knowledge and Assent, by stopping our Enquiry*, and n employing our Faculties in the Search of any Truth. If were not so, Ignorance, Error, or Infidelity, could not in ny Case be a Fault. Thus in some Cases we can prevei or suspend our Assent: But can a Man, vers'd in modern ancient History, doubt whether there be such a Place as *Rom* or whether there was such a Man as *Julius Cæsar?* Indee there are Millions of Truths, that a Man is not, or may n think himself concern'd to know, as whether our Kin *Richard* the Third was Crook-back'd, or no; or wheth *Roger Bacon* was a Mathematician, or a Magician. In the and such like Cases, where the Assent, one way or other, of no Importance to the Interest of any one, no Action, n Concernment of his following or depending thereon, the 'tis not strange that the Mind should give it self up to th common Opinion, or render it self to the first Comer. The and the like Opinions, are of so little Weight and Momen that, like Motes in the Sun, their Tendencies are very rar ly taken Notice of. They are there as it were by Chanc and the Mind lets them float at Liberty. But where th Mind judges that the Proposition has Concernment in it where the Assent, or not Assenting is thought to draw Con quences of Moment after it, and Good or Evil to depend o chusing or refusing the right side, and the Mind sets it sel seriously to enquire, and examine the Probability; there, think, it is not in our Choice to take which side we pleas if manifest odds appear on either. The greater Probability I think, in that Case, will determine the Assent; and a Ma can no more avoid assenting, or taking it to be true, when he perceives the greater Probability, than he can avoid know ing it to be true, where he perceives the Agreement or Dis greement of any two *Ideas*.

If this be so, the Foundation of Error will lie in wrong Measures of Probability; as the Foundation of Vice in wrong Measures of Good.

§. 17. *Fourthly*

§. 17. *Fourthly*, The fourth and last *wrong Measure of Probability* I shall take Notice of, and which keeps in Ignorance or Error more People than all the other together, is that which I have mention'd in the foregoing Chapter, I mean, the *giving up our Assent to the common receiv'd Opinions*, either of our Friends or Party, Neighbourhood or Country. How many Men have no other Ground for their Tenets, than the suppos'd Honesty, or Learning, or Number of those of the same Profession? As if honest or bookish Men could not err; or Truth were to be establish'd by the Vote of the Multitude; yet this, with most Men, serves the Turn. The Tenet has had the Attestation of reverend Antiquity; it comes to me with the Passport of former Ages, and therefore I am secure in the Reception I give it; other Men have been, and are of the same Opinion, (for that is all is said) and therefore it is reasonable for me to embrace it. A Man may more justifiably throw up Cross and Pile for his Opinions, than take them up by such Measures. All Men are liable to Error, and most Men are, in many Points, by Passion or Interest, under Temptation to it. If we could but see the secret Motives that influenc'd the Men of Name and Learning in the World, and the Leaders of Parties, we should not always find, that it was the embracing of Truth for its own Sake, that made them espouse the Doctrines they own'd and maintain'd. This at least is certain, there is not an Opinion so absur'd, which a Man may not receive upon this Ground. There is no Error to be nam'd, which has not had its Professors; and a Man shall never want crooked Paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right Way, where-ever he has the Footsteps of others to follow.

Fourthly, Authority.

§. 18. But notwithstanding the great Noise is made in the World about Errors and Opinions, I must do Mankind that Right, as to say, *There are not so many Men in Errors, and wrong Opinions, as is commonly suppos'd.* Not that I think they embrace the Truth; but indeed because concerning those Doctrines they keep such a Stir about, they have no Thought, no Opinion at all. For if any one should a little catechize the greatest Part of the Partizans of most of the Sects in the World, he would not find, concerning those Matters they are so zealous for, that they have any Opinions of their

Men not in so many Errors as is imagin'd.

their own, much less would he have Reason to think, that they took them upon the Examination of Arguments, and Appearance of Probability. They are resolv'd to stick to a Party that Education or Interest has engag'd them in; and there, like the common Soldiers of an Army, shew their Courage and Warmth as their Leaders direct, without ever examining, or so much as knowing the Cause they contend for. If a Man's Life shews that he has no serious Regard for Religion; for what Reason should we think, that he beats his Head about the Opinions of his Church, and troubles himself to examine the Grounds of this or that Doctrine? 'Tis enough for him to obey his Leaders, to have his Hand and his Tongue ready for the Support of the common Cause, and thereby approve himself to those who can give him Credit, Preferment, or Protection in that Society. Thus Men become Professors of, and Combatants for those Opinions they were never convinc'd of, nor Proselytes to; no, nor ever had so much as floating in their Heads; and though one cannot say there are fewer improbable or erroneous Opinions in the World than there are, yet this is certain, there are fewer that actually assent to them, and mistake them for Truths, than is imagin'd.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Division of the Sciences.

Three Sorts.

§. 1. ALL that can fall within the Compass of human Understanding, being either, *First*, The Nature of Things, as they are in themselves, their Relations, and their Manner of Operation: Or, *Secondly*, That which Man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary Agent, for the Attainment of any End, especially Happiness: Or, *Thirdly*, The Ways and Means whereby the Knowledge of both the one and the other of these are attain'd and communicated: I think *Science* may be divided properly into these *three Sorts*.

§. 2. *First*,

§. 2. *First*, The Knowledge of Things, as they are in their own proper Beings, their Constitutions, Properties, and Operations, whereby I mean not only Matter and Body, but Spirits also, which have their proper Natures, Constitutions, and Operations, as well as Bodies. This, in a little more enlarg'd Sense of the Word, I call φυσικὴ, or *natural Philosophy*. The End of this is bare speculative Truth, and whatsoever can afford the Mind of Man any such, falls under this Branch, whether it be God himself, Angels, Spirits, Bodies, or any of their Affections, as Number, and Figure, *&c.* *First*, Physica.

§. 3. *Secondly*, Πρακτικὴ, The Skill of right applying our own Powers and Actions, for the Attainment of Things good and useful. The most considerable under this Head, is *Ethicks*, which is the seeking out those Rules and Measures of human Actions, which lead to Happiness, and the Means to practice them. The End of this is not bare Speculation, and the Knowledge of Truth; but Right, and a Conduct suitable to it. *Secondly*, Practica.

§. 4. *Thirdly*, The third Branch may be call'd σημειωτικὴ, or the *Doctrine of Signs*, the most usual whereof being Words, it is aptly enough term'd also λογικὴ, *Logick*; the Business where- *Thirly* Σημειωτικὴ.

of is to consider the Nature of Signs the Mind makes Use of for the understanding of Things, or conveying its Knowledge to others. For since the Things the Mind contemplates are none of them, besides it self, present to the Understanding, 'tis necessary that something else, as a Sign or Representation of the Thing it considers, should be present to it: And these are *Ideas*. And because the Scene of *Ideas* that makes one Man's Thoughts, cannot be laid open to the immediate View of another, nor laid up any where but in the Memory, a no very sure Repository; therefore, to communicate our Thoughts to one another, as well as record them for our own Use, Signs of our *Ideas* are also necessary. Those which Men have found most convenient, and therefore generally make Use of, are articulate Sounds. The Consideration then of *Ideas* and *Words*, as the great Instruments of Knowledge, makes no despicable Part of their Contemplation, who would take a View of human Knowledge in the whole Extent of it. And perhaps if they were distinctly weigh'd, and duly consider'd, they would afford us another

Sort

Sort of Logick and Critick, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with.

This is the first Division of the Objects of Knowledge.

§. 5. *This* seems to me *the first and most general, as well as natural Division* of the Objects of our Understanding. For a Man can employ his Thoughts about nothing, but either the Contemplation of *Things* themselves, for the Discovery of Truth; or about the Things in his own Power, which are his own *Actions*, for the Attainment of his own Ends; or the *Signs* the Mind makes Use of both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them for its clearer Information. All which three, *viz. Things* as they are in themselves knowable; *Actions* as they depend on us, in order to Happiness; and the right Use of *Signs* in order to Knowledge, being *toto Cœlo* different, they seem'd to me to be the three great Provinces of the intellectual World wholly separate and distinct one from another.

FINIS.

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